



Selected  
Secret Documents  
from  
Soviet  
Foreign Policy  
Documents Archives

1919 to 1942

Concentrated on 1st and 2nd WW Correspondence and Meetings  
related to Turkey, Balkans and Iran  
with some additions from  
Afghanistan and India

Stalin, Molotov, Chicherin and others

Svitlana M  
Erdogan A

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**Svitlana M, Erdogan A**

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## CONTENTS

April 21, 1919, note of the people's commissioner for foreign affairs of the RSFSR to the ministry of foreign affairs of Great Britain - **P18**

August 28, 1919, from: appeal of the people's commissioner for foreign affairs of the RSFSR to the workers & peasants of Persia -**P21**

June 3, 1920, Letter from the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the RSFSR to the Chairman of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey Mustafa Kemal Pasha – **P22**

June 17, 1920, From the Report of the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the RSFSR G.V. Chicherin at a meeting of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee -**P24**

November 6, 1920, from Stalin report delivered at a celebration meeting of the Baku Soviet -**P52**

December 1920, Telegram of the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the RSFSR to a member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Caucasian Front G.K. Ordzhonikidze – **P53**

December 3, 1920, Telegram from Baku, a member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Caucasian Front to the Plenipotentiary Representative of the RSFSR in Armenia B.V. Legrand – **P54**

December 22-29, 1920, From Annual report of the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs of the RSFSR to the VIII Congress of Soviets for 1919-1920 – **P55**

January 18, 1921, Telegram of the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the RSFSR to a member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Caucasian Front G.K. Ordzhonikidze – **P61**

February 26, 1921 , the speech at the opening of the Moscow conference on the conclusion of the Soviet-Turkish treaty was delivered on February 26, 1921 by the head of the Soviet delegation G.V. Chicherin. – **P62**

March 16, 1921, treaty between Russia & Turkey, article no. 598 - **P67**

March 23, 1921, telegram of the government of the Azerbaijan SSR to the government of the grand national assembly of Turkey – **P79**

April 6, 1921, note from the representative of the people's commissariat of foreign affairs of the RSFSR in Turkey to the commissioner for foreign affairs of the government of the grand national assembly of Turkey Ahmed Mukhtar – **P81**

April 6, 1921, note of the people's commissar for foreign affairs of the RSFSR to the ambassador of Turkey to the RSFSR Ali Fuad -**P82**

April 8, 1921, note of the people's commissar for foreign affairs of the RSFSR to the ambassador of Turkey to the RSFSR Ali Fuad -**P82**

April 9, 1921, letter from the representative of the people's commissariat of foreign affairs of the RSFSR in Turkey to the chairman of the grand national assembly of Turkey Mustafa Kemal – **P77**

April 24, 1921, telegram of the government of the Azerbaijan SSR to the government of the grand national assembly of Turkey – **P85**

April 26, 1921, note of the people's commissar for foreign affairs of the RSFSR to the ambassador of Turkey to the RSFSR Ali Fuad -**P86**

May 13, 1921, note of the people's commissar for foreign affairs of the RSFSR to the ambassador of Turkey to the RSFSR Ali Fuad -**P87**

May 18, 1921, note of the people's commissar for foreign affairs of the RSFSR to the ambassador of Turkey to the RSFSR Ali Fuad -**P88**.

May 24, 1921, note of the people's commissar for foreign affairs of the RSFSR to the ambassador of Turkey to the RSFSR Ali Fuad -**P90**

May 29, 1921, note of the people's commissar for foreign affairs of the RSFSR to the ambassador of Turkey to the RSFSR Ali Fuad – **P91**

June 6, 1921, note of the people's commissar for foreign affairs of the RSFSR to the ambassador of Turkey to the RSFSR Ali Fuad – **P93**

July 21, 1921, telegram of the people's commissar for foreign affairs of the Azerbaijan SSR to the commissar for foreign affairs of the government of the GNA of Turkey Y. Kemal -**P96**

July 31, 1921, note from the people's commissar for foreign affairs of the Georgian SSR to the commissar for foreign affairs of the government of the GNA of Turkey, Yusuf Kemal.- **P98**

August 13, 1921, note of the plenipotentiary representative of the Ukrainian SSR in the RSFSR to the ambassador of Turkey in the RSFSR Ali Fuad. – **P99**

August 17, 1921, telegram of the people's commissar for foreign affairs of the Armenian SSR to the commander of the eastern front of Turkey Karabekir. – **P103**

August 20, 1921, note from the plenipotentiary representative of the RSFSR in Turkey to the commissioner for foreign affairs of the government of the grand national assembly of Turkey, Yusuf Kemal. No. 863-a – **P105**

August 20, 1921, note from the plenipotentiary representative of the RSFSR in Turkey to the commissioner for foreign affairs of the government of the grand national assembly of Turkey, Yusuf Kemal. No. 863-b – **P107**

August 24, 1921, note from the people's commissar for foreign affairs of the Armenian SSR to the commissar for foreign affairs of the government of the GNA of Turkey Yusuf Kemal. – **P109**

September 17, 1921, agreement on the repatriation of prisoners of war and civilian internees concluded between the government of the Ukrainian Soviet socialist republic and the government of the Turkish grand national assembly.- **P112**

September 18, 1921, note from the plenipotentiary representative of the RSFSR in Turkey to the commissioner for foreign affairs of the government of the grand national assembly of Turkey, Yusuf Kemal.- **P120**

September 22, 1921, note from the plenipotentiary representative of the RSFSR in Turkey to the commissioner for foreign affairs of the government of the grand national assembly of Turkey, Yusuf Kemal.- **P122**

October 3, 1921, note from the people's commissar for foreign affairs of the RSFSR to the commissar for foreign affairs of the government of the grand national assembly of Turkey Yusuf Kemal – **P124**

October 10, 1921, note of the people's commissar for foreign affairs of the RSFSR to the ambassador of Turkey to the RSFSR Ali Fuad-**P125**

October 13, 1921, the treaty of friendship between the Armenian SSR, the Azerbaijan SSR and the Georgian SSR, on the one hand, and Turkey, on the other, concluded with the participation of the RSFSR in Kars - **P135**

October 22, 1921, note from the people's commissariat of foreign affairs of the RSFSR to the governments of all countries.- **P147**

December 26, 1921, letter from the people's commissar for foreign affairs of the RSFSR to the extraordinary ambassador of the Ukrainian SSR in Turkey M.V. Frunze. – **P149**

February 15, 1922, Telegram of the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the RSFSR to the Representative of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of the RSFSR in the Transcaucasian Republics B.V. Legrand -**P152**

March 7, 1922, Telegram of the Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the RSFSR to the Plenipotentiary Representative of the RSFSR in Turkey S. I. Aralov- **P153**

November 24, 1922, note of the deputy people's commissar for foreign affairs of the RSFSR to the ambassador of Persia in the RSFSR Moshaver-ol-me-Malek – **P154**

December 17, 1922, letter from the chairman of the Russian-Ukrainian-Georgian delegation at the Lozaia conference to the deputy people's commissar for foreign affairs of the RSFSR Litvinov – **P163**

December 12, 1922, Letter from the Chairman of the Russian-Ukrainian-Georgian delegation at the Lausanne Conference to the Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the RSFSR M. M. Litvinov – **P156**

December 17, 1922, Letter from the chairman of the Russian-Ukrainian-Georgian delegation at the Louisan conference to the deputy people's commissar for foreign affairs of the RSFSR M.M. Litvinov – **P163**

December 19, 1922, letter from the chairman of the Russian-Ukrainian-Georgian delegation at the Lausanne conference to the deputy people's commissar for foreign affairs of the RSFSR Litvinov – **P167**

January 21, 1923, Letter from the Chairman of the Russian-Ukrainian-Georgian delegation at the Lausanne Conference to the Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the RSFSR M. M. Litvinov – **P171**

February 20, 1923, telegram of the deputy people's commissar for foreign affairs of the RSFSR to the consul general of the RSFSR in Tiflis Lvovich – **P118**

January 21, 1923, Letter from the Chairman of the Russian-Ukrainian-Georgian delegation at the Lausanne Conference to the Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the RSFSR M. M. Litvinov

October 5, 1933, recording of the conversation of the USSR plenipotentiary representative in Turkey with the minister of foreign affairs of Turkey – **P234**

October 17, 1923, Letter from the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR to the Official Representative of the USSR in Great Britain – **P174**

September 3, 1935, Kaganovich, Molotov to Stalin

January 28, 1937, telegram of the USSR plenipotentiary representative in Turkey Karakhan to the USSR people's commissariat of foreign affairs. – **P227**

February 1, 1937, telegram of the USSR plenipotentiary representative in Turkey Karakhan to the USSR people's commissariat of foreign affairs. – **P224**



February 10, 1937, telegram from the charge d'affaires of the USSR in Turkey to the people's commissariat of foreign affairs of the USSR -**P221**

March 3, 1937, telegram from the charge d'affaires of the USSR in Turkey to the people's commissariat of foreign affairs of the USSR. -**P219**

April 15, 1937, recording of the conversation of the USSR people's commissar for foreign affairs with the Turkish ambassador to the USSR Apaydin. – **P217**

April 25, 1937, telegram from the plenipotentiary representative of the USSR in Turkey I. M. Karakhan to the people's commissariat of foreign affairs of the USSR. – **P215**

May 14, 1937, telegram of the people's commissar for foreign affairs of the USSR to the people's commissariat for foreign affairs of the USSR, from London – **P213**

May 17, 1937, recording of the conversation of the charge d'affaires of the USSR in Turkey with and. About. Minister of foreign affairs of Turkey Saracoglu – **P209**

May 18, 1937, telegram of the plenipotentiary representative of the USSR in Romania to the people's commissariat of foreign affairs of the USSR. – **P207**

May 25, 1937, telegram of the people's commissar for foreign affairs of the USSR to the people's commissariat for foreign affairs of the USSR, from Geneva – **P205**

June 1, 1937, recording of the conversation between the USSR plenipotentiary representative in Turkey and Turkish president Ataturk. -**P203**

June 2, 1937, telegram from the plenipotentiary representative of the USSR in Turkey to the people's commissariat of foreign affairs of the USSR. – **P201**

June 11, 1937, record of the conversation between the plenipotentiary representative of the USSR in Turkey and the minister of foreign affairs of Turkey Aras. – **P199**

June 18, 1937, recording of the conversation of the USSR plenipotentiary representative in Turkey with the minister of foreign affairs of Turkey Aras and the minister of internal affairs of Turkey Shukru Kaya. - **P178**

June 30, 1937, recording of the conversation of the USSR plenipotentiary representative in Iran with the minister of foreign affairs of Turkey Aras. – **P182**

July 15-17, 1937, recording of the talks between the USSR people's commissar for foreign affairs and the Turkish foreign minister Aras. - **P192**

July 16, 1937, report of the Soviet press on the signing of the convention on the procedure for consideration and resolution of border incidents and conflicts between the USSR and Turkey. – **P194**

July 17, 1937, report of the Soviet press about the visit to the USSR of the minister of foreign affairs of Turkey Rushtu Aras and the minister of internal affairs of Turkey Shukru Kaya – **P195**

August 29, 1937, telegram of the deputy people's commissar for foreign affairs of the USSR to the plenipotentiary representatives of the USSR in France, Czechoslovakia, Turkey, Great Britain, USA, Italy, Germany, Poland, china, japan. – **P197**

September 7, 1937, telegram from the charge d'affaires of the USSR in Turkey to the people's commissariat of foreign affairs of the USSR. - **P191**

October 11, 1937, recording of the conversation of the charge d'affaires of the USSR in Turkey with and. About. Secretary general of the ministry of foreign affairs of Turkey Bata. - **P186**

October 16, 1937, telegram from the charge d'affaires of the USSR in Turkey to the people's commissariat of foreign affairs of the USSR. -**P 185**

December 14, 1937, letter from the deputy people's commissar for foreign affairs of the USSR to the charge d'affaires of the USSR in Turkey G.A Zalkind. December 14, 1937 - **P176**

March 18, 1938, telegram from the charge d'affaires of the USSR in Germany g. A. Astakhov to the people's commissariat of foreign affairs of the USSR – **P229**

April 30, 1938, telegram from the plenipotentiary representative of the USSR in Turkey A.V. Terentyev to the people's commissariat of foreign affairs of the USSR – **P230**

May 12, 1938, from telegram of the plenipotentiary representative of the USSR in Great Britain to the people's commissariat of foreign affairs of the USSR – **P231**

August 11, 1938, telegram from the plenipotentiary representative of the USSR in Turkey – **P232**

November 24, 1938, telegram of the deputy people's commissar for foreign affairs of the USSR to the people's commissariat of foreign affairs of the USSR, from Ankara – **P240**

January 18, 1939, telegram of the plenipotentiary representative of the USSR in Germany Merekalov to the people's commissariat of foreign affairs of the USSR -**P243**

January 21, 1939, from letter of the interim attorney of the USSR in Iran I. A. Kartashev to the people's commissioner for foreign affairs of the USSR m. M. Litvinov -**P245**

February 15, 1939, from letter of the interim attorney of the USSR in Iran I. A. Kartashev to the people's commissioner for foreign affairs of the USSR m. M. Litvinov

March 6, 1939, telegram of the plenipotentiary representative of the USSR in Turkey A.V. Terentyev to the people's commissariat of foreign affairs of the USSR -**P247**

April 16, 1939, recording of the conversations of the temporary attorney of the USSR in Turkey o. I. Nikitnikova with the president of Turkey I. Inonu and the minister of foreign affairs of Turkey -**P249**

April 17, 1939, telegram of the people's commissioner for foreign affairs of the USSR m. M. Litvinov to the temporary attorney in the affairs of the USSR in Turkey o. I. Nikitnikova – **P253**

April 29, 1939, recording of the conversation of the interim attorney of the USSR in Turkey o. I. Nikitnikova with the secretary general of the MFA of Turkey Menemencioglu -**P254**

May 9, 1939, recording of the conversation of the plenipotentiary representative of the USSR in Turkey a. V. Terentyev with the ambassador of Germany in Turkey Von Papen -**P249**

May 12, 1939, recording of the conversation of the plenipotentiary representative of the USSR in Turkey A.V. Terentyev with the prime minister of Turkey R. Saydam - **P262**

May 13, 1939, recording of the conversation of the deputy people's commissioner for foreign affairs of the USSR Potemkin with the ambassador of Turkey in the USSR z. Apaydin - **P263**

May 14, 1939, from the record of the conversation of the plenipotentiary representative of the USSR in Turkey Terentyev with the minister of foreign affairs of Turkey s. Saracoglu -**P265**

May 19, 1939, telegram of the plenipotentiary representative of the USSR in the Great Britain I.M. Maisky to the people's commissariat of foreign affairs of the USSR - **P267**

May 24, 1939, telegram of the plenipotentiary representative of the USSR in France Z. Suritsa to the people's commissary of foreign affairs -**P268**

July 8, 1939, g. A. Astakhov to the people's commissariat of foreign affairs of the USSR -**P269**

August 20-26, from diary of the first secretary of the official USSR representations in Germany Ivanova -**P270**

August 25, 1939, telegram of the plenipotentiary representative of the USSR in Turkey A.V. Terentyev to the people's commissioner for foreign affairs of the USSR V. M. Molotov -**P271**

September 5, 1939, telegram of the plenipotentiary representative of the USSR in Turkey A.V. Terentyev – **P273**

September 6, 1939, telegram of the plenipotentiary representative of the USSR in Germany a. A. Shkvartsev to the people's commissar for foreign affairs of the USSR v. M. Molotov – **P277**

September 23, 1939, recording of the conversation of the head of the eastern European department of the people's commissariat of foreign affairs of the USSR a. I. Lavrent'ev with the ambassador of Romania in the USSR n. Diano – **P278**

October 1939, record of the conversation of the secretary general of the cc CPSU (b) Stalin and the people's commissioner of foreign affairs of the USSR V. M. Molotov with the minister of foreign affairs of Turkey sh. Saracoglu – **P279**

October 26, 1939, telegram of the plenipotentiary representative of the USSR in Turkey A.V. Terentyev to the people's commissariat of foreign affairs of the USSR – **P292**

October 27, 1939, telegram of the plenipotentiary representative of the USSR in Turkey A.V. Terentyev to the people's commissariat of foreign affairs of the USSR – **P295**

November 6, 1939, letter of the plenipotentiary representative of the USSR in Turkey A.V. Terentyev to the people's commissioner for foreign affairs of the USSR V. M. Molotov – **P300**

November 13, 1939, record of the conversation of the people's commissioner for foreign affairs of the USSR V. M. Molotov with the ambassador of Germany in the USSR f. Schule n. Burg – **P311**

December 7, 1939, letter of the plenipotentiary representative of the USSR in Turkey A.V. Terentyev to the general secretary of the VKP (B) central committee i.v. – **P316**

December 25, 1939, telegram of the plenipotentiary representative of the USSR in Turkey A.V. Terentyev to the people's commissioner for foreign affairs of the USSR V. M. Molotov – **P327**

December 28, 1939, recording of the conversation of the people's commissioner for foreign affairs of the USSR V. M. Molotov with the ambassador of Turkey in the USSR a.kh. Aktaem – **P329**

March 4, 1940, from: conversation between the 1st counselor of the USSR embassy in Germany m. G. Tikhomirov and the representative of the German air force m. F. Kleis – **P335**

March 1940, from: conversation of the people's commissar for foreign affairs of the USSR V. M. Molotov with the ambassador of Germany in the USSR f. Schulenburg – **P336**

March 19, 1940, telegram of the plenipotentiary representative of the USSR in the Turkish republic A.V. Terentyev in the NKID of the USSR -**P337**

April 9, 1940, from : conversation of the people's commissar for foreign affairs of the USSR V. M. Molotov with the ambassador of Germany in the USSR f. Schulenburg – **P339**

April 20, 1940, telegram of the plenipotentiary representative of the USSR in Germany a. A. Shkvartsev to the people's commissar for foreign affairs of the USSR v. M. Molotov – **P340**

April 26, 1940, from the diary of the plenipotentiary representative of the USSR in Germany a. A. Shkvartsev – **P342**

June 11, 1940, telegram of the plenipotentiary representative of the USSR in the kingdom of Afghanistan k- a. Mikhailov in the NKID the USSR -**P343**

June 20, 1940, telegram of the plenipotentiary representative of the USSR in the Turkish republic A.V. Terentyev in the NKID of the USSR – **P345**

June 24, 1940, telegram of the plenipotentiary representative of the USSR in the Turkish republic a. V. Terentyev in the NKID of the USSR – **P348**

July 1940, from: conversation of the general secretary of the VKP (b.) Stalin with the ambassador of Great Britain in the USSR Cripps in the kremlin – **P351**

July 10, 1940, telegram of the attorney of the USSR in the Turkish republic s. A. Vinogradov in the NKID of the USSR – **P353**

August 9, 1940, from: conversation of the people's commissar for foreign affairs of the USSR V. M. Molotov with the ambassador of the Turkish republic in the USSR – **P355**

August 14, 1940, telegram of the plenipotentiary representative of the USSR in the kingdom of Afghanistan K. A. Mikhailov in the NKID of the USSR – **P358**

September 4, 1940, telegram of the attorney of the USSR in the Turkish republic S.A.Vinogradov to V. M. Molotov, the people's commissar of foreign affairs of the USSR -**P359**

October 12, 1940, telegram of the plenipotentiary representative of the USSR in the Turkish republic S.A. Vinogradov in the NKID of the USSR – **P361**

November 2, 1940, from: conversation of the first deputy commissioner for foreign affairs of the USSR A. Y. Vyshinsky with the ambassador of Great Britain in the USSR p.c. Cripps – **P365**

November 4, 1940, telegram of the plenipotentiary representative of the USSR in Germany Shkvartsev in the NKID of the USSR – **P368**

November 4, 1940, telegram of the first deputy commissioner for foreign affairs of the USSR A. Y. Vyshinsky to the plenipotentiary representative of the USSR in the Turkish republic Savinogradov - **P370**

November 4, 1940, telegram of the first deputy commissioner for foreign affairs of the USSR A. Y. Vyshinsky to the plenipotentiary

representative of the USSR in the Turkish republic sl. Vinogradov – **P372**

November 5, 1940, from telegram of the first deputy commissioner of foreign affairs of the USSR A. Y. Vyshinsky to the plenipotentiary representative of the USSR in the UK Maisky – **P375**

November 7, 1940, conversation of the temporary attorney in the affairs of the USSR in the kingdom of Greece a. Ilazareva with the prime minister of the kingdom of Greece I. Metaxas – **P376**

November 9, 1940, some] dir [ekti] you to burl [inn] ride – **P377**

November 9, 1940, from the telegram of the interim attorney of the USSR in France Ivanov in NKID USSR – **P379**

November 12, 1940, from : talk of the chairman of the council of people's commissars of the USSR, people's commissioner for foreign affairs of the USSR V. M. Molotov with minister of foreign affairs of Germany I. Ribbentrop – **P381**

November 12, 1940, From: conversation of the chairman of the council of people's commissars of the USSR, people's commissioner for foreign affairs of the USSR V.M. Molotov with Reichscanzler of Germany Agitlerom – **P384**

November 12, 1940, from: telegram of the chairman of the council of people's commissars of the USSR, people's commissioner for foreign affairs of the USSR V. M. Molotov to the general secretary of the cc vksch) J. V. Stalin – **P386**

November 13, 1940, telegram of the first deputy people's commissioner for foreign affairs of the USSR Vyshinsky to the plenipotentiary representative of the USSR in Germany Shkvartsevu- **P390**

November 13, 1940, telegram of the first deputy people's commissioner for foreign affairs of the USSR Vyshinsky to the plenipotentiary representative of the USSR in Germany al. Shkvartsev – **P391**

November 13, 1940, from: telegram of the chairman of the council of people's commissars of the USSR, people's commissioner for foreign



affairs of the USSR V. M. Molotov to the general secretary of the cc CPSU (b) J. V. Stalin – **P393**

November 13, 1940, conversation of the chairman of the council of people's commissars of the USSR, people's commissioner for foreign affairs of the USSR V.M. Molotov with minister of foreign affairs of Germany I. Ribbentrop – **P397**

November 14, 1940, telegram of the chairman of the council of people's commissars of the USSR, people's commissioner for foreign affairs of the USSR V. M. Molotov to the general secretary of the cc CPSU (b) J. V. Stalin – **P404**

November 14, 1940, telegram of the advisor of the plenipotentiary representation of the USSR in Germany Semenova in the people's commissariat for foreign affairs of the USSR – **P405**

November 15, 1940, conversation of advisor of the plenipotentiary of the USSR representation in the kingdom of Afghanistan Kozlova with the ambassador of Turkey in Afghanistan Shevket – **P406**

November 15, 1940, telegram of the plenipotentiary representative of the USSR in the Great Britain I.M. Maisky in the NKID of the USSR – **P409**

November 15, 1940, conversation of advisor of the plenipotentiary of the USSR representation in the kingdom of Afghanistan B.C. Kozlova with the ambassador of Turkey in Afghanistan E.M. Shevket – **P489**

November 17, 1940, telegram of the people's commissioner for foreign affairs of the USSR V. M. Molotov to the plenipotentiary representative of the USSR in the UK I.M. Maisky – **P411**

November 19, 1940, from: political letter of the plenipotentiary of the USSR representation in Germany – **P413**

November 21, 1940, telegram of the plenipotentiary representative of the USSR in the Turkish republic ca. Vinogradova in the NKID USSR – **P492**

November 21, 1940, telegram of the plenipotentiary representative of the USSR in the Turkish republic ca. Vinogradova in the NKID USSR- **P416**

November 25, 1940, from : talk of the people's commissioner for foreign affairs of the USSR V. M. Molotov with the German nose in the USSR by f. Schulenburg – **P418**

November 25, 1940, telegram of the secretary general of the NKID USSR. Sobolov to the people's commissioner for foreign affairs of the USSR V. M. Molotov – **P420**

November 26, 1940, telegram of the plenipotentiary representative of the USSR in the Turkish republic ca. Vinogradova in the NKID USSR – **P421**

November 28, 1940, talk of the plenipotentiary representative of the USSR in the Turkish republic of ca. Vinogradova with the ambassador of the kingdom of Yugoslavia in Turkey I. Shumenkovich – **P425**

November 30, 1940, from: telegrams of the plenipotentiary representative of the USSR in the kingdom of Bulgaria al. Lavrishchev to the people's commissioner for foreign affairs of the USSR V. M. Molotov -**427**

December 6, 1940, conversation of the first deputy people's commissioner for foreign affairs of the USSR al. Vyshinsky with the ambassador of the Turkish republic in the USSR – **P429**

December 10, 1940, conversation of the people's commissioner for foreign affairs of the USSR Molotov with the ambassador of the Turkish republic in the USSR – **P432**

December 10, 1940, telegram of the plenipotentiary representative of the USSR in the kingdom of Afghanistan Mikhailov in the NKID of the USSR – **P494**

December 13, 1940, from: telegram of the plenipotentiary representative of the USSR in the Turkish republic ca. Vinogradova in the people's commissariat for foreign affairs of the USSR – **P436**

December 14, 1940, talk of the people's commissioner for foreign affairs of the USSR V. M. Molotov with the ambassador of the Turkish republic in the USSR – **P438**

December 17, 1940, telegram of the plenipotentiary representative of the USSR in the Turkish republic ca. Vinogradova in the NKID USSR – **P444**

December 27, 1940, from: talk of the plenipotentiary representative of the USSR in the Great Britain Maisky with the minister of foreign affairs of the Great Britain A. Iden – **P447**

December 30, 1940, conversation of the people's commissioner for foreign affairs of the USSR V. M. Molotov with the ambassador of the kingdom of Italy in the USSR a. Rosso – **P449**

January 6, 1941, from the diary of the plenipotentiary representative of the USSR in the kingdom of Romania a. I. Lavrentiev – **P451**

January 13, 1941, from a conversation of the plenipotentiary representative of the USSR in Germany Dekanozov with the temporary attorney in the Turkish republic in Germany f. Alkendom – **P455**

January 23, 1941, talk of the people's commissioner for foreign affairs of the USSR V. M. Molotov with German ambassador to the USSR f. Schulenburg – **P457**

January 24, 1941, from the diary of the plenipotentiary representative of the USSR in the kingdom of Bulgaria al. Lavrishchev – **P460**

January 27, 1941, conversation of the people's commissioner for foreign affairs of the USSR V. M. Molotov with the ambassador of the kingdom of Italy in the USSR a. Rosso – **P461**

January 29, 1941, from; talk of the plenipotentiary representative of the USSR in the Great Britain I.M. Maisky with the minister of foreign affairs of the Great Britain Ideiom – **P467**

February 18, 1941, from: conversation of the plenipotentiary representative of the USSR in Germany Dekanozov with the ambassador of the kingdom of Bulgaria in Germany Draganov – **P468**

February 20, 1941, conversation of the first deputy people's commissioner for foreign affairs of the USSR Ia. Vyshinsky with the ambassador of the Turkish republic in the USSR – **P470**

March 2, 1941, from the diary of the plenipotentiary representative of the USSR in the Turkish republic ca. Vinogradova – **P495**

March 25, 1941, from the diary of the plenipotentiary representative of the USSR in the Turkish republic ca. Vinogradova – **P415**

April 17, 1941, talk of the plenipotentiary representative of the USSR in the kingdom of Afghanistan ka. Mikhailov with the ambassador of Turkey in Afghanistan m.sh. Esendalem – **P475**

April 23, 1941, from; talk of the plenipotentiary representative of the USSR in the Turkish republic of ca. Vinogradova with the ambassador of the kingdom of Yugoslavia in Turkey I. Shumenkovich – **P484**

May 3, 1941, talk of the plenipotentiary representative of the USSR in the Turkish republic of ca. Vinogradova with the ambassador of Great Britain to Turkey Netchbull-hugessen – **P497**

June 24, 1941, recording of the conversation of the people's commissioner for foreign affairs of the USSR V. M. Molotov with the ambassador of Turkey in the USSR a. Aktay – **P501**

June 26, 1941, recording of the conversation of the first deputy people's commissioner for foreign affairs of the USSR A. Y. Vyshinsky with the ambassador of Turkey in the USSR A. Aktay – **P503**

June 29, 1941, recording of the conversation of the first deputy people's commissioner for foreign affairs of the USSR A. Y. Vyshinsky with the ambassador of Turkey in the USSR a. Aktay – **P504**

July 10, 1941, from; recording of the conversation of the chairman of the council of people's commissars of the USSR J. V. Stalin with the ambassador of Great Britain in the USSR s. Crips – **P506**

July 20, 1941, recording of the conversation of the people's commissioner of foreign affairs of the USSR V. M. Molotov with the ambassador of Great Britain in the USSR, Scripps – **P512**

5 august 1941, recording of the conversation of the people's commissioner for foreign affairs of the USSR V. M. Molotov with the ambassador of Great Britain in the USSR, Scripps – **P514**

August 6, 1941, from; recording of the conversation of the people's commissioner for foreign affairs of the USSR V. M. Molotov with the ambassador of Great Britain in the USSR S. Crips – **P515**

August 10, 1941, statement of the Soviet government of respect for the territorial invalidity of the Turkish republic – **P517**

August 30, 1941, recording of the conversation of the ambassador of the USSR in Turkey Vinogradov with the minister of foreign affairs of Turkey Saracoglu – **P518**

September 29, 1941, record of the conversation of the chairman of the council of people's commissars of the USSR J. V. Stalin with the heads of the delegations of the Great Britain Lord W. Beaverbrook and the USA A. A. Garriman at the Moscow conference of the representatives of three – **P 520**

September 30, 1941, recording of the conversation of the chairman of the council of people's commissars of the USSR J. V. Stalin with the heads of delegations of the Great Britain Lord W. Beaverbrook – **P527**

October 15, 1941, recording of the conversation of the ambassador of the USSR in Turkey Vinogradov with the minister of foreign affairs of Turkey s. Saracoglu – **P533**

October 16, 1941, recording of the conversation of the ambassador of the USSR in Turkey Vinogradov with the minister of foreign affairs of Turkey Saracoglu – **P535**

December 18, 1941, recording of the conversation of the chairman of the council of people's commissars of the USSR J. V. Stalin with the minister of foreign affairs of the Great Britain A. Iden – **P538**

December 28, 1941, recording of the conversation of the people's commissioner for foreign affairs of the USSR V. M. Molotov with the ambassador of Great Britain in the USSR s. Crips – **P 545**

**Note of the people's commissioner for foreign affairs of the RFSR  
to the ministry of foreign affairs of Great Britain**

Transmitted on the radio on April 21, 1919. No 531

After an unprovoked attack by the British armed forces on Russian territory, the British military expedition was similarly sent in August last year to Baku, one of the most important cities of the Russian Soviet republic, by agreement with some treasonous elements in the city itself. The pretext served the alleged intention to defend Baku against the Turkish offensive, equally attacking the Russian Soviet republic, the appearance of a small British detachment in Baku only helped the Turks justify their offensive, and when they began to bombard Baku, the British fled at the first shot, not even trying to defend the city.. They took with them the Baku commissioners Shaumyan, Japaridze and others who remained faithful to their duty towards the Soviet republic and resigned when British troops joined Baku.

For all the negotiations that were held last fall and later on the issue of the exchange of citizens of both sides, the Russian Soviet government has always insisted on the return to Russia of the commissioners captured in Baku. The British government never confessed to the fate of them, and, moreover, carefully concealed their fate, concerning which only gradually obscure and sketchy information began to reach the Soviet republic. British official sources in Tiflis were rumored that Baku's commissioners were bastards, which, as it turned out later, was a completely false allegation. A well-known socialist revolutionary Chaikin, a member of the Baku socialist committee, recently published in Baku newspapers a detailed report based on genuine data, which lifted the veil and established the truth about the fate of the commissioners, with no doubt about the veracity of this report..

It was finally established that after the hasty retreat of the British from Baku, the English officer Reginald Jones, along with some Russian Caspian counter-revolutionaries, fulfilling the desire of the British military mission, decided to secretly kill the commissioners

taken away from Baku.. An official report was issued that the commissioners were allegedly taken to India, while the training which they were stationed was taken to a secluded place in the desert, where an escort appointed by the British military and the Caspian counterrevolutionaries was filled out. He was ordered to shoot the captives, 26 in total, and buried the bodies of the dead victims in the sand. . In committing this brutal and cowardly act, the British military authorities carefully tried to cover it up. General Thomson asked Chaikin to give him the testimony on which his message was based, when Chaikin demanded that the safety of witnesses be guaranteed and that the crime be investigated by a mixed commission to ensure its impartiality, general Thomson rejected these just claims, clearly showing that the British authorities sought only to avenge those who had disclosed their crime to the world. .

But the truth has now been revealed, no shenanigans can hide it or save the perpetrators of this brutal crime from public disgrace. The British government, whose representatives so often poured mud on the Russian workers-peasant government for the so-called red terror. For the necessary acts of self-defense, distorted and immensely exaggerated by slander, this is the most British government publicly exposed in the low, cowardly and treacherous murder of defenseless prisoners, whose only crime was their loyalty to their workers-peasant government. The British government cannot point to such acts by the Russian Soviet government, which is incapable of such inferiority and treachery. After the British state secretary called the killers the Russian Soviet government, fighting not for life, but for death against the advancing enemies from everywhere, any honest observer can now see who the killers are actually .

The Russian Soviet government is protesting in the face of the working masses around the world against the shameful act of the British authorities, and in particular calls out to the conscious workers of Great Britain who will not violate their duty on the side of honour, true justice and the good of the people..

People's commissioner for foreign affairs

Chicherin

It's a seal. By arch. The opoble. To the gas. "Izvestia" lq 85 (637),  
April 23, 1919 .



**From: appeal of the people's commissioner for foreign affairs of the RSFSR to the workers and peasants of Persia**

**August 28, 1919**

The Persian government, for its part, has also declared all such treaties destroyed. . It seemed that a new free life and rebirth after the age-old oppression of foreign predators were to begin for the Persian people. .

But that's not what happened. . In the spring of 1918, British troops gradually occupied the entire territory of Persia. The British swore that once the Turks were expelled, they would clear Persian territory and reward the Persians for all the looting and requisitions caused by British soldiers. Note of the English government of March 12, 1918. These promises were printed on March 14 in the official Persian body "raab".

**Letter from the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the RSFSR  
to the Chairman of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey Mustafa  
Kemal Pasha**

June 3, 1920 No. 11/551

The Soviet Government has the honor to acknowledge receipt of a letter in which you express your desire to enter into constant relations with it and to take part in the joint struggle against foreign imperialism, which threatens both countries. The Soviet Government got acquainted with satisfaction with the basic principles of foreign policy of the new Turkish Government, headed by the Grand National Assembly in Angora.

These principles are as follows:

- 1) The declaration of independence of Turkey.
- 2) Incorporation of the undisputed Turkish territories into the Turkish state.
- 3) The proclamation of Arabia and Syria as independent states.
- 4) Decision made by the Grand National Assembly on granting Turkish Armenia, Kurdistan, Lazistan, Batumi region, Eastern Thrace and all territories with a mixed Turkish-Arab population the right to determine their own destiny. The Soviet Government, of course, means by this that a free referendum will be held in these areas with the participation of refugees and emigrants who at one time were forced to leave their homeland for reasons beyond their control and who must be returned to their homeland.
- 5) Recognition for national minorities in the territories of the new Turkish state, headed by the Grand National Assembly, of all the rights recognized for national minorities in the European states with the most liberal system.
- 6) Transfer of the question of the straits to the conference of the Black Sea coastal states.

7) Abolition of the regime of capitulations and economic control by foreign states.

8) The elimination of all kinds of spheres of foreign influence.

The Soviet Government takes note of the determination of the Grand National Assembly to align your work and your military operations against the imperialist governments with the lofty ideal of the liberation of the oppressed peoples. The Soviet Government hopes that diplomatic negotiations will allow the Grand National Assembly to establish between Turkey, on the one hand, and Armenia and Persia, on the other, the exact boundaries that justice and the right of peoples to self-determination require - the Soviet Government is ready at any time, at the invitation of the parties concerned, take on the duties of an intermediary.

In order to establish friendly relations and lasting friendship between Turkey and Russia, the Soviet Government proposes to immediately establish diplomatic and consular relations. The Soviet Government extends the hand of friendship to all the peoples of the world, remaining invariably faithful to its principle of recognizing the right of each people to self-determination. The Soviet Government is following with keen interest the heroic struggle waged by the Turkish people for their independence and sovereignty, and in these difficult days for Turkey, it is happy to lay a solid foundation of friendship that should unite the Turkish and Russian peoples.

Bringing the above to your attention, Mr. President of the Grand National Assembly, I have the honor, on behalf of the people of the Workers 'and Peasants' Federal Republic, to express to you our wishes of success to the peoples of Turkey fighting for their independence.

People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs

Chicherin

Publ. into gas. Izvestia Jtè 123 (970), June 9, 1920

**From the Report of the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the RSFSR G.V. Chicherin at a meeting of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee on June 17, 1920**

[...] The current session of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee is gathering at an extremely difficult moment of a new crisis, the last attempt of our opponents, who once again directed at us all the forces at their disposal, once again straining all their efforts to strangle us. Our enemy, i.e., world imperialism, i.e. in fact, all capitalist governments around the world act against us not only by violence, not only by military offensive, but also by diplomatic maneuvers, not only by open attack, but also by the appearance of peacefulness, the appearance of friendly actions, requiring on our part constant caution, the greatest vigilance.

Our policy is, as usual, the policy of peace, and everyone knows that. We want one. We want not to be hindered from developing the way we wish, to build our new socialist society in the world. We do not carry our own system, N'I our power on bayonets, and everyone knows this, and nevertheless, more and more enemies are being set on us. Our policy is a policy of peace, but it is not a policy of surrender. We want peace, agreement, but a valid agreement, mutually beneficial on equal terms. We reject the insidious smiles that hide the dagger hidden behind our backs. We reject the poisoned goblet of false assurances that hide behind a friendly appearance a new attack. Our first responsibility is vigilance and firmness. The most sophisticated representatives of the state Nskuostv, accumulated over many generations, are up in arms against us. Noble lords think that they can deceive us as simpletons, that they can lull us to sleep with false peace-loving assurances, but communist diplomacy responds to these attempts with unswerving vigilance and firmness. Communist diplomacy is armed with the analysis provided by Marxism, which for the first time analyzes social relations to the end. Communist diplomacy is armed with the fighting strength that the proletariat it represents, inspired by class hatred of its enemies, gives it. Communist diplomacy is armed with that trick-defying realism offered by the working class it represents, the only class that stands face to face with the reality of the struggle against nature.

Communist diplomacy does not for a moment retreat from its vigilance, from its firmness. It responds to a blow with a blow, to machinations it responds by exposing them, it responds to insidiousness by appealing to the broad masses of other countries. It responds by exposing to the working class of all countries the insidious plans that the ruling classes of all countries are directing against it.

The political situation in which we have to work is difficult and complex at this moment, when we are convinced that the last wave of the ninth has stood against us, when we need to strain our last efforts in order to take the lead in unhindered development and peaceful labor.

At the beginning of the year it seemed to us that we had already approached the period of the peaceful policy that we are striving for. Our policy is and remains a struggle for peace, and our enemies are responsible for our struggle to strangle us. At the beginning of the year, it seemed to us that our struggle for peace had already achieved such results that provided us with the opportunity to devote all our strength to our internal construction. Our slogan was and remains the same: peaceful coexistence with other governments, whatever they may be. Reality itself has led us and other states to the need to create lasting relations between the workers 'and peasants' government and the capitalist governments. These long-term relationships are imperatively imposed on us by economic reality. Economic reality requires the exchange of goods, entering into permanent, regulated relations with the whole world, and the same economic reality demands the same from other governments, no matter how much they hate our system. And at the beginning of the year the moment came when we seemed already close to this goal. This was at the time when we were making peace with Estonia, when prospects for peace negotiations with our other neighbors were opening up, when the imperialist governments decided to lift the blockade, when a decision was then made to enter into trade relations with us. ... Then it seemed that the implementation of our peace program was already near. We still stand on the basis of this program [...]

Our task is a peaceful duel in the struggle against devastation by our socialist means, our labor service, our general labor discipline. And we will see how the capitalist governments, with their anarchy, with their increasingly rebellious working class, with their increasingly crumbling finances, will fight this growing chaos. This peaceful duel on the basis of the struggle against devastation is that necessary stage through which we have to go through and within which we have to establish our relations with the capitalist states by diplomatic means. But the capitalist governments did not confine themselves to this, were not content, they took a different path, they strained their efforts once more to try once more to strangle us by violent means. And we think, and we are convinced, we see that by this they accelerate their own destruction, accelerate the process of the collapse of the capitalist world, the process of increasing devastation and the growth of revolutionary consciousness among the masses of the capitalist countries, through which they must go through before reaching the moment of the final revolutionary rise and seizure of power. We think that this policy of the capitalist governments hastens their demise. This is their business. But for now, this policy means new sacrifices for us, new hard efforts, new calamities that we have to reckon with and fight within our own country.

Why did they use this technique again? We think there were two main reasons that prompted them to change their tactics. Firstly, our policy of peaceful restoration of the economic life of our society on new socialist principles was completely new to the bourgeois governments. And our labor service policy has made a tremendous impression in all countries. For the first time, the working class saw what it meant to build a new society the day after it seized power. And for the first time the ruling classes saw that we had new opportunities in our hands that they had not foreseen before. And they decided to prevent this by all means. Precisely because they incite more and more enemies against us, because they hope this way, distracting us from our peaceful construction, preventing us from exerting all our forces to restore our economic life, to continue the devastation still prevailing in Russia, and thus they still hope to bring us one way or another until the final crisis. Reality will deceive them. Our future is in our hands, and our job is to

show them that they are wrong. But for now, this means for us a new struggle, new sacrifices. Another fact, which undoubtedly had the strongest effect on them, is the development of the revolutionary movement, or, I would say, the liberation movement in the East. This movement threatens the very foundations of the capitalist economy, threatens the very existence of those capitalist groups that dominate the leading imperialist countries. This movement develops by itself, it develops because the peoples of the East are awakening, because the oppression that lies on them becomes too unbearable. And at the same time, the very existence of Soviet Russia, the very example of our construction work, our successful uprising against the oppression of Western capital, is for them the greatest incentive to follow the path of uprising against the despotism of Western imperialism and Western capital. And this is what the imperialist governments know.

And therefore, one of the constant leitmotifs of Churchill's speeches is the danger in the East. Churchill supported Denikin and Kolchak precisely for this reason, as he himself repeatedly said that Denikin and Kolchak, in his opinion, were the defenders of the interests of England in Persia and India. And gradually our advance to the East, the approach to these sensitive points of British diplomacy and, on the other hand, the growth, the invincible powerful growth of the liberation movement among the Eastern peoples, undoubtedly prompted the governments of the West once again to exert all their strength in order to try to strangle and destroy us. ... Poland served as their weapon, with which we are now waging a hard fight. But they operate not only in Poland, we know about those intrigues that they are engaged in in other neighboring states. And the best remedy against their intrigues is our constant appeal to the broad masses of the people. If these intrigues do not succeed, if instead of setting 14 states against us again, instead it is achieved only that Finland enters into negotiations with us, and Latvia and Lithuania continue negotiations with us, and Estonia remains with us in the most peaceful, friendly relations, the reason is that the broad masses of these countries realize that they have no motive for war against us, that everything forces them to be at peace with us. These intrigues against us are being carried out everywhere in the West and in the East. In relation to ourselves, they take the form of peace-loving

assurances, they aim to lull us to sleep, while behind them, in reality, hostile actions in Poland, hostile actions in Crimea are hidden. We see these intrigues among our neighbors in the West, the Middle East and the Far East, right up to imperialist Japan, which, undoubtedly, with the knowledge of the Entente, is once again attacking us, the Far Eastern Republic, closely connected with us. Our instrument is our policy of peace. We are ready at any time for a peace agreement. The broad masses of the Entente countries know this. This is our main weapon in that diplomatic duel, which has been going on for a long time, without interruption for a single minute. But in the hands of England, our imperialist enemy, the policy of peace is also a means to try to bind us, to try to deprive us of the freedom of action necessary in our struggle.

Before us, as before, is a complex coalition of imperialist governments, and as before the main and leading force is the British government. If we look at the politics of England, we see extreme complexity in it. There are numerous currents, as if hesitation, eternal zigzags and seemingly internal contradictions in her policy, but at the same time, if you look at her as a whole, she represents an amazing unity. The ruling classes of England, with their traditions of diplomatic art, represent a profound unity of politics in a variety of apparent contradictions. And her various voices turn out to be the notes of one melody, the main line, which has the goal, as at the moment it is manifested, on the one hand, to try to strangle us, on the other hand, to try to deprive us of freedom of action, to bind us and at the same time to put us to sleep, try to take away the vigilance we need. The foundations of England's policy are clear to us. Its goal is to let us bleed to death, to excite one enemy after another, so that we are always busy at the fronts and cannot calm down and cannot devote all our strength to internal construction. This is a policy of our constant distraction from our life tasks, it is a policy that has the goal, as I said, to let us bleed to death. This policy takes many forms. On the one hand, weapons are given to Poland, protection is given to Wrangel, on the other hand, peaceful assurances are made to us with a kind air, they are promised us an agreement at the moment when the same government sets our enemies against us and arms them against us. We are going to an agreement with England, we are ready for it, but let it be a valid agreement binding both sides, let it be real



negotiations. We don't want to be the victims of deception. Our goal is quite definite. Our goal is the actual lifting of the blockade, both maritime and financial. One lifting of the naval blockade is invalid, it is necessary to remove the financial blockade. It is necessary to give us the opportunity to pay in other countries with our customers, sellers and buyers of our goods. We need to enable us in other countries to monitor the market and protect our trade interests. Therefore, lifting the blockade means not only the passage of ships with our goods, it means a real restoration of relations. Words don't matter to us. Official recognition is secondary for us. We need a factual, valid recognition, the lifting of the ban on us, which lies on us, as a result of which we cannot penetrate anywhere, except for individuals with special permission, who are under the threat of expulsion and return to Russia every minute. We need a real lifting of the blockade, both personal, naval, and financial, and only this will give to us the possibility of real exchange of goods and real economic relations with other countries. We are ready for an agreement, and for a political agreement, we want, we are looking for a political agreement, we recognize that one trade agreement without a political one is impossible. But this political agreement must be reciprocal. It should not only bind us, it should not consist in the fact that we give everything, that we promise everything, and the other side is not tied up in anything and continues to set our enemies against us, continue the previous policy against us. This one-sided policy is unacceptable, we do not want to be deceived by simpletons. We want peace, but let it be on both sides, and not only on one side. We are ready to give up full freedom of action, but let the other side also give up hostile actions and attacks on us. This is our policy.

Our program is clear and simple. Everyone knows her. Nevertheless, the British Government has not yet agreed to that real and sincere agreement, to the consistent peace negotiations that we are seeking. In our negotiations with England, the question of preventing our diplomatic representative Litvinov from entering England plays an important role. We were reproached for allegedly posing as an ultimatum the question of a trip to England. We do not pose this question as an ultimatum. On the contrary, when the moment came for the trade delegation, the delegation of the Tsentosoyuz, to go there, we

agreed that the delegation should go without Litvinov. However, we must say that the question of removing our representatives is of much more serious importance to us than the personal question of Comrade Litvinov. The question of the withdrawal of our experienced comrades], competent in foreign diplomacy, who played a role abroad, is extremely serious. All of them are under the same alleged charges that Litvinov is under. He is accused of allegedly interfering in the internal affairs of England. In fact, when Litvinov was in England, he behaved in the most careful manner. Everyone knows that. Nevertheless, he was then accused in the same way as Comrade Vorovsky in Sweden, Comrade Berzin in Switzerland and comrade Joffe in Berlin and all our representatives in general who were abroad, in interference in the internal affairs of these countries. The accusation is directed not against Litvinov alone, but against all comrades who are experienced in foreign politics and have experience in foreign diplomatic activity. This question would mean depriving us of all our comrades experienced in foreign diplomatic activity. Meanwhile, only persons who have been abroad for a long time, who have looked closely at foreign policy for a long time, only they can, step by step, expose all the machinations that every government puts up against us every day. This would mean our exhaustion on the world stage.

But there is something even more serious about this. We said to England: we offer open diplomatic negotiations on the basis of reciprocity, reciprocity, equal rights. We bind ourselves and you must bind yourself. What is England doing? She invites Comrade Krasin for trade negotiations, and under the guise of trade negotiations she tries to push through diplomatic negotiations and bind us without tying herself. History of negotiations comrade Krasin abroad is as follows: a delegation arrived in Copenhagen, 'began negotiations with the economic' representatives of the Entente. She was told then we will conduct trade negotiations when diplomatic issues are resolved. Fine, in that case we will conduct diplomatic negotiations. When they started diplomatic negotiations, she was told it is premature, first we will resolve these or those trade issues. This diplomatic circle lasted week after week. After that, a new meeting of the Supreme Council of the Entente took place in St. Decisions were made, and our delegation

without com. Litvinova, without our diplomatic representative, went to London. There our trade delegation, the delegation of the Centrosoyuz, is received by Lloyd George. They talk with her about the restoration of trade relations. And Lloyd George says Comrade. Krasin about what obstacles supposedly prevent you from starting a correct trade. But under the pretext of listing obstacles to trade, he speaks of our entire policy, he demands that we abandon our active policy in Europe, the Caucasus, and throughout Asia. He demands that we surrender all along the line. Instead of diplomatic negotiations, where a certain political trade would take place, they want to bind us, take everything from IAS and give us only a problematic promise to enter into trade negotiations with us. We do not agree to such machinations, and we declare: "We insist on real political negotiations, which would be conducted on the basis of reciprocity, 'equality of both sides. We refuse to let ourselves be bound one-sidedly. " We see what the policy of England is. It consists in economically skimming the cream off us. The blockade will not be lifted from us. We will not be able to communicate freely with other countries. We will not be able to observe the markets, conclude all the deals that are beneficial today for Soviet Russia. England will hold Ias in hand. . Only those transactions that are beneficial to her will be allowed.

She will pump out our raw materials, give us what she desires and benefits. Why do Western states come to an agreement with us in general? One of the main reasons is the need for economic communication with us. Economic reasons are pushing the capitalist countries to an agreement with us- We need them, and they need us And now, England's machination is to try to pump out all that we can give from us, to seize the whole mechanism of economic communication with us. Since there is no real lifting of the blockade, there is no complete real reconciliation, England will set us economic conditions and will completely dispose of economic relations between us and other countries [...]

She wants us to give everything, and for her part she gives us nothing but problematic promises, except for the possibility of such a trade, which in reality is skimming the cream from us. And this is when at the

same time she is setting Poland on the pass and patronizing Wrangel. At the same time, in the same conversation with Krasin, Lloyd George said that England was not taking part in Poland's attack on Russia. Eye to eye with Comrade Krasin, he declares that England does not sympathize with Poland's attack on Russia. And at the same time, as you know, Bonar Law declares in Parliament that England is sending Poland the very equipment that was promised to her in September. A deal was made in September, and now the deal cannot be taken back. England, as an honest merchant, fulfills the deal made in September, and sends Poland the weapons that it then pledged to send. The working class of England is opposed to this, the transport workers are fighting against this, although, unfortunately, not always; we know that the Executive Committee of the railway workers has withdrawn this ban, but the working masses continue to fight. We know that on the Jolly George ship the crew refused to carry equipment to Poland. So, England is supplying Poland with weapons, while with Comrade. Krasin Lloyd George is negotiating and politely declares that England does not sympathize with the attack on us.

The same is true for Wrangel. Our press published the notes with which England intervened in our struggle against the last remnants of the Denikinites in order to protect them from us. We know that Britain and the Entente in general continue to support them and, nevertheless, the British government is now declaring in parliament that Britain does not sympathize with Wrangel's offensive against Soviet Russia. It claims that it allegedly provided equipment before, but now does not, while we now actually know that Wrangel's troops continue to receive equipment from England and other Entente countries. And this while the British government in Parliament declares that it does not sympathize with Wrangel's offensive, which is being carried out by the weapons of England itself. We have now posed to England the question of what real measures it is taking to turn its disagreement with Wrangel's adventure into real facts.

She does not sympathize - it is something subjective. How will this disagreement be expressed practically? We put this question to England. We are still waiting for an answer to this question, and I think

that we will not get an answer to this question until we ourselves cope with Wrangel. This is the policy of England. But we, being invariably vigilant and invariably exposing its machinations, invariably appealing to the broad masses of all countries with an indication of these machinations of the imperialist governments, we nevertheless continue to adhere to the old position, to our policy of peace. We are ready at any moment for a valid agreement and negotiations, and we want these negotiations. We demand political negotiations with Britain, we insist on them. If these negotiations do not begin, then the fault is not ours, but solely our opponents.

France is located next to England. It seems to be in many ways deviating from the policy of England. France is our consistent enemy. At a time when England was talking to us about reconciliation, about an agreement, France invariably opposed this policy. But if we look at the balance of forces, at the relations that really exist between us, we will have to say to ourselves that France plays this role in international relations only because certain elements of the British government itself support it and want it. Financially and militarily, France is playing its present role because there is a stream in British politics itself that wants France to play this role. In reality, this role of France is, in essence, an auxiliary role, and we know that on the day when the British government, under the pressure of its own masses, under the pressure of the economic crisis, will finally have to come to an agreement with us, we know - France it won't hurt him then. France has always been interested most of all in the position of the loan holders, and now France has raised a big fuss over the issue of exporting our gold, with which we must pay for goods. This gold is supposed to be intended to pay off the French holders of our loans. And we heard that France even turned to Sweden with a protest for the fact that Sweden allowed us to export a certain amount of gold as a guarantee for future payment for the goods that Sweden will send us. In the meantime, we think that these protests cannot be taken so seriously. We are convinced that on the day when England finally wants to conduct trade with us, these protests by France against the export of gold will not interfere with England. As for the French protest in Sweden, today we have already received a refutation. Sweden, I must say, is so interested in trade with us that the

absence of such a means for her complete economic insanity and threatens with the most serious consequences for her economic life and her domestic policy. For Sweden it is the main question of life that we enter into trade relations with it. Gold was exported there to cover the cost of goods, and now France protested against this and demanded the alleged imposition of a ban, sequestration of this gold. Today we have received a refutation that France does not demand a sequestration for this gold, but only expresses a wish that Sweden does not forget about French loan holders, and we are convinced that we cannot treat these French protests so wastefully.

With France, we concluded an agreement on the return of our soldiers from France, those soldiers who, as you know, were subjected to terrible repressions, persecutions, the most cruel treatment there - to exchange them for those French citizens who remained in Russia and who are returning on the basis of a prisoner agreements gradually in exchange for all returning soldiers from France. There has been a hitch in this process of returning soldiers lately. Just when the Polish offensive began, when our opponents were inspired by new hopes, just then for some reason the return of our soldiers from France stopped. But, obviously, our victories over the Poles had a beneficial effect in this respect, and today we have received news from Millerand that several thousand of our soldiers are returning from France to replace French citizens who are to return to France on the same ships. And this fact testifies that the impression of our victories is also there in France, and we are convinced that its results will be more significant than just resuming the return of soldiers. We know that French officers play a big role in the Polish army. The French government denied this. We received an official note stating that the French officers had been withdrawn. Nevertheless, according to the testimony of Polish prisoners and on the basis of documents that fell into our hands after the Polish defeats, we can establish with complete certainty that it is not true that responsible posts in the Polish army are occupied by the French military. France plays the role of the main military leader, inspirer in the Polish army, and in reality, in our struggle with Poland and militarily, we have not only Poland before us, but the French military organization with which we are facing face to face.

Nitti said that a parliamentary commission representing all parties in Italy is going to Russia. However, this commission has been traveling for six months, and no one still knows where it went. When the socialists, who play a big role there, appear in Italy, the Italian government speaks out towards us in the most friendly way, and when it comes to turning these friendly wishes into reality, the Italian government fades away and disappears behind the Entente collective. The Entente has a single policy, and in this policy, Italy disappears, there is no special policy, its friendliness does not go beyond the minister's answer to the socialists. We have a purely trade agreement with Italy. Our Tsentrosoyuz has concluded an agreement with Italian cooperatives, and on the basis of this agreement, our cooperatives have the right to open an office in Italy, and, conversely, Italian cooperatives - with us. And now, when Comrade Borovsky was appointed representative of the Tsentrosoyuz in order to travel to Italy on the basis of this agreement, the Italian government is still denying him the right to cipher, the right to send radio telegrams and the right to communicate with us: by couriers. Nevertheless, we entered into a certain preliminary agreement with Italy. In the south of Russia, bread is ready for export to Italy in exchange for the necessary machines that Italy will supply to us. This deal is beneficial for IAS and beneficial for Italy. The Italian people suffer from the lack of this bread. The Italian government knows this, and, nevertheless, this dispatch is delayed because the Italian government does not give the right to code to our representative, while Litvinov and Krasin have this right. What is the matter - we do not know. Moreover, Italy sends airplanes and uniforms to Poland. In general, we can say that all the friendly assurances of the Italian government are nullified when it comes to turning them into reality. Italy is obscured by the united collective of the Entente, which is our constant and consistent enemy. We can say that the whole policy of Italy boils down to the words: "Italy too" - Italy "too" is a great power, Italy "too" is a member of the Entente. The Italian ruling classes do not want to be recognized as something inferior, separate from the leading imperialist governments of the main imperialist countries. And now Italy wants to pursue the policy pursued by the Entente as a whole by all means. Let the Italian people starve without bread, which they can

get from Russia - the main thing is that Italy "too" should be a member of the Entente, that she "too" sit in the Supreme Council, so that she "also" supposedly determines the fate of all countries, while in fact, it is only in the wake of the leading powers of the world.

And therefore, until the Italian masses force their government to get down to business, we will be in a strange position in relation to Italy. We will face the same riddle that we receive assurances and promises, and when we move on to fulfilling these promises, we do not receive actual fulfillment. But we expect that the growing pressure of the Italian broad masses will compel the Italian government, the new government that will be formed, whatever it is called, will compel to come to a real agreement with us, and we hope that soon we will be able to enter with Italy, despite the machinations and pressure from the Entente, into a truly lasting relationship.

America is a completely different picture. Italy also wants to be among the great powers. America is obscuring, it does not want to play a role among the European powers. America is a typical example of the fact that the absence of political experience accumulated over many generations makes it impossible to use the full extent of their own strength and their own power. American diplomacy suffers from some kind of provincialism, insufficient knowledge of world relations. This very first capitalist power is far from playing the role that it could play if it possessed "that amazing diplomatic skill that is the property of the British ruling strata. And we see that while England is negotiating with us, trying to skim the cream off us and trying to enter into an economic agreement with us and use our wealth, America is missing all these opportunities. It is now, when we have a hitch with England, it would be the most opportune moment for America to enter into economic relations with us to take the place that England, due to their machinations, hesitates to take. Nevertheless, America does not. We see the same in the Far East, where Japan is trying to seize Eastern Siberia. The vital interests of American capital are violated by the fact that diplomatic peace America does not possess that huge mass traditional art that has been developed by generations following each other layers of politicians. And in relation to America we are faced with a different



kind of riddle than in relation to Italy. Why is America still keeping aloof, therefore not taking advantage of the broad opportunities that relations with Soviet Russia would represent for it? These opportunities exist. We are waiting for America to take advantage of this. We think that this moment will come soon. Some representatives of American capital are feeling the ground. And we are convinced that, despite the extreme shortsightedness of the American government, which is missing out on the best opportunities, American capital will soon seize these opportunities. We see this by individual signs, by the way representatives of influential capitalist groups are already probing the soil from our representatives abroad. We think that soon England will have a rival - America. It will be in the very near future. Then England will accelerate the pace of restoring economic relations with us. When America takes the place that belongs to her by her economic nature, then England will be forced to accelerate the pace of rapprochement and restoration of economic relations with us.

The picture is completely different in Japan. Japan's mainstream groups are hard-core realists who grab and try to grab whatever lies within their reach. The Japanese ruling classes are capturing too much, and we think that they are hurting themselves with these unnecessary captures. Their entire policy in the Far East in recent months shows that too large seizures that do not correspond to their own power lead to the opposite results. We think that, despite Japan's renewed desire to seize the entire Far East up to Irkutsk, such a task exceeds its strength, and its ruling classes falsely assess the degree of their own power. And we think that this deep mistake of the Japanese ruling classes will lead to fatal results for them and accelerate the process of revolutionizing Japanese society, which is still progressing too slowly.

Side by side with these ruling powers of world politics, Germany is completely obscured. We can say that it has no politics. She seemed to want, in contrast to the Entente, to enter into economic relations in dreams, and at the same time she was afraid of it. On the other hand, there are elements in Germany who would like to actively participate in the "struggle against the Bolsheviks." But they are not strong enough either. There are elements that are aware of the opposing interests of

the ruling classes of Germany and Poland, which require the use of the current conjuncture of our struggle with Poland. But they don't. The whole policy of Germany is some kind of continuous empty space. Germany seems incapable of having a foreign policy in one direction or the other. We wish, we are ready to enter into economic relations with Germany, we wish to maintain friendly relations with it, but, unfortunately, all our steps are not crowned with success, and until now the German government cannot get out of that extreme passivity, as a result of which it does not even responds to our attempts to establish economic relations beneficial to both sides.

Further, there is a number of those secondary states that are the arena for the intrigues of the world politics of the ruling powers. And here our strength is our policy of peace, which is recognized by the broad masses, who understand that we do not threaten them, that our entire policy is based on striving for the mutual benefit of both our country and the country with which we enter into relations. We have concluded an economic agreement with Sweden through the representation of cooperatives. We are not completely satisfied with it. But we are confident that the restoration of our relations with Sweden will not stop there. We need Swedish products and Sweden needs our market. We are convinced that life itself will force the Swedish government to go further, to agree to a more consistent and effective economic agreement with us.

Norway takes the friendliest position towards us. The Norwegian government has entered into relations with us in the North; it is already supplying coal to our North, which is in dire need of it. It agreed to the restoration of representation in our North and in the Norwegian North, it posed to us a number of questions regarding the settlement of mutual relations. And we offered him diplomatic negotiations that would cover all these issues. In Copenhagen, our representative, Comrade Litvinov, and we suggested that Norway on all these issues, linking them together, to contact Cde. Litvinov, who has full instructions and authority from us. And we are convinced that quite friendly relations with Norway will soon improve, and easier than with Sweden. And the whole tone of the Norwegian government towards us was

incomparably more conciliatory and friendly than the tone of other capitalist governments.

As for Denmark, there is so far only a private trade agreement with individual firms. But, of course, Copenhagen plays such a large role in the trading world that when economic relations with the West are improved, Denmark will not lag behind other countries.

Closer to us are those small states that separated from the former Russian Empire. And in relation to them, the whole strength of our policy lies in the fact that their masses are well aware that we are the only consistent sincere friends of small nations. That is why Estonia made peace with us, that is why now Latvia, Lithuania and Finland are negotiating with us, that is why Kolchak and Denikin succeeded so little in mobilizing these small states against us, precisely because we alone from the very beginning stood on the basis of complete and unconditional recognition of their independence.

And they know, that is, their ruling strata and their masses know that this is not an empty phrase, that we recognize their independence not in words, but in deeds. And therefore, we recognize it, that we proceed from the political consciousness and interests of our working masses and their working masses. There is no contradiction, no conflict between the interests of their working people and our working masses. Since we need to communicate with them, in so far as they need to communicate with us. Estonia is a transit country, Estonia needs to serve as a transit country for us, and we need Estonia as a transit country. This is its benefit, this is also our benefit, and our peaceful and friendly relations are based on this mutual benefit, because we proceed from the interests of the working masses, between whom there is no conflict. And that was what brought to naught Churchill's famous plan for the campaign of 14 states. And now, when intrigues against us continue, when there are elements in Estonia itself that are extremely antipathy towards friendly relations with Soviet Russia, nevertheless, this is what makes Estonia develop friendly and good-neighborly relations with us, which are becoming more and more consolidated. This also leads to the fact that, despite all the intrigues, other neighboring states are negotiating with us, making peace with us and,

despite all the obstacles, will undoubtedly come to complete and final peace with us.

Our relations with Finland have gone through a number of successive stages, and we have invariably stood on the basis of the unconditional recognition of the complete independence of Finland without the semi-vassal relations that once existed. Finland responded to this with exorbitant claims, both territorial and financial. When in 1918 our first conference with Finland took place, it demanded almost the entire Kola Peninsula and the Olonets province, it demanded such financial sacrifices that were really inconsistent with anything. Last fall, just at the moment when the Entente was trying to raise 14 states against us, and together with others, Finland, on September 11 we offered Finland to conclude peace with us. She didn't go for it then. But the consciousness that we are ready for peace, that we offer it, it is precisely this consciousness that prevented the Finnish ruling classes from raising the Finnish masses against us and leading them into battle against us. This is what prevented Mannerheim from drawing Finland into the war with Soviet Russia.

Last year, the ruling circles of Finland wanted to involve it in a war with us. But they did not succeed. The Finnish masses did not want this, because they realized that by doing so they would help their worst enemies, that is, the Russian reactionaries, and they would go against those who alone in Russia are consistent and true defenders of complete Finnish independence and alone stand for sincere and consistent reconciliation and agreement with the Finnish people.

In April we tried to conclude an armistice with Finland, but these negotiations ended in failure, because the very atmosphere of the armistice negotiations responded extremely unfavorably to those concessions, to that political trade, which is necessarily connected with all negotiations. When peace negotiations take place, one government offers concessions to the other. The truce negotiations did not allow this. And nevertheless, a future peace seemed to be behind the terms of the truce. The terms of the armistice were seen as a preliminary stage, as the initial forms of the future peace. In this situation, it was not possible to come to terms with Finland, and we went for something

else: we proposed real peace negotiations, which opened the other day in Yuryev, on June 12. Of course, great difficulties lie ahead both in territorial and financial relations. First, the issue of Eastern Karelia presents a difficulty. Eastern Karelia, that is, several districts of Olonets and Arkhangelsk provinces, are inhabited by Karelians, a people related to the Finns by their origin. We stand on the basis of self-determination of any nationality, and we also stand on the basis of self-determination of the Karelians, the Karelian nationality. The Karelian Labor Revolutionary Committee has already been created, which prepares the Congress of Karelian Soviets on the basis of the national autonomy of the Karelian people. We meet her halfway to the extent required by the interests of the working masses of Karelia. They will be given the full opportunity for their national development. The Karelian Congress of Soviets will establish the forms that are necessary for it, and the forms of relations with the Soviet Republic as a whole.

But we know that something else was done there. There, White Finns campaigned among the local possessing elements, the exploiters: it was these local possessing elements that created the so-called Provisional Government of Eastern Karelia. This government has told us and is still sending us several times over the radio, demanding complete secession, and behind this secession there is another plan - to then join Finland. This is openly expressed. This intrigue did not begin today, and it has been waged for a long time, by representatives of the Finnish great-power imperialism among the possessing elements of Karelia, who want to rely on bourgeois Finland to protect their economic interests. We are receiving protests against this policy from the broad masses of Karelia, who admit that the interests of the working masses of Karelia require that the possessing class of Karelia in no case subordinate them to the Finnish capitalist government. When Finland, in negotiations with us, speaks of its sympathies for the kindred friendly Karelian people, we point out that the kindred Karelian people have full possibility of national self-determination. The Congress of Soviets, which will soon take place, will give him this opportunity. Our negotiations in Yuryev will show how much we will be able to come to an agreement on this basis with Finland, which, as we know, has a plan to subjugate it after the establishment of independence of Karelia. We

will appeal to the broad masses of Finland and find out to them that the interests of the working masses of Karelia are quite satisfied with the fact that now we will do our best to talk to them.

Another difficult question with regard to Finland is the question of Pechenga, that is, a small territorial area where we come into contact with Norway. This territory is inhabited partly by Russian colonists, partly by Lapps and only to a small proportion by Finns, who, as we know, do not at all sympathize with the imperialist policy, the great-power policy of the current Finnish government. The Finnish government refers to the fact that Finland's economic interests require access to the ocean. We are ready to consider these economic interests. In Yuryev, we can talk with the Finns about how to satisfy the real interests of the Finnish people, while at the same time not violating the interests of the Russian working masses. We are convinced that on the basis of mutual recognition of the interests of the working people of both countries, this agreement is quite possible. If an agreement is difficult, we will also appeal to the masses of Finland, pointing out that it is quite possible to peacefully reconcile their interests and the interests of the working masses of Russia. There are financial claims on the part of Finland, which will be considered in Yuryev. Financial claims, in our opinion, are not vital for the broad masses to justify waging war. We stand guard over the interests of the working masses of Russia, we are convinced that the working masses of other countries may well make peace with us on the basis of a mutually beneficial agreement. We are convinced that this agreement with Finland is quite possible.

Negotiations with Latvia have been underway for a month and a half. First of all, we faced significant territorial difficulties. In principle, we stand on the same basis as the government of Latvia, on the basis of an ethnographic basis for the demarcation between the two states. We have recognized this basis. We acted with the same sources, relying on the same scientific research. Nevertheless, our disputes continued for a very long time, and only recently ended in an agreement. In general, we proposed a border along the border of three counties - Lyutsinsky, Dvinsky and Rezhitsky. In addition, the Latvian government wanted to

receive from us a part of the neighboring counties - Ostrovsky, Sebezhsy, Opochetsky and Drissensky. Having carefully considered the ethnographic composition of the population, we agreed to annex to Latvia a whole strip of the Ostrovsky district of the Pskov province, moreover, we agreed to annex the Pytalovsky railway. node for economic reasons, because the [railway] road of Latvia would hang in the air if Latvia did not have this railway. knot. On the contrary, we resolutely opposed the joining of neighboring sections of Opochetskiy, Sebezhskiy and Drissenskiy u [rides] to Latvia, where the population is Belarusian. Latvia gave up its claims, with the exception of the question that took the most time, the question of the neighboring corner of the Drissensky district with Latvia. This corner cuts between Latvia and those Belarusian areas that are occupied by the Polish army. After long disputes, finally, it was quite transparently indicated to us that the occupation of this corner of Driessenskiy near [riding] by Latvia was required by Poland so that the flank of the Polish army could be defended from this side by the army of Latvia. Therefore, the question of this corner of the Driessen district was reduced to the question of Latvia's participation or non-participation, in one form or another, in Poland's struggle against us and, finally, to the question of Latvia's neutrality. The question of this pivotal area of the Driessen district was reduced to the question of Latvia's observance of its neutrality. In principle, the dispute was resolved by the consent of both parties to a plebiscite, but the question of the withdrawal of Latvian troops from this sector remained. The chairman of our delegation, Comrade Joffe said in this regard that "the clash of weapons on the western Russian front affects the mood of the Latvian delegation." In response to this, the chairman of the Latvian delegation said that "the clash of weapons at the front interests the Latvian delegation insofar as it wants to ensure its neutrality."

Thus, after lengthy negotiations, the Latvian delegation has definitely declared to us the observance of neutrality. As a result, a commission was created to discuss the issue of this section in connection with the issue of Latvia's observance of its neutrality. As a result of the commission's work, the first articles of the peace treaty were worked out, which had already been adopted by both delegations. In these

articles, for the first time, the conditions of the plebiscite are elaborated in detail, ensuring complete freedom of the popular vote. An agreement was reached on all points, with only one exception. One controversial point remained and remains unresolved and open. We talked about voting by workers. The Latvian delegation speaks of voting with the inclusion of those who exploit the wage labor of others. Our project says: "if voting is attended by the entire population, with the exception of those who exploit other people's labor for profit." The Latvian version suggests deleting these words. This is the only point of difference between us and the Latvian delegation. In all other respects, the detailed conditions of the plebiscite are a model, worked out to the smallest detail, of guarantees of complete freedom of the population from any pressure from outside during voting.

As for the controversial issue of the withdrawal of Latvian troops and Latvia's preservation of its neutrality, we have come to the following conciliatory formula: the withdrawal of Latvian troops will take place as soon as, by mutual agreement of the contracting parties, martial law on the Russian western front is recognized as allowing it, but in any way if no later than the cessation of hostilities on this front. After a month and a half of negotiations with the Latvian delegation, territorial issues have been resolved, and this extremely difficult issue related to Latvia's neutrality has also been resolved. Now financial issues are to be resolved. The claims of the Latvians are significant. Meanwhile, we refuse to take the point of view that it is necessary to take from us because they are small people, and Soviet Russia is big. We approach the issue of financial obligations from the point of view of the mutual benefit of the working masses of both sides, and we are convinced that the interests of the Latvian working masses and ours clash with one another, and they can be completely reconciled.

The same applies to negotiations with Lithuania. We have great sympathy for the Lithuanian government because it is also the object of imperialism of the Polish ruling strata. The Polish government denies Lithuania's right to independence. Lithuania in its fight against Poland is fighting for its self-determination. But at the same time, in its negotiations with us, this very Lithuanian government reveals such



financial appetites that we can in no way agree to, and we are convinced that the Lithuanian delegation will eventually agree to a mutually beneficial agreement with us. The initial draft submitted to us by the Lithuanian delegation included, among other things, an obligation on our part to denationalize and return to Lithuanian citizens their property; further, we would have to give Lithuania a proportional part of its population of the Russian military and merchant fleet. As far as we know, Lithuania is not a maritime power, so compensation is clearly meant here. Further, part of the state capital and property abroad, for example, embassy buildings, was required from us.

After considering this draft, the Lithuanian delegation itself took it back, and we are convinced that, especially under the pressure of the broad Lithuanian masses, we will be able to find an outcome with Lithuania that is beneficial for both sides, and that the interests of the working masses of Lithuania will prevail over the tendencies of individual groups her ruling layers.

Azerbaijan, red Baku, presents a completely different picture. We do not impose by force of bayonets either our domination or our system. We are not bringing communism anywhere by force, and our neighbors know this; they know that we do not threaten them with either attack or forcible imposition of our system. But we were not mistaken when we expected from such a large industrial center as Baku that the red proletariat itself, by its own forces, would seize power, meet us halfway and enter into the closest fraternal alliance with Soviet Russia. And indeed, as soon as we succeeded in putting an end to Denikin's army in the south, the red Baku proletariat revolted, seized power, and a Soviet government was created in Azerbaijan, which entered into a close alliance with us between two fraternal Soviet governments.

**Now after that, the changed situation affected Georgia as well.** This is one of the most sensitive knots of world politics, and in Georgia we have set ourselves two goals. One goal is that the territory of Georgia does not serve to prepare any attacks against us and does not serve as an arena for troops hostile to Soviet Russia. On the territory of Georgia there are not only the remnants of Denikin's troops, but there are also Entente troops in Batumi, and under an agreement with us, Georgia

pledged to return us both the equipment and the remnants of Denikin's troops that ended up in this territory, and pledged to clear the territory of Georgia from the Entente troops ... A Mixed Commission with our participation will oversee this item. Another goal is to provide the Georgian communists with a legal position, and this is achieved by another article of the amnesty treaty by howling communists. And our office in Georgia 'will make sure that this point does not remain an empty word. Thus, we are convinced that conditions have been created in Georgia for peaceful relations between the Georgian government and our government.

For Georgia we came into contact with Armenia. There is also a bourgeois government in Armenia, nevertheless, in Armenia the pressure of the broad masses leads to the fact that the government is going to reconcile with us, to friendly relations with us more than with the governments of the Entente. And in Armenia, we also set the goal of protecting the communists from persecution, and as soon as we enter into those permanent relations with Armenia that are being prepared by the talks that have begun, our representation in Armenia will also monitor this and think that the communists in Armenia have the opportunity to activity and free agitation.

But more than that, we are everywhere in these countries peacekeepers and arbitrators of territorial disputes between warring nationalities, and they all agree that our troops occupy disputed territories and that mixed commissions under our chairmanship decide questions about disputed territories. They all know that Soviet Russia is a disinterested friend of every small nationality, that only in Soviet Russia can every nationality find protection and patronage against an attack, against a threat to its national existence. And we will play the same role between Armenia and Turkey, just where there has been a constant massacre for generations, just there only Soviet Russia, thanks to its prestige, thanks to its influence on the masses of both people, only it is in able to keep both sides from the national massacre, from the desire to slaughter another nation.

We enter into relations with the Turkish government, which is fighting for its existence in Asia Minor against the predatory governments of

Antanta. We have addressed this government with a note that has already been published. We expected to send our representative office to Asia Minor in the near future. The famous Turkish leader Halil Pasha, representing the Turkish revolutionary government of Asia Minor, is in Moscow. We know that precisely because the Turkish people fell prey to the predation of the Entente, that is why they look at Soviet Russia as their only friend who is completely disinterested. But we enter into friendly relations with Turkey only on those conditions so that mutual delimitation is established between Turkey and neighboring peoples, like the Armenian one, and mutual massacre stops.

**We are also peacekeepers there, and Turkey, just like Armenia,** already agrees that we are mediators, so that under our influence those still-irrelevant contradictions between the Turkish and Armenian peoples that have poisoned their existence for so long are eliminated ...

Thus, gradually in the East, we come into direct contact with peoples fighting for liberation from the oppression of capital. We touched the Persian masses when the remnants of Denikin's fleet escaped in Anzeli. We made a landing only to end these remnants of the Denikin fleet, and we have already cleared Anzeli. Our troops and navy left Persian territory and Persian waters [...]

Our position in Afghanistan is not without difficulties. Afghanistan is fighting against British imperialism, and in this struggle, it has met in us with full support, but at the same time we know that there are also hostile influences of reactionary elements, those layers that fear the growth of the revolutionary movement. On the other hand, the broad masses in Afghanistan treat us, Soviet Russia, with such sympathy, seeing us as the main defenders of the preservation of their independence, and at the same time, influential mountain tribes, exerting strong pressure on the policy of the Afghan government, are so resolutely for a close alliance with us, and the Emir himself is so clearly aware of the British danger that, in general, our friendly relations with Afghanistan are becoming more and more consolidated. In recent public speeches, the emir clearly spoke in favor of close friendship with the Soviet government against the aggressive policy of

England. By force of things, Afghanistan is drawn into the struggle against Britain and is forced to defend itself against British imperialism. Negotiations with England in Mysore ended in nothing. Despite some difficulties, we still have a friend and ally in Afghanistan, and we are convinced that these friendly relations with Afghanistan will develop in the future.

We managed to enter into direct contact with the Chinese government as well. In general, a broad wave of sympathy for Soviet Russia is developing in China, it is expressed in constant resolutions adopted in different places with expressions of enthusiasm for the Soviet Republic. The local Chinese authorities have already entered into direct relations with our authorities. So, it was in Semirechye and Uryankhai. In addition, a special Chinese delegation has now arrived in Siberia to settle a number of issues of broader importance. The Chinese government is extremely fearful because of the pressure exerted on it by the European imperialists. But the further we gain a foothold in Asia, the more by the power of things the Chinese people will turn into reality the community of interests that they have with us and which the broad masses of the Chinese people associate with complete clarity.

As for Japan, it has recently been in talks with the so-called Far Eastern Republic. We recognized this Far Eastern Republic at the request of Japan itself. Its territory extends to the whole of Eastern Siberia, from Lake Baikal to the Pacific Ocean. After that, Japan negotiated partly with us and partly with the government of the Far Eastern Republic, namely about the neutral zone, about the occupation of certain areas by the Japanese, about the evacuation of certain areas by them.

Over time, Japan became more and more demanding, and now the Japanese government has declared that it considers the Far Eastern Republic insufficiently authoritative. The negotiations suffered a hitch, and at the same time a new advance of Japanese troops began in Eastern Siberia. The Japanese captured port facilities in Vladivostok, Northern Sakhalin, port de Kastri, Nikolaevsk-on-Amur and are preparing to seize Kamchatka. They actually control the East Zhntai railroad. etc., they are transferring new divisions along it with the definite intention of a lasting occupation of the territory of the Far Eastern Republic.

Unfortunately, the military clique has now gained the upper hand in Japan, but there not only the mass of workers, but also the broad bourgeois elephant are fighting against this new widespread intervention. The Japanese military clique is putting forward a plan for the occupation of Eastern Si'bnrn up to Irkutsk, but we are convinced that this plan exceeds the actual forces of the Japanese, that on this path the Japanese will not make themselves anything but endless difficulties, military failures, tens of thousands of lives of Japanese soldiers who will be sacrificed. It is on this basis in Japan itself that the movement against the domination of the current extremely reactionary military clique will undoubtedly grow. The landowners who have gained the upper hand in parliament are pursuing this policy, and we think that on this policy they will break their neck. We think that this policy is not durable for NNH.

Korea is already slipping out of their hands. Korea has the strongest revolutionary movement directed against Japan, a movement that takes the form of a social movement, with a program close to communism [...]

Of course, the situation in the East is not the same as in Europe. The East still has a long and complicated process ahead of it. The East is only at the first steps of its revolutionary development. But in the East, there are already elements for a revolutionary movement that will at the same time know the same world struggle. Thus, looking at the world arena, we can say that we stand, as a world force, in the center of the historical process. We stand guard over the interests of the Soviet Republic, the working masses of Russia, and at the same time we are a world force opposing world imperialism. He strains all his forces, makes his last efforts to "strangle you, acts with both military violence and diplomatic machinations, acts by deception, acts with a false semblance of reconciliation, which is not valid. We oppose it with a clear program of our policy of peace, we oppose it with the demands of a real agreement, a real peace that would be mutually beneficial, which would be rooted in the interests of the working masses of both sides. We stand for peace, but not for surrender. We wish, we demand peace. On this basis, we wish to negotiate with the imperialist governments. We believe that negotiations are possible, that they will lead to the goal.

We are convinced that when governments are convinced that their last attempt did not lead to the goal, when our valiant Red Army has dealt with our last enemy, we are convinced that then we will come to the agreement that we are seeking. Then our Peace Policy will become a reality, and we will ensure ourselves the possibility of peaceful construction and the implementation of our program of socialist reconstruction of the entire life of our society, our new socialist construction, which will be the first example for all peoples of the whole world.

Print. according to the brochure "Report of the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs GV Chicherin at a meeting of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee on June 17, 1920. (Transcript) ", NKID, M. 1920.

**November 6, 1920, from Stalin report delivered at a celebration meeting of the Baku Soviet**

In the east, the red army's successes started a ferment which, for instance in Turkey, developed into an outright war against the entente and its allies.

...

And it is not by chance that the leader of the second international, Herr Kautsky, has been thrown out of Germany by the revolution, and that he has been forced to seek asylum in backward Tiflis, with the Georgian social innkeepers.

Lastly, whereas three years ago we observed in the countries of the oppressed east nothing but indifference to the revolution, now the east has begun to stir, and we are witnessing a whole number of liberation movements there directed against the entente, against imperialism. We have a revolutionary nucleus, a rallying centre for all the other colonies and semi-colonies, in the shape of the Kemal government, a bourgeois revolutionary government but one which is waging an armed struggle against the entente.

Whereas three years ago we did not even dare to dream that the east might stir into action, now we not only have a revolutionary nucleus in the east, in the shape of bourgeois revolutionary Turkey; we also possess a socialist organ of the east—the committee of action and propaganda.

All these facts indicating how poor we were in the revolutionary sense three years ago and how rich we have become now; all these facts furnish us with grounds for affirming that Soviet Russia will live, that it will develop and defeat its enemies.

**Telegram from Baku, a member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Caucasian Front to the Plenipotentiary Representative of the RSFSR in Armenia B.V. Legrand**

December 3, 1920 M 935

I transmit Chicherin's telegram for Mdivani No. 115: "We instruct Mdivani to answer the Turks that we are sending a commission from here to negotiate with them on the conclusion of an agreement and we ask the Turkish government to inform when the commission appointed by them for this purpose will leave, and who it will consist of, and what place do they offer for negotiations. In the coming days, we will inform you who will be appointed by us to our commission.

We also ask the Turkish government to inform us what proposals it wishes to make to us for concluding an agreement. It would be desirable for us to know whether the tour [etskoy] government received the draft treaty that we worked out together with Bekir Sami and sent to Angora with Yusuf Kemal. Does the [Turkish] government consider him acceptable and how does it deal with those points of difference between us and Bekir Sami, on which the latter could not make a decision?

So far, we are limited to only this. Further instructions for Mdivani will be sent immediately. Chicherin. December 1, 20 No. 9979 ".

Ordzhonikidze



**Telegram of the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the RSFSR  
to a member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Caucasian  
Front G.K. Ordzhonikidze**

// December 1920

The issuance of weapons must be resumed immediately, but it should be added that we demand the cleansing of the Alexandropol district and the retreat to the Kars region. We do not wait with the issuance of weapons until they do it, but when we start issuing, we count on their fulfillment of our demand. Mdivani will emphasize to the Turks that this is a sign of trust and a desire for friendship.

Chicherin

**From Annual report of the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs  
of the RSFSR to the VIII Congress of Soviets for 1919-1920  
December 22-29, 1920**

**I. GENERAL PROVISION**

(...)

**OUR EASTERN POLICY IN THE SUMMER AND AUTUMN 1920**

This summer, our relations with the so-called elder sister of the Muslim world, Turkey, became the foreground of our eastern policy. Entente imperialism wanted to destroy it by the violent Treaty of Sevres but achieved the point that broad sections of the Turkish masses, embraced by a strong national movement, began a heroic struggle against invasion from outside and foreign oppression. Before the dispersal of the Entente, the Constantinople parliament solemnly adopted the so-called national agreement, or national act, that is, the charter of a new Turkey, for which it vowed to fight to the end. This act contains the proclamation of democratic principles for Turkey itself, the recognition of the rights of national minorities and the rights of other peoples and self-determination. Accordingly, Turkey renounces in this act of domination over Syria and Arabia and turns into a national state of the Turkish people. While in Constantinople Sultan Mohammed VI and the remnants of the old court stratum surrounding him turned into a toy in the hands of the Entente, the whole of Asia Minor was engulfed in a strong Turkish national movement, the central figure of which was Mustafa Kemal Pasha. Its participants at the congresses in Erzurum, Trapezund, Aydin, Usak and Sivas organized and created a government of the Turkish Grand National Assembly in Angora. The Kemalists entered into relations with us through Azerbaijan, where a group of their adherents contributed to the coup and the invitation of the Russian Red troops by the revolutionary Azerbaijani government. The first to arrive in Moscow was the famous commander Halil Pasha, who utterly defeated the British army at Kut-el-Amar and captured General Townsgend. He introduced us for the first time to the aspirations of the new Turkey and the hardships it is going through. After the Grand National Assembly opened in Angora in April, the

Greek offensive in Asia Minor began in May and the Greeks occupied Brusa, Eregli and the Adani vilayet, which finally blocked national Turkey. In August, the ghostly government of the Sultan in Constantinople signed the Treaty of Sevres, after which national Turkey began to see in it a traitor to the Turkish people.

The government of the Grand National Assembly, signed by the chairman of the Assembly, Mustafa Kemal Pasha, on April 26, addressed the Soviet Government with a letter, which reached only the beginning of June. Mustafa Kemal stated in it that Turkey undertakes to fight together with Soviet Russia against the imperialist governments for the liberation of all the oppressed, undertakes to influence the Republic of Azerbaijan so that it enters the circle of Soviet states, expresses its readiness to participate in the struggle against the imperialists in the Caucasus and hopes for the assistance of the Soviet Russia to fight against imperialist enemies who attacked Turkey. In a letter dated June 3 to the President of the Grand National Assembly Mustafa Kemal Pasha, Chicherin said that the Soviet Government took note with satisfaction of the main principles of the foreign policy of the new Turkish government, headed by the Grand National Assembly in Angora, namely the proclamation of Turkey's independence, the incorporation of indisputable Turkish territories into the Turkish state, the proclamation of Arabia and Syria as independent states and the decision to grant Turkish Armenia and other territories with a mixed element to enjoy the right to national self-determination; further, the recognition of the rights of national minorities, providing the Black Sea states with a solution to the issue of the straits, the abolition of capitulations and foreign economic intervention and, finally, the abolition of any spheres of influence of foreign states in Turkey. The Soviet Government expressed the hope that through negotiations the borders between Turkey, on the one hand, Armenia and Persia, on the other hand, would be precisely established on the basis of justice and self-determination of peoples, and the Soviet Government expressed its readiness to be a mediator; it offered to immediately establish diplomatic and consular relations between Russia and Turkey; Following with the liveliest sympathy the heroic struggle of the Turkish people for independence, the Soviet Government was happy to lay a

solid foundation of friendship that should bind the peoples of Turkey and Russia. The People's Commissar of National Turkey Bekir Sami-bey, in a return radio telegram received by us on July 4, expressed the liveliest joy on behalf of the Great National Assembly regarding the letter of comrade. Chicherin on June 3 and expressed his readiness to accept the mediation of Russia to establish borders with Armenia and Persia.

He reported that in view of the violent actions of the Dashnak government against Muslims in Armenia, the Turkish government had already announced mobilization on the eastern front to occupy the necessary strategic points, but upon receiving the letter from Comrade Chicherin, he reported that in view of the violent actions of the Dashnak government against Muslims in Armenia, the Turkish government had already announced mobilization on the eastern front to occupy the necessary strategic points, but after receiving the letter from Comrade Chicherin, it postponed the implementation of this plan; to regulate relations between Russia and Turkey, even before receiving the letter from Comrade Chicherin, it was decided to send a delegation to Moscow, headed by himself, Bekir Sami-bey. Meanwhile, on July 2, Comrade Chicherin wrote a letter to Mustafa Kemal for the second time through Khalil Pasha, again expressing his desire that the peoples of Russia and Turkey would be bound by close ties of friendship as soon as possible. In a reply letter, Mustafa Kemal said that the workers of Western countries fighting against capital and the oppressed peoples of Asia and Africa will have to understand that they must support each other against a common enemy.

The delegation that arrived in Moscow consisted of Bekir Sami and Deputy Yusuf Kemal, with the Turkish communist Dr. Fuad Sabit arriving with them. This first Moscow conference worked out the foundations of the Russian-Turkish treaty, and the Turkish delegation, returning to Angora in the fall, took with it the draft for a report to its government. At that moment, the main difficulty in reaching a full agreement was the question of establishing Turkey's borders in the East. Negotiating, on the one hand, with the Turkish delegation and, on the other hand, with the delegation of the Armenian Dashnak

government led by poet Leon Shant (May-July), the Soviet Government was forced by force of things to find ways to coordinate the territorial claims of both governments. This task was essentially impossible. At that moment, the Dashnak government had already abandoned the plan put forward by the Entente for Greater Armenia, which was supposed to embrace half of Asia Minor and get access to the sea from Syria itself.

But the territorial claims of the Dashnak government were still quite significant, embracing Erzurum, Lazistan with Trebizond and several Turkish vilayets. Even during negotiations with Khalil Pasha, the Soviet Government put forward the principle of an ethnographic border based on national relations that existed before the Great War and proposed mutual resettlement in order to create a homogeneous ethnographic territory on both sides. In principle, this was accepted by the Dashnak delegation, but when trying to concretize this principle, it turned out that the claims of the Dashnaks were still so great that it was not possible to achieve with them an acceptable definition of the borders of Armenia. Leon Shant's delegation left without achieving results. "In negotiations with the delegation of Bekir Sami, the Soviet Government put forward the principle of such a rectification of the old Turkish border, in which lands with a predominant Muslim population, on the one hand, would pass to Turkey, and lands where there was an Armenian majority before 1914 would be transferred to Armenia. But in this case, attempts at a compromise solution to the ethnographic problem were unsuccessful. Moreover, Bekir Sami himself, who differed greatly in his views from the new ruling stratum of the renewed Turkey and who belonged to the old Turkish ruling elite, then used his conversations with Comrade. Chicherin on the topic of correcting the Turkish border in order to try to set up national Turkey against Soviet Russia upon returning to Angora.

At a time when the hopelessness of the attempt to establish a compromise ethnographic border began to be clarified in Moscow, the Turkish government decided to cut the Gordian knot with a sword. The Dashnaks themselves gave a pretext for this by the offensive of the Turks. Under the leadership of Kazim Karabekir Pasha, the eastern

Turkish army easily overthrew the Dashnak Mauserists, put the poorly welded army of the Dashnak government to flight and, with its quick victory, revealed all the illusory nature of the imaginary power of the Dashnak bourgeoisie.

Based on what comrade Chicherin on June 3, the proposal for mediation, accepted by Bekir Sami in his reply letter, the Soviet Government proposed to Turkey and Armenia to implement this mediation, but contrary to its previous statements, the Turkish government rejected the mediation of the Soviet Government that it had previously accepted. The Dashnak government, for its part, still hoping for the mercy of its patroness, the Entente, also rejected our mediation. Moreover, on December 2, when the Armenian Soviet Republic was already proclaimed, the Dashnak peace delegation in Aleksandropol signed a shameful peace, which turned the remaining independent part of Armenia into a de facto Turkish protectorate.

One of the most painful issues in the Caucasus is the question of the borders between the Caucasian national republics. From the moment when Azerbaijan became the Soviet Republic and an outpost of the workers 'and peasants' system in the East, its former border disputes with neighboring republics were further complicated by the opposite of the system. Occupying a part of the disputed Zakatala district, Georgia turned the occupied part of it into a base for counter-revolutionary organizations trying to operate in Azerbaijan. The relations between Azerbaijan and Dashnak Armenia became even more aggravated. In Zangezur, Karabakh, in the Nakhichevan district, in the Sharur-Daralagez district, the national struggle between Armenians and Muslims was further complicated by the world struggle between the Entente imperialism, which the Dashnaks became an outpost, and the Soviet world with its outpost - Azerbaijan. In the interests of peace, the Soviet Government decided to occupy the disputed zone both between Georgia and Azerbaijan and between Armenia and Azerbaijan with its own troops.

The consequence of this was the clash of the Red troops with the Dashnak detachments and the attempts of the Dashnaks to organize uprisings in the rear of the Red troops in the Armenian-populated

areas. This armed struggle was ended by a preliminary peace, concluded by our plenipotentiary representative Legrand in Erivan on August 10th. In Erivan itself, the situation was extremely aggravated, and the brutal Dashnak government responded with punitive expeditions to the movements of the Armenian communists or the oppressed masses. Under the agreement on October 28, Armenia renounced Karabakh, but received Zangezur and Nakhichevan, and was promised a loan of 21/2 million. Finally, the Erivan executioners were eliminated by a coup that began at the end of November and ended with the proclamation of the Armenian Soviet Republic.

(...)

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**Telegram of the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the RSFSR  
to a member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Caucasian  
Front G.K. Ordzhonikidze**

January 18, 1921

Let Comrade Mdivani especially overlaps with the need to get Armenia out of the catastrophic situation. The Turks not only do not render assistance to the Soviet fraternal Republic, but block it, rob it, and condemn it to starvation. The cause of every Soviet Republic is our business, and we would be unfaithful to ourselves if we looked at the death of the fraternal Soviet Republic with indifference.

Let Comrade Mdivani will reassure the Turks about negotiations with England; he knows what the matter is. If they talked about Batum, let him not forget that we cannot agree to the capture of Batum by the Turks, but we will resolve all territorial issues in Moscow. The accuracy of the further issue of weapons is in your hands but let Mdivani adjust the technique<sup>54</sup>.

We inform the Turks of our negotiations with England; let them keep us informed of their negotiations with the Entente and Constantinople. Let Mdivani 'take care of our connection with Angora; we did not respond to Turkish notes because we did not receive them.

Chicherin

Print. by architect.



**February 26, 1921 , the speech at the opening of the Moscow conference on the conclusion of the Soviet-Turkish treaty was delivered on February 26, 1921 by the head of the Soviet delegation G.V. Chicherin.**

In his speech G.V. Chicherin, in particular, said:

“The conference, which I have the honor to open, is destined to create an era in the history of the East and to finally consolidate the close and lasting unity between the peoples of Russia and Turkey, imbued with the same decision to defend their independence against any external oppression and oppression and the right to dispose of their own destiny and decide their own question. political and social order ...

Difficult trials that both people have to endure. If the working Russian people succeeded in repelling an external attack and defeating internal enemies, it was possible to do this only at a great cost and by exerting all their vital forces. Fortified in the process of those unparalleled trials that fell to its lot. Soviet Russia has become a natural ally of all peoples fighting for their freedom, including the Turkish people, with whom we today proclaim indissoluble friendship. In the same way, the new Turkey has to create its new strength in an unheard-of struggle, and just like the Russian people, the Turkish people had to simultaneously become a hero and a victim of their unparalleled suffering. At times it seemed that he was on the edge of an abyss and almost swallowed up by the abyss. And only the amazing courage of the Turkish worker and peasant, who fought off the rapists on the battlefield, opened the way for him to a new future.

By virtue of the Treaty of Sevres, Turkey lost its capital, the Mediterranean coast, two-thirds of Asia Minor was turned into a sphere of influence of France and Italy, and even in that small piece of territory that remained to the Turkish people, it has to be the eternal slave and tributary of the large financial capital of Western Europe ... They hoped that the invasion of the Greek troops would break his resistance, and if it is true that above all the amazing heroism of the Turkish peasant and worker led to a complete change in his position, I am happy to declare that the moral and political assistance that we have provided to Turkey,

our natural ally, the bond that has developed between us since last year has also contributed to this result. And if now the question of revising the Treaty of Sevres has come up, if Constantinople begins to shake off before Angora, if the delegation of the Great National Assembly is invited to the London conference, which, in all likelihood, will end in a postponement of the decision, and not a refusal, we can rightfully declare that, along with the heroism of the Turkish soldier, there is our share in this matter.

The conference that we are opening today should consolidate this unity, which is so important for both our countries, and complete the work that we started last year. The friendship of the peoples of the East is for us the main condition of our international life, just as for Turkey our friendship should be the main basis of its political position. Our moral and political forces are inextricably linked with our alliance with the peoples of the East, who are fighting for their freedom; The friendship that unites us must develop in our and your interests, in the interests of all peoples fighting against the tyranny imposed from the outside. It must find its expression in a formal and final treaty uniting our two peoples. "

Touching further on the issue of the territorial integrity of Turkey and pointing out that the seacoast adjacent to Constantinople should belong to Turkey, G.V. Chicherin continued:

"At the same time, the Turkish people told us last year through their representatives that they are ready to recognize in the straits, where he is the master, a special regime that ensures freedom of trade and guarantees the interests of countries experiencing a natural need for them - countries adjacent to the Black Sea.

So, no disagreements on this vital point can divide us. But above all, the Turkish people must be the master of their home. He must no longer remain a slave to international capital, and the entire old system of foreign intervention must be done away with. Russia set an example in this regard by canceling all of its foreign debts, and therefore we are in a favorable position to negotiate with the Turkish people on this issue.

But above all and with special attention during these negotiations we will treat the interests of the working masses. It is they who want to conclude an alliance through our agency, it is they who formed the new Russia and breathed new life into the old Turkey. In fact, it is only in the working masses that the strength and all life of peoples and states rests. And since these masses are fighting in Turkey and Rosshi, we can be sure that no force in the world can break them. Their only representative in Turkey is the Grand National Assembly. They defend freedom with their breasts. They have risen to repel foreign rapists, and whatever the difficulties they have yet to overcome, they alone ensure victory through their struggle. The hour of victory will soon strike. It is approaching every day, and today's conference will be a new stage that will give new strength to both peoples.

With these thoughts and this confidence, I declare the Conference open.

In a speech in response, delivered in Turkish, the head of the Turkish delegation, Yusuf Kemal, said: "In his speech, Mr. Commissioner praised the Turkish working people and Turkish soldiers who are fighting for the independence of their homeland. I give him endless gratitude for this. At the same time, it is necessary to express praise to the Russian people and the Red Army.

Under the yoke of the same system of coercion, people from both camps near Erzurum died. Our peoples were forcibly thrown into struggle with each other under the pretext of the "Eastern question". This question could not be solved by the imperialists, and Turkey itself solved its own question.

Turkey was so oppressed that bitter experience taught it to rely only on its own strength.

The Treaty of Sevres destroys Turkey, but it exists only in the imagination of those who drew it up, and the Turkish people will never agree to it. At that moment, when he decided to fight to the end, his eyes were presented with an example of another people pursuing an even higher ideal: an agreement naturally arises between them with the aim of common action. I believe that under the prevailing conditions, historical determinism would have forced our two peoples to come to

an agreement even if it was contrary to the wishes of the rulers. I will not refer to historical facts, but I dare to assure all workers in Russia, peasants, workers and soldiers, that the Turkish people are sincerely extending their hand to them.

Let London revise the Treaty of Sevres. We know too well in what sense this revision can be made and what benefits it promises to the Turkish people. Is it possible for imperialism to abandon its demands?

We have chosen the surest path. Geographical, historical, economic and political conditions showed us the way to Russia. Before the representatives of the new Russia, I say with all the sincerity characteristic of the Turk: believe in us. Let the people who control world politics consult, they are powerless to change the course of history. All the meetings that are taking place will not force us to deviate from the right path on which we stand.

Let's take a look at the present situation: we have two valiant peoples who want to get rid of world capitalism. New Turkey has a new source of energy: the Turkish people have become quite conscious of the meaning of economic domination. He knows that economic independence is the main factor in the life of the nation, and such a Turkey will undoubtedly be able to win back complete freedom for itself. As you just said, the common interests of our peoples make us unite our efforts in order to give new strength to our peoples, and we must subordinate all our actions and aspirations to cooperation. A unity has already emerged between us: we are firmly convinced that it will grow in volume and strength. We sympathize with all your desires for collaboration. When the details of the existing draft treaty are clarified, it can be made public to the whole world. We must declare not only Asia, but also the peoples of the West and the imperialists of the treaty between the Moscow government, the hotbed of communism, and Turkey, the hotbed of aspirations for the liberation of the eastern world. This treaty will show the whole world that it contains the freedom of peoples and the right of everyone to a free and independent existence, that we have no views on this or that territory and we are not like those who sit in London. Such a comparison will show that we alone are the bearers of the freedom of nations. Both

nations are fighting for the same ideal, and if an agreement is not concluded between them, the blame will fall entirely on those who had the duty to do so.

The Turkish delegation, imbued with a sense of its duty, wishes to start negotiations with this "consciousness and, as soon as possible, arrive at satisfactory results." - 515.

**Treaty between Russia and Turkey, article no. 598.**

**March 16, 1921**

The government of the Russian socialist federal republic and the government of the grand national assembly of Turkey, sharing the principles of brotherhood of nations and the right of peoples to self-determination, noting the solidarity existing between them in the struggle against imperialism, as well as the fact that any difficulties created for one of the two peoples worsen the situation another, and wholly inspired by the desire to establish between them permanent cordial relations and an indissoluble friendship based on the mutual interests of both parties, decided to conclude an agreement of friendship and brotherhood and appointed for this as their delegates:

The government of the Russian socialist federal Soviet republic: Georgy Vasilyevich *Chicherin*, people's commissar for foreign affairs and a member of the all-Russian central executive committee, and Dzhelal Edin *Korkmasov*, a member of the all-Russian central committee, and

Government of the Turkish grand national assembly: *Yusuf Kemal-bey*, people's commissar for national economy of the Turkish grand national assembly, MP *Kastamonu* in the same assembly.

Dr. *Riza Nur bey*, people's commissar for education of the grand national assembly of Turkey, deputy of *Sinop* in the same assembly and

*Ali Faud pasha*, ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary of the Turkish grand national assembly, member from *angora* in the grand national assembly, who, after exchanging powers found in proper and legal form, have agreed as follows:

**Article I.**

Each of the contracting parties agrees in principle not to recognize any peace treaties or other international acts, the adoption of which would be compelled by force by the other of the contracting parties. The government of the RSFSR agrees not to recognize any international acts concerning Turkey and not recognized by the national government of Turkey, now represented by its grand national assembly.

The term Turkey in this treaty means the territories included in the Turkish national assembly of January 28, 1336 (1920), worked out and proclaimed by the ottoman chamber of deputies in Constantinople and reported to the press and all powers.

The northeastern border of Turkey is determined by: the line that, starting from the village of Sarpi, located on the black sea, passes through the Khedis-mta mountain, the watershed line of the Shavshet mountain-Kanni Dag, it then follows the northern administrative border of the Arden and Kars Sandjak - along thalweg of the Arpa-chay and Araks rivers to the mouth of the lower Karasu (detailed description of the border and issues related to it are defined in appendix I (a) and (b) and on the attached map signed by both contracting parties).

#### **Article ii.**

Turkey agrees to cede suzerainty to Georgia over the port and city of Batumi and the territory lying to the north of the border specified in art. I-sth of the current treaty and constituting a part of the Batumi district, provided that:

1) the population of the localities specified in this article of the treaty will enjoy broad local autonomy in administrative terms, ensuring each community its cultural and religious rights, and that the population will be given the opportunity to establish a land law in accordance with its wishes.

2) Turkey will be provided with free transit of any goods sent to or from Turkey through the Batumi port, duty-free, without causing any delays and without imposing any fees on them, with the granting of Turkey the right to use the Batumi port without being charged for that special fees.

#### **Article iii.**

Both contracting parties agree that the Nakhichevan region, within the boundaries specified in appendix (b) of this agreement, forms an autonomous territory under the auspices of Azerbaijan, provided that Azerbaijan does not cede this protectorate to any third state.

In the triangle-forming zone of the Nakhichevan territory included between the thalweg of Araks, and in the west by the line passing through the Dagna mountains (3829) - Veli-dag (4121) - Bagarzik (6587) - Kemurlu-dag (6930), the border line of the indicated territory, starting from mount Kemurlu-dag (6930), passing over mount Serai-bulak (8071) - Ararat station and ending at the crossing of Kara-su with Araks, will be corrected by a commission consisting of delegates from Turkey, Azerbaijan and Armenia.

**Article iv .**

Both contracting parties, noting the contact between the national liberation movement of the peoples of the east and the struggle of the working people of Russia for a new social system, solemnly recognize for these peoples the right to freedom and independence, and equally their right to choose a form of government in accordance with their wishes.

**Article the v .**

In order to ensure the opening of the straits and the freedom of passage of merchant ships for all peoples, both contracting parties agree to transfer the final elaboration of the international status of the black sea and the straits to a special conference of the delegates of the littoral countries, provided that its decisions do not prejudice the full sovereignty of Turkey, as well as security of Turkey and its capital Constantinople.

**Article vi.**

Both contracting parties acknowledge that all contracts concluded so far between both parties correspond to mutual interests. They therefore agree to declare these treaties canceled and null and void.

The government of the Russian socialist federative Soviet republic declares in particular that it considers Turkey free from any monetary or other obligations to it based on international acts previously concluded between Turkey and the tsarist government.

**Article vii.**



The government of the Russian socialist federative Soviet republic, considering the regime of surrender to be incompatible with the free national development of any country, as well as with the full exercise of its sovereign rights, considers all actions and rights that have anything to do with this regime invalid and canceled.

#### **Article viii.**

Both contracting parties undertake to prevent the formation or presence on their territory of organizations or groups claiming the role of the government of the other party or part of its territory, as well as the presence of groups with the aim of fighting another state. Russia and Turkey assume the same obligation with respect to the Soviet republics of the Caucasus, subject to reciprocity.

It shall be considered established that the Turkish territory referred to in this article means the territory under the direct military and civil administration of the government of the Turkish grand national assembly.

#### **Article ix.**

In order to ensure the continuity of relations between both countries, the contracting parties undertake to take, by joint agreement, all the necessary measures in order to maintain and develop at the possible speed of railway, telegraph and other means of communication, as well as ensuring the free movement of people and goods between both parties, without any delays.

However, it is recognized that the rules established in each country will fully apply to the movement, entry and exit of both travelers and goods.

#### **Article x.**

Citizens of both contracting parties residing in the territory of the other side will be subject to all rules and obligations arising from the laws of the country in which they are located, with the exception of national defense obligations from which they will be exempted.

Matters concerning family law, inheritance law and legal capacity of citizens of both parties also constitute an exception to the provisions of this article. They will be allowed by special agreement.

**Article xi.**

Both contracting parties agree to apply the most-favored-nation principle to citizens of each contracting party residing in the territory of the other party.

This article does not apply to the rights of citizens of the Soviet Union of Russia, as well as to the rights of citizens of Muslim countries, union of Turkey.

**Article xii.**

Any resident of the territories that constituted part of Russia before 1918, which the government of the Russian socialist federative Soviet republic recognizes as currently under the sovereignty of Turkey on the basis of this treaty, has the right to freely leave Turkey and take with him his things and his property, or their value. A similar right extends to the inhabitants of the territory of Batumi, whose sovereignty is ceded to Georgia by this treaty.

**Article xiii.**

Russia undertakes to return to Turkey at its own expense to the northeastern border of Turkey, extending the 3-month period for European Russia and the Caucasus and 6-month period for Asian Russia, counting from the date of signing this treaty, all prisoners of war and civilian prisoners of war of the Turks, located in Russia.

The details of this repatriation will be established by a special convention, which will be developed immediately upon the signing of this agreement.

**Article xiv.**

Both contracting parties agree in the near future to conclude a consular convention, as well as agreements governing all economic, financial

and other issues necessary for the establishment of friendly relations between both countries specified in the introduction to this agreement.

**Article xv.**

Russia undertakes to take in relation to the Transcaucasian republics the steps necessary for the obligatory recognition by these republics in the treaties that they will conclude with Turkey of the articles of this treaty that directly concern them.

**Article xvi.**

This treaty is subject to ratification, the exchange of instruments of ratification will take place in Kars as soon as possible.

This treaty will enter into force on the date of the exchange of the instruments of ratification, with the exception of article xiii.

In witness to the foregoing, the aforementioned plenipotentiaries have signed this treaty and affixed their seals to it.

Done in duplicate in Moscow on March 16, 1921 (one thousand three hundred thirty-seventh).

*Georgy Chicherin.*

*Jalal Korkmasov.*

*Yusuf Kemal.*

*Dr. Riza Noor.*

*Ali Fuad.*

**Appendix I (a).**

The northeastern border of Turkey is established as follows (according to the map of the Russian general staff of scales 1 / 210.000 - 5 versts in inch):

There he leaves this river and, walking along the watershed, goes to mount Ayrilyan-bashi (8512), passes through the Kelle-tapa mountains (9709), reaches mount Kasris-seri (9681) and follows the Karzamet-chai river to the Kura river, from there it goes along the watershed of the Kura river to the point that to the east of the village of Kartanakev, where it departs from the Kura, passing along the watershed line of mount Kara-ogly

(7259) - from there, dividing lake Khazanin into two parts, it goes to an altitude of 7580, and from there to mount Geg- dag (9152) - walks along the mountains Uch-tanalyar (9783), Tayla-kala (9716) - peak 9065, where it leaves the former border of the ardagan district and passes through the mountains of b. Akhbaba (9063) - 8828 (8827) - 7602 - passing to the east from the village of Ibish, it reaches a height of 7518 and then to the Kizil-dash mountain (7439) (7440) - the village of Nov. Kizil-dash (kizil-dash) - passing to the west of Karamemed, goes to the Dzhambushu-chai river,

(n. V. Of course, the border follows the watershed lines of the above heights).

*Georgy Chicherin.*

*Jelal korkmasov.*

*Yusuf Kemal.*

*Dr. Riza Noor.*

*Ali Fuad.*

*Document note:*

<sup>1</sup> the name jambushu-chai is not indicated on the map of the 1899 edition.

**Appendix I (b).**

Taking into account that the border line, as indicated in appendix I (a), are the thalwegs of the Arpa-chay and Araks rivers, the government of the grand national assembly undertakes to move the blockhouse line at a distance of 8 versts from the Alexandropol-Erivan railway in its present tracing in the area of the railway in the Araks region. The lines bordering the above-mentioned areas are indicated below for the Arpa-chay zones in points a and b of paragraph 1 and for the Araks zone in paragraph 2.

**I. Zone Arpa-chai**

A) southeast of Varganli, east of Uzun-kilis through mount Bozyar (5096), 5082 - 5047 - east of Karmir-vaik - Uch-tapa (5578), east of Arazoglu, east of ani, reaches Arpa-chai west of Yeni-koy.

B) it departs from Arpa-chay to the east of the height of 5019 - goes straight to the height of 5481 - 4½ versts east of Kyzyl-Kum - two versts east of Bojaly - then the Digor-chai river - follows this river to the village of Duz -kechut and goes directly north of the ruins of Karabat and goes to Arpa-chai.

## **Ii. Zone of Araks**

Direct line between Kharaba Alijan and the village of Suleiman (diza). In areas bounded on one side by the Alexandropol-erivan railway line and on the other by lines located at a distance of 8 and 4 versts from the above-mentioned railway line. The government of the grand national assembly undertakes not to build any fortifications (these lines of distance are outside the above zones) and does not contain regular troops in them, however, it retains the right to have troops in the above zones necessary to maintain order, security and for administrative needs.

*Georgy Chicherin.*

*Jalal Korkmasov.*

*Yusuf Kemal.*

*Dr. Riza Noor.*

*Ali Fuad.*

## **appendix I (b).**

### **Territory of Nakhichevan.**

Station Ararat-mountain saray bulak (8071) - Kemurlu-dag (6839), (6930) - 3080 - sayat-dag (7868) - the village of Kurt-kulag (kurt-kulak) - Gamessur-dag (8160) - height 8022 - Kuri-dag (10282) and the eastern administrative border of the former Nakhichevan district.

*Georgy Chicherin.*

*Jalal Korkmasov.*

*Yusuf Kemal.*

*Dr. Riza Noor .Ali Fuad.*

**Note from the representative of the people's commissariat of foreign affairs of the RSFSR in Turkey to the commissioner for foreign affairs**

**of the government of the grand national assembly of Turkey Ahmed Mukhtar.**

April 6, 1921 no. 317

Mr. Commissioner,

I hasten to inform you of the translation of the telegram I have just received, comrade Chicherin, people's commissariat of the RSFSR:

"formally convey to the Turkish government our congratulations, lively joy and the friendliest feelings on the occasion of the signing of the treaty between Russia and Turkey, which is the cornerstone of the friendly relations between our peoples so necessary for the entire east."

Please accept, Mr. Commissioner, the assurances of my highest consideration.

Representative of the people's commissariat of the RSFSR

P. Mdivani

Print. By architect.

This note was sent in connection with the following note by Ahmet Mukhtar to Chicherin dated March 21, 1921:

"Mr. Commissioner,

We have just received the Russian text of the treaty of friendship and brotherhood, signed on March 16 in Moscow by delegates from both sides. Although we received this text with large gaps and significant distortions during transmission, I want to express without further expectation the joy that I feel on the occasion of this first and important step taken by the peoples of Russia and Turkey towards the necessary unity for the realization of their common ideal of justice and freedom. I am confident that with the receipt of the full text of the treaty, our sense of satisfaction will only increase.

The working people of Russia, who are trying to free the world from the dominance of capitalism, and the working people of Turkey, who are trying to free it from the dominance of imperialism, will gladly

welcome the new era of success and achievements that is opening up before them thanks to the coordination of their efforts and the good agreement between their leaders.

Greeting you as one of the leading figures in this field, I ask you, Mr. Commissioner, to accept, along with my congratulations, the assurances of my highest consideration. "

**Letter from the representative of the people's commissariat of foreign affairs of the RSFSR in Turkey to the chairman of the grand national assembly of Turkey Mustafa Kemal.**

April 9, 1921 no. 319

Mr. Chairman,

I am happy to see that the valiant Turkish people, led by their national government headed by you, have once again triumphed over the new effort of imperialism to seize their native land and subject it to their exploitation. But at the same time, I see with sorrow that the defeated and forced to leave your territory, the Greek troops, seeing the final collapse of their hopes to achieve the intended goal, in impotent rage, completely devastate the country as they purify, plunging the population into terrible poverty, - another proof of that that imperialism can only destroy, having no other goal than satisfying its own greed. Toiling Russia, which itself has taken so much trouble to rid itself of the greed of western capitalism and imperialism, follows with lively participation the noble struggle of the Turkish people in defense of their national existence and is always ready to alleviate their suffering as much as possible. Therefore, I ask you, Mr. Chairman, on behalf of the RSFSR and the working people of Soviet Russia, to accept their modest gift of 30,000 rubles in gold to alleviate the needs of the population of those areas that the cruel invader devastated before leaving them.

I flatter myself with the hope that this modest gift of the working people of Russia will help the Turkish people understand the difference between rapacious imperialism, on the one hand, and the fraternal people of the working people of Soviet Russia, on the other.

In conclusion, I wish you to complete your struggle for the independence of the Turkish people as soon as possible and with full success, and I ask you, Mr. Chairman, to accept the assurances of my highest consideration.

Representative of the people's commissariat for foreign affairs of the RSFSR

Mdivani

Print. By architect.



The following reply from Mustafa Kemal was received to this letter on April 12, 1921:

"Mr. Representative,

I bring you my deep gratitude for the sum of 30,000 rubles in gold, which you were pleased to transfer to the red crescent society in favor of those who survived the Greek massacre in the areas liberated by our victory. This generous and humane act of Soviet Russia towards the unfortunate, whom the greed of imperialism and the barbarism of the Greeks plunged into the most terrible poverty, will be fully appreciated by the entire Turkish people. On the other hand, I am happy to see your lively participation in the struggle of the Turkish people defending their homeland against the invader. The atrocities and devastations committed by the Greeks are such that they should revolt the human conscience, and I would be very grateful if you would report this to your government with a request to give widespread publicity to the crimes committed by the Greeks during their last offensive.

Taking your wishes for an early and complete victory of our troops over all our enemies as a good omen, I ask you, Mr. Representative, to accept the assurances of my deepest respect. "

**Telegram of the government of the Azerbaijan SSR to the government of the grand national assembly of Turkey.**

March 23, 1921

Admiring the heroic struggle of the Turkish people, who refused to submit to the violence of the victorious imperialists and did not slow down with criticism and weapons to prove the fragility of the entente's plans in dividing the world, the Azerbaijani Soviet government was always eager to lend a hand of fraternal assistance to the Turkish people. However, an entente mercenary, the Menshevik government of Georgia, stood in the way of realizing this desire, which, implementing the entente's plans for the Turkish people, invariably denied the Azerbaijani Soviet government the right to transit through Georgia to Turkey the liquid fuel that the Turkish people desperately need. But now, when the red banner of workers 'and peasants' power has hoisted over Georgia, the Azerbaijani Soviet government is getting the opportunity to prove in practice its ardent sympathy for the Turkish people and to provide them with all possible assistance. From Baku, with the assistance of Soviet Georgia, the first oil route to Kars is sent to the Turkish people, consisting of 30 oil tanks and 2 gasoline tanks, to which 8 kerosene tanks will be connected in Tiflis.

the Azerbaijani Soviet government deeply and sincerely believes that at the moment when the signing of the treaty in Moscow consolidates the commonwealth of Russia, this cradle of world liberation of workers, with revolutionary Turkey, this first aid of Soviet Azerbaijan to the Turkish people opens a new era of close communication of fraternal peoples along the historical paths of liberation of the east ...

People's commissar for foreign affairs

D. Huseynov.

**Note of the people's commissar for foreign affairs of the RSFSR to the ambassador of Turkey to the RSFSR Ali Fuad.**

April 6, 1921 no. 11/551

Mr. Ambassador,

The Georgian Soviet government informed us that the Russian and Georgian ships, which were in Batumi and were taken away from this port by the French, partially took refuge in the ports of the northern coast of Asia minor. As soon as we receive accurate data on the ships actually staying in these ports, I will immediately inform you of these data, but now I ask you to confirm to me the decision of your government to take all necessary measures so that these ships are returned to the Russian and Georgian Soviet the republics, which you spoke to me during our yesterday's conversation.

I allow myself to ask you, Mr. Ambassador, to bring to the attention of your government the desire expressed by the Russian Soviet government that the government of the grand national assembly give the necessary instructions so that the indicated ships return to the ports of the Soviet republics as soon as possible.

Please accept, Mr. Ambassador, my sincere assurances of my highest consideration.

**Note of the people's commissar for foreign affairs of the RSFSR to the ambassador of Turkey to the RSFSR Ali Fuad.**

April 8, 1921 no. 11/568

Mr. Ambassador,

I cannot hide from you my deep surprise, which I experienced when I read the statements of the minister of war of the government of the grand national assembly of Turkey Kemal Fevzi pasha, which I was informed about from Trapezoid in the newsletter. The minister of war declares, in particular, that the Turkish army of the eastern front, while remaining in the Caucasus, should serve as an element of balance there. It is difficult for me to understand which other military force the Turkish army of the eastern front is intended to oppose to restore the balance of power in the Caucasus. Since the only other military force in the area is the united red armies of the Soviet republics, the conclusion is that, in the opinion of the minister of war, the Turkish army should serve as an element hostile to the Soviet forces and intended to be a counterbalance to their military power.

In the same statement, the minister of war says that the part of Armenia that is still under the occupation of Turkish troops will be evacuated only after the entry into force of the treaty of Alexandropol. Let me remind you that the treaty of Alexandropol was concluded with the Dashnak government at the time when the Armenian Soviet government was already proclaimed, and that it was not ratified, although, according to the text of this treaty, ratification within a month was a condition of its entry into force ... But even if we leave this consideration aside, then all the main provisions of the treaty of Alexandropol were canceled in part by the Moscow treaty, in part by statements by two delegations about the preservation of the right of absolute and complete sovereignty of the Soviet republics. To wish for the fulfillment of the treaty of Alexandropol is tantamount to annulling the Moscow treaty. Therefore, Mr. Ambassador, it would be extremely important for me to get clarifications from you in connection with the above-mentioned statements by the minister of war of your government.

I take this opportunity to remind you that it is imperative to achieve the urgent evacuation of Alexandropol by Turkish troops in order to avoid the unfortunate consequences of the continued occupation of this city by the Turks.

Please accept, Mr. Ambassador, my sincere assurances of my highest consideration.

Chicherin

Print. By architect.

To this note, Ali Fuad received a reply from April 10, 1921, no. 280, which, in particular, said:

“the statements attributed to the military commissioner of my government, which I am not yet aware of, appear to have been made before the announcement of the establishment of a new communist government in Erivan was received in angora. Putting facts and dates in their proper place in this way, it is clear that the above-mentioned statements only express views that are resolutely directed against imperialism and, therefore, favorable for the Soviet armed forces.

As for the question of the need to evacuate the territories on this side of the border line established by the Russian-Turkish treaty, I already had the honor to give Mr. Komisar an answer regarding this in my letter dated April 10, 1921, no. 274.

During the negotiations at the Moscow conference, the Turkish delegation repeatedly explained the circumstances and decisive motives that dominated the conclusion of the treaty of Alexandropol with Armenia. And during the same negotiations we expressed to the Russian delegation our firm hope that after the disappearance of all factors that disturb and peace, and the coming to power of a truly Soviet Armenian government, all articles and conditions included in this treaty to ensure our security against aggressive elements will be canceled. At the present time, I have the same hope. In addition, I officially declare that the provisions of the Russian-Turkish treaty, which is the result of the conference, which concern the Soviet republics, are clear and final.

I have sent to my government all messages that have been made to me by Mr. Commissioner. Nevertheless, in view of the fact that Mr. Komisar often manages to deal with angora faster than the Turkish embassy, I allow myself to suggest to him the idea of discussing this

issue directly with angora through the intermediary of comrade Mdivani as the fastest way to resolve this issue.

In this case, I have the honor, Mr. Commissioner, to repeat to you once again that the friendship and good intentions of Turkey towards Soviet Russia, as well as the fraternal republics with strong ties to it, are deep and unchanging.

Assuring you that the future will fully confirm my present statements and precedents, I have the honor to ask you, Mr. Commissioner, to accept the assurances of my highest consideration. "

**Telegram of the government of the Azerbaijan SSR to the government of the grand national assembly of Turkey.**

April 24, 1921

On the anniversary of that historic day when, as a result of the entente's attempts to crush independent Turkey, the mass of the Turkish people in revolutionary anger raised their weapons for a sacred struggle, the Azerbaijani Soviet government, sharing the joy of this historic celebration, sends its sincere congratulations to the government of the revolutionary Turkey.

On the day of two years of heroic tension and sacrifices of the Turkish people for the right to an independent life, the Turkish people can sum up the results of a great victory over those who, under the command of the entente, tried to kill the proud impulse for freedom and independence with fire and iron. Triumphant together with the Turkish people over the tremendous successes of fraternal arms over our common enemy, the Azerbaijani Soviet government expresses its deep, indestructible conviction that the day is not far off when the victorious troops of revolutionary Turkey will hoist their victorious banners over their historical capital, Istanbul.

Long live revolutionary Turkey!

Long live the union of the Soviet federation with Turkey!

Pre-revolutionary committee

I. Narimanov

Narkomindel

D, Huseynov

**Note of the people's commissar for foreign affairs of the RSFSR to the ambassador of Turkey to the RSFSR Ali Fuad.**

April 26, 1921 no. 758

Mr. Ambassador,

Leaving Batum, the former Georgian government took with it the following ships belonging to the Russian republic, which, according to an agreement concluded between the former Georgian government and the Russian government, were to be handed over to representatives of Russia: maria, a passenger steamer of the former Russian company; vesta, a merchant ship owned by the former Russian company; "Ilya Morozov" and the steam schooner "Amvrozia"; motor sailors "Anapra", "saint Nicholas", "bayan", "Elena", "Vasily", "peter the great", "saint Alexei", "Strogiy", "Verdun ii", "Maria" and "Alexander".

In addition, ships were taken away, which are the property of Russia and which the Georgian republic has not yet agreed to hand over to it, namely: the minesweeper castor with two barges and the steamer donets.

Some of these ships took refuge in the ports of Asia minor, directly subordinate to the government. The grand national assembly of Turkey, others arrived in Constantinople.

Considering Constantinople the capital of Turkey, we turn to you with an official petition for the return of those of our ships that are there, and, since the ports of Asia minor are fully subordinate to your government, we ask you to hand over the Russians who have taken refuge there as soon as possible to our authorities. Court.

Please accept, Mr. Ambassador, the assurances of my highest consideration.

Chicherin

**Note of the people's commissar for foreign affairs of the RSFSR to the ambassador of Turkey to the RSFSR Ali Fuad.**

May 13, 1921 no. 11/930

Mr. Ambassador,



The Russian government is informed by its military authorities in the Caucasus that the Turkish troops, evacuating Alexandropol, caused great material damage to the combined armies of the Russian republic and the Transcaucasian republics, including blowing up the powder depots belonging to these armies, which is an extremely important loss, the amount of which is still not yet calculated.

The Russian government strongly protests against hostile actions by the military authorities of a friendly country. These actions cause him all the more surprise because they are taking place at the very moment when the Russian government is providing the friendly government of the great national assembly with all the assistance it is able to provide.

The Russian government reserves the right to revisit this issue when it receives more detailed information from its military departments.

Please accept, Mr. Ambassador, the sincere assurance of my deepest respect.

Chicherin

**Note of the people's commissar for foreign affairs of the RSFSR to the ambassador of Turkey to the RSFSR Ali Fuad.**

May 18, 1921 no. 11/1013

Mr. Ambassador,

With great regret, I am compelled to once again draw the attention of the government of the grand national assembly to the actions of the Turkish authorities, which cause a deplorable surprise in our people and which cannot be considered nothing more than a sign of a hostile spirit against the Russian federal republic. From the numerous information received by our military authorities, it is clear that acts of violence are being committed in the Kars territory against the inhabitants of Russian origin, who remained there in small numbers.

The Turkish authorities are forcibly expelling these Russians from their villages in order to settle instead of them Muslims specially brought from Asia minor. In the village of Novoye Mikhailovka, 2000 Muslims were settled in this way, and the Russian population was placed in stables and barns. Newcomers have sown the fields. The same was done in the villages of Grenadierskoe, Novopokrovskoe and others.

On behalf of the Russian government, I protest in the most energetic manner against such actions by the Turkish authorities and consider it my duty to draw your attention to the feelings that they evoke in the working masses of Russia in the face of such violence against the Russian population of the Kars region.

I also draw your attention to the predicament these actions put us in because of the excitement they cause in our people. Understand that under such conditions it will be impossible for us to go further along the path mentioned in your note no. 424 of 15 May <sup>1</sup>.

I am deeply convinced, Mr. Ambassador, that you will soon provide accurate data on the cessation of these sad actions and on the change in the behavior of the local Turkish authorities in relation to the Russian population in this area.

Please accept, Mr. Ambassador, the sincere assurance of my highest consideration.

Chicherin

Print. By architect.

<sup>1</sup> the note of the Turkish embassy dated May 15, 1921 indicated the difficulties allegedly experienced by the Turkish consul in Tuapse when sending military materials to Turkey, in the repatriation of former Turkish prisoners of war, etc. The note contained a request to give appropriate instructions to the local authorities, as well as to accelerate the dispatch to Turkey of arms, military equipment and funds in order, as the note emphasized, "to bring closer the friendly relations so happily created between the two governments."

**Note of the people's commissar for foreign affairs of the RSFSR to the ambassador of Turkey to the RSFSR Ali Fuad.**

May 24, 1921 no. 11/1092

Mr. Ambassador,

Only from your no. 460 dated May 24, I learned that some difficulties had arisen in issuing to major Saffet-bey the amount that was to be transferred to him through the foreign trade commissariat. The exchange of letters on this matter, of course, was carried out with this latter, and not with us. In any case, neither from your side, nor from anyone else, I have not received messages that there is such a difficulty.

With regard to the concluding remarks contained in your aforementioned dispatch, I received a certain assurance from citizen Ordzhonikidze that the 4 million in gold that the delegates of the grand national assembly of Turkey Yusuf Kemal-bey and Rizahyp-bey took with them were indeed transported them across the Turkish border.

I also allow myself to express the hope that the Turkish ships that left the black seaports, thanks to the efforts of citizen Samsonov, have already arrived at their destination.

Please accept, Mr. Ambassador, my sincere assurances of my highest consideration.

Chicherin

**Note of the people's commissar for foreign affairs of the RSFSR to the ambassador of Turkey to the RSFSR Ali Fuad.**

May 29, 1921

Mr. Ambassador,

In response to your personal and urgent letter no. 472 dated May 25, <sup>1</sup>, to which instructions are attached, I allow myself to inform you that our government considers the issue raised in this letter to be extremely important. Unfortunately, I cannot immediately give you an answer on the question that is the main subject of this post. You are well aware of the extremely difficult financial situation our republic is in. Consumption of gold on a colossal scale for us remains an expense, even if it takes on the character of a loan. We are well aware of the enormous political significance of the issue of the loan, which your government should have concluded, and we cherish the hope that soon we will be able to put forward concrete proposals on this issue. Unfortunately, at the moment I am not able to inform you of them.

Once again, I express my great surprise at the statement that Turkey did not receive any assistance from our side. According to the information we have and which we will soon be able to confirm with documentary evidence, the assistance provided to your government before the conclusion of the Moscow treaty was much more significant than it was then established. As for the assistance provided later, more than half of it is already outside the Soviet territory, and the necessary measures are being taken in order to successfully complete this operation.

Some new proposals, formulated in the attached instructions, will be considered by our government with the same desire to do everything in our power in this direction.

Please accept, Mr. Ambassador, your sincere assurances of my highest consideration.

Chicherin

In connection with this note, Ali Fuad's note of June 6, 192 has been received! G. No. 511, which said:

"Mr. Commissioner,

I learned with pleasure that with the exception of cannons, artillery supplies and draft horses, the rest of the military materials and military

supplies of the first part of the material aid promised by the government of Soviet Russia to the government of the grand national assembly of Turkey, that is, guns, machine guns and their equipment, were sent from Tuapse to Anatolia.

I have the honor to thank, on behalf of my government, the sincere conduct of the government of the RSFSR, which, despite the great difficulties of transport in Russia, paid serious attention to the urgent needs of our armies in military equipment and military supplies and did everything possible to send them to Turkey as soon as possible. Way.

Please accept, Mr. Commissioner, the assurance of my sincere respect.  
"

<sup>1</sup> the instruction of the Turkish government, mentioned in the letter of May 25, 1921, obliged the Turkish ambassador to put before the government of the RSFSR the issue of providing Turkey with financial assistance in the amount of 50 million rubles. Gold "under the guise of a loan or in any other form," as well as the construction of a powder factory and a smokeless powder factory in Turkey.

**Note of the people's commissar for foreign affairs of the RSFSR to the ambassador of Turkey to the RSFSR Ali Fuad**

June 6, 1921 no. 11/1297

Mr. Ambassador,

In response to your no. 498 of June 3, to which the instructions are attached, I must first of all note that article xv of the Moscow treaty, to which you refer, remained unfulfilled not at all through the fault of the Russian government or the governments of the Transcaucasian Soviet republics, but because of the only the reason is that the Turkish delegation, which left Tiflis for a short time in order to enter into direct contact with its government, has not returned to Tiflis since then, which made it impossible to conclude treaties stipulated between Turkey and the Transcaucasian republics.

As a result, the latter have not yet assumed the obligations that are based on the Moscow treaty and will follow for them from the treaties that they will sign with the government of the great national assembly. However, they are not abandoning the implementation of article xii, which concerns the right of residents of the Kars territory to leave this territory if they so wish. For me, there is no doubt that the messages made to us regarding the alleged refusal of some border authorities to admit Molokans to the territory of the Soviet republics are the result of a misunderstanding, since in the course of our exchange of views with the Transcaucasian governments regarding the Russian population of the Kars territory, these governments never did not question their willingness to admit Molokans to their territory. However, it should be added, that according to the same article, residents who wish to leave this territory, by virtue of the agreement, have the right to take with them all their property, which, unfortunately, was denied to the Molokans by the Turkish authorities; moreover, the Molokans were subjected to robbery and all kinds of oppression; they were deprived of their land plots, kicked out of their homes and, half-dead from hunger, were herded into sheds and stalls. It is this unheard-of treatment to which the Russian population of this territory was subjected that caused such unrest in the Soviet republics that we consider it necessary to categorically insist that a strict investigation of the actions of those responsible for all this be carried out.

The forced mobilization of the Russian population of the Kars territory is equally contrary to article xii and is an act of arbitrariness against which we protest in the most resolute manner.

Your messages regarding the so-called revolutionaries in the Kars territory seem to me to be an idle fiction, stemming from those elements who want to shake the friendship so happily established between our two countries and so necessary for both countries. I would venture to suggest that the presence of certain elements among your authorities that are hostile to the close alliance between your government and a revolutionary republic like ours may be the reason for the appearance of false information, deliberately aimed at sowing a sense of suspicion among your leaders. Relation to the union republic.

The Armenian Soviet government, the seat of which is Erivan, along with other governments, pursues the same foreign policy course as the Russian government, and does not at all harbor any subversive intentions towards the Turkish authorities in the territories that are now recognized as yours. These reports about the notorious revolutionaries do not explain at all, however, the measures taken against the Molokans, a religious sect that has nothing to do with Bolshevik revolutionary ideas. As in Muslim countries, no one would think of accusing the reactionary ulama of pro-communist actions, and it is more than strange to explain the alleged intrigues of these latter persecutions directed against a Christian sect remote from worldly affairs. The assumption that the Molokans can be evicted to the center of Asia minor,

I allow myself to hope that you will make the most energetic submissions to the government of the grand national assembly in order to eliminate the possibility of such actions, which could only lead to the need for repressive measures, since the broad masses of our compatriots would not agree that such actions remain unanswered ...

Please accept, Mr. Ambassador, my sincere assurances of my highest consideration.

[Chicherin]



**Telegram of the people's commissar for foreign affairs of the Azerbaijan SSR to the commissar for foreign affairs of the government of the grand national assembly of Turkey Yusuf Kemal.**

July 21, 1921

In response to your telegram conveyed to me by comrade Natsarenus, with a feeling of deep satisfaction, I hasten to inform you that I fully share your desire to start convening a Transcaucasian-Turkish conference. Our vital interests mutually dictate the need, in addition to and development of the Moscow treaty, for the rapid strengthening in contractual forms of those relations of union and friendship, which permeate the communication between Turkey and the Transcaucasian Soviet republics, which have a common front against a common enemy and decide on the basis of popular aspirations and desires questions of the historical paths of its development.

Even when you were in Baku, discussing certain issues related to the conclusion of an agreement, I insisted on convening a conference in Baku. You expressed your desire to have the Kars conference as a venue, to which, for my part, I did not object. Both then and now, provided that we would have continuous and constant communication with our missions, I would not object to Kars as the place of convening the conference and would undertake the obligation to obtain the consent of my comrades Armenians and Georgians for this. Appreciating your exceptional services in the rapprochement of the Soviet republics with Turkey and sincerely wishing your presence in the Turkish delegation at the Turkish-Azerbaijani-Georgian-Armenian conference, I, unfortunately, still cannot give my consent to the convening of the conference in angora.

In conclusion, I cannot but express my sincere hope that, despite the enormous significance of your work, which requires your presence in angora, we will have deep pleasure to see you at the head of the Turkish delegation at the upcoming conference.

Please accept the assurance of my complete respect and devotion to you.

People's commissar for foreign affairs

Huseynov

Print. By architect.

In the mentioned telegram of Yusuf Kemal dated July 1, 1921, it was said:

"to resolve all issues that exist between the fraternal republic of Azerbaijan and the government of the grand national assembly of Turkey, to streamline and establish relations and, finally, to discuss by the parties such circumstances as mutual guarantee of the parties in matters related to Azerbaijan and touched upon in the Moscow treaty, concluded between Turkey and Russia, I, as you already know from our conversation in Baku with our delegation, ask you to appoint your delegates to the conference.

Earlier, Kars, which is the seat of the headquarters of our eastern army, was proposed as a place for such a conference, however, my election to the post of commissioner for foreign affairs and an extraordinary desire to personally finish the work I have begun prompts me to ask for your consent to convene this conference in angora. On the other hand, since my government, which attaches great importance to this conference, intends to entrust me with this matter, the convening of the conference in a place other than angora will for a long time deprive me of the opportunity to deal with my business. My government is ready to render all possible assistance to all delegates on the question of telegraph communication, just as it has until now provided extraordinary privileges to the Russian embassy located in our city.

We were unable to negotiate the issue of the conference with the leader of the Armenian Soviet republic, but if the Erivan Soviet government has a desire, it will give us pleasure by sending its delegates to angora. As it was decided earlier, I ask you to inform him about these proposals. "

**Note from the people's commissar for foreign affairs of the Georgian SSR to the commissar for foreign affairs of the government of the grand national assembly of Turkey, Yusuf Kemal.**

July 31, 1921

The Soviet government of Georgia accepts with deep satisfaction your proposal addressed to the governments of Georgia and the fraternal Soviet republics of Azerbaijan and Armenia to convene a conference. The Georgian government hopes that this conference will serve to further strengthen and develop friendly neighborly relations that already exist between the working masses of Georgia and the people united under the rule of the grand national assembly.

We are ready to delegate our plenipotentiary representation to the conference in the very near future. But we expect that the angora government will not insist on the election of the city of angora as the place of the conference, this point so remote and not having reliable telegraphic communication with the residences of the other governments participating in the conference. We are ready to choose the city of Kars according to your initial proposal, subject to providing our delegation with a direct wire to Tiflis, or we can, on our part, propose to hold a conference in the city of Batumi, guaranteeing your delegation free use of wires and radio.

Pending your reply, please accept, citizen commissioner, the assurance of my utmost respect.

A. Svanidze

**Note of the plenipotentiary representative of the Ukrainian SSR in the RSFSR to the ambassador of Turkey in the RSFSR Ali Fuad.**

13 august 1921

Mr. Ambassador,

Desiring to expedite the conclusion of a peace treaty with Turkey and to provide evidence of its ardent feeling of friendship for the Turkish people, the government of the Ukrainian Soviet republic accepts the Turkish government's proposal that angora be chosen as a meeting place for the Ukrainian and Turkish delegations. For this purpose, the Ukrainian government appoints as its first delegate a Ukrainian comrade, Mikhail Vasilyevich Frunze, commander of the order of the red banner, commander of all land and naval armed forces of Ukraine, a member of the all-Ukrainian central executive committee of Soviets, a member of the council of people's commissars. Citizen Frunze intends to leave for angora at the end of august this year. \*

In bringing this decision of my government to your attention, I have the honor to ask you, Mr. Ambassador, to do everything necessary to inform the government of the Turkish grand national assembly about this in a timely manner, as well as to inform me of its consent.

As for the conclusion of a convention on the repatriation of prisoners of war, my government agrees, given the impending start of peace negotiations in angora, to discuss this issue and conclude such a convention here in Moscow.

I ask you, Mr. Ambassador, to accept the assurances of my deepest respect.

Plenipotentiary representative of the Ukrainian SSR in Russia

Kotsyubinsky

Printed by architect.

\* the extraordinary embassy of the Ukrainian SSR headed by Frunze was in Turkey from November 24, 1921 to January 16, 1922.

The mission of Frunze, undertaken during the difficult military situation in Turkey, testified to the Soviet state's support for the national liberation struggle of the Turkish people. M. V. Frunze's address to the Turkish people, which was read out on December 20, 1921 in the Mejlis, said:

“the history of the Soviet republics has much in common with the history of revolutionary Turkey ... However, none of us should hide the fact that good-neighborly relations between Turkey and the Soviet governments are subject to many dangers.

there is no doubt that after the enemies of Turkey, who decided to wipe out the Turkish state from the face of the earth with fire and sword and turn it into their colony, met with heroic resistance from the Turkish working people, rallied around the great national assembly, and became convinced of the strength and vitality of the Turkish nation, they will try to change the nature of their actions. It goes without saying that they will begin to play the role of flattering friends and well-wishers and will make every effort to undermine the friendship between Turkey and the Soviet governments - this is the only guarantee of the integrity and independence of Turkey and, pushing Turkey to act against the Soviet governments, under the guise of friendship will try achieve a goal that they could not achieve with the help of weapons.

But we are confident that the government and people of Turkey, who have endured so many trials and received so many lessons from political history, will not be deceived by tricks and intrigues ... "

A telegram from Mustafa Kemal (Ataturk) to the chairman of the all-Russian central executive committee m. I. Kalinin and the chairman of the all-Ukrainian central executive committee g. I. Petrovsky said about this appeal: “the grand national assembly of Turkey was happy to hear the statements of Mr. Frunze, republics that by themselves will leave an indelible mark on the history of our independence. The members of the assembly took these statements with great satisfaction, and each phrase caused a storm of applause ... , sent to us Mr. Frunze, one of the largest political figures and commander-in-chief, as well as one of the most valiant and heroic commanders of the red army, and the fact that this decision was communicated to us on the eve of the Sakarya battle [see. Approx. 66], at a time when the enemies announced to the whole world that our final defeat was a matter of the near future, evokes a particularly deep feeling of gratitude among the members of the national assembly. This fact is all the more highly appreciated by our assembly because it is a confirmation of sincerity and sympathy, which

are the most important factors of current political relations. " when the enemies announced to the whole world that our final defeat was a matter of the near future, arouses a particularly deep feeling of gratitude among the members of the national assembly. This fact is all the more highly appreciated by our assembly because it is a confirmation of sincerity and sympathy, which are the most important factors of current political relations. "

As a result of negotiations between m. V. Frunze and the leaders of the Turkish government on January 2, 1922, a Ukrainian-Turkish treaty of friendship and brotherhood was signed.

In a telegram sent on January 4, 1922 to the chairman of the council of people's commissars of the Ukrainian SSR, mv Frunze noted: "the treaty aroused great interest in government circles, among the deputies of the VNST and the population."

M.V Frunze's negotiations with the leaders of the Turkish government, his trip around the country, meetings with representatives of various public circles helped to improve mutual understanding between the Soviet republics and Turkey. In a letter to Chicherin dated March 1, 1922, the plenipotentiary representative of the RSFSR in Turkey, s. I. Aralov, reported: "the stay of comrade. Frunze left a deep mark here. They speak of him as a wonderful, sympathetic person, they consider him a great friend of Turkey, he dispelled all misunderstandings and turned the sympathies of the Turks towards the RSFSR. Of course, he is considered a representative not only of Ukraine, but of the entire RSFSR, and his words, promises, speeches, judgments are considered the views of the entire federation. "

**Telegram of the people's commissar for foreign affairs of the Armenian SSR to the commander of the eastern front of Turkey Karabekir.**

August 17, 1921 no. 6454

The government of Soviet Armenia expresses its satisfaction with your statement that the citizens of Armenia, when passing through Turkish territory, meet the assistance of the Turkish authorities. For their part, the Armenian authorities show no less solicitude towards the Muslim refugees passing through Armenia to Turkey.

But in our last telegram of July 22, we also had in mind those citizens of Soviet Armenia, military and civilians who, after the cessation of hostilities between Armenia and Turkey, remained on your territory for one reason or another. Public opinion in Armenia is deeply disturbed by the fact that thousands of our citizens languish in captivity for many months, while relations of friendship and good neighborhood have been established between Turkey and Soviet Armenia.

No less excitement among the population is caused by information that the Armenians of Artvin being evicted by the Turkish authorities are in very difficult conditions, and during the eviction there were deplorable clashes. We hope that the government of the grand national assembly of Turkey will pay due attention to all of the above and release all the citizens of Armenia who are now on its territory to freedom, thus dispelling the remnant of mutual mistrust between the two peoples and creating an unshakable basis for relations of direct and sincere friendship. For a more organized and painless resettlement of the Artvin Armenians and to provide them with the necessary medical and material assistance, it would be desirable for us to send a representative of the main directorate of Soviet Armenia for resettlement affairs to Artvin. Hopefully

We ask you to wire about your agreement to admit this representative to Artvin. Please accept the assurances of my utmost respect,

People's commissar for foreign affairs

A. Mravyan

**Note from the plenipotentiary representative of the RSFSR in Turkey to the commissioner for foreign affairs of the government of the grand national assembly of Turkey, Yusuf Kemal.**

August 20, 1921 no. 863-a



Lord commissioner,

I have the honor to inform you that my government has instructed me to inform you that it readily accepts the invitation contained in your note to take part in a conference for the conclusion of treaties between the government of the grand national assembly of Turkey and the governments of the three Soviet republics of the Caucasus, which conference should complement an agreement concluded in Moscow between Soviet Russia and Turkey.

My government, however, rejects Angora as a place to convene the conference because of the difficulty of telegraph communication with this city and the martial law, and expresses the wish that the conference be held in Kars, the city you yourself proposed earlier.

Please accept, Mr. Commissioner, the assurance of my highest consideration.

Natsarenus

The following reply was received to this note from Yusuf Kemal on 28 August 1921:

“Mr. Plenipotentiary representative,

In response to your letter of the 20th of this month, I have the honor to inform you that my government agrees to Kars as the venue for a conference to be held between Turkey and the Transcaucasian Soviet republics with the participation of delegates from the RSFSR. The Turkish delegation will be chaired by divisional general Kazim Karabekir pasha, the commander of the eastern army of the government of the grand national assembly of Turkey and a deputy from Adrianople in the same national assembly, with the participation of Veli bey, a deputy from Burdur, Memduh Shevket bey, the plenipotentiary of Turkey in Baku, and Mukhtar-bey, chief engineer for the construction of railways in eastern Anatolia, a former deputy and secretary of state in the commissariat of public works.

I believe that in view of the range of distance to be covered for different delegations, it would be desirable to set the last week of September as the opening date for the conference.

I would be grateful to you, Mr. Plenipotentiary representative, if, while handing over to your government the content of this, you also convey our firm confidence regarding the most favorable results to be achieved during negotiations based on the excellent relations existing between Turkey, on the one hand, and the Russian Soviet and Transcaucasian Soviet republics on the other.

I would be happy to know as soon as possible whether the appointed date is convenient for the Moscow government, as well as the names of the Russian delegates to the Kars conference.

Please accept, Mr. Plenipotentiary representative, the assurances of my highest consideration. "

**Note from the plenipotentiary representative of the RSFSR in Turkey to the commissioner for foreign affairs of the government of the grand national assembly of Turkey, Yusuf Kemal.**

August 20, 1921 no. 863-b

Mr. Commissioner,

The government of the socialist republic of Ukraine, an ally of Soviet Russia, wishing to conclude an agreement with the government of the Turkish grand national assembly, appointed Cde. Frunze, commander of the Ukrainian forces, to conduct preliminary negotiations in angora. The said government hopes that the government of the Turkish grand national assembly will do everything necessary to make it as easy as possible for it to fulfill the mission entrusted to it. Comrade Kotsyubinsky, representative of Ukraine in Moscow, informed Mr. Ali Fuad pasha, your representative in Moscow \* about the above.

I am happy to have been instructed to make this message, which once again proves the solidarity between Russia and Turkey and the sincere desire of my government, which has undertaken mediation between the governments of Turkey and Ukraine, to further strengthen the bonds of friendship between our two peoples.

Having no representative in angora, the government of Ukraine instructs me to send you this message and convey your answer to him.

Natsarenius

Print. By architect.

\* see doc. No. 187

The following reply was received to this note from Yusuf Kemal on 23 august 1921:

“Mr. Plenipotentiary representative,

In response to your letter of august 20, 1921, no. 863-b, I am happy to inform you that my government will be very pleased to receive Mr. Frunze, commander-in-chief of the Ukrainian troops, as a delegate of the Ukrainian Soviet republic.

I hasten to add that Mr. Frunze will receive the friendliest welcome here, as well as the sincerest desire to conclude an agreement that is equally beneficial to both parties.

I will be grateful to you if you do not refuse to inform the government of Soviet Ukraine of the above and to inform us as soon as possible about the time of Mr. Frunze's arrival, and also which route he wishes to follow.

Thank you for your kind mediation and I ask you, Mr. Plenipotentiary representative, to accept the assurance of my highest consideration. "

**Note from the people's commissar for foreign affairs of the Armenian SSR to the commissar for foreign affairs of the government of the grand national assembly of Turkey Yusuf Kemal.**

Transmitted by telegraph on august 24, 1921 no. 6781

The government of the socialist Soviet republic of Armenia considers the final settlement of relations between Soviet Armenia and Turkey on a firm treaty basis timely. Due to the close political and economic ties

between the Transcaucasian Soviet republics, we consider it expedient that the treaty between Soviet Armenia and Turkey be developed at a conference convened [in] the near future between Turkey and the rest of the Transcaucasian republics with the participation of representatives of the RSFSR. The finding of power in the hands, on the one hand, of the workers 'and peasants' Soviet government, and on the other hand, of the revolutionary government of the Turkish grand national assembly, is a simple guarantee that these governments, free from the stupid chauvinism and blind mutual hatred of their predecessors, will be able to find a fair solution to all the issues that seemed insoluble for wise European diplomacy, and thus smooth over the traces of that struggle and mutual hatred of the two neighboring peoples, skillfully and maliciously fueled by imperialist diplomacy. The most pressing issues of both sides imperiously dictate to us peaceful cohabitation and complete mutual trust.

The government of Soviet Armenia cherishes the hope that the government of the grand national assembly of Turkey also shares our point of view and will not refuse to inform us about its consent.

Please accept the assurance of perfect respect for you.

People's commissar for foreign affairs

Mravyan

To this note the following reply was received from Yusuf Kemal on august 30, 1921:

"I have the honor to acknowledge receipt of your telegram of august 24, no. 6781, and at the same time to inform you of the assumptions and details regarding the future conference in Kars.

In order to reflect in the treaties to be concluded with the Transcaucasian Soviet republics the provisions set forth in the Moscow treaty concerning these republics, my government was back at the beginning of July this year. G. Invited the governments of the above-mentioned republics to the conference, the draft of which was developed in Baku and Tiflis during my stay in these cities in the spring upon my return from Moscow.

Your telegram of august 24 made me understand that the government of Soviet Armenia is completely in agreement with us and also believes that the future conference in Kars represents a convenient opportunity to finally settle relations between Turkey and Soviet Armenia.

It would not be useless to add that I fully share your point of view regarding the need for our two peoples to live in complete harmony in the future and forget all their previous feuds, the seeds of which, as you rightly noted, were sown by the imperialist powers who took advantage of our strife.

The government of Soviet Russia, as you already know, will also send its delegates to Kars in order to fulfill the obligations under the Moscow treaty, and will make the necessary representations for the Transcaucasian republics to conclude treaties with Turkey in accordance with the terms of the Moscow treaty.

The Turkish delegation in Kars will be chaired by Kazim Karabekir pasha, the commander of our eastern army and the deputy from Adrianople in the grand national assembly of Turkey, consisting of: Velibey, the deputy from Burdur, Memduh Shevket-bey, the plenipotentiary of Turkey in Baku, and mukhtar-bey, chief engineer for the construction of the Anatolian railways, a former deputy and former secretary of state in the commissariat of public works.

We have proposed the last week of September for the convening of this conference and we would be grateful if you could tell us as soon as possible the composition of the delegation that would represent Soviet Armenia, as well as your agreement on the proposed date,

While waiting for your answer, please accept, Mr. Commissioner, the assurance of my highest consideration. "

**Agreement on the repatriation of prisoners of war and civilian internees concluded between the government of the Ukrainian Soviet socialist republic and the government of the Turkish grand national assembly.**

September 17, 1921

The government of the Ukrainian Soviet socialist republic, on the one hand, and the government of the grand national assembly of Turkey, on the other, which have already expressed their firm intention to fix in the treaty of friendship and brotherhood the good-neighborly relations existing between the two states, prompted by the desire to put an end to the disasters resulting from world war ii, decided to conclude an

agreement on the repatriation of prisoners of war and civilian internees and appointed their commissioners for this purpose:

Government of the Ukrainian Soviet socialist republic - Yuri Kotsyubinsky, plenipotentiary representative of the Ukrainian SSR under the government of the RSFSR and member of the all-Ukrainian central executive committee;

Government of the grand national assembly of Turkey - Ali Fuad pasha, ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary of the government of the grand national assembly of Turkey under the government of the RSFSR and a member of the grand national assembly from angora.

The designated plenipotentiaries, who met in Moscow and recognized their powers drawn up in the proper form and in due order, agreed on the following:

#### Article I

The contracting parties undertake to repatriate, as far as possible, within three months from the date of the signing of this agreement, all prisoners of war and civilian internees of the other party who are on their territories.

#### Article ii

It was agreed that the repatriation of prisoners on both sides would be voluntary and that coercion to repatriation was in no case allowed.

Prisoner registration offices will collect from prisoners of war and civilian internees who have declared their unwillingness to return to their homeland, detailed information about their country of origin, their name and surname, their location, their occupation or their craft, for communication to the delegation of the other party provided for in article ix of this agreement.

#### Article iii

Prisoners have the right to repatriate their families who were captured or declared prisoners at the same time as them, as well as to repatriate their wives and children, insofar as this applies to families formed



during their time in captivity. In this latter case, however, cohabitation is considered compulsory. Family members will be considered: a wife, if she is really in a marital relationship with her husband, children, mother, a weak father, grandchildren, pupils, as well as relatives of the repatriated person, if they live in a common household.

#### Article iv

Transportation of prisoners and civilian internees, their families and their property to exchange offices will be carried out on the territory of each of the two contracting parties at the expense of the latter. Each of the two contracting parties will, in addition, take care of the housing, sanitary services and food for the prisoners on their territory during their repatriation.

It was agreed that both contracting parties, although they have the right to use prisoners of war and civilians before the start of their repatriation as labor, nevertheless undertake not to use them in particularly difficult jobs.

Both contracting parties also undertake not to use prisoners of war and civilians as labor from the time that their re-evacuation begins.

#### Article v

Immediately upon the signing of this agreement, all prisoners convicted of any offense will be released for the purpose of their repatriation, with the exception of those convicted of murder or theft; the same applies to all prisoners in pre-trial detention, except for those accused of murder or theft.

Cases of those accused of murder or theft must be examined promptly.

Delegations will be presented with a list that will include the names of all persons convicted of murder or theft, with details of who they are, what kind of offenses they are charged with and what kind of sentence they are serving.

#### Article vi

In the process of repatriation, in the first place, persons who are unable to do without outside help, the sick, the disabled, as well as persons whose family members are on the territory of the other side should be sent as far as possible.

Both parties, observing the conditions set out in the first part of this article, must begin work on repatriation from areas most unfavorable for prisoners and civilian internees in terms of housing, food and hygiene conditions.

#### Article vii

Within five months from the date of signing of this agreement, both delegations must receive a list of deceased prisoners with all data on their name, surname, marital status, country of origin, illness or cause of death, since this information is at the disposal of the other party.

#### Article viii

The Ukrainian Soviet government, with the humane goal of facilitating the work of repatriating Turkish prisoners of war and internees, undertakes to select the Ukrainian port of Taganrog as prisoner exchange points, and by agreement with the Russian Soviet government, the Russian ports of Novorossiysk and Tuapse, through which some of the Turkish prisoners of war and civilian internees will be evacuated. ...

The Turkish government, for its part, will choose the ports of Trebizond and Inebol as the exchange point.

#### Article ix

It was agreed that on both sides an official delegation of three members will be created with the task of intensifying the implementation of this agreement, providing assistance and assistance to prisoners, monitoring the implementation of the provisions of this agreement and the provisions of any further agreement on the same issue.

The members of these delegations will be granted diplomatic immunity during their stay in the capital of the country where they will be staying,

as well as during all their movements within the territory of that country.

Both parties undertake to recognize for the official commissioners for the repatriation of prisoners the right to:

1. Communicate with your embassy and government.
2. Visit all places where prisoners are. Local authorities will have the right, if they deem it necessary, to accompany the delegates on these visits.
3. In case of need, provide assistance to the prisoners both in cash and in clothing and food.
4. By agreement with the authorities of the other party in charge of evacuation, use all means to inform prisoners of repatriation. This includes, in particular, the posting of notices in the language of the prisoners and the publication of official messages in the press.

Note. Since Turkey does not have an embassy in Ukraine, Turkish commissioners will have the right to communicate in code with the Turkish embassy in Moscow and the central government of Turkey.

5. Use official seals.

#### Article x

Property that, according to the laws and regulations of the country of departure, is the property of the persons specified in article I of this agreement, may be liquidated or taken away without hindrance, subject to the following provisions:

#### § 1

It is allowed to take out over hand luggage no more than eight poods per head of family or a single person, five poods for each family member and two poods for children over ten years old.

#### Section 2

Allowed to take out in baggage, among other items:

1. Linen and clothing; no more than two pieces or pairs of one or another type of clothing and footwear (only one fur coat) and six changes of underwear per person.
2. Items needed on the way, in an amount that does not exceed the actual need, for example, pillows, sheets, blankets, towels, kettles, etc.
3. Persons of special professions, such as workers, artisans, farmers, doctors, artists, scientists, etc., have the right to take out items necessary for their professional activities, even if the weight of these items exceeds the established weight, subject to obtaining in each case special permission.

### Section 3

It is prohibited to export:

1. Seals, acts, documents, photographs and all kinds of manuscripts not examined by the competent authorities.
2. Weapons and military equipment.
3. Manufacture, furs, leather, haberdashery, metal products and other items intended for trade and not for personal use.
4. Provisions in excess of 20 pounds per person, including flour and bread over 8 pounds, meat 5 pounds, dairy products 3 pounds and other products - 4 pounds, including sugar - over one pound and 1/4-pound tea,
5. Livestock and poultry.
6. Cars, motorcycles, all kinds of bicycles, carts and sledges.
7. Raw precious metals, rimless precious stones and gold and silver coins.

8. Items of gold and platinum weighing more than 16 spoons each, the same items weighing more than 16 spoons per person, and items of silver weighing more than 1 pound per person.

Gold and silver watches, wedding rings, cigarette cases and silver wallets can be exported in the amount of one item per adult. The weight of these items is not included in the weight of the above items.

9. Items made of precious stones (diamonds, diamonds, sapphires, emeralds, rubies, etc.), the total weight of which exceeds one carat. The same rules apply to pearls.
10. Machines and machine parts of all kinds, surgical equipment and musical instruments, other than those referred to in § 2, paragraph 3 of this article; sewing machines can be exported in the amount of one per family.
11. Tobacco products (in excess of 500 cigarettes or half a pound of tobacco for every adult over 18).
12. Soap in excess of one bar of toilet soap per person and one pound of laundry soap per household.
13. Paper money of any issue legally circulating in the territory of the country of origin in the amount of over 100,000 Ukrainian rubles or 100 Turkish pounds.

The export of money in an amount exceeding this norm may be allowed only with a special permit.

14. All kinds of securities, rent, government interest-bearing securities, bills of exchange, transport receipts, warehouse receipts, if there is no special permission for them.
15. Items of artistic or antique value for which no special permission has been issued.

#### Article xi

Persons departing under this agreement, as well as their luggage, will not be subject to any taxes or fees charged upon departure.

Article xii

This agreement will be published in the capital no later than 10 days, and in the province no later than one month from the date of its signing.

Article xiii

This agreement is not subject to ratification and comes into force from the date of its signing.

In witness whereof the aforementioned plenipotentiaries of both parties have signed this agreement and have attached their seals to it.

Done in duplicate at Moscow on the seventeenth day of September one thousand nine hundred and twenty-one (one thousand three hundred thirty-seven).

Kotsyubinsky

Ali Fuad

Publ. In the "collection of existing contracts ..." I, m., no. 24, pp. 281-285.

**Note from the plenipotentiary representative of the RSFSR in Turkey to the commissioner for foreign affairs of the government of the grand national assembly of Turkey, Yusuf Kemal.**

September 18, 1921 no. 957-a

Mr. Commissioner,

I have the honor to acknowledge receipt of your venerable letters of the number 2874, the content of whose were not slow to inform my government, and I thank you on behalf of my government and the

Russian people, the warmest gratitude for the generous gift of grain and bean products<sup>1</sup>, made by the government of the grand national assembly to help victims of hunger in our country.

You can be sure, Mr. Commissar, that this assistance coming from the fraternal Turkish people will be highly appreciated by the Russian people and will not fail to further strengthen the bonds of friendship and brotherhood that already exist between our two peoples, and will increase sympathy for the Turkish people in his heroic struggle.

I take this opportunity to express to you, lord commissioner, the assurance of my utmost respect.

Natsarenius

In the mentioned letter of Yusuf Kemal no. 2874 dated September 18, 1921 it was said: "Mr. Plenipotentiary representative.

I have the pleasure to inform you that in addition to 30 tons of corn located near Heraclea and of which I informed you earlier, my government decided to deliver to Soviet Russia, after tax collection, about 800 tons of grain and legumes, loading them in various ports of the black sea for assistance victims of famine in Russia.

Please accept, Mr. Plenipotentiary representative, the assurance of my highest consideration. "

<sup>1</sup> at the end of 1921, a consignment of corn came from Turkey to help the hungry.

**Note from the plenipotentiary representative of the RSFSR in Turkey to the commissioner for foreign affairs of the government of the grand national assembly of Turkey, Yusuf Kemal.**

September 22, 1921 no. 974-a

Mr. Commissioner,

I have the pleasure of transmitting at the same time the translation of a telegram which I have just received from comrade Chicherin, people's commissar for foreign affairs of the RSFSR.

"convey to the government of the Turkish grand national assembly our warmest congratulations on the Turkish victories<sup>1</sup> and our wishes to the Turkish people for continued success in their struggle against the imperialist invasion. No. 6137/4135 Chicherin ".

Joining the congratulations of my government, I hope to soon congratulate you on the complete and final victory of the Turkish people, which will ensure, along with political, economic independence, which is the basis of the true independence of every people.

Please accept, Mr. Commissioner, the assurance of my highest consideration.

[Natsarenius]

In response to this note, the following note by Yusuf Kemal dated September 27, 1921 was sent to the plenipotentiary representative of the RSFSR in Turkey:

"Mr. Plenipotentiary representative,

I would be grateful if you deigned to convey to the government of the RSFSR and Mr. Chicherin, people's commissar for foreign affairs, the gratitude of the government of the grand national assembly of Turkey, as well as my personal gratitude for the congratulations sent on the occasion of the victory at Sakarya and for the expressed wishes of our future success.

At the same time expressing our gratitude to you for your congratulations and good wishes to Turkey, I ask you to accept, Mr. Plenipotentiary representative, the assurance of my very high esteem. "

<sup>1</sup> in the course of long and fierce battles that took place from august 23 to September 13, 1921, the Turkish army under the command of Mustafa Kemal (Ataturk) defeated the Greek troops advancing on Ankara and threw them back on the left bank of the Sakarya river (central Anatolia).



**Note from the people's commissar for foreign affairs of the RSFSR to the commissar for foreign affairs of the government of the grand national assembly of Turkey Yusuf Kemal**

October 3, 1921 no. 7083

In view of the message to the Russian government by its plenipotentiary delegate at the Kars conference of the issue raised by the Turkish delegation on the relationship of the Transcaucasian Soviet republics, I have the honor to explain to you, Mr. The fact that the aforementioned republics are among themselves in close political and economic union, resolving jointly related political and economic issues.

People's commissariat of the RSFSR

Chicherin

**Note of the people's commissar for foreign affairs of the RSFSR to the ambassador of Turkey to the RSFSR Ali Fuad.**

October 10, 1921 no. 11/5255

Mr. Ambassador,

The memorandum dated 4 august in angora and signed by commissioner Yusuf Kemal-bey, as well as your personal letter dated 17 September no. 870, which complements it, embraces the entire political situation in general and raises a number of different issues of a very diverse nature. The need to wait for the political situation to be

clarified, which became unclear due to many unexpected facts, made us delay a little in response to your message.

The essential factors of this situation are known to you: the terrible scourge of hunger, attempts by various governments to take advantage of it to the detriment of Russia's interests, a new wave of intervention, expressed in the fruitless efforts of France to push Poland into Russia, and, finally, an English note on Soviet policy in the east, which is British political offensive on this basis. Soviet Russia, severely tested by the disaster that struck more than 10 provinces, is forced once again to fight against the complex and varied attacks launched in all areas by its united adversaries. The Russian workers and peasants, in strong unity under the Soviet banner, must exert all their efforts and all their energy in order to protect themselves from the new dangers that suddenly threaten Soviet Russia.

We can say with conviction that the struggle we are waging for our protection is at the same time a struggle for the cause of all oppressed peoples fighting for their existence. We can assert that the very existence of revolutionary Russia, the workers 'and peasants' republic, the natural enemy of all oppression, is the greatest trump card that peoples in distress can have. The great historical role that fell to the lot of Russia in the east is based on its policy of renouncing any attempt to fight or rule. Those who were exploited in Russia, who put an end to all domination of the exploiters, are natural friends of all peoples, exploited or oppressed by foreign rulers. The very existence of this new Russia, an indomitable enemy of all exploitation, this workers 'and peasants' Russia, whose basic principle is the absence of any oppression of man by man, is thus an indestructible rock that allows the peoples of the east to fight incessantly for their economic freedom unconditionally. The working people of Russia extend a fraternal hand to all who are fighting against the yoke imposed from outside. This policy of disinterest cannot in any way contradict the Anglo-Russian London treaty, and England cannot reproach us for it. To the extent possible, the workers 'and peasants' government of Russia is helping the peoples of the east in strengthening their national existence, in the matter of their political and economic development, and England

cannot reproach him for this either. As soon as Soviet Russia emerges from the endless difficulties with which it is still struggling, help, which it renders to the fraternal peoples who strive to have an independent existence, will become more and more significant and extensive. Our policy is built for a whole long period of history, and not for a passing moment. If our difficult situation today prohibits us from doing more, we will seize the first opportunity and the first more favorable moment to provide all the assistance that is in our power to the peoples whom, according to our principles, we must help.

The Turkish people, which are exerting all their strength to push back the advancing invader, are guided in their struggle by a different order of ideas, but they are fighting in the same way with innumerable difficulties. The deep ties that currently bind our two peoples on the basis of great historical principles that find expression in their struggles make us emphasize the constant contact between our governments. The proposal expressed in the memorandum of August 4, supplemented by your letter of September 17, and which consists in a joint study of all aspects of the present political situation, is, of course, accepted with pleasure. What the Turkish government offers us amounts to, so to speak, supplementing the Moscow treaty with permanent negotiations on all issues.

We also regard as highly desirable periodic discussions by our two governments of everything that may interest them in relation to the political life of the moment. This real cooperation between us, using your own expression, can only contribute to a greater extent to the development of friendly relations that bind us, and to the satisfaction of the interests of our peoples. To make a common decision on all current issues - this is what the principle of a friendly policy that unites us should be. This incessant exchange of views will also enable the Turkish government to take into account the dangers and difficulties that we must overcome. All the obligations imposed on Russia by the Moscow treaty will, of course, be fully fulfilled by it, but the Russian government is ready and decided to go even further, than the obligation of the treaty as soon as the position in which it is located will allow it. In the very near future, we are confident of this, we will

improve this situation enough to go beyond the precise expression of our obligations.

The question of the straits is, without any doubt, one of those questions that interests the Soviet government most of all in the general plan of world politics. Our two governments have come to an agreement on this issue on a single program, which was expressed in our Moscow treaty, and if today this program is still ideal for us, then the day is near when we will overcome our difficulties enough to be able to undertake it. Practical implementation. Our relations with Romania are only indirectly related to the question of the straits. At one time there were fears that Romania would take an active part in the struggle waged in Asia minor against the freedom of the Turkish people. The Russian government proved then, by terminating the negotiations on the Dniester, that it fully took into account this new element in its relations with Romania. These fears, however, turned out to be only transitory, and at present the Soviet government was able to resume the general course of negotiations with Romania, which it has been conducting in one form or another for a long time, without causing the slightest damage to the interests of the fraternal Turkish people.

Mesopotamia, where British forces are directly involved, is one of the areas in which the Anglo-Russian treaty comes into effect immediately, but the Russian people and the government are considering with the greatest care and with the greatest sympathy the general position of the Muslim peoples, whose independence is under threat. ... The Russian people are deeply concerned about the possibility of abuse of the Muslim religious idea to harm the vital interests of the Muslim peoples themselves. We think that the most effective way to protect oneself from this danger would be to oppose the religious idea with the idea of a national movement, which sets a definite goal of satisfying the basic vital needs of these nationalities.

The Turkish government has linked some exaggerated concerns to the presence of Turkish political figures in Russia who do not belong to the ruling party of the grand national assembly. I can categorically declare to you and decisively refute any contrary statement that no assistance or assistance was provided by the Russian government to political

persons or political movements hostile to the present government of Turkey. Strictly adhering to the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of Turkey, we believe that the struggle of the parties in the grand national assembly does not interest us.

As for the fears of the Turkish government regarding fictitious troop movements in the Caucasian republics or fictitious aspirations hostile to Turkey on the part of these republics or even the Russian government, I declare to you on behalf of the Russian government that they are completely devoid of any foundation. Leaving aside Russia's predicament, the basic principles of our policy are incompatible with any movement, hostile or offensive towards the Turkish people, which is fighting against foreign invasion and oppression, a movement that would, moreover, be in contradiction with the Moscow treaty which the Russian government has signed and will unswervingly observe with perfect fidelity. If some agents of the government violate the principles arising from the treaty,

All rumors about negotiations between Russia and Greece are also groundless. The Greek government, through some of its ministers, proposed to Russia to start negotiations on the resumption of relations and on repatriation, but the Russian government did nothing on this matter without consulting the Turkish government, and it was in accordance with your opinion, Mr. Ambassador, that we refused to give a go. Suggestions.

In this permanent cooperation, which we have established, the agreement between Turkey and the Caucasian republics, which is to be signed in Kars \* in the near future, will be an extra element for the consolidation and strengthening of our friendly relations. All issues of this policy must be clarified between us, and at the moment when the Kars treaty forms new ties between Turkey and Soviet Russia, we think all the more that we are allowed, based on the mutual obligations assumed, to ask the Turkish government to inform us about what is the agreement that has just been concluded in Angora with the representative of France<sup>1</sup>... The merciless hostility of the French government towards the Soviet republics compels us, of necessity, to view with apprehension the secret relations (negotiations) of the

Turkish government with France, since the nature of these agreements has not been revealed to us. Thus, we will accept, with the deepest gratitude, Mr. Ambassador, the explanations that you will no doubt give us on this matter.

Please accept, Mr. Ambassador, the sincere assurance of my deepest respect.

[Chicherin]

Printed by architect.

In the mentioned memorandum of august 4, 1921, in particular, it was said:

“at this moment, which it considers decisive both for itself and for the entire eastern world, the government of the Turkish grand national assembly, convinced of the need to give a definitive direction to its political orientation, appeals to the government of the Russian socialist federative Soviet republic with an offer of its cooperation in all issues where the goals and interests of both governments are close enough to be considered identical. The present moment is chosen for the renewal of our proposal because we think that we are on the eve of very big events of the international order. [...]

In making this offer to you, we, of course, are by no means going to demand from one of the parties to sacrifice any principles for which it is fighting; we only want to jointly consider all world issues in which the parties may have common interests, and that they agree on a sheaf of actions in order to present a united front against imperialism and capitalism of the western powers in accordance with the spirit of the preamble and article 4 of the Moscow treaty. Our conviction, which we have already expressed several times, is that the capitalist regime will be overthrown in the west and, consequently, the Soviet regime will remain in Russia, and also that the eastern peoples will be liberated from the yoke of imperialism only if the current governments Russia and Turkey will form a bloc against western governments who, despite the divergence of their world interests, as well as the difference in the

positions they hold in relation to each of us, they are essentially our irreconcilable enemies. G--]

Believing that in Moscow the international situation is assessed in approximately the same way, I consider it useful to indicate in general terms the main issues on which an agreement between us would be necessary. These questions are as follows:

First, help with weapons and money that we expect from Russia. I take this opportunity to express my gratitude for the weapons that have already been sent and are being supplied. But our unyielding will to conquer and throw our enemies into the sea, which your plenipotentiary representative in our city has probably already informed you of, compels us to undertake a new very large effort in armament. In addition, recruiting recruits requires a lot of weapons and large sums of money. Therefore, I would be grateful to you if you would deign to take into account the requests that we have presented to you and are presenting at the present time both through Mr. Natsarenus and Ali Fuad pasha. I consider it necessary to draw your attention in particular to the question of financial assistance, which we urgently need. On this occasion, let me say that the promised amount of 10,000,000 rubles in gold, which, as you told me, could be provided immediately, has not yet been received in full, despite repeated requests. [...]

Second, the question of the straits to be posed. The Russian government, naturally, is aware of the advances made by Britain to Romania in order to enlist her assistance in protecting the straits. On the other hand, similar attempts took place in Belgrade in order to attract the Yugoslav kingdom to put pressure on Bulgaria in order to prevent it from attacking Greece if necessary. Under these circumstances, we would be happy to know to what extent Russia could facilitate diplomatic or other means of enforcing art. 5 of the Moscow treaty. You can easily admit that Russia itself is highly interested in resolving the issue of the straits so as to ensure the independence and security of Turkey.



Third, the question of Mesopotamia. The London government pursues a variety of goals in this country, the most important of which are: a) the creation of a barrier to protect India, b) the exploitation of Mosul oil, c) in order to ensure the safety of this exploitation - the creation of one or several small states between Mesopotamia and the black sea, placed under British tutelage; as Armenia, which was intended for this role, is out of the question at present. England is trying to use for the same purpose, among other things, unsuccessfully, Kurdish gangs led by crooks; d) strengthening the power of the family of Hussein, king of Hejaz, patronized by the British, both of whose sons are called to reign over Mesopotamia and Transjordan.

In this regard, we consider it our duty to insist on the fact that if in the east religious thought were opposed, as a result of the seizure of the caliphate by the British, national thought, then the national and liberation movements of the eastern peoples would be opposed, and these peoples could even be used for in order to renew the attempts made by the forces of national emancipation and the world proletariat in order to create a new social system, we ask on this occasion the Moscow government to inform us about how it views all these various possibilities and to what extent it could with us to cooperate in order to prevent the aims pursued by England in Mesopotamia.

Fourth, the question of central and east Asia. The secret negotiations, begun between England, America and Japan and which should serve as a prologue to the Washington conference, are aimed at concluding an agreement, the main provisions of which appear to be as follows: Mongolia, Manchuria, Shandong and eastern Siberia are left to Japanese influence; America receives its zone in the southeastern provinces of China and unconditionally recognizes the British mandate in Mesopotamia. For its part, England gains freedom of action and expands its influence on Chinese Turkestan, which in past centuries has always served as a gateway to the invasion of India. We believe we will be wise to prepare in advance for all of these opportunities.

These are the main points on which, in our opinion, a quick agreement between us would be very useful. On the other hand, it would be quite clear that we are ready to consider in the most careful way all the

questions that the Russian government could offer us, as well as all the wishes that it could express as to what it would expect from us in exchange for any kind of assistance rendered to us in resolving issues that might be offered to us. We hope that the frankness and frankness with which we address the Soviet republic will be appreciated and that on the eve of the resumption of negotiations on the settlement of the eastern question, we will be able to lay solid foundations for a Russian-Turkish agreement, without which there would have been a chance of success in the attempts of the western powers to defeat us one by one.

...

We also hope that quick aid in arms and money will not be a bargaining chip at a time when our enemies are about to attempt, through important concessions, to force us to abandon some of our goals.

In conclusion, I would be sinning against the frankness that I have shown if I did not point out circumstances that, if left unchecked, could seriously damage our good relations. These circumstances are as follows:

First, support, apparently, provided in Moscow to some deposed careerists who, hiding abroad at the most critical moment in the country's history, intrigue against us and want to return to the country as winners.

Secondly, the anxiety that some Soviet agents in the Caucasus are causing us, and, mainly, the preparations that we think are taking place in Georgia, preparations even more intensified since the beginning of the Greek offensive.

Thirdly, rumors about the upcoming Russian-Greek trade negotiations. We consider it our duty to declare on this occasion that such negotiations would have made a painful impression on Turkish public opinion, especially since such negotiations would not make sense, since the benefits that they would give Russia would be insignificant, whereas king Constantine saw it would be an encouragement to act as a mercenary, placing the Greek people at the service of British imperialism.

Waiting for an early reply, I ask you, Mr. Commissioner, to accept the assurances of my deepest respect. "

\*cm. Doc. No. 264

<sup>1</sup> from September 20, 1921, Franco-Turkish negotiations on military-political and economic issues took place in Ankara. During these negotiations, French representative franklin-bouillon tried to persuade Turkey to break off friendly relations with Soviet Russia and to draw closer to the imperialist powers.

Franco-Turkish negotiations ended on October 20, 1921 with the signing of an agreement that ended hostilities between the two countries, determined the border between Turkey and Syria, which was under the protectorate of France, provided for the evacuation of French troops from Cilicia within two months, and also contained resolutions on the issue of Alexandretta Sandjak, on the railway and other concessions granted by Turkey to France.

Having made some concessions to Turkey at the conclusion of the Ankara agreement, France intended to involve it in the mainstream of an active Anti-Soviet policy.

There were serious disagreements in the Turkish ruling circles over the direction of Turkey's foreign policy.

However, during this period, the Turkish government refused to support the aggressive plans of the imperialist powers.

On November 15, 1921, the Turkish ambassador to Moscow, Ali Fuad, sent a note to Chicherin stating that the Franco-Turkish agreement of October 20, 1921 "does not contain a single thesis, not a single clause that could to shake the spirit and letter of the Russian-Turkish treaty of friendship concluded in Moscow or to contradict them in any way. My government adds that neither the Franco-Turkish agreement, nor any other agreement that it may conclude, will never be of such a nature as to damage the policy of friendship and cordiality, the beginning of which the Russian and Turkish peoples and their governments laid the Moscow and Kars treaties ".

On December 26, 1921, during the stay in Turkey of the extraordinary embassy of the Ukrainian SSR, headed by m. V. Frunze (see note 48), Mustafa Kemal (Ataturk) assured m. V. Frunze that there is no whatever secret clauses of the agreement with France, unknown to you, "he also noted that" the entire national assembly, with the exception of individual individuals, firmly intends to firmly adhere to the alliance with Russia "and that" without reliance on Russia we cannot imagine a healthy Turkish policy " ...

**The treaty of friendship between the Armenian SSR, the Azerbaijan SSR and the Georgian SSR, on the one hand, and Turkey, on the other, concluded with the participation of the RSFSR in Kars \***

October 13, 1921

The governments of the socialist Soviet republic of Armenia, the Azerbaijan socialist Soviet republic and the socialist Soviet republic of Georgia, on the one hand, and the government of the grand national assembly of Turkey, on the other, sharing the principles of the brotherhood of nations and the right of peoples to self-determination, inspired by the desire to establish between them permanent cordial

relations and continuous sincere friendship based on the mutual interests of both parties, we decided to start negotiations with the participation of the Russian socialist federative Soviet republic in order to conclude a treaty of friendship and appointed for this as their plenipotentiaries:

Government of the socialist Soviet republic of Armenia: Askanaz Mravyan, people's commissar for foreign affairs, Poghos Makinzyan, people's commissar for internal affairs;

Government of the Azerbaijan socialist Soviet republic: Behbud Shahtakhtinsky, people's commissar of state control;

Government of the socialist Soviet republic of Georgia: Shalva Eliava, people's commissar for military and naval affairs, Alexander Svanidze, people's commissar for foreign affairs and people's commissar for finance;

The government of the Turkish grand national assembly:

Kazim Karabekir pasha, deputy of the great national assembly from Adrianople, commander of the eastern front, Veli bey, deputy of the great national assembly from Burdur, Mukhtar bey, former assistant to the state secretary of public works, Memduh Shevket bey, plenipotentiary representative of Turkey in Azerbaijan;

The government of the Russian socialist federative Soviet republic: Yakov Ganetsky, plenipotentiary representative in Latvia, who, after exchanging powers found in proper and legal form, have agreed as follows:

#### Article 1

The government of the grand national assembly of Turkey and the governments of the socialist Soviet republics of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia consider the treaties concluded between the states \*\* that previously exercised their sovereign rights in the territory now part of the territory of the contracting parties and concerning the aforementioned territories as canceled and invalid, as well as treaties

concluded with third powers and concerning the Transcaucasian republics.

It is considered established that this article does not apply to the Turkish-Russian treaty concluded in Moscow on March 16, 1921 (1337).

#### Article 2

The contracting parties agree not to recognize any peace treaties or other international acts, the adoption of which would be compelled by force by one of them.

By virtue of this, the governments of the socialist Soviet republics of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia agree not to recognize any international acts concerning Turkey and not recognized by the national government of Turkey, now represented by its grand national assembly.

(the term Turkey in this treaty means the territories included in the Turkish national pact of January 28, 1920 (1336), worked out and proclaimed by the ottoman chamber of deputies in Constantinople and reported to the press and all states.)

For its part, the government of the grand national assembly of Turkey agrees not to recognize any international acts concerning Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia and not recognized by the respective governments of these countries, now represented by the Soviets of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia.

#### Article 3

The governments of the socialist Soviet republics of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia, recognizing the regime of capitulations as incompatible with the free national development of any country, as well as with the full exercise of its sovereign rights, consider all kinds of functions and rights that have any relation to this regime to be invalid and canceled. ...

#### Article 4.

The northeastern border of Turkey (according to the map of the Russian general staff in scale 1/210000 - 5 versts in an inch) is determined by a line that begins at the village of Sarp, located on the black sea, passes through Mount Khedis-mta, the watershed line of mount Shavshet - Mount Cannes- dag; it then follows the old northern administrative boundaries of the Ardagai and Kars Sandzhaks along the Thalweg of the Arpa-chai and Araks rivers to the mouth of the lower Karasu. (a detailed description of the boundaries and the issues related to it are defined in annexes I and ii and on the attached map signed by both contracting parties. In the event of a discrepancy between the text of the treaty and the map, the text shall be decisive.)

The detailed definition and drawing of the state border in nature, as well as the installation of border markers, is carried out by the joint border commission with the same number of members from the contracting parties and with the participation of a representative of the RSFSR.

Appendix iv: map.

Article 5.

The government of Turkey and the governments of Soviet Armenia and Azerbaijan agree that the Nakhichevan region, within the boundaries indicated in annex iii of this treaty, forms an autonomous territory under the auspices of Azerbaijan.

Article 6.

Turkey agrees to cede suzerainty to Georgia over the city and port of Batum and the territory lying to the north of the border specified in art. 4 of this agreement and a constituent part of the Batumi district, provided that:

1. The population of the localities specified in this article will enjoy broad local autonomy in administrative terms, ensuring each community its cultural and religious rights, and the population will have the opportunity to establish in the indicated localities a land law corresponding to its wishes;

2. Turkey will be provided with free transit of all goods sent to or from Turkey through the Batumi port, duty-free, without causing any delays and without imposing any fees on them, with the granting of Turkey the right to use the Batumi port without charging any special fees.

To implement this article, a commission will be formed from the representatives of the interested parties immediately after the signing of this agreement.

#### Article 7

The government of the socialist Soviet republic of Georgia and the government of the grand national assembly of Turkey agree to facilitate the border zone residents' crossing the border, subject to the customs, police and sanitary rules to be established in this regard by the mixed commission.

#### Article 8

The government of the socialist Soviet republic of Georgia and the government of the Turkish grand national assembly, taking into account the need for residents of the border areas of both countries to use summer and winter pastures on the other side of the border, agreed to grant these residents the right to cross the border with their herds and use ordinary pastures.

Customs regulations, as well as police, sanitary and other measures for crossing the border will be established by the mixed commission.

#### Article 9.

In order to ensure the opening of the straits and the freedom of passage of merchant ships of all nations through them, Turkey and Georgia agree to hand over the final elaboration of the international statute of the black sea and the straits to a future conference from the delegates of the coastal states, provided that the decisions made by it do not prejudice the full sovereignty of Turkey, as well as and the security of Turkey and its capital, Constantinople.

#### Article 10.



The contracting parties undertake to prevent the formation or presence on their territory of organizations or groups claiming the role of the government of another country or part of its territory, as well as the presence of groups with the aim of fighting against another country.

It shall be considered established that the Turkish territory referred to in this article means the territory under the direct military and civil administration of the government of the Turkish grand national assembly.

#### Article 11.

Citizens of both contracting parties who are on the territory of the other side will be subject to all the rights and obligations arising from the laws of the country in which they are located, with the exception of national defense obligations from which they will be exempted.

Matters concerning family law, inheritance law and legal capacity of citizens of both parties also constitute an exception to the provisions of this article. They will be allowed by special agreement.

#### Article 12.

The contracting parties agree to apply the most-favored-nation principle to citizens of each contracting party residing in the territory of the other party.

This article does not apply to the rights granted mutually by the Soviet republics on their territory to citizens of the union Soviet republics, as well as to the rights granted by Turkey to citizens of the Muslim states allied with Turkey.

#### Article 13.

Any resident of the territories that were part of Russia before 1918 and are now recognized as being under the sovereignty of Turkey, has the right, if he wishes, to renounce Turkish citizenship, freely leave Turkey and take with him his things, his property or their value.

Equally, all residents of the territory over which the suzerainty over which was ceded by Turkey to Georgia \*\*\*, have the right, if they wish,

to renounce Georgian citizenship, freely leave the territory of Georgia and take with them their belongings, their property or their value.

Residents referred to in the above article will enjoy a month's exemption from military service from the moment they duly declare their desire to leave the mentioned territories.

#### Article 14

The contracting parties undertake to conclude, within 6 months from the date of signing this treaty, special agreements concerning refugees from the wars of 1918-1920.

#### Article 15.

Each of the contracting parties undertakes to declare, immediately after the signing of this treaty, a full amnesty to the citizens of the other party for crimes and misdemeanors arising from hostilities on the Caucasian front.

#### Article 16

The contracting parties agree, within 2 months from the date of signing this treaty, to return former prisoners of war and civilian prisoners of war in the territory of one of the contracting parties.

#### Article 17.

In order to ensure the continuity of communication between their countries, the contracting parties undertake to take, by mutual agreement, all the necessary measures to preserve and develop as soon as possible rail, telegraph and other means of communication, as well as to ensure the free movement of people and goods without any delay.

However, it is recognized that with regard to the movement, entry and exit of both travelers and goods, the rules established in each of the countries of the contracting parties in this regard will apply in full.

#### Article 18.

In order to establish commercial relations and regulate all economic and financial or other issues necessary to strengthen friendly relations

between the contracting states, immediately after the signing of this treaty, a commission will be formed in Tiflis from representatives of the countries concerned.

#### Article 19

The contracting parties undertake to conclude consular conventions within 3 months from the date of signing this treaty.

#### Article 20

This treaty, concluded between the governments of Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey, is subject to ratification.

The exchange of instruments of ratification will take place in Erivan as soon as possible.

This treaty shall enter into force upon the exchange of the instruments of ratification, with the exception of articles 6, 14, 15, 16, 18 and 19, which shall enter into force immediately upon signature of the treaty.

In witness to the foregoing, the aforementioned plenipotentiaries have signed this agreement and affixed their seals to it.

Done in five copies at Kars on 13 October 1921 (1337).

A. Mravyan Kazim Karabekir

P. Makinzyan Veli

B. Shahtakhtiisky Mukhtar

S. Eliava Memduh Shevket

A. Svanidze

Ganetsky

\* the Kars conference of the three Transcaucasian Soviet republics (Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia) and Turkey with the participation of a representative of the RSFSR, convened in pursuance of the Moscow treaty between the RSFSR and Turkey of March 16, 1921 (see vol. III, document no. 342), continued from September 26 to October 13, 1921

The task of the conference was to regulate political and economic relations between its participants.

The conference ended with the signing of the Kars treaty of friendship of October 13, 1921 (see doc. No. 264).

\*\* in the original - entre les governments (between governments).

\*\*\* this refers to the Batumi district.

## **Appendix I**

The northeastern border of Turkey is established as follows (according to the map of the Russian general staff, scale 1/210000 - 5 versts per inch):

The village of Sarp on the black sea - mount Kara Shalvar (5014) - along the watershed of the rivers towards r. Ts. north of the village of Maradidi - crosses Chorokh north of the village of Maradidi and passes north of the village of Sabaur - mount Khedis- mta (7052) - Kva-kibe mountain - Kaptareti village - the watershed line of Medzybna mountains - Herat-kesun mountain (6468) - following the watershed line of Korda mountain (7910), goes along the western part of the Shavshetsky ridge to the former administrative boundary of the former Artvinsky district - passing along the watershed of the Shavshetskaya mountain, it goes to the Sarichai (kara-isal) mountain (8478) - the Kviralsky pass - from there it goes to the former administrative border of the former Ardagan district near the Kanna-dag mountain - from there, heading to the north, it reaches the Tlil mountain (8357) - following the same border of the Ardahan district, it leaves, northeast of the village of Badela, to the river Poskhov-chai and follows the same river to the south to the mountain near the village of Chanchakh - there it leaves this river - walking along the watershed line, goes to mount Ayrilyan-bashi (8512) - passes through the mountains : Kelle-tapa (8463), Harman-tapa (9709) —reaches the Kasris-seri mountain (9681) —from here follows the Karzamet-chai river to the Kura river - from here it goes along the Thalweg of the Kura river to the point east of the village of Kartanakev , where it departs from the Kura, passing along the watershed line of mount Karaoglu (7259) - from there, dividing lake

Khazapin into two parts, it goes to an altitude of 7580 (7560), and from there to mount Gek-dag (9152) - Uch-tapalyar ( 9783), where the border with Georgia ends and the border with Armenia begins: Taya-kala (9716) - peak 9065, where it leaves the former border of the Ardahan district and passes through the Bol mountains. Akh-baba (9973 or 9963 - 8828 or 8827-7602) - from here in a straight line to the top of 7518 - passing east from the village of Ibish, then to mount Kizil-dash (7439, or 7440, or 7490) - the village of new Kizil- dash, from here, following the river that flows through the new Kizil-dash to its bend located north-west of Karamemed - follows the watershed line and goes to the Camushbu-chai river \*\* located to the east of the villages: Dalaver , b. Kimly and Tikhnis - through the villages of Vartanly and Bash-shuragel - following the mentioned river, goes to the Arpa-chai river north of Kalal, or Kalali, - from there, following all the time along the Arpa-chai thalweg, goes to the Araks, following the thalweg Araks to the villages of Urmia, where the border with Armenia ends and the border with Azerbaijan begins - then follows the thalweg Araks to the confluence of the lower Karasu, where the border with Azerbaijan ends.

N. V. Of course, the border follows the watershed lines of the above heights.

A. Mravyan Kazim Karabekir

P. Makinzyan Veli

B. Shahtakhtiisky mukhtar

Sh. Eliava Memduh Shevket

A. Svanidze

Ganetsky

\* ruined church.

\*\* the name Camushbu-chai is not indicated on the map of the 1899 edition (note, doc.)

## Annex ii

Taking into account that the border line follows the thalweg of the Arpa-chai and Araks rivers, as indicated in appendix I, the government of the Turkish grand national assembly undertakes to move only the blockhouse line at a distance of 8 versts from the Alexandropol-Erivan railway in its present outline in the region Arpa-chai and at a distance of 4 versts from the above-mentioned railway line in the Araks region.

The lines bordering the aforementioned areas are indicated below: for the Arpa-chay zone - points a and b, § 1, and for the Araks zone - in § 2.

### I, zone Arpa-Chay

A) southeast of Vartanlı - east of Uzun-kilis, across mount Bozyar (5096) - 5082-5047 - east of Karmir-vaik - Uch-tapa (6578 or 5578) - east of Arazoglu, to the east of ani - reaches Arpa-chai to the west of Yeinikoy.

B) it departs again from Arpa-chai to the east of the height of 5019 - goes straight to the height of 5481 - four and a half versts east of Kyzyl-Kum - two versts east of Bojaly - then the Digor-chai river - follows this river to the village of Duz-kechut, goes directly to the north of the ruins of Kara-bag and goes to Arpa-chai.

### 2. Zone of Araks

Direct line between Kharaba- Alijan and the village of Suleiman-diza.

In the zones bounded on the one side by the Alexandropol-Erivan railway line and on the other by the lines located at a distance of 8 and 4 versts from the above-mentioned railway line, the government of the Turkish grand national assembly undertakes not to build any fortifications (these lines of distance are outside the indicated zones) and do not contain regular troops in them; however, it retains the right to have troops in the indicated zones necessary for the maintenance of security order and for administrative needs.

A. Mravyan Kazim Karabekir

P. Makinzyan Veli

B. Shahtakhtiisky mukhtar

S. Eliava Memduh Shevket

A. Svanidze

Ganetsky

### **Appendix iii**

Territory of Nakhichevan

Urmia village - from here, in a straight line - Arazdayan station (leaving it behind the socialist Soviet republic of Armenia) - then in a straight line to the western Tash-Burun mountain (3142) - the watershed line of the eastern Tash-Burun mountain (4108) - passes through the Jaanam river- dagArasi to the south of the inscription "native." (Bulak) (south) - follows the watershed line of mount Bagarsykh (6607 or 6587) and from here follows along the administrative border of the former Erivan district and Sharuro-daralagez district through a height of 6629 to mount Komurlyu-dag (6839 or 6930) and from here to the heights 3080 - Sayat-dag (7868) - the village of Kurt-kulag (kurt-kulag) - mount Gamessur-dag (8160) - altitude 8022 - Kuyuki-dag (10282) and the eastern administrative border of the former Nakhichevan district.

A. Mravyan Kazim Karabekir

P. Makinzyan Veli

B. Shahtakhtiisky mukhtar

S. Eliava Memduh Shevket

A. Svanidze

Ganetsky

Publ. In the "collection of existing contracts ...". No. Iii, m "1922, pp. 49-57.

The exchange of instruments of ratification took place in Yerevan on September 11, 1922.

**Note from the people's commissariat of foreign affairs of the RSFSR  
to the governments of all countries.**

October 22, 1921

The brutal, inhuman actions of the Greek troops in Asia minor are forcing the Russian government to raise a question before all governments about their attitude to these actions and to draw their attention to the horrific devastation of the barbaric atrocities to which entire areas of Turkey are subjected by the invading Greek troops. Even neutral observers and telegraph agencies state that all that part of



Turkey which was occupied by the Greek troops and which is cleared by them during their retreat is turning into a desert. Everywhere in the area of Greek retreat, Turkish villages are burned down, and the population is completely destroyed or taken prisoner, and women are subjected to the most barbaric violence. Of the entire Turkish population of these areas, only those who take refuge in the forests and mountains are saved. In the orders of the Greek command, there are references to the king's son Andrew, who ordered the Greek troops to burn all Turkish villages on the way. Even the commander-in-chief of the Greek army, Papoulas, gave orders for the devastation of Turkish villages.

The official message of the chairman of the Turkish grand national assembly Yusuf Kemal-bey \* dated September 28 to the plenipotentiary of the Russian republic contains a long list of horrific atrocities of the Greek troops. There are quite accurate factual indications of the devastation and atrocities committed by the Greek troops in the villages: Guzelce-kale, Sherekli, Katranji, Yalrak-bayir, Yeni-mehmedli, Kara-ali, Uzun bailey; all villages in the area between Inler Katranci and Kurd hedger were burnt; the city of Bilejik was plundered and burned, Nazhum gazle, Yuch-bash, Meti bashi, etc., the city of Kaimaz, the villages of Fakki naushem, Melek were plundered and burned; in the same way, all the villages of the Bolvadin region and others. The same official communication contains excerpts from the testimony of eyewitnesses who were present at the atrocities committed by the Greeks.

The Russian government draws the attention of all governments to the fact that the invading Greek army is thus completely devastating and turning a vast flourishing land into a real desert. The Russian government considers it absolutely necessary to appeal to all governments with a proposal to take steps before the Greek government to put an end to the unacceptable actions of the Greek troops in Turkey.

People's commissar for foreign affairs

Chicherin

Publ. Into gas. "news"

No. 239 (1382), October 25, 1921

\* Yusuf Kemal-bey was the commissioner for foreign affairs of the government of the Turkish grand national assembly.

In connection with the published note of the people's commissariat of foreign affairs of the RSFSR, Turkish ambassador to the RSFSR Ali Fuad sent Chicherin the following note dated October 26, 1921:

"Mr. Commissioner,

I have received with gratitude a copy of the protest that you have deigned to send to all governments against the atrocities committed by the Greeks in Asia minor, and which is proof of the high humane feelings that inspire the Soviet government. On this occasion, I express my warmest gratitude to the Soviet government on behalf of the people and the government of Turkey, and I ask you to accept, Mr. Commissioner, the assurances of my highest esteem. "

**Letter from the people's commissar for foreign affairs of the RSFSR to the extraordinary ambassador of the Ukrainian SSR in Turkey M.V. Frunze.**

December 26, 1921

Dear comrade,

Both from London and from Rome news is being sent that angora allegedly took the side of the entente and accepted or is going to accept the terms of the attack on the Caucasus. It is possible, and even likely, that this news is provocative in nature. We must nevertheless reckon with the worst opportunity, and our sources report on the work to

strengthen Kars and the concentration of new Turkish troops on the eastern front, in particular, near Erzurum, as well as the recruitment or mobilization in Artvin, Ardahan and Kars districts. If the comrade minister who spoke to you was sincere when he blamed us for the alleged cooling off, he simply underestimates the difficulties of the situation. After all, we continue to send something, despite the fact that from various sources we are told about Turkish hostile plans. We send less than before just because we ourselves are difficult, and the first list, which we pledged to fulfill at the time of signing the treaty, has almost been completed. Taking into account our position, we can say that we are really helping Turkey as much as possible.

Regarding Romania, not only there was no evasiveness, but quite the opposite, we interrupted the Dniester conference with Romania at the time of Yusuf Kemal's proposal and officially informed Turkey about it. She could very well use it much more than she did; after that the question of Romania lost its relevance because the master of Romania, that is, France, made friends with angora.

The alleged concentration of our troops in the Caucasus belongs to the realm of myth. As for the Molokans, the blame lies entirely with Turkey. Their [Turks] behavior in this matter was so arrogant and unacceptable that it was necessary to address them in an appropriate tone.

Our imaginary help to Enver <sup>1</sup> is a fairy tale. We consider it impossible to arrest the most prominent Muslim hero. When he went to Batumi, we could not interfere with him if we did not want to arrest him, but we did not provide him with absolutely any assistance and do not provide him.

We definitely consider it necessary to continue to maintain our previous relationship with Turkey. If there is a change in these relations, it will exclusively depend on Turkey, and not on us, you are being told about sincerity, and meanwhile, we were not at all kept abreast of the negotiations with the entente, and on the franklin-bouillon negotiations, the text of the treaty was sent to us only after that how it became an accomplished fact. We were not told anything about

the classified articles. Meanwhile, we can probably say that there are such. The Turkish emissaries are undoubtedly stirring up trouble in Adjara, in the dagestan and mountain republics. We have documents in our hands. This, however, does not prevent the continuation of the line of friendship on our part. We believe in general that the eastern peoples are our natural allies,

With communist greetings

[Chicherin]

Print. By architect.

<sup>1</sup> Enver pasha is a former war minister of the sultan government of Turkey and one of the leaders of the bourgeois-landlord party "unity and progress" (young Turks). Having been in exile in Germany since 1918, he widely promoted the ideas of pan-Islamism and at the same time launched activities in support of the anti-imperialist movement in the countries of the east; took part in the congress of the peoples of the east, held in September 1920 in Baku. In 1921, Enver arrived in Batumi, intending to leave for Turkey. However, the government of the Turkish grand national assembly, headed by Mustafa Kemal (Ataturk), given Enver's desire to return to power, banned him from entering the country.

In this regard, on November 27, 1921, Chicherin sent a letter to the RSFSR consul in Batumi containing the following instructions; "I emphasize once again that at the moment one should not allow the appearance of Enver in Turkey itself ... You have every opportunity to prevent him from going further, so that he does not penetrate into Turkey. He vowed that he would not do anything against Kemal while Kemal was fighting the Greeks. Since now it turns out that he does not keep this promise, we can also refer to this to say that we cannot provide him with hospitality in Batumi any longer".

At the end of 1921, Enver illegally made his way to Bukhara, where, having come into contact with British intelligence, he led the Anti-Soviet Basmachi movement. In august 1922, when units of the red army were defeated by the Basmachi bands, he was killed.

December 26, 1921, letter from the people's commissar for foreign affairs of the RSFSR to the extraordinary ambassador of the Ukrainian SSR in Turkey M.V. Frunze.

**Telegram of the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the RSFSR to the Representative of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of the RSFSR in the Transcaucasian Republics B.V. Legrand**

**February 15, 1922**

Ali Fouad informs us in a note that our consul in Kars refused to endorse the documents relating to the wagons with ammunition, which are to be sent by the Turks through Tiflis-Batum to the West Turkish Front. Norman must be immediately notified of the unhindered issuance of visas to the Turks and all measures must be taken to ensure that Turkish ammunition travels unhindered along the aforementioned route. Wire the execution,

Chicherin

**Telegram of the Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the RSFSR to the Plenipotentiary Representative of the RSFSR in Turkey S. I. Aralov**

March 7, 1922

It was decided to immediately transfer three and a half million rubles in gold to the Turks . Inform Mustafa Kemal about this; We agree that the money should be transferred through you and not through Karabekir. Send an inspector to Tiflis immediately, having secured reliable security from the Turks on Turkish territory, with responsibility for the safety of the Turks when moving through their territory.

L. Karakhan

**Note of the deputy people's commissar for foreign affairs of the RSFSR to the ambassador of Persia in the RSFSR Moshaver-ol-me-Malek**

November 24, 1922 no. Vb / 1034

Lord ambassador,

In response to your note of November 18, no. 1363, I have the honor to inform you that I read it with the greatest surprise. The policy of Soviet Russia in relation to Persia, striving to strengthen the political and economic power of the first K'sidekigo state, fundamentally cannot sympathize with any separatist aspirations of the Persian outskirts, let alone their struggle against the central government. This policy, sympathetic to the creation of a strong Persian state, has sufficiently proved itself in practice, starting from the first days of the emergence of the Russian Soviet republic. In particular, the willfulness of the Astrabad-SKP / Turkmens and their disobedience to government officials first of all caused concern from our throne, since such a

situation constantly threatened to break the peace on our border and manifested itself in a number of robberies, cattle theft and border clashes caused by the activities of Persian Turkmen. We have repeatedly drawn the attention of the Persian government to the need to take measures to protect the security of the borders from the attacks of the Turkmen, and our consul in Astrabad informed us that the arbitrariness and plunder of the Turkmen have intensified recently.

Your message that the Russian consul in Astrabad distributes money and weapons to the Turkmen, prompting them to revolt against the government, is so contrary to the foundations of our policy in Persia and our real interests on the border with Astrabad that no other conclusion can be drawn than that it is based on incorrect and obviously defamatory information. This information is all the more surprising because, as you know, the Russian consul cannot, on his own behalf, promise any individuals or groups to change the laws in force in the RSFSR and the republics allied with it.

I would be very grateful to you, Mr. Ambassador, if you would take measures to clarify the sources of this information, since then it will be obvious who is interested in its dissemination, especially since I know from Persian newspapers that the distribution of weapons to tribes and the incitement of the latter against the central government is, unfortunately, included in the political program of one of the foreign powers in Persia, which may be interested in diverting public attention, through false rumors, from its criminal activities in a different direction.

I have no doubt, Mr. Ambassador, that such attempts to throw a gag on good-neighborly relations between Soviet Russia and Persia will remain fruitless and their exposure will only serve to further strengthen the friendship of our peoples.

Please accept, Mr. Ambassador, the assurance of my utmost respect.

Karakhan,



**Letter from the Chairman of the Russian-Ukrainian-Georgian delegation at the Lausanne Conference to the Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the RSFSR M. M. Litvinov**

December 12, 1922 No. 9

Dear comrade,

In recent days, the question of the straits has been clothed in the form of expert meetings, and the whole struggle has concentrated in and around these meetings, taking on a largely behind-the-scenes character. I will briefly reconstruct the course of events.

At an evening meeting of the Straits Commission on Friday 8 December, Curzon said that the allied experts would meet with Turkish experts. This caused the incident you know \*\*\*. During the polemic with me and Rakonsky, Curzon first said that the question of demilitarized zones did not concern Russia, but then he said that it was about unofficial meetings of experts. Barrer further emphasized that experts of any kind can talk privately with each other. When I demanded the convening of the subcommittee, Curzon said that the

moment had not yet arrived. The written opinion presented by us on this matter is specially sent to you \*\*\*\*. In the days that followed, conversations between Turkish and Allied experts took on the character of real separate negotiations. The Turkish experts told us, they said, in an exhaustive way, what was happening at these meetings. In fact, a real bargaining took place there. On this occasion, we had a number of discussions and conversations, partly between us and the Turkish experts, and partly between us and the Turkish delegates.

When I was at Ismet Pasha on Sunday, he very much asked us to demand a meeting between our experts and the allies on Monday morning. Having discussed this, we came to the unanimous conclusion that in this way we will only contribute to the system of separate conversations between experts, unacceptable for us, leading to the elimination of the Russian delegation from the negotiations between the Turks and the Entente. In this sense, I wrote a letter to Ismet Pasha, which is also sent to you in a special way.

On Tuesday, that is, this morning, our experts were formally invited to a meeting of experts from all delegations. Against one comrade. Mdivani, we decided that it was impossible not to go there in view of the fact that the convocation of experts in full complement corresponds to what we ourselves demanded. But the experts were instructed to protest and even leave if it turns out that the meeting goes beyond purely informational explanations, and in this sense the experts had to demand clarification of the purpose of the meeting from the very beginning. Since it was clear from the messages made to us by Turkish experts that the Allies intend to return to the theory put forward by Curzon in passing that the demilitarization of the straits does not concern Russia, the experts were also instructed not to discuss the issue of the passage of ships into the Black Sea, if they were not given talk about the demilitarization of the straits. Further, since we learned that at this meeting of experts they would be presented with a new draft of the allies, the experts were instructed not to accept such a draft and to protest against the submission of such a draft not to the Commission and the subcommittee, but to experts. This would be a further step towards transferring all negotiations to a commission of experts who

would replace the sub-commission. On the 11th afternoon, Ismet Pasha came to us, and we agreed with him that our both delegations would demand the convocation of a subcommittee. We explained to Ismet Pasha that only in the sub-commission is there an opportunity for our delegation and the Turkish delegation to jointly fight for acceptable conditions, while the transfer of negotiations to a meeting of experts makes it possible to completely eliminate Ias, and generally conduct negotiations with non-political persons. On the basis of this agreement, we sent a note on the evening of the 11th demanding the convocation of a subcommittee, which will be sent to you separately \*. The Turkish delegation sent a note of the same, apparently on the 12th morning.

So today, on the 12th morning, a meeting of experts from all delegations took place. A new draft was introduced by allied experts, and upon examination it turned out that it contains completely new articles. At the same time, their project on the demilitarization of the straits was not introduced, but only the project on the passage of ships through the straits to the Black Sea. When our experts demanded an explanation for this, the allied experts answered them that the demilitarization of the straits did not concern Russia. In view of these two circumstances - the removal of Russia from the question of demilitarization of the straits and the transformation of the meeting of experts into a real subcommittee, our experts, by virtue of the directive we had given, demonstratively left the meeting. At the same time, our delegation was officially sent a new draft "freedom of the straits,"<sup>3</sup> that is, the passage of ships through the straits into the Black Sea. A few hours later, our delegation received from the secretariat of the conference, without any comments, also the draft demilitarization of the straits<sup>13</sup>. Thus, all the cards were confused: after Russia was officially denied the right to participate in the discussion of the demilitarization of the straits, this project was nevertheless sent to us. This did not stop us from sending a note of protest, which is especially sent to you, regarding the transformation of the meeting of experts into a subcommittee, and most of all, regarding the removal of Russia from the discussion of the demilitarization of the straits \*. The last question is the most serious and can lead in the future to the most serious fights. Of course, it is out of the question for us to submit to such an act of violence.

Apparently, Karzai wants to push through the issue of the straits as quickly as possible. In the form of a meeting of experts, he wants to come to terms with the Turks and then confront us with a fait accompli, submit a finished draft to the commission and immediately raise the issue of signing or unsigning it, or simply postponing it until the end of the conference. Everywhere they talk about the likelihood of a critical moment in the near future. Curzon's goal is to sign a treaty with the Turks, and at the same time Russia does not sign this treaty. He sees success in such a formal rejection of Turkey from Russia.

To all the preceding, I must add that yesterday the British naval expert Admiral Keyes invited Behrens \*\* and had a long conversation with him. At our address, oi expressed many friendly feelings, but the main content of his conversation boiled down to the fact that it was very beneficial for us to sign an agreement in the form proposed by the Allies. At the same time, in the French spheres, they say that they hope that the Russians will appreciate the conciliatory spirit of the French, who prompted the British to make very important (?) Concessions.

The new projects of the allies do not differ at all from the original ones. Regarding the passage of ships into the Black Sea, instead of granting [the right] to each state to have three ships, of which one can be more than 10,000 tons, the minimum right is established for each state to carry three ships through the straits to the Black Sea, each of which cannot exceed 10 000 ton. The size of foreign ships, thus, decreases, but a very unclear formula is obtained, from which it is not clear with complete certainty whether it refers to the presence of these forces in the Black Sea or to the moment of their passage through the straits.

In the area of demilitarizing the shores of the straits, there are some improvements, such as allowing small batteries or the refusal to prohibit the [use of] w [rail] d [orogs], which exclusively serve to facilitate the defense of land from landing, but do not in the least help protect the straits from passing foreign fleets. At the same time, it was established in a definite way that control over the implementation of the Straits Agreement is not entrusted to Turkey. [...]

There are, apparently, some points on which the agreement took place in Angora between Turkey and the allies. There is no general agreed game between them, but on certain points, apparently, there is an agreement. Such a point is Turkey's obligation not to fortify the straits and to allow armed ships to pass within certain limits. Ismet Pasha partly sings Lazarus, partly fights stubbornly against the Entente, but it is precisely at these points that he systematically fails.

The main idea passing through the concessions of the Turks and making one think that a certain part of these concessions is more than voluntary is to completely separate the question of the fate of the straits and the Black Sea from the question of the security of the land and internal territories of Turkey. Our point of view is this: the security of the south of Russia is the security of Turkey and vice versa; there is no security for Constantinople without closing the straits, and this also determines the security of southern Russia and vice versa. The Turks reason like this: their capital will remain in Angora, the real Turkey will be in Asia Minor, and only partly in Thrace; no matter what happens in the straits, real, that is, land, Turkey will remain independent of this and will not be involved in the war; if we accept the Russian point of view, then in the event of a war between England and Russia, the former will demand that Turkey let the British fleet pass, Turkey will find it difficult to resist, or Turkey will be involved in the war; the Russian point of view therefore leads to Turkey's involvement in the war; the Turkish point of view is to give up on the straits, since the internal territories of Turkey are protected; let the Entente fight with Russia, Turkey will watch and observe its own benefit; she herself will remain on the sidelines, but Turkey is not Constantinople, but is the inner territory of Asia Minor.

In recent days, this theory has often slipped into the words of Turkish delegates and is quite consistently embodied in the supposedly forced concessions of the Turks. This is connected with the complete illusory nature of Turkish control over the passage of ships through the straits. Previously, the matter was clear and simple: there were cannons at the entrance to the straits, a suitable ship had to stop, but if it did not stop, a cannon fired at it. Now there will be no cannons, they will be

completely free to swim in the straits, there will not even be Turkish pilots, the passage will be open to everyone. The Turks are extremely willing to concede precisely on the issue of removing from them all control over the passage of ships through the straits. And since this is so, then any limitations become illusory. It is at this point that the Turks have an ambiguity that we have not yet been able to clarify. The OII strongly insist that the passage of ships through the straits should be in batches. We are interested in the fact that there are no warships in the Black Sea. The Turks say that they agree with us, but that we should fight for this, not they; they are only ready to support us (in words, maybe). The OII themselves are interested in the fact that the foreign warships between the entrance to the straits and the exit from the straits do not exceed the tonnage of their own Turkish fleet. Their theory is the passage of foreign warships in batches. We heard about this for a long time and, apparently, they already had some kind of agreement with the Entente about this. But for IAS it is completely unclear how the OII will control these packs, since they give up both control itself and the means of control over the straits.

At the meetings of their experts with allied experts, the following tendency was quite consistently manifested: the Turks should bother about the state of affairs in the Proli-ichkh, and the situation in the Black Sea is of interest to Russia, and Russia should be the initiator on these issues. This practically coincided with an attempt by Kerzoia to eliminate the discussion of the demilitarization of the straits. The Turks themselves to rot this attempt of Kerzoia promise to protest, but their experts were silent when raising this question and did not support us. The Turkish note demanding the convocation of the sub-commission states that this sub-commission should study the entire complex of the question of the straits. In this form, Ismet Pasha fulfills his promise to support our demand for our participation in the issue of demilitarization as well.

In conversations with us, the Turks are developing a theory that is very reminiscent of our theory of the respite of the Brest-Li-tovsk period. They say that Turkey cannot under any circumstances continue the war. They want to temporarily improve their situation by means of a

treaty, and they consider the regime established by the treaty to be temporary, transitional. They hope (are they simpletons or cunning?) By treaty to get rid of the allied troops and the British fleet occupying Constantinople (their system of packs should eliminate the English fleet). Then, getting rid of the allied forces and getting a little stronger, they will continue the war, according to them, in order to completely throw the allies out. They say that the Curzon peace will be extremely difficult for Turkey; as a result, the Turkish people will get closer and closer to the Russian people; They will immediately begin a struggle in order to throw off the bonds imposed by Curzon, and will conduct this struggle together with the Russian people. In this form, Ismet Pasha beats us with our good brow. As for allied control over the straits, he, he said, wants to outsmart the allies. By the way, Ismet Pasha categorically declares that in no case will Turkey accept the Allied Control Commission, which has real military and administrative power. OII agree only to a commission in the spirit of the Russian project, that is, a purely commercial one with technical functions.

So, the Turks are not doing their duty towards us in the sense that they are only concerned about the security of their internal territories, not waging a fight over the passage of ships through the straits into the Black Sea, and, secondly, they are ready to sign an agreement even without Ias. [...]

With communist greetings

Georgy Chicherin

**Letter from the chairman of the Russian-Ukrainian-Georgian delegation at the Louisan conference to the deputy people's commissar for foreign affairs of the RSFSR M.M. Litvinov**

December 17, 1922 m 12

Dear comrade,

At the time of sending you my letter no. 9 \*\*\*\*\*, an incident with the experts, described in this letter, occurred. Our experts were invited to a joint meeting for the first time and left, because, firstly, the allied experts declared that the issue of demilitarization of the straits did not concern Russia, and, secondly, because the presentation of new projects to the meeting of experts turned this meeting into a subcommittee conference, which achieved the elimination of us from the negotiations of the allies with the Turks. Right now, after that, the union project for the demilitarization of the straits was officially sent to us from the secretariat of the conference, 3. I wrote to you about this that the cards are confused. Later statements by the conference secretariat confirmed that the conference believes that the demilitarization of the straits concerns Russia. [...]

During all this time, the negotiations of the Turks with the allies continued in the form of a meeting of experts, and the Turks partly kept us informed of these negotiations, but not always and not in everything. Yesterday, conference interim secretary Logard called by telephone that



the allied experts are inviting our experts to take advantage of their right to come to a meeting with them. We rejected this, because this would mean that we would recognize separate meetings of allied experts with experts from individual countries. We have therefore sent a secondary copy of the previously stated request for the convening of the subcommittee \* with an accompanying letter, which is sent to you separately.

During the talks between the allied experts and Turkish experts, the allies made a number of concessions to the Turks. The day before yesterday, he made two important concessions, which I informed you in a coded message: the Turkish fleet can freely pass through the straits and land everywhere, even in the demilitarized zones; all restrictions are removed from the Asian coast of the sea of Marmara, and the Turks can install any large artillery there.

These negotiations are intertwined with other negotiations, and, as you already know from the Rosta telegrams, there was an extreme aggravation between Curzon and the Turks on the issue of minorities, but when after that the Turks agreed to join the league of nations, Curzon expressed his greatest pleasure. As you know, behind this lies the British maneuver on the issue of Mosul and oil. Mosul is included in Iraq, which is mandated by the league of nations; after Turkey joins the league of nations, the latter may transfer the mandate to Turkey. Behind this lies negotiations on the preservation of oil concessions or on the transfer of oil concessions to the Turkish petroleum company, where the British have an overwhelming majority. There are different versions of the specific proposals that the British make to the Turks regarding the oil agreement: the division of the territory or the transfer of 25% of the profits to the Turks. These trial balloons are launched through Ricket, who visits Ismet pasha at least once a day. Their meaning is to eliminate the American!! From this oil. Hence the colossal excitement evoked by every such trial balloon. There are shouts that the conference is in danger, and the offended American oilmen will achieve the derail of the conference.

For two days now, the Turks have been telling us very secretly that they allegedly drew up a counter-draft on the question of the straits, but so

far they have not sent this counter-draft to us, and they say that it is "being translated." [...]

During the entire past week, Rickett has developed an intense activity towards us. I do not accept him, but he constantly sees Arens. As you probably remember, Rickett in Berlin was an intermediary between Krasin and the British oilmen, but nothing came of it. Now he began to develop Arens' plan for an agreement between us and Curzon. He said that Curzon's hostile line did not correspond to the mood of British public opinion. The latter, like the government itself, with the exception of Curzon, ardently desires an agreement with Russia. Curzon will perhaps be considered a personal success if he brings a treaty with Turkey without the participation of Russia, but England will see this as a failure, and this will be a pyrrhic victory for him. One of the largest political forces of the conservative party, Sir George Armstrong, is traveling from London especially for talks with us.

From conversations with others it later emerged that this Armstrong was also a major oil worker. He actually came not only to negotiate with us, but also to negotiate about Mosul, and has now left for Paris to negotiate the same with the French government. He left Vickers-Armstrong a long time ago. He finances the conservative party and enjoys influence in it. Goodbye, Armstrong had a conversation with our maritime expert Behrens and told him: "you are a big elephant, he dominates the shore, leave us the water."

.....

To my reproaches, he replied that the Russian delegation in Lausanne eliminated itself. The Russian experts left the meeting, and when they were later invited, they did not come at all; elaboration of details at meetings of experts is a general rule, it always happens; in Genoa it was, perhaps, not so, but everyone is generally satisfied with the much more business-like, non-theatrical conduct of this conference; at the very first meeting, the Russian delegation outlined its plan, later the allies outlined their plan, then the details were discussed by experts, this is quite normal; tomorrow, as a result of the experts' work, the allies will submit a new draft to the Straits Commission, and the Russian

delegation will have a full opportunity to express itself; if because of each article to negotiate and negotiate - there will be no end. "we went very far to meet the Turks, they agreed to our proposal - and the foundation of your project will be taken away from you; if you offer it again, no one will accept it; for England, the possibility of turning the black sea into a Russian lake is excluded. " "if you insisted so much on the participation of your experts in the meetings, why did not your Turkish friends demand this?" "you cannot demand the creation of a subcommittee when the conference has not created one, this is the business of the conference, a separate delegation cannot demand it." "regarding demilitarization, I personally would think that this does not concern Russia, but I do not want to remove Russia from this." "it was I who insisted that you be invited to Lausanne, while Poincare proposed that at the end of the Lausanne conference another conference on the straits in Geneva be convened with your participation." "all other delegations were of their own accord against your plan; I didn't know in advance what Romania and others would say; they did not require their experts to attend the meetings at all. " "I came to conclude an agreement on the straits with the participation of Russia. I am fully aware that without Russia this treaty will have less force. But if you do not sign, / this your case, we will sign without you. Maybe you will join later. " reproaching us for our tactics, he recalled my interviews in English newspapers: "you are trying to denigrate me in the English press, you only worsen relations and complicate your own situation."

In the course of this dispute, I gradually laid out all our claims, but all the time I met a cold, purely formalistic attitude.

My general impression is that under Curzon there can be no serious agreements with England at all.

Tomorrow there will be a decisive meeting of the straits commission, but in view of the departure of the courier, we have to send the accumulated material to you now.

With communist greetings

Georgy Chicherin

**Letter from the chairman of the Russian-Ukrainian-Georgian delegation at the Lausanne conference to the deputy people's commissar for foreign affairs of the RSFSR M Litvinov \***

December 19, 1922 m 15

Dear comrade,

In my letter no. 12 \*\* I informed you about my meeting with Curzon, who said that on Monday there will be a meeting of the commission, and the Turks will finally express their opinion on the straits. Yesterday, Monday 18th, this meeting took place. The night before, the allies sent out their drafts no. 3 and no. 4. (draft no. 1 concerned the passage of ships through the straits, project no. 2 dealt with the demilitarization of the strait zones; both were introduced by Curzon on December 6; the draft no. 3 now international commission of the straits, and no. 4 on the guarantee of the league of nations; in addition, on Sunday evening the Turks sent us the text of their counter-draft, which they sent to the delegations yesterday morning.<sup>21</sup> yesterday, just before the meeting, we passed our counter-draft \*\*\* to the conference secretariat.) [.. .]

You should know the progress of yesterday's meeting from the detailed report of Rosta and the materials sent to you at the same time. First, the allies spoke about their projects no. 3 and no. 4. The Turks said that they had not yet had time to study these projects and would express

themselves at another meeting. We joined in and stated the same. I read our declaration \*\*\*\* with an analysis of the union projects no. 1 and no. 2. Curzon polemicized against me, I polemicized against Curzon. I note the very essence of the matter: Curzon said that the center of the question lies in the fact that at present mankind is trying more and more to bring freedom of navigation, freedom of passage through the seas and straits, etc. I pointed out in my objection that the center the issue is that much more progressive is the desire to limit theaters of military operations, to limit armaments, to cut state spending, rather than to expand and not increase all this. Taking advantage of barrera's speech in favor of the league of nations, I pounced on the latter and illustrated her impotence by the fact that she gave up in front of Zheligovsky. This was followed by a rather lengthy debate about the late introduction of our counter-projects. I pointed out that the allies themselves had just submitted their drafts no. 3 and no. 4 and that we could not have submitted our counter-draft earlier, because the commission had not been convened for 10 days, and the sub-commission had not been created at all. Curzon and Barrer pounced on the Turkish delegation for introducing new projects.

Today, on Tuesday, the 19th, there was a meeting, which, according to Curzon; had to be decisive and final. The Turks, however, did not speak out, and the meeting ended with Curzon's half-frank ultimatum to the Turks: the inviting powers appoint one more last meeting on the straits, no more. In other words, a final answer is required from the Turks and no further negotiations are allowed.

You should know the course of the meeting from other materials. I will recapitulate in a nutshell: Curzon analyzed our counter-project in a very summary and tendentious way, then analyzed in detail, article by article, the Turks' amendments to the union projects. Almost all the demands of the Turks, deviating from the proposal of the allies, Curzon on behalf of the latter rejected. Ismet pasha answered only on some points, and he rejected some of the most important demands of the allies. I then objected to Curzon and read our declaration on the union projects no. 3 and no. 4 \*. Of my objections to Curzon's polemics, I will single out two points: 1) to our declaration of our readiness to convene

a conference of the black sea states to discuss the mutual security of the shores, Curzon replied that this is completely insufficient, for Russia only expresses its readiness to speak with the black sea states, and other states do not allow it. To this I replied that this was the same idea put forward by the British government in 1920, when it, together with other great powers, proposed to participate in the negotiations between Russia and the Limitrophes; we then rejected this, because we believed that we would more easily come to terms with the Limitrophes if, in our negotiations, we proceed from our interests and their interests and not add to this world conflicts and all the complexity of world politics \*; I think in the same way that we ourselves will more easily come across the black sea states. 2) regarding Curzon's malicious remarks about our isolation, I ended my speech by saying that we have a powerful ally - the taxpayer of all \* countries, who will understand tomorrow that the system of expanding the scope of operations of military courts, increasing armed forces and multiplying conflicts at sea leads to increased costs, and therefore it will ensure the triumph of our point of view tomorrow.

All small states, of course, accepted the allied project. Roles were assigned and each had a specific role.

The end of the meeting was occupied by Kerzon's leaning against the Turks and Curzon's statements, which had the character of an ultimatum. Tomorrow at 4 pm there will be a meeting, which, according to Curzon, is regarded by the inviting powers as the last on the question of the straits.

Meanwhile, the Americans have just received a protest against the creation of an international commission in the straits. At the same time, the Turks continue to resolutely rebel against the provision of the international commission with the functions of overseeing the demilitarization of the shores and, in general, any functions falling within the competence of the Turkish government.

We just had a conversation with Ismet pasha. He most of all insists on the item on the competence of the international commission. Other questions also arise in the circles of the conference they say that the

British want now to sign only a preliminary peace and postpone the final peace. This means that Turkey's agreement in principle will be squeezed out of her, and the final peace, that is, the withdrawal of British troops and navy from Constantinople, will be postponed. On the question of the straits, the British want to end immediately and get the consent of the Turks to their demands and immediately sign a separate convention on the straits even without Russia. Therefore, the most important issue for them will thus be torn out of Turkey's consent and formalized, and everything else will be postponed. Ismet pasha says that he will insist on the immediate evacuation of Constantinople by the allies and that on the points on which he accepts the demands of the allies regarding the straits, he will give a conditional agreement, depending on the agreement on all other controversial issues of the conference.

As a result of the departure of the courier, I have to interrupt at this, and I will write about tomorrow's decisive meeting with the next courier.

With communist greetings

Georgy Chicherin

**Letter from the Chairman of the Russian-Ukrainian-Georgian delegation at the Lausanne Conference to the Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the RSFSR M. M. Litvinov**

Lausanne, January 21, 1923 No. 84

Dear comrade,

There was no such mass of false reports and rumors on any issue as on Mosul. Some significant points remained and probably remain unknown. From Curzon's letter to Ismet Pasha, published in today's newspapers, we learned for the first time that at the beginning of the conference, Ismet Pasha had offered the British separate negotiations on Mosul. We thought, on the contrary, that it was England that proposed separate negotiations. At the moment, Ismet Pasha insists, with all his characteristic persistence, that the question of Mosul must certainly be resolved in Lausanne and must be included in the treaty. The entire British press, on the contrary, is developing the official thought of the British government that it would be better to single out the question of Mosul and refer it to a future special Anglo-Turkish conference.

Bey Lausanne was amazed at the news that Curzon invited Ismet Pasha to raise the issue of Turkey's southern border before the conference on Tuesday. At the same time, Curzon also speaks of the Syrian border, as if referring to Ismet Pasha. In his answer, Ismet Pasha accepts Curzon's proposal, but says that the initiative to raise the issue of the Syrian border does not come from him. In conversations, the Turks say that Curzon, obviously, wanted to drive a cline between the Turks and the



French by mentioning the Syrian border. Indeed, in the Majlis, many very violently demanded the return of Alexandretta to the Turks. Now Ismet Pasha demands clarification of the clause of the Franco-Turkish agreement on a special administrative regime for Alexandretta. Under this sauce, some kind of English intrigue will be carried out, because there the oil pipeline ends. The entire English press trumpets in the loudest tones about the need to hasten the end of the conference. Curzon's letter is interpreted in the sense that he wants to brusque \* the solution of the most important questions. It is not known exactly what Bompard brought with him from Paris. It is reported that he brought France's consent to the distribution between the former parts of the Ottoman Empire of the debt capital itself, and not just annuities, but this concession to the Turks was made a few days ago.

The answer from the conference chairpersons \*\* has already been sent to you by previous mail. The question of convening the Pulling Commission remains open: neither yes nor no.

With communist greetings

Georgy Chicherin

**Telegram of the deputy people's commissar for foreign affairs of the RSFSR to the consul general of the RSFSR in Tiflis Lvovich**

February 20, 1923

We agree to transfer one echelon of artillery equipment by the Turks across our territory from Kars to the western front.

L. Karakhan

**Letter from the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR  
to the Official Representative of the USSR in Great Britain**

**October 17, 1923**

Dear comrade,

Has the British government paid any attention to our protest, expressed through Comrade Berzin, against the withdrawal of Soviet ships from Constantinople by the French \*? In view of the fact that the occupation was collective, the responsibility falls on England. I didn't notice anything about this in print. Comrade Berzin conveyed a general protest and, apparently, limited himself to this. Meanwhile, the fact of the withdrawal of ships from an area where England is also responsible, had to be widely communicated to the English public.

The Russian shipping and trade society was nationalized, but a few fugitive board members usurped the rights in Paris with the support of the French government, which soon placed its commissars over them. Constantinople was home to the ships of Ropit, which the French government allegedly chartered under an agreement with these fugitive members of the former government. In our note of protest, we indicated that no deals made with these traitors and usurpers are valid. Some kind of sympathy was expressed from Italian sources, but in London everything was limited to filing a protest

See doc. No. 264.

Berzanna. Meanwhile, the French were doing real outrage. The captains and sailors were almost all on our side and wanted to return to Russia. The French military authorities subjected them to all kinds of

repression. On the Ayu-Dag steamer, Captain Morshchikov and mechanic Ivanov were put in a French military prison and subjected to all kinds of abuse there. Others were also beaten and abused. The Zarya steamer belonging to the Russian Maritime Department was also taken away, although all of its papers were in Comrade Zalkind's. The French flag was forcibly raised on it. In total, the following 7 ships were taken away by the French: "Askold", "Besh-tau", - "Ayu-dag", "Zarya", "Lazarev", "Brave" and "Dream". The Turks bought two ships - "Ararat" and "Vesta" and took as a prize one ship - "Queen Olga". Turk was detained for debts one ship - "Rumyantsev". In addition, the ships "Kornilov" and "Truvor" are in the hands of the French off the coast of Syria.

All this was done in the area of collective allied occupation. All this took place in an atmosphere of violent protests from the teams and most of the captains and wild repression against them by the French military authorities.

With comradely greetings

Chicherin

**Letter from the deputy people's commissar for foreign affairs of the USSR to the charge d'affaires of the USSR in Turkey, Ga Zalkind. December 14, 1937**

*December 14, 1937*

We quite deliberately refrained from commenting on the replacement of the Turkish cabinet in the Soviet press. At first, we wanted to wait for the declaration of the new government. However, when this declaration was published, we stated that Bayar, like Ataturk, did not mention a single word about relations between Turkey and the USSR. Under these conditions, we did not find it possible to make any statements in the press regarding the new Turkish government.

In the event that the Turks begin to grieve for you about the silence of the Soviet press about the arrival of Bayar, you should go on the offensive and directly state that you are surprised by such complaints, while the lengthy declaration of the new head of government does not contain a single word at Soviet Union. Bayar should, at least out of tact, mention the traditional Turkish-Soviet friendship. If he did not do this, then, by doing so, willingly or unwillingly, he created the impression that the new cabinet did not attach the importance to relations with the USSR that they had before. We are not going to reproach the Turks for this, but the Turks, in turn, cannot pretend that the Soviet press show an interest in the new Turkish cabinet greater than the interest that this government is showing to the USSR.

As for the considerations that in general it would be necessary to publish articles on topics about Turkey in Soviet newspapers from time to time, I completely agree with this. Indeed, we could find a number of topics related to the economic development of Turkey, in particular railways, new factories, etc., in which we could give an impartial and

positive coverage for the Turks. I therefore ask you to outline several such topics and instruct the embassy staff to prepare articles for publication in the central Soviet press. These articles can be sent to us, we will review them and then submit them to the newspapers. I consider this method to be the most practical, since in Ankara you are much more aware of what and in what aspect you should write.

Deputy people's commissar

*B. Stomonyakov*

**Recording of the conversation of the USSR plenipotentiary representative in Turkey with the minister of foreign affairs of Turkey Aras and the minister of internal affairs of Turkey Shukru Kaya. June 18, 1937**

*June 18, 1937*

Aras said that he would not be in Moscow by July 1-2. Thus, it will target July 13-14. He cannot give the exact date now, as he still has a long trip ahead. He will transmit this date to Moscow through our plenipotentiary in Tehran. Five of his personal employees will come with Aras.

Shukru Kaya will leave Istanbul in such a way as to arrive in Moscow at the same time as Aras or one or two days earlier. He will travel by sea if there is a suitable steamer, or through Negoreloye. He will be accompanied by two parliament members - central committee member Rahmi Apak (former military attaché in Moscow) and Osman Shevki, two employees of the ministry of foreign affairs and his personal secretary.

As for the way back, Aras does not want to go either through Warsaw or through Berlin. He also does not intend to return via Romania. He has just been to Bucharest twice, and for the third time it is inconvenient and unnecessary for him to go. The easiest way is through Odessa. However, he does not know if there will be a suitable steamer, and in general he would not like to give us much trouble. Therefore, he had the idea to go through Scandinavia and then Paris. At the same time, he would have paid a visit to his friend Holst, with whom he had established very friendly relations many years ago in Geneva, and to Sandler, whom he would have thanked for his efforts on the [Alexandretta] Sandjak. I asked if he had spoken with comrade Litvinov

about this route. Aras said that it only occurred to him now. This issue has not yet been resolved, and he wants to consult with com.

I asked Aras if he had anything to say to me for transmission to Moscow in connection with his upcoming visit. Aras said no, since he is not going to raise any questions in Moscow. His visit is indeed a courtesy call. He is going to demonstrate friendly relations and to exchange views with the leaders of the Soviet government. Several times during the conversation, Aras and Shukru Kaya repeated that they hoped to meet with Stalin.

Answering my question, Aras said that minister of economy Bayar was going with him to Baghdad for talks with the Iraqi government on the oil issue. The Turkish government is concerned about the oil problem. Turkey must ensure itself the receipt of oil both in peacetime and especially in case of war. By the way, he is also going to talk about this in Moscow. **As for Iraq, the Turkish government intends to receive its share of the Mosul oil in kind and build an oil refinery in Diyarbakir.** The Turks also want the Iraqi government to cede its share to them. The resolution of this question depends on the consent of the British, and we will have to talk on this topic in London. The Turks have the means of pressure. An extension of the oil concession is pending, which will require the consent of the Turkish government.

Today Aras received a report from the Turkish envoy in Belgrade about his conversation with Stojadinovich. Stojadinovich believes that the Berlin-Rome axis is not solid. The contradictions of German-Italian interests cannot be hidden, and, despite all attempts to coordinate the policies of these states in the Balkans and in the Danube basin, this has not yet succeeded. Stojadinovich is unhappy that Neurath chose the Belgrade - Sofia - Budapest route for his trip, and allegedly made it clear to Neurath.

The main topic of negotiations between Neurath and Stojadinovich was allegedly economic issues. Among the political issues, the problem of German-Czechoslovak relations deserves mention. The normalization of relations between Germany and Czechoslovakia, is impeded by the policy of the Czechoslovak government towards the Sudeten Germans,



as well as the Soviet-Czechoslovak pact. However, Neurath in the most categorical form gave Stojadinovich an assurance that Germany did not have any aggressive intentions towards Czechoslovakia,

Then Aras said that he had given a directive to the Turkish envoy in Belgrade to make a deMarche on the Anti-Soviet campaign of the Yugoslav press. In response, Stojadinovich assured the Turkish government that in relation to the USSR he adheres and will adhere to the line that he spoke about during his visit to Ankara. **As for the Anti-Soviet campaign that the Yugoslav press is currently waging,** Stojadinovich said that **he needed this campaign for reasons of domestic policy.**

Aras spoke in very vague terms about the need to prepare the ground for the eastern pact, which is now becoming relevant in connection with talks about the western pact. I asked if he had done anything specifically on this matter. Aras replied that when he was in Belgrade, he asked Antonescu to probe Beck's attitude to Poland's participation in the eastern pact. Due to the fact that Antonescu has not yet given him any answer, Aras concludes that this probe gave a negative result. I noticed that for me the negative position of Poland is beyond any doubt (I think that Aras' probing on this issue without our knowledge is unacceptable, but refrained from making any comments, not being sure that Aras had not spoken on this topic with t. Litvinov).

Aras said that on June 14, the Polish ambassador Sokolnitsky came to him with statements about the Romanian-Polish relations. This visit, according to Aras, is a reaction to the conversations that Aras had with Antonescu in Bucharest. Sokolnitsky assured Aras. That the polish-Romanian alliance is not aggressive and is not directed against any third state. To this, Aras said that Turkey's attitude towards this union is well known and Sokolnitsky's statement cannot change the Turkish position in any way. Assurances about the usefulness of the polish-Romanian alliance for the cause of peace could be convincing only if this alliance was open for the accession of third countries, in particular the USSR. Sokolnitsky said that this was impossible, as it would mean for Poland to spoil its relations with Germany.

Aras and Shukru Kaya said the situation on the Turkish-Syrian border is much calmer. This is explained by instructions received by the local colonial French authorities from Paris. Aras expressed satisfaction at his meeting with Blum and Delbos and assured me that Franco-Turkish relations can be considered normalized and will develop in a spirit of friendly cooperation.

Plenipotentiary of the USSR in Turkey

*M. Karsky*

[1] the text is wrong - to the ambassador.

**Recording of the conversation of the USSR plenipotentiary representative in Iran with the minister of foreign affairs of Turkey Aras.**

*June 30, 1937*

Rushtu Aras, together with the Turkish ambassador, came to see me in Zergand [1] ... He reported on a telegram he had received from Ankara informing him that the Soviet government would provide him with a special ship on his return from Moscow to Turkey. In this regard, Rushtu Aras decided to reconsider his route. Previously, after his stay in Moscow, he intended to visit Stockholm to pay a visit to Sandler, but, given that the Soviet government is providing him with a special ship, he will postpone his visit to Sandler until a later time and will return directly to Ankara from Moscow. Rushtu Aras began to explain that, in general, his plans for a trip to Stockholm were connected precisely with the fact that there was no regular steamship service on the black sea. However, he immediately added that, while changing the route, he also tried to emphasize that his visit to Moscow does not have the character of a visit during transit but is an independent visit.

I told Rushtu Aras that on the question that interested him about the date of his trip to Moscow, I managed to find out that Moscow was expecting his arrival on July 13th. In order to be in Moscow on July 13, you need to leave Pahlavi on July 10, and on July 11 - from Baku.

Regarding the message made to me by Rushtu Aras, I noticed that I had an assignment from comrade Litvinov to find out whether Rushtu Aras had in mind to visit Moscow by way of passage, or whether this visit was of an independent character. The message from Rushtu Aras about his change of the route gives me grounds to give the necessary explanation to comrade Litvinov.

Rushtu Aras further said that the afghan foreign minister is expected in Tehran on July 6-7, while the Iraqi foreign minister is expected on July 1. The signing of the pact will probably happen on July 8 or 9. Rushtu Aras thinks that some difficulties may still arise between the Iraqis and the Iranians during the final editing of the text of the Shatt al-Arab convention, since there is no complete text yet.

It is assumed that after the signing of the pact, a council of the middle east entente will be formed, and Rushtu Aras intends to elect Iranian foreign minister Sami as chairman of this council for the first year. Rushtu Aras also thinks to propose on behalf of this council to send greetings telegrams to Litvinov and Eden, as representatives of neighboring countries.

Rushtu Aras said that he had a visit from an Italian envoy and asked him why they were in such a hurry to sign the middle east pact. Rushtu Aras states that the Italians are showing concern and dissatisfaction with the pact. He did not ask the Italian envoy about the reasons for such an unusual interest and limited himself only to a statement that the middle east pact poses no threat to anyone and that his task is only to consolidate peace. Rushtu Aras states that Germany and Poland are also showing interest in the fact of the conclusion of the middle east pact and the representatives of these countries in Ankara have contacted the ministry for relevant information. However, this interest was quite correct in form, without going beyond requests for ordinary information. In this way,

Speaking about the circumstances facilitating the conclusion of the middle east pact, Rushtu Aras gave a special place to the settlement of the Iraqi-Iranian disputes over the Shatt al-Arab. Rushtu Aras links the successful outcome of these disputes to the European situation. The European situation led to the fact that the most difficult moment, namely the requirement for a three-member, with the participation of Great Britain, management of the Shatt al-Arab, was subsequently removed.

Rushtu Aras said that in Ankara he had heard from the Soviet embassy about the unsatisfactory nature of Iranian-Soviet relations. Comrade

Litvinov told Ismet [Inonu] about the same [2]. Rushtu Aras allegedly even offered his mediation. Now, having arrived in Tehran, from conversations with prime minister jam and the minister of foreign affairs of Sami, he was convinced that such mediation, in fact, is not necessary. Both jam and Sami are quite satisfied with the cooperation with the Soviet embassy and the nature of the ongoing negotiations [3] ... In Sami, Rushtu Aras found a supporter of the settlement of Iranian-Soviet relations, moreover, according to Rushtu Aras, Sami would like to establish relations with the Soviet Union, so to speak, parallel to Turkey. After the settlement of the issue with Iraq and the signing of the middle east pact, Sami intends to take up the settlement of the Iranian-Soviet governments to exchange views and reach mutual understanding.

*A. Chernykh*

[1] suburban area near Tehran.

[2] probably referring to the conversations on May 13-14, 1937.

[3] this refers to the negotiations on border issues and concerning the Soviet-Iranian joint stock company "Kevir-Khurian", which lasted for a number of years and actually broke off in 1937. The negotiations were held with great difficulties, especially in 1937; the Iranian side has repeatedly rejected the already agreed positions and put forward new proposals.

On December 2, 1954, an agreement was concluded between the USSR and Iran on the settlement of border and financial issues (see "Vedomosti of the supreme Soviet of the USSR", 1955, no. 8). As for the joint-stock company "Kevir-Khurian", the Soviet government in July 1956 announced a free renunciation of its rights in favor of Iran.

**Telegram from the charge d'affaires of the USSR in Turkey to the people's commissariat of foreign affairs of the USSR. October 16, 1937**

*USSR foreign policy documents. T. 20. January - December 1937 / ministry of foreign affairs of the USSR; - m.: politizdat, 1976., p. 549.*

*October 16, 1937*

I visited Bayar after Aras had previously inquired about the purpose of the visit. In response to my congratulations, in which I noted his personal influence on the course of the negotiations [1], Bayar said that, of course, I know his views and he will strive to expand our economic and political relations. If at first there will be difficulties in the implementation of the trade agreement, then with the good will of the parties, they will be eliminated. Then Bayar stopped at the opening of the Nazilli combine [2], asked if I was familiar with his speech, and noted the great satisfaction of Ataturk, who got acquainted with the combine not only externally, but also in essence.

Bayar behaved more like an economy minister than a prime minister. It is possible that at first, he is still very cautious, but I admit that he behaved this way on the advice of Aras.

*Zalkind*

[1] this refers to the Soviet-Turkish negotiations, which began in connection with the expiration of the trade agreement and ended on October 8, 1937 with the signing of an agreement on trade and navigation, as well as a trade and payment agreement.

[2] the textile mill in Nazilli was built according to Soviet designs and equipped with equipment from the Soviet Union. The opening of the plant took place on October 9, 1937 in the presence of President Kemal

Ataturk, prime minister Bayar, who delivered a speech, and other members of the Turkish government.

**Recording of the conversation of the charge d'affaires of the USSR in Turkey with and. About. Secretary general of the ministry of foreign affairs of Turkey**

*October 1937 11 city of*

1. I told Bata that I wanted to talk to him personally on one very significant issue, namely [about] the situation in the border strip. Several days ago, the embassy handed in a note of protest against one very serious violation of the border peace [1]. At present, I am forced to inform the foreign ministry again about new cases of border violations by the Turkish border authorities. A consistent violation of the border creates a tense state in border relations, I said, which is why I considered it necessary, in addition to a written appeal to the foreign ministry, to personally support our protest.

Bata noted that the resolution of border incidents is entrusted by the border convention to border commissioners. Isn't it premature to resort to the diplomatic route, he asked, since these incidents have not yet been discussed by the border commissioners?

I replied that I had read the text of the border convention. This convention provides for the resolution of "minor border incidents" to which the cases I have reported cannot in any way apply. In addition, having determined the procedure for investigating border incidents, the government did not prevent itself from discussing the cases that took place through diplomatic means. Apart from the fact that the investigation of the border commissioners may take a long time, each case is considered [by them] in isolation and not on the political plane. Meanwhile, the Soviet government, in view of the increased frequency of border incidents, is forced to raise the issue politically, in terms of drawing the Turkish government's attention to the need to take decisive measures to improve the border situation.

I further pointed out that it is not so much a matter of individual incidents that may occur from time to time and occur on the border, but in their number and nature. Referring to the last two cases, set out in the note of October 11, I pointed out that they could only have taken place in the atmosphere of mistrust and unfriendliness existing on the Turkish side of the border among the border units. The receptions of the Turkish border authorities do not at all correspond to the nature of the relationship between the two countries. Why is this happening? It is not in my competence to give an answer to this question, but I could, for example, point to one phenomenon that can generate the mistrustful attitude of the Turkish border authorities. So, I know that the consul of the USSR in Kars cannot make a step without the accompaniment of a soldier or a gendarme. When he needs to go out of town then he is obliged to put a gendarme or a soldier in his car. This is not new for the foreign ministry, since I mentioned this in one of my conversations with Essad bey (director of the iii department, who replaced Bata in the summer). Is it any wonder that the same soldier or gendarme, going to the border post, recalling the regime of distrust applied to the official representative of the USSR, acts in the same spirit in border relations?

The embassy, on behalf of its government, several times signaled to the Turkish government the abnormality of the situation, but, believing in the invariability of friendship between the two countries, the Turkish government did not pay attention to our signals, forgetting that friendship should also be practiced specifically.

It cannot be hidden that the behavior of the Turkish authorities, which is incompatible with the concept of friendship, creates a certain nervousness on our side of the border. The inaction of the Turkish authorities in improving the border situation leads our authorities to different thoughts. So, it is completely incomprehensible to them why, despite the positive attitude of the ministry of foreign affairs to the evacuation of bandit elements from the border strip, the implementation of this measure met with resistance from other Turkish departments. Meanwhile, it is known that no legal considerations can interfere with this, because in the interests of its social or military-



defensive policy, the Turkish government did not hesitate to evict thousands of people from their homes.

"what suspicions can there be?" - Bata asked. "I cannot answer exactly," I said, "but I admit that they think that elements hostile to the USSR are being used by some local bodies for intelligence or propaganda work." Bata said that he would thoroughly familiarize himself with the border convention and demand an explanation for all cases reported by the plenipotentiary. He completely agrees that friendship should be put into practice, and if there are unhealthy moods, then they should be radically eradicated. He believes that our side is also not entirely safe from the point of view of the atmosphere of trust. Thus, the NKID appealed to the Turkish embassy in Moscow with a note [2], in which he points out that, according to the local authorities, for a whole six months there were no meetings between the Soviet and Turkish border commissars, although during this time more than 100 conflict cases have accumulated. Meanwhile, according to the certificate received by the ministry of foreign affairs, during this time, three or four meetings took place, and there are from eight to 10 conflict cases. Such a discrepancy in information cannot, of course, be attributed to mere chance.

I replied that I have no instructions on this matter. In order to give a clear idea of the nature of violations of the border peace by the Turkish side, I believe it is possible to divide them into four categories;

1. Illegal crossing of the Soviet-Turkish border by armed bandits and their return to Turkey without being stopped by Turkish border guards or brought to justice, although these cases were signaled to the Turkish authorities by Soviet border commissars.
2. Armed transfer of bandits to Soviet territory with the commission of acts of violence and banditry in this territory. The Turkish authorities do not react in any way to these criminal actions, although the bandits go back to the Turkish side.
3. Direct connivance and assistance, up to and including armed, on the part of the Turkish border guards in bandit crossings to Soviet territory and

#### 4. Violation of the border by the Turkish border soldiers themselves.

Bata noted that many of the transitions are explained by the fact that the emigrants want to take their families with them. I objected that, firstly, such a desire cannot justify the violation of the border (with this Bata agreed), because there are rules on leaving for another country that must be observed. Secondly, in many cases families do not want to go to Turkish territory at all, and it is on this basis that many acts of violence by bandits occur. The armed transitions of bandits to Soviet territory also create hostility towards them on the part of their fellow villagers and local authorities, in which it is difficult to expect any assistance on their part for families to travel abroad.

Bata said that after reading all the material, he would invite me to his place in order to exchange views on what should be done to improve the local situation.

I noticed that this, of course, should not stop the investigation of specific facts and the punishment of those responsible.

Chargé d'affaires of the USSR in Turkey

*Zalkind*

[1] on October 4, 1937, the USSR embassy in Turkey sent a note to the Turkish foreign ministry in connection with the border incident on September 21, 1937, in which it declared "a strong protest against the provision of armed support by the Turkish armed guards to border violators." in a note from the embassy on October 11, it was reported about "two new cases of violation of the Soviet-Turkish border by the Turkish border guard."

On October 21, the Turkish foreign ministry, in a response note, rejected the request for an investigation contained in the notes of the embassy, trying to blame the Soviet border authorities for the incidents noted.

[2] in the mentioned note of the people's commissariat for foreign affairs of the USSR of September 2, 1937, it was indicated that in the first half of 1937, due to the behavior of the Turkish side, not a single meeting took place between the USSR border commissars for the

Leninakan and Yerevan-Echmiadzn regions and the commissars of the corresponding border regions Turkey, despite the presence of a significant number of conflict cases. The note contained a request "to draw the attention of the competent Turkish authorities to the abnormal situation that has arisen in the activities of the institution of border commissioners in the aforementioned border regions."

In a reply note dated October 9, the Turkish embassy operated on facts related to other border areas.

On November 4, the USSR people's commissariat for foreign affairs sent a new note to the Turkish embassy, which stated that, "since the note of the embassy refers to completely different regions," the Soviet side, "confirming the content of its note dated September 2 of this year. No. 122, I have the honor to once again ask the embassy of the republic of Turkey to deign to communicate with the appropriate Turkish authorities about giving the Turkish border commissioners categorical instructions with a proposal not to evade meeting with the border commissioners of the USSR in order to urgently and uninterruptedly consider and resolve conflicts arising at the border " ...

**Telegram from the charge d'affaires of the USSR in Turkey to the people's commissariat of foreign affairs of the USSR. September 7, 1937**

*September 7, 1937*

I touched upon in a conversation with Menemencioglu [1] the issue of the upcoming conference on the safety of navigation. Menemencioglu is very pessimistic about the situation, believing that Italy and Germany will raise the Spanish problem as a whole at this conference and this may lead to complications. I asked what the attitude of the Turkish government is towards taking collective security measures. Menemencioglu said that if they entail a war against Italy and Germany, then Turkey does not intend to participate. "even if England, France, USSR, etc. Will participate in this conflict?" I asked. Menemencioglu replied that it would depend on what Turkish interests would be affected, because Turkey would not want to repeat the mistake of the world war when it was not for anything drawn into it by Germany. When asked what instructions Aras, appointed by Turkey's representative to the conference, will have, Menemencioglu replied that he would be instructed to work towards general agreements. "and if, as can be foreseen, Italy and Germany sabotage?" I asked. Menemencioglu replied that in convening the conference, England apparently had in mind to propose something that would be acceptable to all. If this turns out to be impossible, then the Turkish government will make a decision adhoc depending on the situation that will be created at the conference.

*Zalkind*

[1] secretary general of the Turkish foreign ministry.

**Recording of the talks between the USSR people's commissar for foreign affairs and the Turkish foreign minister Aras. July 15-17, 1937**

*July 15-17, 1937*

Aras began his first conversation with me by announcing Yugoslavia's response to our request, transmitted through Turkey, regarding the loan office [1]. The answer, very unsatisfactory, is set out in a letter from Yugoslavia addressed to Turkey.

Aras considered it necessary to mention the middle east pact concluded in Tehran, informing that the chairman of the council of the new entente, the Persian minister, had allegedly been instructed to address me regarding the pact with a special telegram. To my remark that I had not received such a telegram, Aras replied that she was probably still on the way (until today - august 2 - the telegram had not arrived).

Recalling our conversations in Geneva regarding a broad pact of mutual assistance, about which Aras undertook to clarify the positions of Yugoslavia and Romania, Aras said that the first promised to talk to him on this topic at the next meeting, and Romania wants to clarify the position of Poland. I reminded Aras that in Geneva, to my direct question whether Romania would join the pact without Poland, Antonescu replied to me that she would go along with the lesser and Balkan entente, even without Poland. Aras threw up his hands, wanting to say by this: you, they say, know Antonescu.

Then we talked about various trifles, and, saying goodbye at the first meeting, Aras said that he expects to talk with me about the general international situation. We, however, did not return to such a conversation in the future, and I did not look for it, without attaching special value to such conversations with Aras. When an hour before the departure of the Turkish ministers I coordinated a communiqué for the press with them, Aras tried to remove from the draft an indication of the aggressive tendencies that have recently appeared in international life. He did not hide his fears of somehow offending Germany, and

especially Italy. I had to tell him that the upcoming visit of the Turkish squadron to Italy will smooth over the alleged insult to Italy. It is curious, however, that Aras was essentially trying to deny the appearance of aggressive tendencies in recent years, arguing that aggression, they say, has existed since the time of the peace treaties. Aras did not hesitate to openly embark on the path of defending revisionism for the first time and to develop views that Hitler and Goebbels would have willingly made their own.

*M. Litvinov*

[1] we are talking about the values of the Petrograd state loan office, taken in 1920 by the Wrangelites to Yugoslavia. At the end of 1936, the people's commissariat for foreign affairs of the USSR instructed the plenipotentiary of the USSR in Turkey, I.m.

**Report of the Soviet press on the signing of the convention on the procedure for consideration and resolution of border incidents and conflicts between the USSR and Turkey. July 16, 1937.**

*July 16, 1937*

On July 15, the NKID signed a convention on the procedure for considering and resolving border incidents and conflicts between the USSR and the republic of Turkey.

On the part of the USSR, the convention was signed by the deputy people's commissar for foreign affairs, comrade bs Stomonyakov, on the part of the republic of Turkey - by the ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary of Turkey to Moscow, Z. Apaydin.

(Tass)

*No. 165 (6 327), July 16, 1937*

**Report of the Soviet press about the visit to the USSR of the minister of foreign affairs of Turkey Rushtu Aras and the minister of internal affairs of Turkey Shukru Kaya. July 17, 1937**

*July 17, 1937*

Arrival to Moscow with an official visit of two representatives of the Turkish government - the minister of foreign affairs of the city of Rushtu Aras and the minister of internal affairs and general secretary of the republican people's party of the city of Shukru Kaya, their meetings and conversations with the chairman of the council of people's commissars comrade Molotov, people's commissar for foreign affairs comrade Litvinov and other members of the Soviet government were given the opportunity, as a result of a very friendly and frank exchange of views on questions of international politics, to make the following statement:

1. The relations of sincere friendship established between the USSR and the republic of Turkey about 16 years ago, strengthened by bilateral and multilateral treaties and agreements concluded between the two states, have withstood the tests of all phases of international life for such a long period of time, have undoubtedly proved their full value for interests both countries.
2. The same interests require the preservation of the existing relations in full and for the future as an invariable stable element of the foreign policy of both states.
3. Soviet-Turkish friendship has turned out to be a very important factor in world peace, the interests of which will correspond to the preservation and further development of this friendship.
4. The present alarming international situation, created by the aggressive tendencies manifesting in international life, cannot but impose on all peace-loving states special concerns for the preservation of peace and general security on the basis of the indivisibility of peace and collective security.



5. Relations of friendship and mutual trust between the USSR and Turkey, their sincere adherence to the idea of peace and the aforementioned principles of the league of nations, their determination to promote the best organization of the forces of peace and to avoid everything that could support or encourage the forces of aggression, create the basis for especially fruitful cooperation between them to strengthen all elements of the potential for peace.

(Tass)

*Print. By gas. "news"*

*No. 166 (6328), July 17, 1937*

**Telegram of the deputy people's commissar for foreign affairs of the USSR to the plenipotentiary representatives of the USSR in France, Czechoslovakia, Turkey, Great Britain, USA, Italy, Germany, Poland, China, Japan.**

*August 29, 1937*

According to the instructions of the government, today, on the 29th, we informed the diplomatic representatives of France, Czechoslovakia, and Turkey in Moscow about the conclusion of a non-aggression pact between the USSR and china. The publication of the pact will follow on the 30th. Explaining to these representatives the meaning of this treaty, we noted: first, that negotiations on the conclusion of a Soviet-Chinese pact had been going on for several years already; second, that some of the slowness of these negotiations was caused by china for well-known reasons of both internal and foreign policy; thirdly, that recently the Chinese government has shown an active interest in concluding a pact due to a significant rise in sympathy for the USSR on the part of the widest circles of the Chinese people, as well as a result of international complications in the far east, naturally evoking the desire of the Chinese government to strengthen its friendly relations with other countries, and primarily with the USSR; fourth, that the Soviet government regards the conclusion of a non-aggression pact between the USSR and china as a new step on the path of its unchanging peace policy and as an international manifestation that acquires the significance of a particularly timely action in the face of the far eastern conflict and that can contribute to the preservation of common peace. More detailed explanations of the true meaning of the Soviet-Chinese non-aggression pact will be given in the articles devoted to it in Izvestia and Pravda.

*Potemkin*

**Record of the conversation between the plenipotentiary representative of the USSR in Turkey and the minister of foreign affairs of Turkey Aras. June 11, 1937**

*June 1937*

Aras showered me with pleasantries, saying that Atatürk told him a lot about me and about his satisfaction from our meeting.

I asked if he had agreed with comrade Litvinov about the date of his arrival in Moscow. Aras said that the exact date in Geneva had not been set and that he asked me to inform Moscow of my intention to be on July 5th. Shukru kaya will go directly from Turkey. One of the vice-chairmen of the CHP may go with him [1].

Aras did not speak much about his visit to Romania. He pointed out to Antonescu that the constant exchange of visits between Bucharest and Warsaw makes an unpleasant impression in Turkey. Antonescu assured him that those visits that are being made on the initiative of Poland should not be considered as any demonstrations directed against third states, in particular the USSR. Aras himself had the impression that there was nothing serious behind this.

Aras believes that the Tatarescu government is going through the last months. Over the next four months, power will pass to the Tsaranists. However, there can be no question of returning Titulescu, since this is unacceptable for the king. If the Tsaranists insist on the inclusion of Titulescu, they will not be able to come to power.

Aras does not yet have information about Neurath's trip, but he is quite calm about Yugoslavia and is sure that Stojadinovich will not agree to any combinations with Germany. Yugoslavia values its relations with Turkey very much and is well aware of the fact that support for German policy would mean the end of the Yugoslav-Turkish friendship.

Aras is less calm about the Bulgarians. He believes that the main purpose of Neuharth's trip was not Belgrade, but Sofia. Although there is still no information from Sofia, he does not rule out the possibility that Neurath was negotiating with the Bulgarians on military cooperation. Aras fears that Germany will want, with Bulgaria's help,

to create military bases for itself on the black seacoast. Today Aras had Greek and Romanian envoys, with whom Aras discussed such a possibility and said that Turkey could not remain indifferent to this, because the appearance of Germans in the black sea is completely unacceptable for the Turks.

Aras is convinced that Neuharth's trip to Budapest cannot produce serious results for German foreign policy. Aras had just been to Hungary himself and had come to the conviction that the Hungarians were taking a restrained attitude towards Germany. Aras, in a conversation with Kanya, advised on the issue of arming Hungary not to take the path of unilateral action. He convinced Kanya that it would be advisable to conclude a bilateral agreement with his neighbor on the issue of armaments. Aras believes that the soil is ripe for this and promised Kanya his assistance.

Aras is pleased with the agreement with France on the [Alexandretta] Sandjak, which will eliminate the protracted conflict. Now, he said, a new era will begin in Franco-Turkish relations. On June 14, the [agreement on] Sandjak will be ratified by parliament. The territorial disputes between Iraq and Iran have not yet been settled, as a result of which the Asian pact will not be signed during Aras's trip.

I asked Aras if there was anything new about the German deMarche on the straits. Aras said that there is nothing new. The Turks answered the German note, and that was the end of the matter. I asked if the Germans had come forward with some new note or memorandum. Aras replied categorically that no.

Plenipotentiary of the USSR in Turkey

*M. Karsky*

[1] people's republican party.

**Telegram from the plenipotentiary representative of the USSR in Turkey to the people's commissariat of foreign affairs of the USSR. June 2, 1937**

*June 2, 1937*

1. Atatürk, at the beginning of the conversation, tried to prove to me that there were no disagreements between us, and everything was based on a misunderstanding. I have outlined our attitude towards Turkish politics in recent times. Atatürk assured of the Turkish government's desire to further develop relations and cooperation, expressed full satisfaction with the explanations that Litvinov and Inonu had. We have come to the conclusion that complete frankness is necessary in our relationship. I said that in case of any ambiguity, I would like to be able to contact him personally, to which he readily agreed.

2. Inonu said that Turkey considers it necessary to cooperate with us on the principles of the league of nations and collective security and that it does not at all sympathize with aggressive states and does not intend to encourage them in any way.

3. Atatürk, like Inonu and Saracoglu, expressed great satisfaction with the resolution of the Sanjak issue. The press speaks in a similar spirit. However, Inonu stressed the need for loyal implementation of the agreement. He has no doubts about the goodwill of the French government but fears the actions of local French agents and Syrians. According to unverified reports, the Syrian parliament is protesting against the agreement. I expressed the hope that the issue was over and that there would be no new complications. Inonu assured of the desire of the Turkish government to seriously improve relations with France and reported on a positive impression from the meeting with representatives of the French government,

4. Inonu denied the weakening of the Balkan entente and stated as evidence that Yugoslavia, on behalf of other members of the Balkan entente, made a serious deMarche in Sofia over the revisionist demonstrations that took place in Bulgaria on 4 may.

5. Atatürk and all my interlocutors stated that they hoped that Aras's trip would finally dispel our doubts about Turkish policy, and Inonu stressed that he asked Litvinov to clarify the visit so that Aras could find all the leaders of the Soviet government in Moscow. The Turks attach particular importance to the latter circumstance. Saracoglu said that it was likely that Shukru Kaya would accompany Aras. Considering this circumstance, I would consider it desirable to confirm our readiness to receive Shukru kai.

6. My general impression is that the Turks have tried to show me their attention and emphasize that our relationship is as close as before.

The trade agreement has been extended until July 1.

**Recording of the conversation between the USSR plenipotentiary representative in Turkey and Turkish president Atatürk. June 1, 1937**

*June 1, 1937*

The conversation began with a mutual exchange of pleasantries, which dragged on for quite some time. Then, when I said that the government instructed me to strengthen and develop our relationship, Atatürk replied that it was not a difficult task, since our relationship is excellent and that there is no misunderstanding between us. True, he added, recently there was a conversation about some misunderstandings and about known frictions between us, but he completely disagrees with this. There was nothing of the kind.

I said that he was putting me in a difficult position. I would not like to start our acquaintance with controversy, but, having come to such a friendly country like Turkey, I believe that the best method of my work will be perfect frankness and directness in our personal relationships. Therefore, I must, unfortunately, disagree with him and confirm that there were misunderstandings between us. We have brought our point of view on this issue to the attention of the Turkish government. Quite recently, comrade Litvinov had the opportunity to speak in detail on this topic with Ismet Inonu and to present to him all our considerations in this part.

Atatürk replied that he was thoroughly informed about the conversation between Inonu and comrade Litvinov and was very satisfied with it. He believes that we have explained and that the misunderstandings have been eliminated. Of course, he went on, in the best family there are some misunderstandings. However, this does not affect cohabitation. The most important thing is mutual understanding and mutual trust.

Seeing that Atatürk frowned, I decided not to pull the strings and said that the fact that the new Soviet ambassador at his very first meeting with the president of the republic could not confine himself to a protocol conversation, but speak with complete frankness, shows the strength of our relationship. If he spoke about trust, then I can say that we know the head of the Turkish state and believe him.

Atatürk was clearly very pleased.

I added that from the telegram I received from comrade Litvinov, it is clear that he was also satisfied with his meeting with Inonu.

The further conversation was already proceeding very smoothly. We went through the most dangerous and delicate places. Atatürk assured me that cooperation with the USSR is the basis of Turkish foreign policy and that under no circumstances and at any price will Turkey refuse this cooperation. He said that he didn't want to hide from me that meeting with me was very satisfying, that he really liked directness and frankness and that he considered this the only correct way of our relationship.

I thanked him and said that if there were any ambiguities or misunderstandings in the future, I would allow myself to address him directly as the supreme leader of all Turkish politics. Atatürk expressed full agreement and assured me of all support.

Plenipotentiary of the USSR in Turkey

*M. Karsky*



**Telegram of the people's commissar for foreign affairs of the USSR to the people's commissariat for foreign affairs of the USSR, from Geneva. May 25, 1937**

*Immediately*

*1937 g 25 on May.*

I had Aras, who on the way met with Inonu, who was returning from London. Aras confirmed the three points that I had agreed with Inonu, adding to this that friendship with the USSR would never depend on a third state. When asked who the idea of the black sea pact came from, about which he spoke with Ostrovsky, Aras answered confusedly, trying to ascribe the initiative to Romania. When asked what pact was in question, Aras replied that he hadn't thought about it yet, but admitted that the Romanians were mainly interested in recognizing Bessarabia within the framework of such a pact. The pact, according to Aras, should, however, be concluded simultaneously with the western Locarno and the Mediterranean pact. Aras thinks of the Danube agreement as part of Austria, Hungary, the lesser and Balkan entente. Apparently with the aim of joining this agreement, Aras seeks to disrupt the previously proposed Danube agreement without the Balkan entente. He further developed the idea of an extensive eastern pact, including the USSR, France, the lesser and Balkan entente, Poland and Germany, if the latter so desired. Although he said to Ostrovsky that he could do without Poland. Aras told me that the presence of Poland is necessary, because without it, Romania cannot participate in the pact, and therefore France needs to demand that Poland participate in this pact under the threat of breaking the alliance with her.

Aras again justified himself in his past sins, but in fact admitted everything that we pointed out. Apparently, under pressure from England, Aras now speaks with restraint about Italy, with which Turkey allegedly seeks only to avoid friction. England allegedly constantly tells Turkey that she not only does not object to the friendship of the latter with the USSR, but, on the contrary, is glad of this friendship and takes Turkey along with this friendship. I think this is Aras's fantasy. He denies receiving new loans from England. He

admitted that the oil agreement with Romania is not being danced yet, as a result of which Aras will again go to Bucharest from here. He is ready to arrive in Moscow in the first week of July, and he will tell us the exact date the other day.

Delbos expressed his complete satisfaction with the results of his visit to Brussels. The Belgians confirmed to him everything that he had previously told Eden, and in addition, they agreed to enter into military negotiations, but in secret.

Holst reiterated to Delbosch his satisfaction with the Moscow visit, but pointed out our supposedly over-arming on the Finnish border.

*Litvinov*

**Telegram of the plenipotentiary representative of the USSR in Romania to the people's commissariat of foreign affairs of the USSR. May 18, 1937**

*May 18, 1937*

Yesterday Aras visited me. The main purpose of Aras's visit to Bucharest was, he said, to push the negotiations on a trade agreement, which is of particular importance for the Turks because the Romanians agreed to supply the Turks with oil products in exchange for the Turkish stamps frozen in Berlin. Aras believes that all the issues related to the negotiations have been settled, and he is very satisfied (this is not the opinion of the chairman of the Romanian delegation Crist, who told me yesterday that the negotiations rested on a number of unresolvable differences and, apart from Antonescu's "empty" promise, settle "", nothing is settled).

Further, Aras, after meeting with the king and the minister, noted a noticeable improvement in Romanian-Soviet relations. The Romanians, they say, are now looking for a formula that could serve as the basis for an agreement with the USSR. This formula should: 1) not be a pact of mutual assistance, 2) give official recognition [annexation] of Bessarabia and show the world the excellent state of Romanian-Soviet relations. They have not yet found this formula. At one time they hoped to achieve this through the multilateral Black Sea pact, but they became convinced that it was unrealistic, since Turkey would not sign such a pact without the USSR, just as it would not sign the Mediterranean pact without England. Aras went on to say that the Turkish security system is important only with the USSR - for the Black Sea region, with England - for the Mediterranean region. Without them and against them, Turkey will not do anything: in the Black Sea basin, the Turks will go only from the USSR, in the Mediterranean - only with England. The recording of the conversation, which lasted an hour, will be sent by mail.

From the conversation it was possible to understand: 1) that Romania did not want and does not want to either increase its obligations on the little entente, or sign a pact with the French, wanting to wait and not wanting to "provoke third powers", and 2) that the Turks had a hand in

this. Aras had been persuading me for a long time that real assistance to Yugoslavia in the event of German aggression against Czechoslovakia, was impossible, and vice versa, therefore, such a pact, authorized by the little entente, was pointless. Further, Aras stated that only the simultaneous signing of the following two pacts: 1) Locarno and 2) eastern, consisting of France, the USSR, the little entente and the Balkan entente, Germany and Poland (or without the last two), can ensure peace. From this I had to deliberately conclude that the pact France-lesser entente, as being neither Locarno nor eastern, is dangerous,

Aras is very pleased with the negotiations between Blum and Inonu in Paris and believes that in Geneva, most likely, the Alexandretta Sandjak will be finished. [1]

*Ostrovsky*

[1] a copy of the telegram was sent to m. M. Litvinov in Paris.

**Recording of the conversation of the charge d'affaires of the USSR in Turkey with and. About. Minister of foreign affairs of Turkey Saracoglu. May 17, 1937**

*May 17, 1937*

1. I asked what's new from Bucharest and London. Saracoglu replied that Aras did not report anything about his conversations in Bucharest. From London, however, there is a telegram from Inonu, announcing meetings with comrade Litvinov. Inonu had two meetings with the people's commissar, each lasting about three hours. Reading by telegram, Saracoglu said that Inonu writes that both interlocutors stated the invariability of Soviet-Turkish friendship and that this friendship is a permanent element in general international relations. Inonu stresses the positive outcome of this meeting.

2. When I expressed my satisfaction with what I had heard, Saracoglu said that he wondered how we could think that Turkey is pursuing an Italophile policy.

I replied that we hardly thought that Turkey was fundamentally revising its policy. We could not have objections to the normalization of Italian-Turkish relations, but rapprochement with Italy took place at a time when Italy began to act especially aggressively against the USSR.

In our country, further, we could not help but be aware of what goals Italy pursues in striving for rapprochement with the Balkan countries. It is clear that she did this in order to be able to carry out a policy of aggression with greater freedom in the western Mediterranean. Thus, it may be against its will, but by its policy of rapprochement with Italy, Turkey objectively contributed to the strengthening of the position of the aggressor powers. Hence the definition that Turkey supports the berlin-Rome axis could have come from.

Saracoglu began to argue that, in fact, there was only a date in Milan, which Aras could not refuse, since several times a year he enjoyed the hospitality of Italy when he passed through its territory.

I replied that, firstly, not only a meeting in Milan, there is further Turkish activity in the matter of concluding an Italo Yugoslav pact; second, the tone of the Turkish press, which extolled the new era in Italian-Turkish relations, should be taken into account; thirdly, to this it should be added that the Italian press, the devil knows what they wrote about the results of the Milan meeting. Italian commentary was picked up by the press in other countries, which gave the impression that Milan was a turning point in Turkish politics.

Saracoglu noted that in the past there were also misunderstandings, for example, dissatisfaction with comrade Litvinov's trip to Rome, but this dissatisfaction was never reflected in the press. I jokingly replied that if the newspaper articles helped to clarify the situation, then these articles can only be welcomed.

"finally," said Saracoglu, "the Turks also had reason to be dissatisfied with you, namely during the Montreux conference, when you refused to support Turkey's thesis on the closure of the straits, although at one time this thesis was defended by Chicherin in Lausanne."

I objected that the Turks could not have any reason for discontent. On the contrary, the divergence of the Turkish position from the Soviet one caused a very strong impression in Moscow.

As for the thesis about the closure of the straits, then during the Lausanne period it was correct, because there the threat consisted in the allies' intention to penetrate at their own discretion into the black sea and it was more profitable to close the straits completely than to leave them open to both. Since then, the situation has changed, as the balance of power has changed. The Lausanne convention left open the straits for the black sea powers. Why was it necessary now to close the straits for the black sea countries? Was Turkey interested in this? The thesis put forward by the Turkish delegation of the same regime for the black sea and non-black sea powers could only have a tactical significance for Turkey and not be caused by its real interests, meanwhile it seriously affected our interests. Why did Turkey choose to enter the conference with a disagreement between us on this essential issue? We assessed the situation more correctly than Turkey, which is shown by the strait

convention. The Turkish delegation, by its tactics, opened up an opportunity for other delegations to oppose the implementation of our wishes. It goes without saying, I concluded, that the fact that Turkey was taking a position contrary to our interests and not dictated by its own caused a very painful impression.

If it were not for the Franco-Soviet pact and our behavior towards England during the Italo Abyssinian conflict, we would never have received what we have, Saracoglu defended. Precisely because Moscow took these facts into account, it correctly assessed the situation, I objected. Turkey was wrong and, having made a mistake, opposed us. Thus, for Montreux, the Turks may not be in a claim, but, on the contrary, we are against the Turks.

3. I asked Saracoglu how the situation with the [Alexandretta] sanjak problem is now. The minister replied that there are still open questions about the language and about the two counties. I observed that it would probably have been easier to reach an agreement if the French government had been confident that such an agreement would lead to a decisive improvement in Franco-Turkish relations.

"how can we go for a far-reaching rapprochement with France," exclaimed Saracoglu, "when it has such an uncertain policy. Today she is with some, and tomorrow she will be with others. France still dreams of rapprochement with Italy, and you cannot rely on its policy. "

As an example of French insincerity, Saracoglu pointed out that, having agreed to send a mixed commission to investigate border incidents, the French government is now declaring that the issue of smuggling should not be a matter for the commission. Meanwhile, said Saracoglu, everything rests on smuggling, on the basis of which border incidents occur.

Charge d'affaires of the USSR

In Turkey

*G. Zalkind*

**Telegram of the people's commissar for foreign affairs of the USSR to the people's commissariat for foreign affairs of the USSR, from London. May 14, 1937**

*1937 g on May 14.*

Yesterday I had breakfast at Ismet Inonu's, and today I have it. We had two long conversations with him. He pointed to the existing opinions about the cooling between us, which, however, does not correspond to reality. But while they have denied these rumors several times, we have been silent. I explained to him that since the whole world saw the reasons for the cooling in the political actions of Turkey, it was natural for Turkey to come up with refutations, and since our policy towards Turkey did not give any reason to talk about cooling on our part, then we had nothing refute. I told him that, unlike friendship between people, friendship between states is important not only in itself, but also in the assessment of the outside world. If this world begins to doubt such a friendship, then it loses in its value. Then I have listed all those points of Turkish politics, which raised similar doubts. Ismet defended himself but was pinned to the wall. The conversations ended with the statement that the friendship of the USSR with Turkey is a constant and long-term element of the policy of both countries, Ismet's promise to make it clear to both Italy and Germany that their efforts to tear Turkey away from the USSR are doomed to failure, and in the future to pursue Turkish policy along the lines of the league of nations and collective security.

Despite Ismet's conversations in Paris with bloom and Delbos, he still does not hope to settle the conflict and asked me to influence France. I suggested that a general improvement in relations with France and the prospect of closer cooperation with her, perhaps, would make France more compliant. In this regard, I tried to find out whether France made an offer to Turkey on a mutual assistance pact and how Ismet relates to this. He said that there was no formal proposal, that he didn't even seem to know what pact was in question, but upon further questioning he had to admit that such a pact with France would be unacceptable for Turkey at the present time. I believe ismet will learn something from my argument. [1]



*Litvinov*

[1] a copy of the telegram was sent to the USSR embassy in Turkey.

**Telegram from the plenipotentiary representative of the USSR in Turkey I. M. Karakhan to the people's commissariat of foreign affairs of the USSR. April 25, 1937**

*April 25, 1937*

At a breakfast hosted today at Inonu's, the latter complained about our mistrust towards Turkey, which, despite all their efforts, the Turks cannot eliminate. I confirmed that mistrust exists, but that the Turks are doing nothing to dispel it. A simple statement that friendship with the USSR is unchanging and that there have been no changes in Turkey's position is unconvincing and just confirms doubt, because, I told him, a change has taken place that cannot be denied and which the Turks do not want to admit. Inonu, in response to my accusations, admitted that something had changed. Previously, they wanted to be our allies and achieved this, but now they are afraid of it, not wanting to be automatically involved in any war in which we find ourselves participating. They do not want to fight if their direct interests are not affected. Talking about the trip to Yugoslavia, he proudly announced that the main thing that he stated when saying goodbye to Stojadinovich in Yugoslavia was, firstly, that neither Yugoslavia nor Turkey sympathized with and would not provide any support to the Rome-Berlin axis, and, secondly, that neither Yugoslavia, neither Turkey will ever take any part in combinations directed against the USSR. As for Italy, the Turks do not repulse it, but their attitude of distrust towards Italy has not changed, but they consider the friendly maneuvers now taking place useful. He tried to convince me in every possible way that the friendship with the USSR is so deep and strong that no inevitable maneuvers can shake it, but they admit that they are in some kind of dead end: Turkey assures that friendship is immutable, but Moscow does not believe. When meeting with Litvinov in London, he hopes to have a frank explanation with him. He also pins great hopes on Aras's trip to Moscow,

He probed the possibility of a trip with Aras for the minister of internal affairs and secretary general of the party, Shukru Kai, which I warmly supported. It will be more interesting to talk to Shukru Kaya, he is more

direct and franker than Aras. Inonu wondered if Shukru kaya and Aras would find Stalin in Moscow.

After all the outpourings about my departure, Inonu said that the Turks could not fail to see political significance in my departure and that in the current conditions it was especially unpleasant.

Plenipotentiary

**Recording of the conversation of the USSR people's commissar for foreign affairs with the Turkish ambassador to the USSR Apaydin. April 15, 1937**

*April 15, 1937*

The French and Soviet press have recently been writing about a change in Turkey's foreign policy, about its orientation towards the Berlin-Rome axis, etc. As a result, the Turkish government instructed Apaydin to tell me that Turkey's foreign policy has not changed, that Turkey is still true to its friendship with the USSR, which she wishes to consolidate, and this goal is pursued by Aras's forthcoming trip to Moscow [1]. According to Apaydin, the alarm information comes from Paris.

I asked Apaydin to thank Ankara for the assurances. At the same time, I said that not only from Paris, but also from other capitals, we are receiving information about the efforts of Aras aimed at destroying the little entente, to grouping a number of countries around Italy, which is how the consolidation of the Berlin-Rome axis is achieved.

When asked about our participation in the mixed commission [2], I replied that I had put the question before the government, which had not yet made a decision. We have an appeal not only from the Turkish, but also from the French government. I am afraid that I will not be able to answer the eventual question about the duration of the commission's work, as well as about the response of England. I also pointed out the possibility of difficulties in finding a suitable person for us. Apaydin promised to inquire about questions of interest to me.

I told Apaydin that Karakhan was responding to us due to his family circumstances and that he had already requested an agreement for comrade Karsky, whose description I gave Apaydin.

*Litvinov*

[1] on March 13, 1937, Turkish foreign minister Aras, in a conversation with the USSR chargé d'affaires in Turkey g. A. Zalkind, as follows from the latter's telegram to the USSR people's commissariat for foreign

affairs, said that he "intends to go to Tehran in June" and from there "I would like to go to Moscow." on March 16, mm Litvinov telegraphed Zalkind: "tell Aras that we will be very glad to see him in Moscow."

[2] see gas. Izvestia, June 17, 1937

**Telegram from the charge d'affaires of the USSR in Turkey to the people's commissariat of foreign affairs of the USSR. March 3, 1937**

*March 3, 1937*

In connection with the arrival of Romanian foreign minister Antonescu in Ankara on March 15, Aras told me that he was rushing to make a statement in a banquet speech that Turkey is a resolute opponent of the violation of the status quo in the black sea. This idea was inspired by conversations with Litvinov and Titulescu about the black sea pact. In the current situation, such a clarification of Turkish policy, according to Aras, may be useful, bearing in mind the German intrigues in Romania and the fascist plans in relation to Ukraine. Aras defined the meaning of the statement as a unilateral commitment by Turkey. The timing is also favorable in view of some relaxation of tension in international relations, as a result of which such a statement will not constitute a challenge to Germany. In this performance and Antonescu's harmonizing performance, if any, at the same time it will be possible to discern the core of a kind of gentlemen's agreement like the Anglo-Italian one. Aras noted that this statement would be especially friendly towards the USSR, representing a well-known addition to Ataturk's speech on the straits [1]. Aras says that all this is still his own idea and he has not yet consulted with Inonu. He told me, obviously, in order to find out the attitude of Moscow, although he did not directly raise the question.

It seems to me that such a statement by Aras serves three purposes:

1. Show us that Turkey's policy towards the USSR remains unchanged, despite the rejection of the pact.
2. To give additional comfort to Romania in connection with the Bulgarian-Yugoslav pact.
3. Balance the Milan date.

*Zalkind*

[1] this refers to the speech of Turkish president Kemal Ataturk,

delivered on November 1, 1936 at the opening of the session of the Mejlis, in which he, speaking about the significance of the conclusion of a convention on the regime of the straits, said:

"in this regard, I must declare with particular satisfaction that our friendship with Soviet Russia, our great sea and land neighbor, which has gone through all kinds of trials for fifteen years, continues to develop normally, retaining all the strength and sincerity of its first days."

**Telegram from the charge d'affaires of the USSR in Turkey to the people's commissariat of foreign affairs of the USSR. February 10, 1937**

*February 10, 1937*

Aras informed me today about the Milan date.

1. Both ministers agreed that the status quo should be maintained in both the Mediterranean and the black sea. Aras allegedly told Ciano that Turkey would resolutely oppose the penetration of any outside (non-black sea) powers into the black sea, to which Ciano did not object. When I asked what is meant by the status quo in the Mediterranean, Aras replied that - territorial and political status in the broadest sense. At the same time, he cited Ciano's words that the separation of the Catalan state from Spain would be a violation of the status. Aras claims that Ciano did not speak about the exit of Soviet ships from the black sea to the Mediterranean, contrary to newspaper reports. Aras also answered the question whether it was about the participation of the Soviet fleet in control under an agreement on non-interference in Spanish affairs.

2. Regarding Italy's accession to the strait convention, Ciano stated that this issue has been resolved positively, but in practice this will be done after Turkey recognizes de jure the annexation of Abyssinia. Since Turkey will not be able to agree to this now, Aras expects that the annexation of Italy will take place after the May session of the council of the league of nations, when, according to Aras, the legal issue of Abyssinia will be resolved. In addition, Ciano made two reservations regarding accession to the strait convention: 1) Italy should be equated to the states that have signed the convention; 2) she will enjoy the advantages arising from the Japanese clause reflected in art. 21 pouring conventions. Aras did not object to these reservations, considering that they were not at variance with the convention. The meaning of these reservations, as Aras told me, he did not understand.

3. Ciano warmly assured Aras of Germany's friendly relations with Turkey. Aras asked his interlocutor: what goals he pursues with these assurances; does Italy, for example, want Germany to end up in the



Mediterranean by concluding a military alliance with Turkey? Ciano flatly rejected this and said that Germany had assured Italy that it had no species in the Mediterranean region. Based on this part of the conversation with Ciano Aras, he concludes that Italy does not want Germany to appear in the Mediterranean as a political or military factor.

4. Ciano said that Italy allegedly became convinced that there was no difference between the Comintern and the Soviet government. He admitted that there is an agreement between Italy and Germany, similar to the Japanese-German one.

5. Speaking about Spanish affairs, Ciano pointed to the growing excitement in both Italy and France over the death of fighters of one nationality at the hands of fighters of another nationality. To prevent escalation into a common war, a quick outcome must be found, which, in Ciano's opinion, must be either Franco's victory or an agreement between the powers concerned. Ciano assigns the first place in the intervention of people on the side of the Spanish government to France, saying that the USSR is limited to sending specialists. Aras found Ciano inclined to quickly resolve the issue of hands-off.

6. Regarding the Italian fortifications on the Dodecanese, Ciano assured that they were never directed against Turkey, but were prepared in anticipation of the Abyssinian war. Aras pretended to believe it.

7. In Milan, nothing was signed, and it is not intended to sign anything. When I asked if the signing of an agreement similar to the Anglo-Italian gentlemen's agreement was planned, Aras replied that there was no need for this, since the Anglo-Italian agreement already ensures the status quo in the Mediterranean. The current task of Turkey, Yugoslavia and Greece is to remove the tension in relations with Italy, which, in part of Turkey, has already been achieved by the Milan meeting. In addition, it would be imprudent to enter into an agreement, as it could be misinterpreted elsewhere.

In his explanations, Aras was, contrary to his custom, little talkative. He simply dismissed some of the questions, saying that Ciano had not spoken about this, without getting into, again contrary to his custom,

any reasoning. I tried several times to decipher the concept of the "status quo in the Mediterranean", but each time I got a stereotypical answer, which is the one given above. I pointed out to Aras that this concept in his formulation is broader than that found in the Anglo-Italian agreement. Aras initially agreed with me, but then said that this was implied in the Anglo-Italian agreement. He cited as an example that the appearance of Germany in the Mediterranean would violate the status quo politically and would be as unacceptable as the violation of the territorial status quo.

*Zalkind*

**Telegram of the USSR plenipotentiary representative in Turkey  
Karakhan to the USSR people's commissariat of foreign affairs. 1  
February 1937**

*February 1937*

Inonu [1], having learned about my departure, invited me to his place for breakfast. We were alone. I am reporting the essential from his statements:

1. Turkey remains true to its friendship with the USSR, which he considered it his duty to emphasize in his last speech in parliament. He understands our position on the [Alexandretta] Sandjak [2]. When he asked if Moscow still had confidence in Turkey, I told him that after the story with the pact, the situation had been greatly shaken and I could not say that it had been restored. He spoke about the sanjak agreement with great satisfaction and stressed that the Turks had no contradictions with France. After my question, he admitted that it was possible to come to an agreement with France on the same basis as now, at the very beginning of the conflict, but as an excuse he cited mistrust in the apparatus of the foreign ministry and the colonies, which wanted to fool Turkey.

2. I told him that I was deeply impressed by Aras's motivation in a conversation with Litvinov [3] that Turkey could not agree to a pact with France, not wanting to risk its economic relations with Germany. I reminded him that both he and Aras, and whoever I touched upon the growing influence of the Germans in Turkey, always reassured me that they were forced to trade with the Germans, but that there was no and never will be any influence of Germany on Turkish politics. Now, I told him, the situation seems to have changed and Germany is influencing and binding Turkey in its foreign policy actions. From Aras's statement, it can be concluded that this binding influence can also take place in relation to other countries. Inonu was embarrassed and said that there was no German influence on foreign policy and that it was only "too early to talk" about a pact with France, and the economic influence of the Germans was a matter of their constant concern, they did not want to be dependent on Germany, but, if no one wants to trade with Turkey

except the Germans, the Turks have no choice. In this regard, he reproached us and the French, to whom he also pointed out the need to expand trade, but to no avail. To this I noticed that our desire to expand trade runs into serious difficulties, especially in the matter of prices.

Speaking about the general line of Turkey's foreign policy, I noticed that it seems to me that Turkey, from the position of coordinating all forces in the interests of peace, is slipping towards a position of neutrality, and that this coincides with what the aggressors are striving for - to neutralize as many states as possible in order to ensure to themselves freedom of action, and that with the same goal both Italy and Germany want to destroy the lesser and Balkan entente, and that the Yugoslav-Bulgarian agreement shakes the unity of the latter.

3. Without denying that the Turks want to be on the sidelines of the war, so as not to be involved in it because of foreign interests, he insisted that Turkey remains firmly in favor of preventing any discord of the Balkan entente and that the agreement of Bulgaria and Yugoslavia in its content does not pose a threat to the entente.

4. He stressed that in the event of a war between France and Germany, Turkey would be neutral, but it would be another matter if the war began between Germany and the USSR. Turkey in the latter case would be true to its old and unchanging friendship.

5. Inonu denied the seriousness behind Aras's date with Ciano. He only noted that Italy and Germany supported the Turkish position on the Sandjak issue and that the Turks are grateful for this. I noticed to him that such support from powers hostile to the league of nations and France could least of all help Turkey, causing only a certain distrust in her and in sudden changes in Turkish policy, especially in the current tense situation. He admitted that the meeting in Milan is only a maneuver and no serious issues will be discussed.

6. Inonu strongly denied that the Turks had voiced their fears to anyone about our naval construction. He only noted that Turkey was negotiating a naval agreement and that there was only a dispute with England about granting Turkey the right to build a Washington-type cruiser with large-caliber guns.

7. In conclusion, Inonu asked me to assure Moscow of the invariability and firmness of Turkish friendship.

8. With regard to agricultural activities, Inonu said that the government is organizing a number of exemplary state farms and the collective use of machinery provided to the peasants by the state for collective cultivation of the land. They mean to use our rich experience in this matter.

Plenipotentiary

[1] chairman of the council of ministers of Turkey.

[2] see gas. Izvestia, January 29, 1937

[3] on January 24, 1937, mm Litvinov telegraphed to the people's commissariat for foreign affairs of the USSR from Geneva about his conversation with Aras: "Aras agrees to joint defense of sanjak with France, but not to a general pact of mutual assistance, which could deprive Turkey of trade with Germany ... I objected that Germany is more interested in this trade than Turkey. "

**Telegram of the USSR plenipotentiary representative in Turkey Karakhan to the USSR people's commissariat of foreign affairs. January 28, 1937**

*January 28, 1937*

Saracoglu [1] reported that in a note sent by the Turkish government to all powers on the entry into force of the strait convention, Germany replied that, taking note of the message, it reserves its attitude to all provisions of the convention. Orally, the German ambassador explained that Germany was always with Turkey on the issue of the problem and sympathized with the resolution of this problem at the moment. She was forced to make reserves due to the lack of equal treatment of all powers in the convention. Germany does not wait for a response to its note, since the note is made in a secondary order so that it does not leave the impression that it has tacitly accepted all the provisions of the convention. Saracoglu said that Aras informed Litvinov and Eden about this. The latter reported that the Germans had made a similar deMarche in London and that the British had given the Germans the answer they deserved. Eden advised giving an answer to the Germans and using the English answer for this purpose. I told Saracoglu that leaving the German deMarche unanswered would mean taking note that Germany does not bind itself by the provisions of the convention, but that this is still my personal opinion. It seems to me that the Turks must answer Germany: whatever your reserves are, the principles of the convention are binding on you just as they are for all countries in the world, and you must abide by them. Urgently inform as for all countries in the world, and you must comply with them. Urgently inform as for all countries in the world, and you must comply with them. Urgently inform [2].

Plenipotentiary

[1] minister of justice of Turkey; temporarily served as minister of foreign affairs.

[2] on January 31, 1937, bs Stomonyakov telegraphed Karakhan: "the response of the Turks to the German reserves is absolutely necessary not only to fix the obligations of Germany, like other countries, to obey

the regime established in the straits on the basis of the Montreux convention, but also to eliminate its eventual claims to interfere in the future in this matter. " February 11 Karakhan, informing the people's commissariat for foreign affairs of the USSR about the conversation with Aras about the reciprocal German

Notes of January 22, 1937 to Turkey's note on the entry into force of the convention on the regime of the straits of November 9, 1936, informed that Aras had told him that he also considered it necessary to give a "proper answer" to the German note.

On March 9, 1937, the Turkish government sent a note to the German embassy in Ankara, which, in particular, said:

"true to the principle of scrupulous fulfillment of its obligations, Turkey is making every effort to ensure that all powers enjoy equally and without exception all the advantages arising from the new regime of the straits with respect to international merchant shipping, while at the same time ensuring that any manifestation of hostility and antagonism, so that it always remains the path of harmony and peace. "

The text of this Turkish note on the same day was transmitted to the diplomatic representatives of all countries participating in the convention in Montreux. Accepting from Aras the text of the mentioned note, Zalkind, as follows from his telegram to the people's commissariat for foreign affairs of the USSR of March 9, 1937, stated that, in his opinion, the note did not contain "direct non-recognition of German reservations."

**March 18, 1938, telegram from the charge d'affaires of the USSR in Germany g. A. Astakhov to the people's commissariat of foreign affairs of the USSR**

The Turkish ambassador assures that at this time there are no phenomena signifying the intensification of German activity in Turkey \*\*\*. Trade friction continues. He believes, however, quite likely that in connection with the capture of Austria, Germany will increase its activity in the Balkans, primarily in Yugoslavia, but also in Turkey. He expects clarification of the situation in this regard after Ciano's upcoming visit to Ankara. In general, he emphasizes that Germany's influence has increased enormously at the expense of Italy, which will dramatically affect the situation in Hungary and the Balkans.

Chargé d'affaires

Pgchat. About arch.



**April 30, 1938, telegram from the plenipotentiary representative of the USSR in Turkey A.V. Terentyev to the people's commissariat of foreign affairs of the USSR**

I personally informed Menemencioglu about the transfer of 10,000 am. Dollars in favor of victims of the earthquake. Menemencioglu was extremely touched by this message, expressed an ardent feeling of gratitude and excitedly declared that the Turkish people, having learned about the help provided to them by the Soviet people, will never forget this vivid feeling of friendly relations.

Plenipotentiary

Print. By srh.

\* see doc. .49 152.170. \*\* means Francesco salata.

May 12, 1938, from **telegram of the plenipotentiary representative of the USSR in Great Britain to the people's commissariat of foreign affairs of the USSR \***

Immediately on May 12, 1938

Turkish ambassador Fethi informed me that the Turkish government bought 24 Bristol bombers from the British with cash and some of them have already been delivered to Turkey. He further said that the Turks are finishing negotiations with the British about loans of two kinds. First, about a loan of 6 million pounds for the purchase of warships in England. Secondly, about trade credits in the order of the export department scheme (as with our 10 million loan \*\*). The Turks are asking for £10 million over ten years, mainly for their port construction. The British take the Turkish wishes positively, but the issue will be finally resolved in the next din.

May

There is no print. By apx,

\* see doc. Chg 183. \*\* see vol. Xix doc. L "236. \*\*\* see doc. L? 180.

**August 11, 1938, telegram from the plenipotentiary representative of the USSR in Turkey**

A. Tereityeva in the people's commissariat of foreign

USSR affairs

Immediately 10 august 1938

Yesterday I spoke with Aras and especially noted the extremely disloyal behavior of the Turkish government towards the USSR, which in fact allowed a gathering of Japanese aggressors in its territory, including the adviser to the Japanese embassy in Moscow, who continue to this day discussing plans to deploy Anti-Soviet work. I told Aras that he had not fulfilled his promise \* not to allow the conference and to raise a stamp on the Japanese, and that all this, at a moment of extreme tension in the far east, was viewed by us as a policy of clear connivance to the aggressor. He emphasized the fact that the behavior of Aras, who turned a blind eye to the actions of the aggressors sitting in Istanbul, exposes our relations to a severe test. I added that in this unusual time, one really does not have to believe the verbal assurances, since the facts speak quite the opposite.

The content of my conversation was literally unexpected for Aras. To his disturbing question, what can be done, I answered-. 1) publish in the press the note of the Turkish government dated august 5; 2) send to the Japanese and publish in the press a note of decisive protest indicating the insolent behavior of the Japanese, who ignored the first Turkish note prohibiting this conference; 3) to truly deliver on previous promises regarding press attacks against the Japanese, both in connection with the conference and the far east events. After some hesitation, Aras agreed with these proposals and promised to do more "so that the Turkish people and the whole world know the final attitude of Turkey towards the Japanese aggressor." today, ulus has already published a powerful article, which is passed on by a Tass correspondent, I inform you immediately. Aras asked Litvinov through me to inform him, in addition to the conversations published in the press, about the essence of the far eastern events. I think this should be done.

Plenipotentiary

Print. By architect.

\*\* . About everything that will be

\* see doc. No. 288. \*\* see gas. Izvestia, august 11, 1938

## **Recording of the conversation of the USSR plenipotentiary representative in Turkey with the minister of foreign affairs of Turkey**

October 5, 1933

The day of the return of the embassy from Istanbul to Ankara Aras invited me to visit him at the foreign ministry, having, apparently, in mind to make some kind of a message in connection with the visit of the German minister of economics Funk in Turkey.

After meeting in the same day in the ministry of foreign affairs, Aras told me about his meeting in Geneva with t. Litvinov and mentioned , that Maksim Maximovich for time session of the league of nations led the negotiations with the Iranian minister of foreign affairs on issues , related to port Pahlavi \*\*. According to the opinion of Aras, between T. Litvinov and Iranian minister how it would achieved satisfying both sides of the agreement, and Nrantsy went on then , that after the construction of a shipyard in the Pahlavi of the entire northern region of Iran Germans will be immediately removed . The Iranians agreed to also not be allowed to further accommodation in the area Pehlevi someone from foreigners, or rather, the citizens of those states, which are openly manifest their hostile attitude to the Soviet Union.

On my remark about the fact , that we are , apparently , is a violation of the Iranian side of the contractual obligations of 1927 on the statute of the port of Pahlavi \*\*\*, Aras said , that he was unfamiliar with the details of this issue in general , but that it takes only a one and the most important point is the strengthening of good-neighborly relations between the USSR and Iran . And since in principle reached today an agreement between the t. Litvinov and Iranian minister of foreign affairs, then he, Aras, the most experienced the feeling of well-known tranquility, even though he called unknown details of the agreement. Trying, apparently, to give anything not significant nature of his subsequent report, Aras like to briefly remark, that Aalyam (Iranian minister of foreign affairs) travel from Geneva to Tehran incognito on a few days stop in Ankara. No formal meeting or the discussions with the

Turkish government leaders the Iranian minister of foreign affairs have no will, so how is a special guest of his ambassador in Ankara.

\* see. Doc. No. 337, 413, 422. \*\* see. Doc. Ne 358. \*\*\* see. Vol. X, doc. No. 227.

Then Aras moved to the main issue, which was the reason for our meeting with him. He said that the 5 October German minister of economics Funk arrived in Istanbul, and the 6th in the morning he will meet in Ankara. Funk wanted to visit Turkey in the 20 days of October, with the order to have the opportunity to talk with Atatürk, but since both the latter feels itself right now is very bad, t. E. All of the time chained to the bed, then of course, that the president of the republic is not able to take fun-ka. For this reason, the German minister of economy was invited by the Turkish government to come to Turkey on October 5. On a given me casual question about that, that Atatürk, on the whole probability, will take part in the upcoming holiday - the 15th anniversary of the Turkish republic, Aras stated in this question, and added, that the state of health of Atatürk's pretty heavy. Turkish ambassador in Berlin Hamdi Arpa, continued Aras, who arrived in Ankara just a few days ago, warned his government about the possibility of, that the Funk, probably, will offer Turkey a loan or a loan to the amount of 150 million. On my question about that, there is or there are already today some preliminary views of the Turkish government on its relation to what, if Funk will make this kind of offer, Aras said, that the government of this issue is still not discussed. " we 'll see, it will offer us the German guest. This is a proposal we will listen to and thank for the provision of credit, so how we really need right now in the money. " on subsequent then the question, that can the Turkish government to buy in Germany on this loan, Aras said, that it would go, at all probability, on the supply of German equipment, weapons, about the construction of individual plants and factories, and can be, and any port in accordance with the country's new industrialization plan. Speaking of military supplies, and having in mind my allusion to the interest of the Germans in the fortification works of a number of important areas of Turkey, Aras said the following: " we have neither of which did not let the Germans to our

fortification works . We are fanatics of all kinds of military construction and military fortifications. All fortification work we conduct, and we will conduct ourselves without the help of any representatives of foreign countries, including here and very friendly. " I noticed Aras, that the Germans, perhaps, want to form coatings for granted Turkey a loan to take is a solid batch of agricultural products, and first of all wheat, barley and cotton. On this Aras I said that the Turks never did not agree to sell only these types of raw materials, " all great zaiyat , that one is only just the products we anyone does not give , and the one , who wants to buy from us the wheat , barley and cotton , he must be taken at the same time and these types of products , like tobacco , raisins and figs ." on my remark about the extremely low interest of the Germans in fact , to buy in Turkey , exactly as same like in other countries , tobacco , raisins and figs ( because this kind of product is not represents a special value for such an aggressive country , which is Germany , which needs first all in the food raw materials ), to which Germans will buy tobacco and raisins , then only to re-export , Aras emphatically stated : " last of the German-Turkish trade agreement , which came into force from 15 on august , putting the Germans obstacle in re-export of Turkish products , and Turkish the government never did not go to it , to at least some kind of raw material , purchased by the Germans here , it was to them re-exported to other countries . "

Then Aras asked me, do not think if I, that in connection with the latest events and the Munich conference is being prepared the ground for the conclusion of " pact of four " western European countries. I told him , that since he had only that came from Geneva , then it should be know better , as there are real "osno zaiya" for the conclusion of " pact of four " powers . On this Aras said, that Moscow is usually on the very serious phenomenon, occurring in the field of international events and policies, always reacts very strongly and clearly. Then I said Aras , which , according to my opinion , barely there can go a speech about the " pact of four " , because , as the well-known all over the world , from the four chapters of the governments of the great nations , to sit in. Munich, two are the aggressors, the third constantly connives at them, and the fourth always surrenders and goes entirely to concessions to the aggressor. Aras said that he kept exactly this same opinion and said, that the

problem of the world is far more still not been solved. However, he thinks, that the Munich conference at a time, although would be approximately at five years. It delayed the possibility of the occurrence of the war and set up obstanozku respite " these four will still be able to resolve the issue of Spain . Then they will gather again and return some colonies to Germany and even provide her with a solid loan. After receiving the money , Germany does not want to conduct themselves badly district, calmed down to some kind of life , try to equip your people a small amount of oil , so that the people could see , that something is done in the country for that , to defuse the acute need in the food issue , and then by 1943 g .. T. E. To the point, when will expire term action agreement between Germany and Poland? Hitler put the issue of the former German territories, now belonging to Poland. " I am for methyl Aras , that his scheme suffers from a range near defects and, in any case , if the democratic countries do not become on the way to repel the aggressors in their insatiable demands and aggressive policy of respect to small and medium-sized countries , then we will find ourselves much earlier witnessed new aggressive statements Germany and Italy , as evidenced by the content of the entire fascist press and the growing tension in relations between Germany and Poland .

After the Munich conference , Hitler was able to make in the treacherous policy of the governments of England and France on the relation to the small countries , the boundaries of which these two states in their time of guarantee , and the most , like I already said , much earlier , than about this thinks Aras . England and France, leaving weakened after Munich, faced with the fact that the need to provide the colony or the other territory for the expense of small countries voracious aggressor.

Having touched upon the question of Czechoslovakia, Aras said, that for the events, unfolding in this country and for the outside of it, he believes completely in charge only a very Czechoslovak government. " how you can protect the country, which she herself did not protect. I am personally on the place of the Czechoslovak minister of foreign affairs went to another and are not allowed to, to deal came even before the first meeting of Hitler with Chamberlain. We must have been to



immediately Czechoslovak government a note to say Germany, that the negotiations will be conducted only just the two concerned countries, i.e. E. Germany and Czechoslovakia, Cannot be had as to allow , to the question of the sovereignty of the country it was decided the third state . If the Czechs thought that thing is about their blood area, then they should have themselves directly talk with the Germans, and only after that, as the Czechoslovak government was faced to a persistent demand to Germany, ought to declare a general mobilization. " in this regard, Aras remembered the case, which had a place in the Italo-Turkish relations, when he as a minister of foreign affairs rejected some Italian demand and the position of his government, said the Italians in the most categorical form.

Statement Aras about his relation to the Czechoslovak question in connection with the Munich decision Vyzzalo with my hand completely different presentation of assessment of these events , which , stopping a detail , was given completely in the spirit of plants , published in our , Soviet press \*, and also in accordance with a speech by comrade Litvinov in Geneva \*\*. Particular emphasis I made to the betrayal of the interests of the Czechoslovak people English n French bourgeoisie and pointed to the causes,

Which prompted chamberlain and Daladier to agree on requirements, brought against them in Munich, Hitler and Mussolini. A wide exchange of views on this issue have not changed the point of view of Aras , who , on the basis of the so -called Turkish position , continued to insist on the need to Czechoslovakia, even after the apparent betrayal , authorized by the French and British governments , to enter into a fierce battle with the German aggressor and with arms in their hands defend the sovereignty of their country .

\* see. Gas. " Izvestia ", 29, 30 September, 2, 4 October 1938 city of \*\* see. Doc. Le 357, 368.

By the end of the conversation I said Aras , that recent events , have taken place in central Europe , are not the first and not the last aggressive step of Nazi Germany , which are interested in not Tanganyika , and then , that lies close by itself in Germany , that is. E.,

Romania, Yugoslavia and even Turkey, which, according to the plans of the German aggressors, should be turned into a base for supplying Germany with raw materials. This remark somewhat knocked confident tone of Aras, who considers Turkey away lying on the center of world events, and his quick response consisted in the following: for Turkey, he, Aras, do not worry, exactly as same as the no worries, and for the border countries of the Balkan entente

Returning to the issue of the arrival of the funk, I noticed his companion. We know, Germany is not so already free is now positioning a solid sum of money, which she would like to give another country in the loan, and if Nazi Germany is on it, then again, how it is all known, it is, probably, made a reservation for a right to receive something substantial in return for a loan.

Aras has promised to immediately the same after the departure from Ankara funk inform me about his talks with the Turkish government. \*

Plenipotentiary of the USSR in Turkey a. Tereityeva

Pgkat. By arch

**Telegram of the deputy people's commissar for foreign affairs of the USSR to the people's commissariat of foreign affairs of the USSR, from Ankara**

Out of line 24 November 1938

Together with Tereityeva this morning I visited Saracoglu, who held us for an hour and a half. He again thanked for the arrival of the delegation \*\*, noted that the government had decided to give it and the sailors the most cordial welcome, assured us that friendship with the USSR was and will remain the basis of Turkey's foreign policy and is one of the most important factors of peace. Saracoglu added that Turkey's cooperation with the USSR should be even stronger and broadened, and that in a complex and tense international situation, it is desirable to prove to the whole world the inviolability of our relationship. Answering my questions further, the minister said that at present a number of countries are showing readiness to improve their relations with Turkey. However, no one is trying to tilt her towards Anti-Soviet policy, because everyone understands that Turkey will never join him. Describing relations between Turkey and France, the minister noted that the trade exchange between the two countries is approaching zero. The question of the Sandjak has not yet been settled; in addition, according to recent reports, the French are going to create on Syrian territory, in particular in Alzhesiras \*, hotbeds of Armenian, Turkish and Assyrian emigration hostile to Turkey. All this revives the old treaties between Turkey and France and raises doubts about the sincerity of French policy. Today Saracoglu has to talk about it with Sarro \*\*, who will then be received by Inonu. Turkey's relations with Italy are rather cool.

The Italians "sulk" at Ankara, and Alois \*\*\* left without even visiting the foreign ministry and did not ask for a visit from Inonu, whom he has been personally visiting since his stay in Ankara as ambassador. It is known that in the same Algeciras, the Italians are actively working against both Turkey and France, which Mussolini is trying to annoy in order to force her to make concessions in favor of Italy. Relations with England are favorable for Turkey. The British were not convinced that Turkey was trying to use the Arab movement against them. With her

loans, Britain makes it easier to arm Turkey. A trade agreement will be signed with the united states in the coming din, which is supposed to eliminate the 9 mli frozen in Turkey. Dollars and revive Turkish exports to America. The German market is the most important for the marketing of Turkish products. The Turks managed to liquidate the 30 mln frozen in Germany through purchases Lire. Now the Germans already have 17 million of frozen LPR in Turkey. The 150 million loan \*\*\*\* offered by the Germans will be used by Turkey for the needs of national defense. Saracoglu assured us assiduously that the Germans did not stutter about the intensification of political relations between Germany and Turkey, and even more so about any joint Anti-Soviet combinations. In his zeal, Saracoglu went so far as to try to portray in front of us, as if he had even forgotten the name of funk. Not without emphasizing, he noted the fact that Neurath with his business

\* so, in the document. \*\* minister of the interior of France. \*\*\* head of the Italian delegation that arrived at the funeral of Kemal Ataturk

He left yesterday, without having visited the foreign office or asked for an audience with Ingo. The whole conversation with Saracoglu leaves the impression of a deliberate courtesy, calculated to lull our suspicions about Turkey's withdrawal from cooperation with the USSR and about its tilt towards our enemies.

After Saracoglu, we visited the closest friend of Ineya, the chairman of the Kamutai Abdulhalik Reida. We were received by him with special cordiality. He met and saw him off the porch of his house. **More sincerely than Saracoglu, Abdulhalik Reida argued that Turkey would never change its friendship with the USSR.** The most characteristic was his statement that if Turkey now has more friends than before, then Oio owes this only to her friendship with us. Today Abdulhalik Reida paid me a return visit at the embassy, noting that he **had informed the president of the republic about this.** Oi stayed with Ias for quite a long time, and several times inquired whether I was satisfied with the reception at Lieu and whether I would inform the Soviet government that Oio could be quite calm about the future of Soviet-Turkish cooperation. We will give the content of the conversation with Lieu on the morning of 24 \*.

Potemkin

Print t. By architect.

**Telegram of the plenipotentiary representative of the USSR in Germany Merekalov to the people's commissariat of foreign affairs of the USSR**

January 18, 1939 top secret

Today I paid a welcome visit to the Turkish ambassador Arpag and Menemencioglu \*. On January 16, a Turkish-German loan agreement was signed for 150 million marks for a period of 10 years out of 5% per annum. The loan must be realized by December 1941. 20% of the orders can go to cover the costs incurred in Turkey itself in Turkish lira. The agreement provides for the provision of benefits for the export of Turkish goods to Germany to cover a loan, preferential freight of German ships and cargo insurance in German companies. According to Menemencioglu's assessment, chamberlain's trip seemed to end in nothing. He thinks that this ineffectuality is only external, in essence, both parties have made some kind of deal, and most likely at the expense of Spain. It is unlikely that the deal could have been made at the expense of France or Germany. France views pact obligations only in terms of its own personal benefits. The wrong policy of France, and especially after the defeat of the republicans in Spain, will transfer it to the category of minor powers in the Mediterranean, just as the refusal to support Czechoslovakia, deprived it of allies in central Europe. Menemencioglu, during his meetings with Stojadinovich \*, allegedly twice developed the idea of the need for diplomatic rapprochement between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, that this would be a political factor in strengthening Turkish-Yugoslav friendship. Stojadinovich in both cases reacted negatively, this is also a fact of negative French policy. The Germans in conversations hide their next intentions and get off with only general phrases, the Italian-German friendship is valid only in peacetime, thanks to it, both sides achieve their goals, it will not stand the military test. If it comes to a world war, then Italy will betray Germany, as in 1914, discontent is hidden behind the external German-Italian prosperity. It is difficult to think that Mussolini is content with compensation from the Germans in the form of a telegram of thanks from Hitler. Germany is clearly seeking to penetrate the black or Mediterranean seas. In this case, one can expect a dramatic change and

restructuring of German foreign policy. German ministers told Arpag that Germany would not allow the division of Carpathian Ukraine between Hungary and Poland, as Germany wants to maintain its hegemony over Carpathian Ukraine. The Germans also have a negative attitude towards the Hungarian claims in Romania. Menemencioglu did not raise questions about Germany's attitude to the Montreux convention \*\*. I will send by mail a copy of the loan agreement received from them, which will enter into force after its ratification by the parties.

Plenipotentiary of wua rf, 059, on. 1, p. 294, d. 2036, l. 18-20.

**From letter of the interim attorney of the USSR in Iran A. Kartashev to the people's commissioner for foreign affairs of the USSR m. M. Litvinov**

January 21, 1939 secret

.....

It is understandable, therefore, that among the broad masses, as well as in merchant circles, they are expectantly awaiting a new treaty with the USSR. At the bazaars in Tehran and Tabriz, fantastic rumors are systematically spread: that the shah, having received a telegram from the Turkish president with advice to restore good relations with the Soviets, sent a delegation to us, that the treaty has already been signed in Tehran, etc., etc. ..

.....

From letter of the interim attorney of the USSR in Iran I. A. Kartashev to the people's commissioner for foreign affairs of the USSR m. M. Litvinov

February 15, 1939 secret

It seems that this thesis was suggested to the Iranians from the outside. I even believe that our Turkish friends could also give the Iranians such advice. I have heard more than once from the Turkish ambassador Akaigen that in conversations with the Iranians he urges them not to weaken, but to strengthen their friendship with their great neighbor and points them to the example of Turkey, which allegedly managed to maintain the best relations with the USSR, while at the same time eradicating communism inside.

Summarizing the above, the following conclusion should be drawn.

The shah, who played such a major role in the specific conditions of the historical development of Iran, by now seemed to have exhausted itself and pulled the country back towards reaction. The current policy of the Iranian government is weakening the results of the reformist activities of the past few years.



The shah is concentrating more and more all power in his hands, and his appetite for power is constantly growing and his fears and anger against all manifestations of personal or social initiative, which can, in parallel with him, that is, the shah's power, influence the course of state life, grow proportionally ...

Shah is still 61 years old, and he tenaciously holds on to life. At military parades, he is still able to gallop on horseback. They say that he kept his health and does not suffer from diseases. But he is in great fear for the fate of his dynasty. And it's understandable. Until now, the country has not created or organized social factors that would ensure the consolidation of this dynasty. The strong-willed, ruthless and despotic figure of the shah firmly gripped the police, the army, and the main support of power in his hands. The father would like his personal influence and power to pass to his son, and in order to strengthen his dynastic root, the shah increasingly strengthens the elements of police and military dictatorship, opposed to progressive social influences.

We will watch where it leads.

[temporary] charge d'affaires of the USSR in Iran

I. Kartashev

Avp rf, f. Oh, on 4, p 28, d 86, l 40-43

**Telegram of the plenipotentiary representative of the USSR in Turkey A.V. Terentyev to the people's commissariat of foreign affairs of the USSR**

**March 6, 1939 , Top Secret**

Informing me today about the conference of the Balkan entente<sup>40</sup>, Saracoglu said that since Yugoslavia did not answer either yes or no to Italy's proposal to join the "anti-Comintern pact" <sup>7</sup>, but announced its intention to consult with the allies in the entente, he, as a representative of the Turkish government, took the initiative and made the following statement: "given the intentions of Yugoslavia to consult with the entente members on the merits of the Italian proposals, the conference participants can resolve this issue in three ways:

A) either all together will agree to the Italian proposal and join the "anti-Comintern pact", or

B) leave each state to decide it at its discretion, or

C) collectively treat him negatively. "

Trying to show off his "merit", Saracoglu said that he "without much difficulty, with the willing support of the Greeks and the positive attitude of the Romanians, ensured a collective decision of the Balkan entente, whose members believe that none of the states that make up the entente can join any what ideological blocs are similar to the "anti-Comintern pact". The Yugoslavs first made a reservation, but then they agreed with Saracoglu proposal, and the decision was adopted unanimously. The minister of foreign affairs informed Apaydin \* about this so that he would bring it to the attention of the Soviet government. Saracoglu stressed that [that] "as never before, the cohesion" of the Balkan entente around the "Balkan axis" "was demonstrated to a whole galaxy of foreign journalists who had gathered in Bucharest." the foreign minister believes that Yugoslavia has become noticeably closer to the entente members under the influence of three reasons:

1). Franco's unwillingness to strengthen his relations with Italy and his intention to remove Italian troops from Spain, which forced Yugoslavia not to take the path of rapprochement with the Rome-berlin "axis" <sup>5</sup>.

2) an increase in armament by Britain, "on which it will now be possible to count."

3) the firm position taken by the united states in support of democracy. Turkey, according to Saracoglu, allegedly had intentions not to recognize

Franco, but the events developed in such a way that they had to go "for recognition." speaking of this, Saracoglu was clearly embarrassed. He twice stressed that after England and France, faced with pressure from Yugoslavia, Romania and Greece, "Turkey had no choice but to join the common decision." Saracoglu, at the request of Gafenku, conveyed the latter's assurances about "the friendly feelings that Romania has for the USSR." Saracoglu speaks extremely positively of Kalinescu \*\* and noted that it is very possible that he and Gafenku will come to Ankara.

Bulgaria, according to Saracoglu, is ready to cooperate with the entente on economic, transport and other issues, but until its relations with Romania and Yugoslavia are settled, it does not want to join the entente.

Terentyev

Avp rf, f. 059, on 1, p. 293, d. 2027, l. 77-79.

**Recording of the conversations of the temporary attorney of the USSR in Turkey o. I. Nikitnikova with the president of Turkey I. Inonu and the minister of foreign affairs of Turkey sh. Saracoglu \***

April 16, 1939 top secret

On April 16, Saracoglu's personal secretary, having phoned the embassy, said that Mr. Ismet Inonu could receive me in 20 minutes. Exactly at the specified time, that is, at 12 o'clock. 40 min., I was in the palace. Ismet Inonu greeted me very friendly and simply on the stairs leading to the second floor to his living rooms, and he himself led me to his office.

Having sat me down against himself, he immediately said that he was very excited when he learned from Saracoglu that I wanted to personally convey to him an important message from comrade Molotov \*\*, and therefore now he wanted to find out as soon as possible what was the matter.

Inonu listened with exceptional attention to comrade Molotov's proposal and wrote it down word for word. After reading it again and making a few notes, Inonu asked if comrade Molotov's message had a more detailed explanation of why Tbilisi or Batumi was planned to be the meeting place for Soviet and Turkish representatives, but not Moscow. At the same time, he noted that in the capitals, in particular in Ankara, it would be more convenient to negotiate from the point of view of opportunities for quick coordination of issues. I replied to ismet that I do not know about the motives for choosing Tbilisi or Batumi, since nothing is said about this in comrade Molotov's message. In any case, if he is interested in this question, I will convey this to comrade Molotov.

After that, ismet Inonu asked me to convey to comrade Molotov his deep gratitude and sincere greetings and said that he personally (ismet) considered such a meeting and consultation of representatives of the Soviet Union and Turkey very necessary and very useful. Therefore, he will urgently convey the contents of comrade Molotov's proposal to the Turkish government, of whose decision he will immediately inform me.

At the end of the conversation, ismet informed me that the Turkish ambassador to Moscow Apaydin had been instructed to conduct negotiations with the Soviet government in Moscow of approximately the same nature. Therefore, he inquired whether comrade Molotov said anything about this in his message. To this I replied that, in my opinion, comrade Molotov, when instructing me to make a message to the president of the Turkish republic, did not yet know about the instructions given to Apaydin by the Turkish government. According to the general impression, ismet Inonu was very happy with the Soviet proposal.

The conversation with the president of the republic lasted 30 minutes. Before the end of the conversation, Ismet's wife was present during the conversation, who was very friendly and helpful.

Saracoglu ismet was not invited.

Less than an hour after my conversation with ismet Inonu, Saracoglu, summoning me to his house, reported the following agreed text of the response of the president and the Turkish government to comrade Molotov's proposal for transmission to the Soviet government:

"the republican government approves the proposal made by Molotov to Inonu and accepts it. The Turkish government believes that the implementation of this meeting as soon as possible is, as Molotov says, in accordance with the existing international situation. However, the Turkish government considers it more convenient to arrange such a meeting in Ankara, both for reasons of facilitating correspondence and for keeping this meeting somewhat secret. The meeting could also be arranged in Istanbul. Expressing our views on the question of the place of the meeting, we will try with pleasure to take into account any proposal of the Soviet government. "

In addition, Saracoglu requested that the second message of the Turkish government be brought to the attention of Moscow as follows:

"the British and French made us (Turkey) an offer to conclude some kind of alliance. This proposal is currently being studied by us. Turkey

will give England an answer by setting the main conditions of Turkey and demanding the participation of the Soviet Union. "

Having conveyed to me the text of the response of the president and the Turkish government to comrade Molotov's appeal, Saracoglu repeated that the president asks to convey his gratitude and greetings to comrade Molotov. Then Saracoglu explained that Ankara or Istanbul are more convenient for negotiations, since, in all likelihood, he, Saracoglu, will conduct them. His departure to Tbilisi or Batumi will cause a lot of noise, and the road itself will take a lot of time. At the same time, the minister said that it would be good if comrade Potemkin came to Ankara.

In response to Saracoglu's link that negotiations in Ankara could be conducted in a more secret environment, I noticed that the arrival of our representatives to the capital of Turkey would cause no less talk, and therefore Tbilisi or Batumi are more suitable in this regard. A trip to the Caucasus, if the Turkish government wants to keep it secret, could be properly organized. In conclusion, Saracoglu said: "if the Turkish representatives had managed to meet in the Caucasus with comrade Stalin, comrade Molotov or comrade Voroshilov, then, of course, the question would have been completely different."

When Saracoglu was dictating to me a message from the Turkish government regarding the English proposal, I asked him whether Turkey had already given such an answer to England (as Saracoglu told me on April 15 in the evening) or would it (as formulated in the text that Saracoglu had just dictated to me). The minister replied to this that Turkey had not yet given an answer to England but was going to give one.

[temporary] charge d'affaires of the USSR in Turkey

O. Nikitnikova

Avp rf, f. Oil, on. 4, p. 31, d. 166, l. 151-154.

**Telegram of the people's commissioner for foreign affairs of the USSR m. M. Litvinov to the temporary attorney in the affairs of the USSR in Turkey o. I. Nikitnikova**

April 17, 1939 top secret

Please ask Saracoglu to convey on behalf of comrade Molotov his sincere gratitude to Inonu for his prompt reply and his attitude to our proposal \*. Then state that we offered Tbilisi or Batumi solely in the interests of the Turkish representative's convenience, to shorten his path, and also because the secrecy of the meetings there could be maximally ensured. We would, however, warmly welcome Saracoglu to Moscow and ask him to come.

Apaydin did not tell us anything about the negotiations between England and France with Turkey, about something like an alliance, and about the Turkish answer you reported in your telegram of April 16, 1939 \*\*, about the need to involve the USSR.

Litvinov

Wua rf, f 059, on I, n 294, d 2029, l 83

**Recording of the conversation of the interim attorney of the USSR in Turkey o. I. Nikitnikova with the secretary general of the MFA of Turkey Menemencioglu**

April 29, 1939 Top Secret

On behalf of comrade Potemkin, I spoke with the secretary general of the foreign ministry Numan Menemencioglu about the following:

1. Referring to ismet Inonu's promise to comrade Potemkin to provide us with the texts of Turkish responses to English sentences, I asked if Numan could give them to me now. Menemencioglu replied that he had not prepared copies for us, as he had not yet received instructions from Saracoglu. Therefore, he promised to ask the minister about this, and then immediately give an order to remove copies of the Turkish replies, which will be sent to the embassy tomorrow by noon with the personal secretary of Numan.

2. In response to my question about the date of Britain's delivery to Turkey of the second proposal, which Numan mentioned in his conversation with me on April 13 \*\*\*, the secretary general replied that the second proposal was received by Turkey around the 20th, on the 25th it was answered<sup>108</sup>.

3. Along the way, Numan said a few words concerning the history of the development of the question of British guarantees to Greece. According to him, the case began when the Italian chargé d'affaires said in London that Italy was giving guarantees to Halifax not to claim Corfu. At the same time, Italy indicated that, in her opinion, it was England that threatened Corfu. This forced England to declare that she had no claims to Corfu and that if any other power had claims to this island, it could end in a very serious way for the aggressor.

After that, England made Turkey on April 12 the first offer of assistance to Greece in connection with chamberlain's speech \*. Numan noticed at the same time that there was nothing in the first sentence, except what he had already told me on the 13th.

4. A) to my question about what "other conditions" are mentioned in paragraph 1 of the Turkish answer to the British of April 25, Numan



replied that by "conditions" one should understand all the points of the Turkish answer of April 25, since Turkey will agree to conclude an agreement on mutual assistance with England only on condition that England fully accepts all the points indicated by Turkey in her reply. If at least one point is not accepted by Britain, Turkey will refuse to conclude an agreement.

B) to my question about exactly which areas are implied in § 1 of the Turkish answer in the event of a war with Italy (i.e. Where these wars should take place in order for Turkey to consider itself obligated to provide assistance to England in the event of Italian aggression), Numan said that in § 1 the areas of the Mediterranean are understood. However, in the event of a war between Italy and England anywhere (be it in the red sea or in any other part of the world) Turkey will still provide England with any kind of assistance, the form of which will be determined later.

Menemencioglu explained § 1 as follows: § 1 (as well as § 2) is directed against the "axis" Rome - berlin<sup>6</sup>. If, for example, Germany commits aggression and as a result Italy enters the war with England on its own initiative or on the initiative of England, Turkey will assist England in the fight only against Italy. England will act in the same way in relation to Turkey if the latter collides with Italy. "if, for example, - said Numan, - Germany starts a war against Belgium and if England finds it necessary to act against Italy as a result, Turkey will help England in the fight only against Italy, but not against Germany." "in general," concluded Numan, "the first paragraph directed against the" axis "means exclusively Italy, and Turkey will act jointly with Britain in the event of any aggression, as well as if England considers it necessary to act against Italy, in order to suppress the aggressive intentions of the latter".

5. To my question whether it was meant that France would also provide assistance, Numan replied that all the negotiations that Turkey and England are now conducting concern only England. However, the possibility is not excluded that France will join this agreement. But that's her business.

6. A) to my question on paragraph 2 of the Turkish answer of April 25, whose aggression in the Balkans is meant, Numan replied that the aggression mentioned in paragraph 2 should be understood as the aggression of the "axis" countries Berlin - Rome, that is, both Germany and Italy. "however," he said, "it is quite natural that with regard to Italy, paragraph 2 repeats the provision of § 1, which covers literally everything that concerns Italy. Paragraph 2 refers mainly to Germany. In the event of a German aggression in the Balkans, mutual assistance begins only if Turkey declares that this aggression is a danger to it. Even when England opposes Germany in the Balkans, Turkey has the right to remain neutral if she considers that this aggression does not directly threaten her. If Italy attacks the Balkans, Turkey will act jointly with Britain.

B) when I asked whether Turkey would provide assistance only to England or also to France, Numan replied that since the British declared that they would act jointly with France, Turkey would thus help France as well. "however," Menemencioglu repeated again, "if Turkey does not consider that German aggression in the Balkans threatens it directly, it will be neutral even if Britain or France also opposed Germany."

7. Regarding § 4 of the Turkish answer of April 25, I asked: do we really understand that assistance between Turkey and the USSR can be provided in the straits and in the black sea. Numan replied: "Turkey believes that common mutual assistance is needed between Britain and the USSR. Turkey does not interfere with the terms of the Anglo-Soviet agreement. At the same time, she (Turkey) would like to have an agreement on mutual assistance with the Soviet Union in approximately the same spirit, but, of course, with different conditions. Turkey believes that it can provide assistance to the USSR in the straits (in the sense of not allowing the ships of the aggressor to pass through) and in the black sea. Mutual aid could extend to the Balkans as well".

8. To my question on § 5 of the Turkish answer of 25 April about what specific requirements have been put forward by Turkey regarding economic and financial assistance and military supplies, Numan replied: "Turkey needs: 1 - military equipment; 2 - financial assistance;

3 - economic aid, which can be expressed in the purchase of Turkish goods by England, which Germany refuses. At present, the specific requirements of Turkey have not yet been proposed to England. However, the Anglo-Turkish mutual assistance agreement will not be signed until England agrees to specific demands from Turkey on the above issues. Therefore, immediately after Britain's agreement in principle, a special commission will be set up, which will work out concrete proposals on what exactly and in what quantity Britain should give Turkey. Turkey will demand that "money be put on the table," Numan said, meaning Turkey will not sign the agreement until England agrees to Turkish specific economic and financial demands and to supply Turkey with military equipment.

At the same time, Numan added (to my question) that Turkey will demand the fulfillment of all its specific requirements immediately after the conclusion of an agreement on mutual assistance, but not expecting a war.

9. I checked with Numan who exactly (Gafenku or the Romanian ambassador) told Saracoglu that the polish-Romanian pact was not directed against the USSR. Numan confidently and definitely replied that Saracoglu had told Gafenku about this.

10. In conclusion, I asked Numan if I understood correctly yesterday (during Saracoglu's conversation with comrade Potemkin in the presence of Numan) in Turkish and English language on Turkey's neutrality. According to Numan, I wrote down both Turkish and English wording.

Turkey proposed to formulate the clause as follows: "la turquie gardera la neutralité tant qu'une agression n'est pas commise en méditerranée ou dans les Balkans" ("Turkey will remain neutral until aggression is committed in the Mediterranean or the Balkans").

The English wording: "si une agression est commise en méditerranée ou dans les Balkans, la turquie ne pourra pas garder sa neutralité" ("if aggression is committed in the Mediterranean or the Balkans, Turkey will not be able to maintain its neutrality").

The difference between the Turkish and English language is, according to Numan, the following: the Turkish language says that "I am neutral everywhere. Wherever there is war, I do not interfere. Only in the event of an attack on the Mediterranean Sea or the Balkans will I be forced to enter the war. " England insisted that Turkey not say that it would be neutral at all. England believed that it was not necessary to use the words "will remain neutral", but it is imperative to point out that "Turkey will not be neutral."

Numan believes that there was a very significant nuance between these two formulations that distinguished them. "however," concluded Numan, "as a result of the negotiations, we nevertheless accepted the English proposal, which was formulated somewhat differently in §§ 1 and 2. Thus, Turkey agreed to a positive form of neutrality.

[temporary] charge d'affaires of the USSR in Turkey

O. Nikitnikova avp rf, f. Oil, on. 4, p. 31, d. 166, l. 140-145.

**Recording of the conversation of the plenipotentiary representative of the USSR in Turkey a. V. Terentyev with the ambassador of Germany in Turkey Von Papen \*\***

May 9, 1939 secret

On my return from Istanbul, I paid a return visit to Von Papen. At first, the conversation was about the timing of a possible departure to Istanbul for the summer. In this regard, Papen told me that he would leave for Berlin immediately after the ratification of the Anglo-Turkish \*\*\* pact and asked that, obviously, the conclusion of a Soviet-Turkish treaty should also be expected. I replied that, judging by the Turkish press, it was only about the Anglo-Turkish negotiations, and asked his opinion on Beck's last speech.

Papen believes that the tone of the Polish foreign minister's speech does not close the door for further German-Polish negotiations, and again began to talk about the fact that Germany's demands are quite legitimate, modest and moderate. "The Poles claim that they cannot live without Danzig - this outlet to the sea. However, they did not say a single word about the fact that at one time in Danzig Poland received 16 sq. km of territory for the construction of the port they need and did not use this opportunity at all". Near Danzig the Poles equipped a new port - Gdynia, the importance of which is immeasurably greater for Poland than Danzig. Germany and now, putting forward a demand for the return of Danzig, promises to grant Poland the right to use the port. Germany recognizes the Poles' right to have a corridor for access to the sea. This means that Poland should also take a positive attitude to the "modest demand" of the Germans to provide them with a small strip, only 20 meters wide, for the construction of a railway from Germany to East Prussia. "Isn't this a minimum requirement for Germany," said Von Papen.

Further, the German ambassador began to develop the idea that Germany only wants to correct the mistakes of Versailles and does not harbor any other aggressive intentions towards other states. To my remark about the contradiction of this statement to the fact of the capture of Czechoslovakia, Von Papen replied that Germany

considered it completely impossible to have in the heart of her state such a country as Czechoslovakia,, with 40 divisions armed to the teeth, and, moreover, had allied relations with those countries that are considering Germany as its enemy. The entire past history of Czechoslovakia speaks of the desire of this state to strengthen friendly ties with France, Romania, etc., instead of being friends only with Germany.

Emphasizing that bohemia once belonged to Germany, Von Papen said the following: "although many believe that the inclusion of bohemia in the Reich is contrary to racial principles, the Czechs will have their own administration, their own schools, their own right and they will not be drafted into the army." ...

Turning to the question of the Balkan countries, Von Papen said that Gafenku had allegedly assured berlin that Romania excluded any danger that might come from Germany. And further, arguing with those who assert the presence of aggressive intentions of the present Germany in relation to the Balkan countries, Papen hotly stated that Germany's only desire in the Balkans is to maintain peace and so that the Balkan countries can supply Germany with bread and other products. "we have absolutely nothing in mind in relation to the Balkan countries."

In the conclusion of the Italian-German military-political alliance \*, Von Papen sees nothing new, since everything previously agreed upon between these countries was only formalized on paper in recent days. "after Danzig," Papen continued, "we will only have questions about economic relations with some countries, but they can be settled by all having gathered at a round table. We are a poor country and our only wealth is that our people know how to work. "

My interlocutor caught a glimpse of the fact that in Turkey, some even prominent figures hinted to the Germans about how Italy would not let them down, referring to the history that preceded the outbreak of the world war. "frankly, there are people here who do not like Italians."

Berlin attaches great importance to the fact that in the near future a pact of mutual assistance may be concluded between Britain and Turkey. This, according to Von Papen, was known in Berlin

\* this refers to the German-Italian agreement on political and military cooperation, the so-called "steel pact", signed on May 22, 1939 in Berlin (see note 113).

And therefore he, as an ambassador, was hastily sent to Ankara, "not being allowed" even to collect his personal belongings.

Before I left, Von Papen repeated to me what he had said on the first visit. No contradictions, according to the German ambassador, divide the USSR and Germany. "ideology should be left aside and return to the bygone Bismarckian times."

Plenipotentiary of the USSR in Turkey a. Terentyev

Avp rf, f. 011. On. 4, p 31, d 166, l 247-249

**Recording of the conversation of the plenipotentiary representative of the USSR in Turkey A.V. Terentyev with the prime minister of Turkey R. Saydam \*\*\*\*\***

May 12, 1939 secret

Today, immediately after the meeting of the Mejlis \*\*\*\*\* Refik Saydam invited me to a separate room and spoke in the warmest terms about the satisfaction that the leaders of the Turkish government received from their recent meetings with comrade Potemkin. These meetings made it possible to establish a complete community of views on issues of relations between the two countries, linked by bonds of fraternal friendship.

Saydam believes that in the near future negotiations should be started between representatives of the USSR and Turkey on specific issues, the positive resolution of which will legally formalize the de facto union that exists between the two states. Speaking about Papen, Saydam said that "the Turkish government was aware of the mission of the German ambassador, which was to prevent further rapprochement of Turkey with Britain and the USSR. Papen counted on using his former connections in Turkey, established during the world war. However, this mission of Papen was not crowned with success." Saydam believes that, in all likelihood, the German ambassador, who is leaving for Berlin the other day, will never return to Ankara.

Plenipotentiary of the USSR in Turkey A. Terentyev

Wua rf. F 'oh, on 4, I 31, d 166, l 242



**Recording of the conversation of the deputy people's commissioner for foreign affairs of the USSR Potemkin with the ambassador of Turkey in the USSR z. Apaydin**

May 13, 1939 secret

Apaydin showed me a telegram from Saracoglu, which entrusted the ambassador to convey to the Soviet government the gratitude of the government of the Turkish republic for the friendly contact established during our last negotiations in Ankara, and for the useful work we carried out in our meetings with statesmen of Romania, Bulgaria and Poland. After that Apaydin asked me to acquaint him with the negotiations that took place in Ankara, Sofia, Bucharest and Warsaw.

I informed Apaydin about what interested him. At the same time, I emphasized that in pursuance of ismet Inonu's request, I brought to the attention of the Bulgarian government about the firm determination of the Turkish government to coordinate its policy with the USSR in everything and to implement, in inseparable connection with it, a common program of ensuring peace and countering aggression in the Balkans and the black sea. Apaydin received this message with great satisfaction.

At the end of the conversation, Apaydin told me that the next task in Soviet-Turkish relations he considers the conclusion of a pact of mutual assistance between the USSR and Turkey. The ambassador knows that his government holds the same point of view. Apaydin asks to give him the opportunity to participate in this matter, which he would consider the best completion of his activity as an ambassador to the USSR. Let the pact negotiations take place in Moscow. Here the pact must be signed. I replied to Apaydin that from conversations in Ankara I knew about the intention of the Turkish government to conclude a pact of mutual assistance with the USSR. If this question were put before us officially, the government of the USSR could discuss it. In the event of an agreement in principle on both sides, nothing would seem to prevent the appropriate negotiations from being held in Moscow, as the ambassador wishes.

V. Potemkin wua rf, f oil, on. 4, p 24, d.7, l. 29-30.

**From the record of the conversation of the plenipotentiary representative of the USSR in Turkey A.V. Terentyev with the minister of foreign affairs of Turkey s. Saracoglu**

May 14, 1939 secret

[...] Then Saracoglu said that he recently had a polish ambassador on beck's order, who told the foreign minister that the poles had not been completely loyal to the Soviet Union and now the polish government is trying to build its relationship with the USSR differently ... "I told the pole the same thing that I said to Gafenku in Istanbul, namely: it is necessary to discard all preconceived and unnecessary feelings of caution, and after sensibly weighing the situation, come to an agreement with the USSR."

Then Saracoglu said that ismet was very well impressed by the statement made by comrade Potemkin in Warsaw \*, with which Inonu was extremely pleased. Ismet is also satisfied with comrade Potemkin's conversation with the Turkish envoy in Sofia. He, Saracoglu, instructed Apaydin to convey to comrade Potemkin on behalf of the Turkish government great gratitude for the best feelings he expressed from his stay in Ankara, and for contact with representatives of Turkey on the way from Ankara to Moscow.

Saracoglu told me about Von Papen's visit to him. The latter asked the minister: "do you really have no room for at least one a pleasant word to Germany in the statement made in parliament by the prime minister?" I answered this to Von Papen, told Saracoglu that the range of issues discussed in the statement had no direct relation to Germany. Von Papen further asked: "throughout the entire statement it is said that Turkey and England are countries of the world, stand for peace and security. What, in your opinion, is Germany the aggressor, or what?" Saracoglu pointed out to the German that Germany itself must answer this question and declare in a clear form whether or not Germany is the aggressor.

According to the foreign minister, the Germans and Italians are now greatly concerned not only by the Anglo-Turkish agreement, but mainly by the prospect of an agreement between the USSR and Turkey.

Comrade Potemkin's visit made a special impression on many, since it is clear that he had close contact with the leaders of Turkish politics, negotiated with them, etc. Comrade Potemkin's trip through Sofia, Bucharest and especially Warsaw increased the anxiety of the Germans. Von Papen asked Saracoglu if Turkey would act in the event of a war over Danzig. To this he received an answer that if only the Danzig adventure provoked participation in the war of Italy in the Mediterranean, then Turkey would fulfill its obligations. Then Von Papen said that if Soviet-polish relations develop into an alliance between the USSR and Poland, then Germany will find herself in the face of the aggression being prepared against her by these two countries. I answered Von Papen, told Saracoglu that although it is not very easy to determine who the aggressor is, in 1933, in London, at the suggestion of the Soviet Union, the convention on the definition of the aggressor \* was concluded, which could well be guided in this case. Von Papen expressed surprise that he did not know anything about this convention. Saracoglu replied to him that, unfortunately, he was not familiar with the details of the 1933 agreement, since at that time he was serving as minister of justice, and invited the ambassador to visit Numan, who would be able to acquaint him with all the materials on this issue.

Before I left, Saracoglu emphasized that the eastern front of the world is becoming more and more harmonized and that it is necessary to finally create a strong chain in the east, which no aggressive force could break.

Terentyev avp rf, f. Ou, on. 4, p. 31, d. 166, l. 286-288.

**Telegram of the plenipotentiary representative of the USSR in the Great Britain I.M. Maisky to the people's commissariat of foreign affairs of the USSR**

May 19, 1939 out of line. Top secret

I told Vansittart this morning our response to his suggestions. \* he showed no particular surprise, for he was prepared for such a response to my statement during our last meeting \*\*. Vansittart said that now he would have to get back to work in order to find some acceptable formula.

The French ambassador Corbin had a long conversation with me in which he tried to convince me of the need to meet the British halfway and not insist on a triple pact of mutual assistance in exchange for a guarantee from the Baltic states. I vigorously defended our proposals.

Aras told me that he was today with the constant comrade \*\*\* minister Cadogan and on behalf of the Turkish government insisted on an early agreement between Britain and the USSR. Cadogan assured him that the British government wants such an agreement and will make every effort to find a formula acceptable to both parties. The question must be finally decided at the next cabinet meeting in the middle of next week, that is, around May 24-25.

Plenipotentiary

Avp rf, f. 059, on. 1, p. 300, d. 2077, l. 24.

**Telegram of the plenipotentiary representative of the USSR in France  
Z. Suritsa to the people's commissary of foreign affairs**

May 24, 1939 out of line. Top secret

According to Mandell, the general staff, especially Gamelin \*, is now the most important pusher of the military alliance agreement with us'21. They have now found unexpected support in general Weygand, who returned from his trip with the same mood. Turkey and conversations with Ismet made a huge impression on him. Ismet told him, in particular, that the greatest mistake and threat for all those who fear communism would be if the Soviet army would remain on the sidelines and would not be drawn into common cooperation. "then communism would have become a real threat." Mandell says that these arguments made a great impression on Lebrun. Weygand's confidence in the need for military cooperation with us was further strengthened when he got acquainted with the "deplorable" state of the Romanian army. Weygand bluntly stated that it would not be possible to save Romania without Soviet help. Mandel said approximately the same thing to the chief of the British general staff. Mandel believes that, having provided guarantees to Romania and Poland, Chamberlain "can no longer accept any conditions that the USSR will condition its assistance to." Mandell is therefore confident that our project \* will be fully accepted. He foresees more attempts to narrow it down, but with our persistence they will be overcome. At the same time, he attaches great importance to the position that Turkey will take. Chamberlain cannot risk breaking the Anglo-Turkish agreement

Maurice Rothschild \*\*, who returned from America, told Mandell that Roosevelt, in his conversation with him, was very restrained and with a "noticeable reserve" about the value of cooperation with the USSR and almost warned against "unnecessary illusions." Mandell asked me if there was any cooling in our relations with America.

Surits\ avp rf, f 059. On 1, p. 302, d 2090. L 45-46

**G. A. Astakhov to the people's commissariat of foreign affairs of the USSR**

July 8, 1939 top secret

According to the Turkish and French ambassadors, as well as the Romanian and Greek envoys who were at my dinner yesterday, Kyoseivanov's visit here is not related to the discussion of any specific issues and, like Paul's visit, will not entail practical consequences, except for general declarative kind statements. The Romanian spoke about this with particular confidence. The Turk, in contrast to his previous tactics, bitterly complained about the Germans adopting a hostile line towards Turkey, which they accuse of breaking their promise to pursue a policy of neutrality. Soon he leaves and confidentially confessed that he is unlikely to return to Berlin. Coulondre is very concerned about the outcome of our negotiations with England. He approves of the tactics of forcing the British to fulfill broader and more precise commitments but freezes in horror at the thought that negotiations may end in vain. Everyone is very gloomy about Hitler's immediate intentions. Active actions are expected to follow in August with respect to Danzig and Slovakia. The annexation of Danzig to the Reich will first be announced in the form of a resolution of the Danzig senate, after which the Germans will wait for what Poland will do. Everyone reported that the Italian ambassador Attolico had officially assured a number of colleagues that nothing would be done by Germany in the coming months. He expects events (assuring, however, that they will not lead to war) only in the second half of August.

Charge d'affaires of the RF WUA, f. 059, on. 1, p. 294, d. 2036, l. 131-132.

## **From diary of the first secretary of the official**

### **USSR representations in Germany Ivanova**

August 20-26, 1939 secret

Viii. A message was published in the German press about the forthcoming conclusion of a non-aggression pact between the Soviet Union and Germany. All day long telephone calls did not stop, inquiring about the validity of Ribbentrop's upcoming flight to Moscow. Press attaché comrade Smirnov was literally attacked by journalists (see his diary) \*. The first secretary of the Turkish embassy, Mr. Efchen, who came to me on a visit, having received information from me about the reality of the upcoming trip, expressed confidence that for Turkey such a pact is a serious contribution to peace, that the friendship between Turkey and Russia is unshakable and that a peaceful policy the Soviet Union has repeatedly saved the world from military adventures, and it welcomes such a pact. He only doubts whether this will wipe Poland off the map of the world, since the pact with the Soviet Union strongly strengthens Germany, without removing its demands from Poland.

**Telegram of the plenipotentiary representative of the USSR in Turkey A.V. Terentyev to the people's commissioner for foreign affairs of the USSR V. M. Molotov**

August 25, 1939 top secret

Today Saracoglu handed me the following answers to our five questions about the pact \*:

1. As we have already explained to Mr. Potemkin and Mr. Ambassador Terentyev \*\*, the Turkish-Soviet pact should have a limited effect, and hence it must be with limited liability. A defensive pact to be concluded may be based on a broad understanding of aggression.
2. A pact can be both independent of both tripartite pacts, and in connection with them. Nevertheless, even in the first case, it is necessary that the Turkish-Soviet pact was in accordance with the provisions of the tripartite pacts.
3. Bearing in mind the limited space and responsibility provided for in the first paragraph, mutual assistance can encompass both naval and land warfare.
4. In any case, within the same limits, the pact can also apply to wars started as a result of corresponding obligations.
5. At present, Turkey's obligations are limited to two declarations: the Turkish-British and Turkish-French and the Balkan entente pact \*\*\*. With the reservation formulated in the first paragraph, these commitments should give effect to the Turkish-Soviet pact. The final Turkish-Anglo-French tripartite pact, as well as the subsequent commitments of Turkey, provided that they were accepted by the Soviets, would automatically add to the commitments currently in force and produce the same actions (effects). It should have been the same with respect to commitments of the same kind made by the Soviets.

I asked Saracoglu a few clarifying questions: a) should, when speaking about the limited spread of the Soviet-Turkish pact, keep in mind the minister's past statements that Turkey cannot assume obligations on the northern and eastern borders of the USSR \*\*\*\*. Saracoglu replied that in



general terms it was about this, but more precisely, the general staffs would agree on certain boundaries; b) under the words "broad understanding of aggression" the Turkish government thinks all definitions of aggression arising from the convention on the definition of aggression signed in London in 1933 \*\*\*\*\*; c) the answer to our second question, according to Saracoglu, should be understood in such a way that the provisions of the Soviet-Turkish pact should not contradict Turkey's commitments under other pacts; d) on point 5, Saracoglu said that the Soviet government is given to decide whether it agrees with the commitments undertaken by Turkey in accordance with the declarations with Britain, France and the Balkan pact: "we only wanted the Soviet government to agree with our obligations under these agreements." Saracoglu added that all the answers to 5 points were drawn up with a view to aggression and the conclusion of a defensive pact against aggression.

Before starting my conversation with Saracoglu, he asked me if I had anything to tell him for a report to the government on the question of the Soviet-German non-aggression pact \*. I replied to the minister that I have no special report on this issue, but "then the articles published in the press by Izvestia and Pravda \*\*", as well as the text of the agreement, fully answer the question of interest to the minister.

Now Saracoglu is completely depressed, I have never seen him like this. In connection with the newspaper hype about the Soviet-German pact and that "on Sunday, the 27th, a general war will begin," I tried to drag Saracoglu into conversation, but he decided to keep silent, noticing only that he was leaving for Ankara on the 26th, where ismet, prime minister Saydam and all the other ministers will arrive in a couple of days.

Terentyev, avp rf, f. 059, on. 1, p. 298, d. 2059, l. 201-204.

**Telegram of the plenipotentiary representative of the USSR in Turkey A.V. Terentyev**

September 5, 1939 out of line. Top secret

Saracoglu received me as soon as I informed him of my intention to talk to him.

Having listened with great attention to my statement, made strictly in accordance with your directive \*, he asked me if he understood correctly the passage where it is said that Turkey had not informed the Soviet Union about the negotiations with Britain. If he understood so, then it is a mistake. I said yes, he understood correctly, since Turkey really did not timely inform the USSR about its negotiations with the British. Then Saracoglu called his secretary, who wrote down my statement in detail. After that, the minister, extremely concerned and outwardly agitated, again said that the Turkish government had informed its embassy in Moscow about everything, and that copies of the British letters had been handed over to Potemkin in Ankara. "we constantly informed Moscow about all the offers made to us by the British. In connection with the German ultimatum to Romania and the appeal of the British to the Romanians and Greeks, we informed Moscow about our proposal, just in case, that with the same appeal the British, apparently, intend to turn to the USSR and Turkey. When Potemkin, while in Ankara, told us that the Turkish embassy in Moscow had not informed the Soviet government of the British proposals, I immediately requested an explanation from Apaydin. The latter replied that he did not get the opportunity to meet with Litvinov, instructed Karabud to inform the people's commissariat of foreign affairs about the British appeal to Turkey: "

Then Saracoglu asked me if the content of the last part of my statement meant mutual assistance between the USSR and Turkey in the event that the latter fulfills its obligations. I replied that it is premature to talk about this, if only because it is necessary to know what specific obligations of Turkey are in question. Should the Anglo-Turkish and Franco-Turkish declarations also be regarded as obligations, although it is as if Turkey has not signed any pact with Britain and France yet.

Declarations are not yet a pact or a breakdown of a treaty with definitely fixed obligations. Saracoglu replied that yes, the declaration is not a pact and the pacts with Britain and France have not really been signed yet. However, he continued, the existing declaration nevertheless imposes certain obligations on Turkey, which is also bound by the pact of the Balkan entente<sup>40</sup>. "only these obligations are limited to the obligations of Turkey."

I asked Saracoglu if he had anything to tell me now about the intention of the Turkish government in connection with the current situation so that I could report this to my government. The minister replied that since the plans of the belligerents are not yet known, the Turkish government has not yet taken any decision. In speaking of this, he obviously had in mind the plans and intentions of Italy. "until now, we do not know whether Italy will really remain neutral or whether it will enter the war on the side of Germany or against it. Until Italy enters the war on the side of Germany or the members of the Balkan entente are attacked, we will not enter the war. I am sure that the war will continue for a long time, several years, the war will be big and stubborn. I am also confident that Germany will be defeated. She could have conquered Poland alone or won successes in the Balkans, but she could not cope with England and France. " he draws these conclusions on the basis that England is located on the islands, has naval bases, and France is inaccessible to Germany with its Maginot line<sup>222</sup>.

I asked Saracoglu in what form the Turkish government's response to the statement I made on behalf of comrade Molotov would follow. Saracoglu replied that he, together with his colleagues in the council of ministers, would carefully study this statement and give me a written answer, preparing at the same time a certificate of the dates when they were instructed to the Turkish embassy in Moscow to inform the people's commissariat of foreign affairs about the negotiations with the British. Finally, I told Saracoglu that I would like to meet with ismet Inonu on occasion. The minister replied that he would be happy to arrange this meeting.

Saracoglu greeted me happily, because apparently he expected that I wanted to make him some message on behalf of Moscow, and to the

first paragraph of the statement, which says about rumors that the Soviet government was in negotiations with Germany on a non-aggression pact even during the period of Potemkin's stay in Turkey, Saracoglu did not react in any way. By this, in my opinion, he tacitly agreed that secret rumors in the Turkish ruling circles were indeed exaggerated. Saracoglu was especially agitated and outwardly looking depressed after my words that the Turkish government did not consider it necessary to inform the USSR in time about its negotiations with Britain and France. Saracoglu returned to my question three times, believing that there was some kind of misunderstanding. Judging by the remarks of surprise thrown to Saracoglu, it seemed to him that my words about the conspiracy being prepared with the British were new to him. Saracoglu especially carefully and asking me to repeat it twice, listened to the last part of my statement, which says that we were and will remain friends of Turkey and that with good will on both sides, we can say with confidence that we will find a common language.

It should be emphasized, however, that when it came to the straits and the Balkans, Saracoglu did not treat this as something that the Turkish government would have to grab onto immediately. I have every reason to think that Saracoglu, clearly an Anglo Francophile, has personally played and is playing a big role in bringing Turkey closer to England and France. Therefore, I assume that he is guilty of untimely information about the Anglo-Turkish negotiations. This, perhaps, explains the proximity of Saracoglu, who in Turkey may be considered the culprit of the policy of withdrawing from the USSR and focusing exclusively on England and France.

We know for certain that among a group of old deputies there is talk condemning the policy of the Turkish government, "which too hastily exchanged declarations with the British and French, while the Turkish government had to talk with the British and French, only being at the same table with the USSR."

Terentyev

Avp rf, f. 059, on. 1, p. 293, d. 2028, l. 137-142

**Telegram of the plenipotentiary representative of the USSR in Germany A. Shkvartsev to the people's commissar for foreign affairs of the USSR v. M. Molotov**

September 6, 1939 immediately. Top secret

On September 6 he received Weizsacker. Weizsacker asked about the position of Turkey and Romania in relation to Germany. I replied that I had not yet visited the Turkish ambassador and therefore could not tell him anything new. And he asked if he had information on this matter. Weizsacker told me that he had no information about Turkey's position. With regard to Romania, he considers the nervousness shown by it about the danger of an attack by Hungary, unjustified, since this danger is not so real. In the west, Germany has not yet fired a single shot, the flight of British aircraft ended unsuccessfully. On the eastern front, there is an offensive, allegedly the polish government was evacuated from Warsaw. When I asked about the possibility of an air attack on berlin, Weizsacker replied that there were no real signals for this. Berlin is an unattractive target for enemy aircraft, as berlin is well defended and there are no people giving orders in berlin. At the end of the conversation, he pointed out that Germany is thinking about expanding our economic relations with her, which will probably be discussed in Moscow. The existing trade and credit agreement<sup>171</sup> will be respected by Germany exactly in spite of the war.

Plenipotentiary

Avp rf, f. 059, on. 1, p. 294, d 2037, l. 24-25.

**Recording of the conversation of the head of the eastern European department of the people's commissariat of foreign affairs of the USSR I. Lavrentiev with the ambassador of Romania in the USSR Dianu**

September 23, 1939 secret

.....

Dianu said in the course of the conversation that he initially intended to leave on September 27, but in connection with the arrival of the Turkish foreign minister \* in the Soviet Union, he postponed his trip.

When I asked why he connects his departure with the visit of the Turkish minister to the Soviet Union, Dianu replied that by this he wants to emphasize the friendly relations that exist between Turkey and Romania, and his departure could be negatively assessed both in Turkey and in the Soviet Union.

A. Lavrentiev

Wua rf, f 06. On. I, l 14, d 153, l. 97-99.

**Record of the conversation of the secretary general of the cc CPSU (b)  
Stalin and the people's commissioner of foreign affairs of the USSR  
V. M. Molotov with the minister of foreign affairs of Turkey  
Saracoglu \***

October 1939 top secret

Comrade Molotov explained in a few words the reason for the delay in the negotiations.

**Saracoglu** — when I saw the results of the work of the Soviet government in recent days, I understood the reasons for the delay in negotiations. At the same time, I acknowledge the honor that has befallen my lot to continue the negotiations in the presence of comrade Stalin.

**Comrade Molotov**- now let's get down to business. We got acquainted with the draft Anglo-French-Turkish mutual assistance pact. We also carefully tried to study the articles of this treaty and came to the conclusion that the purpose of the entire document as a whole is not entirely clear to us, that is, **against whom** exactly the pact of mutual assistance concluded by Turkey with England and France will be directed. **We would like to know to what extent** Turkey is bound by the need to conduct these negotiations with both British and the French, how far Turkey has gone in these negotiations. We would also like to know to what extent the Turkish government **considers it obligatory** for itself to conclude this pact with the British and French, and whether it would not be better not to conclude this pact. The present situation and conditions are different from the situation and conditions that took place in the spring when negotiations began (about this pact). All of this interests us **for the following reason**: is it possible that a moment may come when **Turkey finds itself in a position unfriendly towards the USSR**, especially since (we) have symptoms of such anxiety.

**Saracoglu** - I will gladly answer your questions. However, won't comrade Molotov be able to tell me something about the Soviet-Turkish mutual assistance pact?

**Comrade Molotov** - We respond to this question dependent on your answer to my question; Will there be confirmation of the existing pact or will there be something else, like a consultation? In addition, before answering Saracoglu's question about the pact of mutual assistance between the USSR and Turkey, we want to get clarification from the minister of foreign affairs; **against whom can this pact be concluded?** We are interested in this if only because there are no signs now that would speak of Italy's intention to oppose Turkey. Hence, only Bulgaria remains. So, **who will our mutual assistance pact be directed against?** We are interested in these questions.

**Saracoglu** - Now I will try to answer the questions posed by comrade Molotov. The draft pact that we have handed \*\* is clear enough and, in any case, it is in the interests of the Turkish government to make it clear. Against whom are the Turkish-English and Turkish-French mutual assistance pacts directed, which have already been initialed and will be signed, against whom are these pacts directed? **The text of the documents explicitly states** that they are not directed against anyone in particular, but at the same time directed **against any aggressor**, with the provision that **these pacts cannot be used against the USSR**. We have already reached the signing of the pacts. Of course, many changes have taken place on earth during this time. However, as far as Turkey's security is concerned, no change has occurred in this matter. In any case, the obligations assumed by Turkey, England and France were taken into account **in the event** that a war broke out in the Mediterranean Sea or in the Balkans. I don't think that it would be possible for Turkey not to sign pacts with Britain and France. As for the possibility of non-signing the pacts with Britain and France in the event that these pacts have already been initialed, I personally cannot say anything definite. However, if these pacts are signed, then we can hardly refuse them.

If you don't mind, then I would like to tell you the history of the negotiations. When the German ultimatum was presented to Romania, the British asked the Turkish government what the latter thought to do if the ultimatum turned into aggression. After two days, talk about the ultimatum was dropped, and it was no longer talked about. Later, the



Albanian question arose, and then the threat of Corfu. In this connection the British asked us again what we intend to do. **We informed the Soviet government** of the British inquiries and instructed our representative in Moscow to ask what the USSR was thinking of doing. 3-4 days later, England made us an official offer. We replied that our position would depend on a number of circumstances, but along the way, we set the following as mandatory conditions:

- 1) **participation of the Soviet Union in the pact;**
- 2) limited area of the pact;
- 3) economic assistance to Turkey from England.

In the latter case, we had in mind our close economic ties with Germany, which would naturally reduce its purchases from Turkey.

**England agreed to our terms.** We also noted with satisfaction that the Soviet Union, concluding a non-aggression pact, **puts Turkey's participation in this pact as the main condition.** At this time, comrade Potemkin paid a visit to Ankara, where they talked about various eventualities. Turkey planned to conclude a pact with Britain and France, if at the same time the Soviet Union also concludes an agreement with the British and French. It meant that [that] if England and France did not come to an agreement with the USSR, they would begin negotiations on the possibility of concluding a black sea pact. If it was not possible to carry out this too, **then Turkey was ready to conclude a bilateral agreement with the USSR.**

Then Saracoglu recalled our first negotiations with Turkey on a mutual assistance pact, about the issues that were raised by the plenipotentiary envoy Terentyev, and Turkish answers to these questions, and reproduced briefly the last statement of Terentyev, made in accordance with the directive of comrade Molotov regarding the common language.

“after all this, we have proposed to you the well-known draft of a mutual assistance pact containing three articles. Then came an invitation from the Soviet government to come to Moscow as a minister of foreign affairs in order to agree here on everything related to the

conclusion of a pact of mutual assistance. Coming here from Ankara, I retained the conviction that the Soviet government was ready to conclude such a pact with Turkey.

**Comrade Molotov** - we answered you: "come to Moscow, and here the question of the mutual assistance pact will be settled."

**Saracoglu** - that's right. I have finished with the history of our negotiations with the British.

In my opinion, the Soviet-Turkish pact interests not only us, but also our friends, that is, the USSR. Even taking into account the 4th article of the Soviet-German non-aggression pact, I still think that there is no obstacle to the signing of the treaty between the USSR and Turkey. I think that the Soviet-Turkish mutual assistance pact meets the interests of both sides as a peace pact. The pact will be an instrument of peace also **because there is a pro-Soviet clause in our agreement with the British**, and a similar clause, apparently, will be recorded in the Soviet-Turkish mutual assistance pact.

I would not like to develop in front of you the thesis about the benefits of a pact between our countries, because you are better than anyone and, in any case, know the international situation better than me.

**Comrade Molotov** - against whom will this Soviet-Turkish pact be directed? We cannot conclude a pact against Germany, against Italy — she is an ally of Germany, against Bulgaria, but the eye does not threaten Turkey!

**Saracoglu** - I will answer with a question. If Germany or Italy comes to the doors of Turkey, what position will the Soviet Union take in relation to Turkey? We think that this will not be indifferent to the USSR.

**Comrade Molotov** - it is true that it is not indifferent. But in reality, aggression against Turkey is **out of the question**. Italy not only does not threaten Turkey, but, on the contrary, withdraws its troops from the Dodecanese.

**Saracoglu** - this is true.

**Comrade Molotov** - Bulgaria is not capable of threatening Turkey.

**Saracoglu** - if Germany is such a country as you portray it, or if Italy will not do anything bad to Turkey, then why are you asking - to conclude a pact between the USSR and Turkey?

We, however, have doubts about the sincerity of Germany and Italy.

Why, finally, not allow such a possibility: the desire of England and France to attack Turkey, if not today, then tomorrow? Our pact, not being directed against any country, will at the same time have a general character, and then **Turkey and the Soviet Union can be guaranteed against a common eventuality.**

**Comrade Molotov** - we think that the Turkish-English and Turkish-French pacts impose many obligations on Turkey, which should bear responsibility even for Romania and Greece, but especially for Romania. All these issues should be resolved only by Turkey, and if the Turkish government does not consider it possible for itself to retreat from the Anglo-Turkish pact, then we should agree in the form Saracoglu explained to the Plenipotentiary in Ankara: **we are talking about the "Soviet reservation" in Anglo -Franco-Turkish pact**, which should fix that Turkey's obligations under the Anglo-Turkish and Franco-Turkish pacts lose their force immediately **if Britain and France oppose the USSR.**

**Comrade Stalin** — the **Turks did not ask me**, but if they asked me, **I would not advise them to agree** to the conclusion of the Anglo-Turkish and Franco-Turkish pacts. **Of course, Turkey needs** both England and France as states with a large fleet. Turkey is considered a Mediterranean power. What England and France should have given the Turks in the Mediterranean and Aegean seas (**in particular, the return of the islands**), the USSR could not give Turkey now. Therefore, **I fully understand the intentions of the Turks** to use the contradictions between England and France, on the one hand, and Italy, on the other, in order to get what Turkey needs in the Mediterranean for this and to protect their interests in the Dodecanese. **It is right.** And only in this way can you get the islands. Up to this point, Turkey is the winner. **Next comes the complication.** As for the Balkans, Greece and Romania were attached to Turkey. Here Turkey can give more to the

British and French, but not vice versa. I think, as if , because of these burdens which Turkey took upon itself in the Balkans, **the Turks and I did not have a misunderstanding**, especially because of Bulgaria. The help with funds and loans given by the British, in my opinion, is worth less than the troops sent by Turkey. The situation in which Turkey finds itself unleashes everything on the continent: whether Bulgaria moved, whether the Hungarians attacked the Romanians, whether Italy attacked Greece - **the Turks must get involved in the war**. Or there was a complication between the USSR and Romania because of Bessarabia - we do not think to attack the Romanians, but we will not give Bessarabia as a gift - **again a conflict**. In my opinion, Romania is like Poland: as she grabbed a lot of land, so did Romania. Whoever contacts Romania with mutual assistance must keep a sword at the ready: Hungary is here, and maybe someone else is not profitable for Turkey.

This **is one group of questions that confuses us**. And that is why we believe that these points, that is, the first and second points of your pact with the British, would not have been better.

**There is also a group of questions that puts us in a difficult position**. Events have their own logic: we say one thing, but events go the other way. We divided Poland with Germany, England and France did not declare war on us, but it may be. We have no pact of mutual assistance with the Germans, but if the British and French declare war on us, we will have to fight them. **What will this contract look like?** This is what is new, this is where the logic of events is felt.

Mr. Saracoglu can reply that we have a reservation of the order that Turkish commitments will expire or **that Turkey will be neutral**. Then we will have to make a reservation that **if Turkey gets involved in the conflict**, then our pact will lose its force. We will not oppose Germany. **What then remains of the pact? Nothing**. Do we want to conclude a pact with the Turks? **We want. Are we friends of Turkey? Yes**. But there are circumstances that I spoke about and which turn the pact into a piece of paper. Who is to blame for the turn of affairs unfavorable for concluding a pact with Turkey? **None**. Circumstances, development of events. Polesha's action played its role. The British and French, especially the British, did not want an agreement with us,

believing that they could do without us. If there are guilty persons, then we are also guilty - we did not foresee all this.

**Saracoglu** - first of all, I must declare that I have a commission from Ismet Inonu: if I manage to see comrade Stalin, then convey to him that Ismet retains unforgettable feelings and the best of the impressions he got from his visit to the Soviet Union and from his meetings with comrade Stalin.

**Comrade Stalin** — I would like to ask you to thank the president for the good memory of us. How is Ismet's health?

**Saracoglu** - he feels good to your words that Turkey did not ask for your opinion ...

**Comrade Stalin** — (remark) —it is not necessary to ask. This is not a rebuke.

**Saracoglu** - can I, Saracoglu, understand the words of comrade Stalin in such a way that if the treaty between Turkey and England were drawn up as comrade Stalin advises, there would be no obstacles to the conclusion of a Soviet-Turkish pact of mutual assistance?

**Comrade Stalin** — certainly.

**Saracoglu** - but if we draw up our pact differently, without technical omissions, what to do?

**Comrade Stalin** - but this is **not a technical mistake**. If Saracoglu recalls, several years ago we had a correspondence with the Turkish government at the time when Turkey concluded the Balkan pact, the Turks somehow stipulated to defend Romania and Bessarabia, how did this end? But this is not a technical question.

**Saracoglu** — we did not take on obligations to protect the external borders of the Balkan countries, and even a special Soviet clause was made.

**Comrade Stalin** - but it was not, it seems, officially recorded?

**Saracoglu** - no, it was written down. Greece made a reservation that it would not oppose Italy, and Turkey made a Soviet reservation. The Balkan pact is a guarantee of the internal borders of the Balkan countries. If Romania had to fight against the USSR, the obligations of the Balkan pact would be invalid. Our pact with Britain, rightly, says that Turkey will defend Romania and Greece if anyone attacks these countries. But if, as a result of the conflict over Romania, Turkey should have opposed the USSR, **then Turkey will not agree to this**, which is provided for by the Soviet clause. We regard the Soviet clause as a substitute for the general conclusion of a mutual assistance pact that was supposed at one time.

**Comrade Stalin** - I think that the Soviet-Turkish clause follows from the 1925 pact. We are also obliged to make a corresponding reservation, and we will.

**Saracoglu** - we considered it our duty to introduce a reservation arising from our non-aggression pact with you. What will be Turkey's position in the event of a war between Britain and France against the USSR? When Soviet troops entered Poland, I invited the British and French ambassadors to my place and advised their governments not to push the Soviet Union into a military agreement with Germany, and also not to create such moments for Turkey in relations with England and France that would have put Saracoglu in Moscow into a difficult position. However, **if a war breaks out**, Turkey will remain neutral. I am also sure, as comrade Stalin thinks, that Britain and France did not want to conclude an agreement with the USSR. However, now, under the influence of a cruel lesson, **I am convinced that the British and French are inclined to come to terms with the Soviet Union**. The Soviet-Turkish pact can resolve all misunderstandings. It could be a harbinger of other broader agreements that are important not only for Turkey, but also for affairs of the world. We are talking about an amicable agreement with Britain and France.

**Comrade Stalin** - despite our doubts, does Saracoglu think that a pact can be concluded with us?

**Saracoglu** - yes, this is my conviction.

**Comrade Stalin** - is it difficult to change anything in the Turkish-English and Turkish-French pacts?

**Saracoglu** - if a conflict arises between the USSR and Romania, Turkey remains on the sidelines. I agree to make a reservation about this. If the Soviet government says that any action by Turkey can be regarded by our friends as an unfriendly action, then Turkey will refrain from this.

As for the reservation, **if something adequate is proposed by the USSR**, then he, Saracoglu, will accept it. This reservation is contained in the general reservation principle. The British themselves took the initiative to introduce a reservation, from which it follows that Turkey may refuse to help Romania if this latter could cause a conflict.

**Comrade Stalin** - when you are dealing with the French and the British, **you need to remember that** these are people **who fulfill their obligations only when it is beneficial to them**, and do not fulfill their obligations when it is not beneficial to them. Example: Czechoslovakia, Poland, etc.

**Saracoglu** - this is true.

**Comrade Stalin** — couldn't article 3 be transferred to the category of consultations? Turkey would have free hands.

**Saracoglu** - we thought that by introducing the reservation, **we obliged our partners** to reckon with every Soviet proposal. If the USSR considered something inconvenient for itself, then we would have to reckon with it.

**Comrade Stalin** - this is inconvenient: the obligations under article 3 automatically come into effect.

**Saracoglu** - why can't we achieve the goal we need by concluding a pact with you?

**Comrade Stalin** - we have no pacts with Bulgaria, but we feel sorry for the Bulgarians. We mean if Bulgaria itself does not go against the Turks. It would be good to write down a clause about Bulgaria and Romania in our mutual protocol. For example, if Bulgaria does not attack itself, then it should not be beaten. If the Turks manage not to fulfill

paragraph 3, then we will welcome it. But **it is best to replace it with a consultation.**

**Saracoglu** - as for the Romanian clause, this document already exists. However, if Italy attacks us or if Bulgaria attacks any of the Balkan countries, then we will have to fight.

**Comrade Stalin** - if Bulgaria opposes Turkey, **then beat her.** But why should Bulgaria be beaten in other cases? I would prefer to translate the 3rd article into an advisory one.

**Saracoglu** - in Romania, you can. But Greece is our vital issue.

**Comrade Stalin** - When was it decided to hand over the Dodecanese to Italy?

Saracoglu answers - Provides historical information.

**Comrade Stalin.** - so, the translation is not going to the consultation?

**Saracoglu** - how about Greece?

**Comrade Stalin** - it would be good too.

**Saracoglu** - impossible. The occupation of Greece is tantamount to the occupation of Turkey.

**Comrade Stalin** - all the same, the Turks will have to fight, and the British will help will not come to you. If the Greeks give the islands to the Turks, then help is needed.

**Saracoglu** — we are not asking for an island.

**Comrade Stalin** — the islands must be demanded. **They are located at the exit to the sea. Your situation is difficult.** We also had this situation. England guarantees, and because of Poland we are at war.

**Saracoglu** - Italy will not go to Greece because of Greece. Greece is a bridge to attack Turkey.

**Comrade Stalin** - what does Italy want from Turkey?



**Saracoglu** - Italy has not exactly formulated, but always talks about the roman empire. The fortification of the rocky islands is directed against Turkey.

**Comrade Stalin** — Italy needs Egypt.

**Saracoglu** - maybe, but Egypt is now in firmer hands

**Comrade Stalin** - doesn't Saracoglu consider it possible to ask Ankara about Greece - for a consultation?

**Saracoglu** - but without adding anything, what do you give?

**Comrade Stalin** - well, let's say, a pact of mutual assistance in the event of an attack directly on Turkey in the straits and the black sea, without the Balkans, and consultation if something arises in the Balkans.

**Saracoglu** - when they talk about the Balkans, does European Turkey belong to the Balkan countries?

**Comrade Stalin** - yes.

**Saracoglu** - and if there is an attack in Thrace, **will it be covered by a guarantee of assistance?**

**Comrade Stalin** - yes.

**Saracoglu** - this is not only against Bulgaria, but against any state. We are afraid of Bulgaria if it unites with anyone.

**Comrade Stalin** - Bulgaria wants only Dobruja and, perhaps, Dodeagach.

**Saracoglu** - I would ask you to formulate everything concerning the pact with you.

**Comrade Molotov** - the reservation must be made in the spirit of the message of the Plenipotentiary, i.e., **Turkey's obligations to Britain and France immediately lose their force** in the event of Britain and France coming out against the USSR.

**Saracoglu** - yes, the pact is inactive during the conflict between Britain, France, on the one hand, and the USSR, on the other.

What will happen if Germany moves towards Turkey?

**Comrade Molotov** – We will not support Turkey if **she opposes Germany**. But if **Germany opposes** Turkey, we will oppose.

**Comrade Stalin** - I understand the reservation so that if a conflict arises, Turkey will be neutral. But Turkey does not break with the British and French **but helps them in other places**.

**Saracoglu** - no, this is out of the question, **I accept your additions to the Soviet reservation**.

I will report to my government on two issues of principle and receive instructions in this regard from Ankara:

1) the commitment undertaken by Turkey to assist Romania and Greece is transferred to the advisory part and

2) **your additions to the Soviet clause** that for the duration of the conflict between Britain, France, on the one hand, and the USSR, on the other, Turkey's obligations are losing their force.

As soon as I receive an answer, I will immediately inform you about it in order for us to continue negotiations.,

Avp rf, f. 0745, on. 14, n 32, d. 3, l. 75-93.

**Telegram of the plenipotentiary representative of the USSR in Turkey A.V. Terentyev to the people's commissariat of foreign affairs of the USSR**

October 26, 1939 out of line. Top secret

Today I visited Saracoglu and posed a number of questions to him in connection with the signing of the Anglo-French-Turkish agreement. Saracoglu repeated much of what he said in Moscow. This time he said that the pact had been initialed even before he left for Moscow and that the signing of the treaty had been postponed only because of the negotiations that were to take place between the Turkish foreign minister of affairs and leaders of the Soviet government. It was also decided that if it is possible to conclude a Soviet-Turkish agreement on mutual assistance, then at the same time Saracoglu in Moscow and Saydam in Ankara will sign, respectively, pacts between Turkey and the USSR and between Turkey, England and France. The minister explains the signing of the pact in Ankara before Saracoglu's return from Moscow by the fact that there was no need to hear his report on the Moscow talks in advance, since he sent daily exhaustive telegrams and widely informed his government about everything. "since I, being in Moscow, did not conclude a pact with the USSR on behalf of Turkey, then, consequently, the trilateral agreement in Ankara was signed by Saydam, without waiting for my return." I asked Saracoglu if the Turkish government had begun to study the documents that had been officially handed over to the foreign minister, comrade Molotov. Saracoglu replied that the Turkish government is currently studying Soviet proposals. "however, if the government of the USSR insists on accepting the German reservations, then we will hardly be able to discuss your proposals. We will not accept this reservation, since otherwise the value of the Soviet-Turkish pact would have been zero. If the Soviets do not support us either against Italy or against Germany, then, consequently, the Soviets will not give us anything. " turning to the question that in the Anglo-French-Turkish agreement, article 3 of the treaty and the Soviet reservations remained in the form in which they were stated in the draft submitted to Saracoglu to comrade Molotov, the minister of foreign affairs told me that if Turkey and the

USSR will be able to conclude a pact of mutual assistance between themselves in the future, then Saracoglu will try to put before the British and French the question of changing article 3 and the Soviet reservation, which can be formulated as it was written by the hand of comrade Stalin. "if we agree with you on all points of the future pact, then I will declare to the British and French, since we have already come to an agreement on changing article 3 of the treaty and Soviet reservations, then, consequently, concluding a pact of mutual assistance with the USSR, it will be necessary to make corresponding changes to the existing Anglo-French-Turkish agreement. Although this is just my personal opinion, I think the British and French will agree with this. " I asked Saracoglu what exactly would be the fulfillment of Turkey's obligations under the Anglo-French-Turkish pact if Romania finds itself in a state of armed conflict with any state and if Britain and France try to pass through the straits to help Romania. Saracoglu answered the following: "if it is specifically about the German-Romanian conflict, then I can answer you immediately. As for the Soviet-Romanian conflict, I must get an answer from the government. " then he immediately caught himself and added: "tomorrow I will give you the answer of the government on one and the other case, if we had to face the fact of joint assistance to Romania." referring to the question of our assessment of the agreement concluded by Turkey with Britain and France, I, on your instructions \*, conveyed the following to Saracoglu: "the Soviet government believes that the conclusion of this treaty without the adoption of the amendments we proposed is a risky business for Turkey and the Soviet government cannot lay hands on this case. " Saracoglu twice asked me to repeat these words, wrote them down and said, the Soviet government at one time approved our intentions to conclude a pact. Potemkin spoke about this in Ankara. It would be necessary that you tell me about this before my departure for Moscow. However, this is a matter of the past, we will now work for the future. In my opinion, - he continued further, - you should not have told me about this now, until I gave you my government's answer on the most important question that you asked me, that is, what will be the position of Turkey in the event of an armed conflict between Romania and any state. If I report to the council of ministers that the Soviet Union

cannot lay its hands on this matter, that is, to the Anglo-French-Turkish agreement, then a bad atmosphere will immediately be created. A minute later, Sarajoglu added that, "in fact, he was already told about this in Moscow in the same spirit."

In conclusion, Saracoglu asked me to thank the Soviet government for the hospitality that was shown to him in Moscow as a representative of the Turkish government, and added that "regardless of any political, diplomatic and military situation that may occur", he, Saracoglu, will remain my personal friend. This phrase, in my opinion, makes a lot of sense, although, quite naturally, I could not ask Saracoglu what this phrase means.

Terentyev wua rf. F. 059. On 1, I 293, d 2028, l 256-260.

**Telegram of the plenipotentiary representative of the USSR in Turkey A.V. Terentyev to the people's commissariat of foreign affairs of the USSR**

October 27, 1939 out of line. Top secret

Today Saracoglu invited me to the ministry of foreign affairs and read the following statement from his notebook:

"1. We were sincere friends of the Soviets, and we are their sincere friends today. We ardently wish (and on the second reading he added "and we are sure") to remain sincere friends.

2. In order to overcome the serious difficulties that arose in the Moscow negotiations, comrade Stalin reminded me that the difficulties that had taken place during the conference in Montreux, 251 were eliminated by Ismet's personal intervention, and comrade Stalin asked Saracoglu to resort to personal intervention of ismet. Then I said that it was my duty to fulfill this wish of comrade Stalin and I would write to Ankara. I wrote about it. As expected by comrade Stalin, ismet personally intervened and posed a question to the British and French about accepting comrade Stalin's phrase under the Soviet clause and about changing article three. I personally thought it would be impossible to get the consent of the British and French, but they agreed.

After that, Ankara thought that the Soviet-Turkish pact would be concluded, but the pact could not be concluded, since two other difficulties, which I intended to resolve, in the presence of comrade Stalin were again put on the agenda of negotiations, and thus the projected the pact could not be concluded. Nevertheless, we have not lost hope of concluding a pact, but only on condition that the question of concluding a bilateral agreement is raised, since there is already an international convention, and provided that a reservation in favor of Germany is not added. Before leaving, I asked Saracoglu if it was already possible to draw with certainty the conclusion that the minister reported to his government on the merits of two documents officially handed in Moscow to minister comrade Molotov regarding the Bosphorus strait and the German reservation, which the Turkish government was supposed to study, and that Saracoglu's reply about

the unconditional unacceptability of our proposals is the final resolved response of the Turkish government. The minister replied: "quite right."

I reminded Saracoglu that he had promised me, during the last conversation, after consulting with his government, how the Turkish government intends to interpret the Soviet reservations included in the Anglo-French-Turkish agreement<sup>255</sup> and, in particular, what position Turkey will take in the matter the admission of warships, auxiliary ships and transports with troops and weapons, which Britain and France would now try to transfer to Romania in fulfillment of the guarantees given to it. Saracoglu replied that in this case, Turkey will scrupulously implement the Montreux convention. Speaking about the threat of military danger that may arise in the Balkans, I reminded Saracoglu of the word spoken to him in Moscow by comrade Stalin that anyone who is closely associated with Romania should always keep his sword ready. Saracoglu asked me: does the Soviet Union have any evidence that Romania is facing the fact of an imminent conflict with any country? I replied that it would be more convenient for Saracoglu to ask his allies - the British and the French, who, while giving guarantees to the Romanians and inviting Turkey for help, themselves believe that Romania could become a hotbed of military danger, at least as a result of a conflict with Hungary, Bulgaria or any other country. Saracoglu replied that the British and French had given this guarantee 6-7 months ago. To this I noticed that this all the more confirms the correctness of our point of view. Then there was no war in Europe, but now a European war is raging, in which just those two states that gave guarantees to Romania are participating. The desire of Britain and France, in the conditions of neutrality of Turkey and Romania, to transfer troops and military materials across the straits, will undoubtedly create a threat to the peaceful situation in the Balkans. Saracoglu said that if such eventualities become a reality, then we can be sure that the Turks will consult with the USSR. I pointed out the rapidly developing course of events to Saracoglu and added that it may happen that when a war breaks out, it will be too late to consult on certain general measures. Therefore, the Turkish government, taking into account both the fact of the European war and the fact that neutral Turkey has concluded a treaty of mutual assistance with the belligerent

Britain and France, could now tell us how concretely the Soviet reservations will be implemented in what position the Montreux convention will operate under the neutrality of Turkey itself. Saracoglu replied that it is very difficult to foresee all this now. It may happen that the USSR, Greece, Turkey will also be in danger. Then we will try to find common ground with you. Consequently, we cannot at the moment say anything about certain events that could unfold in the Balkans, and about the specific application of the Anglo-French-Turkish pact. I said that, based on Saracoglu's answers, one can come to a conclusion about the intention of the British and French to actively send military materials and even military units to the Balkans, in particular to Romania, we left our draft Soviet-Turkish pact in Moscow. If Moscow sends us another counter-project, then we are ready to study it with benevolence, always having the firm conviction that in this way we will not fail to arrive at results that satisfy both sides.

### 3. The Montreux convention will be applied scrupulously. "

All this through the straits, and the Turkish government, without specifically answering the question of whether or not it will let commercial ships with military materials into the black sea, limit itself only to a statement that at the right time it will consult with the government of the USSR. Saracoglu replied that Bulgaria is still receiving weapons from different sides, and in particular aircraft. It is very possible that this is directed against Turkey or against Romania and Yugoslavia. However, Saracoglu continued, the countries are neutral and in relation to the straits apply the provisions of the Montreux convention providing for peacetime. As long as none of the black sea states is at war, including Turkey, we will fully and scrupulously apply the Montreux convention. Turkey is now applying the peacetime regime to the straits. We have entered into our pact a reservation regarding the USSR, which will make us neutral in the event of a conflict between you, on the one hand, and the British and French, on the other. If we had agreed to conclude a pact with you with the inclusion of German reservations, then in fact we would have nullified our pact with Britain and France, since this pact means Italy and Germany.



Then I asked Saracoglu about the detention of our steamer Svaneti by the British warship. I have transmitted this part of the conversation to you in a separate telegram.

After I got up and said goodbye to Saracoglu, he told me the following: "when difficulties arose in Moscow during our negotiations, then Stalin asked me to write to ismet so that the latter, by his personal intervention, would eliminate them. I also ask you to write to Moscow and I think that the current difficulties will be resolved thanks to the personal intervention of comrade Stalin. " I replied that I would bring Saracoglu's request to the attention of my government, but at the same time I pointed out that the negative response of the Turkish government to both Soviet proposals could hardly be met favorably in Moscow. I reminded Saracoglu of the words of comrade Molotov that the conclusion of the Soviet-Turkish pact of mutual assistance is inextricably linked with the Turkish government's acceptance of the proposals made in Moscow by the Soviet] government. The persistent refusal of Saracoglu to talk about the strait's regime was regarded by the [Soviet] government] as a fact that naturally worries us. This alertness after what Saracoglu just told me, that is, after the Turkish government refused to accept our proposals, not only does not decrease, but, on the contrary, it can increase. I added that when the war breaks out, it will probably be too late to consult, and then the Soviet Union will independently take the necessary measures to protect its security. Saracoglu reiterated that [that] everything that specifically concerns the USSR and Turkey, in the presence of friendship between the two countries, can be quite calmly resolved. I replied that friendship is friendship, but at a time like this, it is not harmful to fix something concretely in separate documents.

Finally, I asked Saracoglu how true were the reports that Britain was providing Turkey with a £ 60 million loan. Saracoglu replied: "in principle, we have agreed on a loan, but the newspapers are somewhat exaggerating the amount. It is expressed in approximately 40-45 million pounds. The British have already supplied us and are supplying materials, in particular aircraft. This is being done while still in a peaceful environment. In the event of war, of course, it will not be about

60 and not about 80 million pounds, and the amounts are much larger. Experts are working on this now. " the conversation ended there.

Saracoglu again asked me to convey the phrase he had said regarding the fact that comrade Stalin would personally intervene and remove the difficulties that had arisen.

In connection with a number of new points that were expressed by Saracoglu in his conversation with me, please indicate whether, regardless of this, I should now meet with ismet, or if I will receive additional instructions from you about a special conversation with ismet \*.

Terentyev

Wua rf, f 059. On 1, n 293, d 2028, l 263-270

**Letter of the plenipotentiary representative of the USSR in Turkey  
A.V. Terentyev to the people's commissioner for foreign affairs of the  
USSR V. M. Molotov**

November 6, 1939

Top secret

It is now known for sure that the initiation of the Anglo-French-Turkish mutual assistance pact<sup>255</sup> took place in Ankara on September 19. This action was carried out not only with the consent of Inonu, but at his direct insistence. He deliberately decided to bind Turkey with obligations to the British and French even before Saracoglu had to leave for Moscow. By initiation of the pact, the Turkish government wanted to present Moscow with a fait accompli and thereby harmonize the alleged Soviet-Turkish agreement with the obligations assumed by Turkey under the pact with Britain and France.

Ankara kept abreast of all the negotiations in Moscow not only England and France, but also informed Romanians and Greeks. I know the fact when the Romanian ambassador Stoica, after another conversation with Saydam, who was then performing the duties of the minister of foreign affairs, said to one of his colleagues: "Moscow is threatening us." merit also noteworthy is the statement of the journalist Ebaziyazade, who said the following: "England and France were well aware that we were not doing anything against them, because we informed them about all phases of the negotiations. On our decisions, we received their consent, and even more, we played the role of just an intermediary between Britain and France and the Soviet Union. Thus, we were willing to provide a service in establishing an agreement between the two parties." it is hardly possible to say more clearly about the position of the Turks. It is clear that statements of this kind were the result of the relevant information sent to Saracoglu from Moscow and which here in extremely condensed tones was transmitted by the Turkish government to representatives of the allied states.

Ismet, who has valued Soviet-Turkish friendship for many years, has recently completely joined the channel of Anglo-French politics and, together with the anglophile clique of such characters as Saracoglu,

Fethi Okyar and Kazim Ozalp, is now acting in the country at the direct behest of London. The British are persistently and quite actively working here in the direction of politically separating Turkey from the Soviet Union. They are driving the idea into the heads of the leaders of the Ankara government that the USSR, which until recently stood aloof from international events, is now beginning to play a huge role in the field of international relations. The Turks are frightened by the fact that expansionist sentiments are allegedly developing in the Soviet Union, which once guided the policy of Peter I. That is why, the British say, now, more than ever, the question of Soviet-Turkish relations arises in all its breadth, for in its development "the USSR, undoubtedly, will try to realize his cherished dream - to seize the straits and make the Black Sea an internal lake".

From all this, Turkey's new allies are forcing the Ankara government to conclude that if Turkey wants to remain independent, then it must be on the side of the British and French, "for none other than the British will be able to resist the Soviets." The British also frighten the Turks by the fact that the Soviet Union allegedly intends to take away the regions of Kars and Ardahan from them, thereby provoking the creation of the eastern front. The British persuade the Turks that if an Anglo-Soviet clash ever takes place, from which the British emerge as a defeated country, "then this will also be a defeat for Turkey. That is why, inciting Ankara, the Anglo-French advisers to the Turkish government are forcing it to reject "any claims of the Soviet Union to establish control over the straits regime, for this control will already mean limiting Turkey's sovereignty."

The work of the British and French in Turkey, as I have already said, is not limited only to tearing this country away from the Soviet Union, but Britain and France are significantly helping the Turks financially. They persuade Ankara not to worry about the fate of Turkish agricultural exports, promising to fill the gap after Germany's withdrawal from the local market. At the same time, however, as we learned, as one of the main conditions, the British put forward the demand for the devaluation of the Turkish lira so that British exporters have the opportunity to buy local goods here. A commercial agreement was

signed between England and Turkey on the basis of 100% tokas, that is, the Turks will receive 100% currency in England for the goods sold by Turkey, and vice versa, for the goods sold by the British in Turkey, the latter must pay only mottos. In accordance with this agreement, the British will pay the Turks world prices for the goods they buy from them, and the difference between these world prices and market prices will be paid to Turkish sellers from the cash desk of the state bank. To pay for the 'export premium, Turkey receives a special loan from England in the amount of 10 million pounds.

In principle, the Anglo-Turkish negotiations on a loan of 45 million British pounds have been completed. According to another, perhaps the most probable version, the loan will be increased to 62 million pounds. The Turkish government will receive 15 million pounds from the British in gold bullion. 60 million the loan is distributed as follows: 10 million allocated to pay export premiums; £ 10 million to cover extraordinary budgetary expenditures and expenditures related to army mobilization; 20 million will be spent on the purchase of equipment and 20 million pounds - for the implementation of fortifications. This latter case refers to the equipping of the ports in Chatalgazy, Trebizond, Cesme and many works in central Anatolia.

Many facts suggest that the Turks received three wagons of gold from them even before the signing of the loan agreement with the British, which roughly amounts to \$ 45 million, or £ 10 million. It is believed that this gold is part of the gold fund that once belonged to Poland and ended up in Turkey.

During Saracoglu's stay in Moscow, the Turkish press, undoubtedly, on the instructions of their government, extremely sparingly covered everything that was connected with the negotiations on the conclusion of a Soviet-Turkish pact of mutual assistance. Recently, the press was preparing public opinion that the agreement in Moscow would not be signed, that the Soviet Union is now occupied in the Balkans and with Germany, and that the end result of the Moscow negotiations should be a "bridge between the USSR and the countries of democracy", and Turkey in creating this the main role was assigned to the bridge. There

were notes in the press that attempts to jeopardize Turkey's obligations to Britain and France "will remain unsuccessful."

On October 17, prime minister Saydam at the parliamentary group of the Mejlis \* made an extensive statement on the Soviet-Turkish negotiations. He said the following: "from the point of view of Turkey's security, the guarantees we were given were not balanced by the commitments we were asked to sign. Moreover, the Soviet proposals could not be considered compatible with Turkish policy regarding the straits, since Turkey considers it most essential not to sign any other provisions than those arising from its general international obligations. "Saydam's statement should be regarded as an attack on the USSR, and it is at odds with the spirit of the communique published by Tass in connection with the Moscow talks to Saracoglu.

The failure of Saracoglu's mission has caused an extremely oppressive state in wide circles of the Turkish public and among the people, for the bulk of the population is afraid of losing the Soviet-Turkish friendship. To defuse the depressed mood and conceal the failure of Saracoglu's talks in Moscow, the turk [et] government [government] under a direct directive ismet Inonu, in an atmosphere of extreme haste, even before Saracoglu's return to Ankara, signed a pact with the British and French on October 19. The fact that the signing of an alliance treaty with Britain and France was done hastily is at least confirmed by the fact that shortly before that Saydam had told Von Papen about the Turkish government's intention to wait for Saracoglu's arrival and only after his detailed report on his trip to Moscow, "we will slowly resolve the issue of the Anglo-French-Turkish pact."

The signing of the pact with the British and French is dissatisfied not only among the people, but also by individual politicians. In a conversation with one of the diplomats, Shukru kaya said that Turkey could now suffer the fate of Poland. Many believe that rapprochement with the British and French is fraught with great trouble for Turkey and that the triple pact could lead it to a clash with the USSR. The guarantees provided by the Turks to Romanians and Greeks are considered to be one of the significant mistakes that the Turkish government made.

The stay in Istanbul for 3 days of two Soviet warships, the crews of which were warmly greeted by the population, gave rise to thinking that Soviet-Turkish relations are still cordial, and among the intelligentsia there was a glimmer of hope for the preservation of traditional friendship between the two neighboring countries. However, at the behest of the Turkish government and in this matter, the press hastened to cool the good mood that had appeared among the people in connection with the visit of the ships of a friendly country. Apart from short chronicle notes, no responses or articles to the stay of our red navy men in Istanbul, not a single newspaper was written.

Saracoglu returned to Istanbul on October 20 and, in a conversation with one of the deputies, proudly told him that the Anglo-French-Turkish pact would not introduce any changes in Soviet-Turkish relations because the Soviet government, "knowing about the superiority of the naval forces of England and France, in the event of their eventual appearance in the black sea, he will not want to create a conflict because of this ". In exactly the same spirit, Saracoglu made a report at the party group of the Mejlis.

The tactics of the Turkish government are clear - this is to widely declare that the Anglo-French-Turkish pact will not in any way affect the Soviet-Turkish relations, and thereby try to calm down the disgruntled part of the deputies, tied by strong threads with those circles of the Turkish public, which is cool to say the least - hostile, disposed towards the tripartite agreement.

There are many people among the thinking circles of Turkey who are perplexed by the fact that the people who are now in power in Ankara, until recently, fought against the British and French, were the best friends of the Soviet Union, from which they received help in their struggle for independence, and now forgetting everything and everyone, they went over to the side of the Anglo-French bloc. Apparently, the British were able to firmly hammer into the minds of the Turks the idea that only the Anglo-French navy could provide Turkey from any unpleasant eventuality.

I was told that the army reacts differently to the breakdown of negotiations between Turkey and the USSR and the signing of a pact with the French and British. The generals of the Turkish army, brought up on the yeast of German culture, express a desire not to completely break with Germany. The middle echelon of the officers - majors, colonels, etc. - participants in the national liberation struggle for independence are in favor of strengthening the establishment of ties with the USSR, for they well remember the assistance that the Soviet Union provided to the impoverished, devastated Turkey. The bulk of the officers, who have recently graduated from military schools and brought up on the ultrapatriotic and chauvinistic desires of modern Turkey, are hostile to the Soviet Union and declare their "readiness to go to war with anyone at any moment, including even the Soviet Union."

Pro-Soviet sentiments in military circles are based on the fact that ismet must fully agree with the Soviet Union and "accept the conditions of the latter, up to the provision of bases to Soviet warships with a pass through the territory of Turkey for the red army." "we don't want to be Poland," they say in these military circles, and these words border on the threat that if the Turkish government does not fulfill all this, then "an internal revolution may occur."

Ankara's ruling circles fueled the press to chat about the fact that the signing of the Anglo-French-Turkish pact took place almost without Moscow's knowledge and that the Soviet Union approves of this foreign policy action of the Turkish government. The Izvestia editorial of October 21 was commented by the Turks in this very spirit, with particular emphasis on the phrase which said that the Anglo-French-Turkish pact did not directly affect the interests of the Soviet Union. The appearance of the possibility of extending the negotiations between Turkey and the USSR was created. The same Saracoglu, upon arriving from Moscow at the reception of journalists, said the following: "the doors of negotiations between the two countries remain half-open," but declined to answer the question of when these negotiations would be resumed.



The press shouted laudably about the Anglo-French-Turkish pact, presenting it to public opinion as "a factor of peace and order in the Mediterranean, the middle east and the Balkans." however, many people, both from the Turkish public circles and in the diplomatic corps, regard this act of Turkey as a crazy step, which runs counter to the traditional policy of friendship between the USSR and Turkey.

In his big speech, delivered on November 1 at the opening of the regular session of the Mejlis, Ismet Inonu devoted a large section to Soviet-Turkish relations. He said the following about the Moscow negotiations: "as you know, our foreign minister, who was in Moscow as a guest of the Soviet government, had contact with him and conducted negotiations for almost three weeks. We hoped that these negotiations would end in an agreement that could be a stage ahead of the stage of happy relations that we have today with our old friend, the Soviet Union. To achieve this goal, we did everything in our power, and there was already a moment when we were convinced that success was guaranteed. However, this time it was not possible to achieve a result that, we believed, corresponded as much to the interests of the USSR as to our own interests. However, you know that friendship between the two countries rests on solid foundations. Obligations and outlines arising from the temporary necessities of the modern period should not harm this friendship. Just as we did in the past, we will continue to sincerely follow the friendly course in Soviet-Turkish relations. "

As can be seen from the quote from Ismet's speech, the Turkish president tries to present the matter in such a way that the friendship between the USSR and Turkey still remains, that it rests on solid foundations and that this friendship in the future, as well as in the past, will follow a well-established tradition. The Turks now widely use the thesis that the pact does not violate friendly relations existing with other countries and want to assure every one of their peaceful intentions and their desire to stay out of war.

During the first 2-3 days, the Turks did not comment on comrade Molotov's speech at the fifth emergency session of the supreme Soviet of the USSR. By the way, it should be noted that the Anatolian agency deleted from the text of the speech that part where it was said about

accusing us of intending to change the Montreux convention, and the section "on the reasons why Britain and France are waging an imperialist war against Germany." however, in the very last days the Turkish press has begun to comment on comrade Molotov's report, and the general tone of the press, in my opinion, should be regarded as a tone inspired by the leading circles of Ankara. So, for example, the deputy Asim in the newspaper "Vakit" on November 4 wrote the following: "if Turkey agreed to the proposal of the USSR, then the German attack against the security of Turkey would not have caused assistance from the Soviet Union, while the USSR proposed to close the straits for the fleets non-black sea powers. Given this situation, if the Soviet Union had not provided assistance to Turkey, then why should Turkey have to close the straits to those powers that would have helped her? Wouldn't it look like a person who is actively defending against an aggressor is tied hands and feet while at the same time giving the attacker freedom of action? " another journalist, MP Hussein Jahid Yalchin on the 4th wrote: "by declaring that Molotov understood clearly the policy of Turkey, he thereby expresses an erroneous opinion about the true meaning of the union agreement signed by us with the democracies, and thereby contradicts." further saying that Turkey has no intention of being drawn into the conflict and that the Ankara pact is only defensive in nature, Yalchin wrote: "we are very touched and grateful to Molotov for the friendly feelings that he shows towards us, expressing the fear that Turkey might not repent of one fine day in your behavior. To calm him down, let's say right away that we, the Turks, learned from the lessons of the past, maturely thought it over and, taking all precautions, signed this agreement and will never regret it. "

It becomes clear that the persistence that Saracoglu adhered to in my conversation with him on October 27 \*, and his reluctance to answer the question about the position of Turkey in the event that the British and French tried to navigate their military, auxiliary or commercial ships laden with troops and military materials , through the straits to the black sea. There is no doubt that the Turks will make all sorts of concessions to the British and French in this matter and, while talking about a possible consultation with the USSR, as well as their intention to remain neutral, will not get involved in a war against the USSR, they

will nevertheless close their eyes to the fact that the British and French would intend to undertake to expand the boundaries of military danger in the Balkans and the black sea.

The British are trying in every possible way to create a Balkan front<sup>264</sup> in order to strengthen their influence in the area. The fact that both the British and the French and the Turks are beginning to vigorously care for the Bulgarians deserves the most serious attention. According to the Bulgarian military attaché, the British are now actively engaged in Anti-Soviet and anti-German work in Sofia in order to attract the Bulgarians to their side as soon as possible, having achieved the inclusion of this country in the Balkan entente<sup>40</sup>.

In order to use the Balkans as a springboard for the fight against Germany and even against the Soviet Union, the British, apparently, will try or are already trying to persuade Romania to abandon Dobruja in favor of Bulgaria. Obviously, under pressure from Britain, France and Turkey, Yugoslavia has also noticeably begun to show interest in the Balkan entente in recent years. It is believed here that the Anglo-French combined forces can be sent to strike against Germany in the direction from Thessaloniki through Yugoslavia. However, such an operation could be carried out only if Bulgaria is in an alliance with the Balkan countries and with the same England and if it does not have close relations with the USSR, relying on which it could carry out its independence from England and France's foreign policy. Not only the British, but also the Turks, obviously, think to promise something to the Bulgarians in order to be calm about this Balkan area. The Bulgarian envoy to Ankara believes that the British want to take control of Bulgaria before it has finally come close to the USSR.

Fully included in the orbit of Anglo-French foreign policy, Turkey is forced to take part in the conflict, acting on the side of England and France. During the autumn and winter, the Turkish government expects to further increase its army, which now reaches 800 thousand people, and equip it at the expense of the British and French with the latest technology. During September and October, the Turks received a significant amount of equipment and war materials from their allies. Information on this matter is contradictory, but everyone agrees that

about 300 aircraft, 200 tanks, 400 guns, 300,000 rifles and many other weapons have already been delivered to Turkey.

The tactic of the Turks is to prepare for the spring in the event of an armed clash with Italy or even the Soviet Union, while chatting about peace and the preservation of neutrality. It is for this purpose that over the past two months there has been a transfer of troops to the eastern border of Turkey, that is, towards the Trans Caucasus. It is for this purpose that new units are being formed there. It was for this purpose and on this that negotiations were conducted in Ankara during the stay here of general Weygand and the British general Wavell.

The British and French promised the Turks their middle east armies of 250,000 men. It is assumed that all military units located near our border will be united by a single command and even Weygand is called as an adviser to this command. According to the most accurate information, the Turks have already sent several steamers from Istanbul to Trebizond with British and French military equipment and military materials. The Turkish general staff surrounds itself with former leaders of the counter-revolutionary organizations operating in the Soviet Union, and mainly in the trans Caucasus.

In Istanbul, military measures are also being actively carried out: houses located along the Bosphorus are registered, right up to the exit to the black sea, in order to create stationary machine-gun and artillery fire centers in them.

That is why Ismet's speech at the parliamentary session should be viewed as an attempt to hide the real state of affairs. We will closely monitor everything that is happening in this country and inform our government in a timely manner so as not to face the fact of this or that surprise in the current foreign policy situation.

Plenipotentiary of the USSR in Turkey a. Terentyev

Wua rf, f 011, on 4, p. 31, d 166, l 353—365.

**Record of the conversation of the people's commissioner for foreign affairs of the USSR V. M. Molotov with the ambassador of Germany in the USSR f. Schule n. Burg**

November 13, 1939 secret

1. At the beginning of the conversation, comrade Molotov shared the message of the Turkish ambassador. The Turkish ambassador conveyed that the Romanian government has raised the issue with Turkey on the creation of a bloc of southeastern countries with the participation of the Balkan entente<sup>4</sup> ", that is, Romania, Turkey, Yugoslavia and Greece. This bloc should be bound by a non-aggression pledge. It should enter into negotiations. With Hungary and Bulgaria to include the latter and then turn to Italy with a proposal to join this bloc. " according to the Turkish ambassador, it turns out that Gafenku hopes that England, France, Italy and Germany will allegedly take a positive view of this idea, and now Turkey wants to find out the opinion of the USSR.

Comrade Molotov conveyed to Herr Schulenburg the text of the message of the Turkish government and noted that it was desirable to know the opinion of the German government on this issue \*.

To this, Mr. Schulenburg replied that, judging by the reports of the German representatives in the Balkans, neither Hungary, nor Yugoslavia, nor Greece - and there is nothing to say about Bulgaria - have no particular desire to deal with this issue.

This is the desire of Romania. " the position of Italy, the ambassador says, is not yet known, and there are no indications from the German [government]. The ambassador promised to immediately request instructions by telegraph.

2. The ambassador inquired whether the rumors about the concentration of significant forces of Soviet troops on the Bessarabia border were true, to which comrade Molotov ironically said that he had not heard of this.

3. Then the ambassador dwelled on the question of the zones of German maritime control in the Baltic sea. The ambassador explained that the

need for the eastern border of control on the Tallinn meridian is based on the fact that, according to their information, Estonian and Latvian ships carry timber by territorial waters, then go across the bay and follow again by territorial waters in the Aland islands region, thus reaching your goal. The German [government], said Mr. Schulenburg, fully complies with the wishes of the USSR to transfer German maritime control in the Baltic to its more western part, but reserves the fundamental right to fight against military smuggling.

To this, comrade Molotov replied to the ambassador that the Soviet government not only had nothing against the fight against smuggling but sympathized with Germany in this and considered this fight absolutely necessary. The southern border of Soviet influence in the Baltic lies on the latitude of the southern border of Lithuania, and the question of the sea border is not a theoretical question, but a military question. Soviet interests in the Baltic north of the southern border of Lithuania, including Finland, must be taken into account by the German government as agreed.

The ambassador agreed with this and said that it would be done according to the wishes of the Soviet [government].

4. After that, Schulenburg asked about the Soviet-Finnish negotiations \*.

Comrade Molotov informed the ambassador, noting that the negotiations were not going well, that Britain was apparently working hard against the USSR. The Finns were offered two options from our side: 1) to lease or sell a plot of land in the Hanko area, 2) in case of unacceptability of the first proposal, to sell or exchange a number of islands east of Hanko in the Lappohja bay.

The Finns rejected both proposals. Finnish territorial concessions in the Leningrad region are completely insufficient

The rest of the questions in the Soviet-Finnish negotiations do not meet with great difficulties. Our requirements are minimal, said comrade Molotov in conclusion, we will not deviate a step from them and will ensure their implementation.

The ambassador noted that Berlin is interested in how these demands will be met, whether only by peaceful means.

To this comrade Molotov replied that it is difficult to say now, but the USSR will not deviate from its minimum requirements.

5. Further, the ambassador said that in Berlin they were a little offended by the fact that the border was changed not quite the way they wanted. To which comrade Molotov remarked that this was a trifle, the border approved on September 28, 1939, should not be shaken. People are already firmly settled, the authorities have chosen, a partial change of the border in one area will cause uncertainty and unwanted responses in other areas.

Comrade Molotov asked the ambassador to send a message by telegraph that the German [government] government should no longer insist on changing the border.

6. In connection with the question raised by Mr. Schulenburg that the chairman and vice-chairman of the border commission stayed too long in Moscow, comrade Molotov pointed out a number of shortcomings in the work of this commission (confidential protocol, imitation of political treaties) and said that there are no differences in substance and the protocol will be signed tomorrow.

7. On behalf of the German government, the ambassador said: the German [government] wants to end the war, how - it is not yet known. They consider it necessary to exert strong pressure on England. Britain and France are concentrating troops in Syria and Egypt, like the Balkan front of the last war. Turkey is ready to help them and did the same in Thrace and the Caucasus. Perhaps Amanullah and his people should have been sent to Afghanistan to put pressure on the British, but the ideal would have been a military demonstration by the USSR on the borders of Afghanistan and the Caucasus without aggressive intentions. If this turns out to be impossible, then it is advisable that the Soviet [government] not refute such rumors, if any. The aim is to divert England from preparations in the Balkans.

8. The ambassador inquired about the Bulgarian-Soviet relations and the opinion of the Soviet] government on Italian-Greek relations.

It was answered that Bulgaria is afraid of England and considers the mutual assistance pact too big for itself. It is possible that an airline will be opened between the USSR and Bulgaria.

9. When comrade Molotov asked about the opinion of the German [government] government on the international situation, the ambassador said that peace cannot be achieved without strong pressure on England. England rejected the offer of the Dutch queen and the Belgian king. Ribbentrop did not answer specifically what to do. In fact, only the fuehrer knows about this. Italy, as friends say, will do whatever it takes

10. Referring to poor communication with France, the ambassador asked about the mood in that country and received an answer from comrade Molotov that information from there was scanty and insufficient.

11. The ambassador again returned to the question of peace. In berlin, he says, they want to know Maisky's own opinion on the English hint of peace. On the one hand, chamberlain and Halifax make warlike speeches, on the other hand, they probe the possibilities of peace through the Norwegian crown prince, America, etc. In Germany, they do not believe England's peaceful intentions.

Comrade Molotov noted that Maisky did not have the impression that England was definitely talking about peace.

The ambassador asked if Mr. Molotov had in mind in his report to render assistance to Germany in the cause of peace in connection with the Soviet-German treaty, and how this assistance was conceived. Berlin wants to know about it.

On that. Molotov replied that the Soviet [government] government considers Hitler's speech the basis for peace negotiations. In the article "peace or war" England. Is branded as a warmonger. Nobody else has done anything like this. If there is a more specific reason, the latter will be taken into account. Maisky's statements are not yet specific enough.



12. Bearing in mind the possible convocation of the league of nations, the ambassador admits that representatives of the Czech Republic and Poland may speak there, which will entail undesirable broad debates, in order to avoid which, it would be necessary to agree.

To this the ambassador received an assurance that in this matter the interests of Germany and the USSR are common.

13. According to the information available to the ambassador, during the retreat, the poles took carpets and tapestries of great historical value from the Cracow castle and sent them to the east. The ambassador asked if these values were found on the territory of the USSR, to return them.

14. In conclusion, the ambassador recalled the promise of the Soviet side to provide warm clothes to the German sailors in Murmansk who are experiencing difficulties in carrying out the winter watch, and noted that it would be desirable to receive at least a third of the previously requested.

In this he is promised \*.

The reception was attended by the counselor of the German embassy, Mr. Hilger.

The conversation was recorded by Semenov

Avp rf, f. 06, on. 1, p. 1, d 4, l. 45-49.

\* see doc. 808.

**Letter of the plenipotentiary representative of the USSR in Turkey  
Terentyev to the general secretary of the VKP (B) central committee**

December 7, 1939, Top Secret

A number of facts that have taken place over the past month and a half after the signing of the Anglo-French-Turkish pact of mutual assistance<sup>255</sup> and the return of Saracoglu from Moscow clearly indicate that Turkey has completely joined the orbit of the Anglo-French foreign policy, abandoned the position of neutrality and prepares to take part in the war on the side of Anglo-French imperialism.

Speaking on November 8 in the majlis \* in connection with the ratification of the Anglo-French-Turkish pact of mutual assistance, Saracoglu called this document a "great creation", adding that the delegates of the three parties "did not quarrel or bargain with each other during the negotiations, but mutually helped to make this creation succeed. " he regards the signing of the pact of mines [isr] foreign affairs as "a turning point in world history." and further: "whatever may be said about the significance of the pact, but this agreement contributes to the cause of peace, being a product of goodwill. The true concept of this document is the beginning of a new era for us, both in the political, military and social spheres".

Speaking further about the "mutual gravitation" towards rapprochement between England, France and Turkey, Saracoglu gave a short interpretation of protocol no. 2 \*\*, portraying it as "a sign of Turkey's friendship with Russia."

Saracoglu ended his speech with the following words: "from the height of this rostrum and on your behalf, I repeat to those who still doubt it that we will be jealous of our rights and conscientious about our duty." it should be noted that these words were largely directed at the USSR.

In a special press review sent with this mail, we have detailed the assessment that was given by the Turkish press of both Saracoglu's speech and of the mutual assistance pact itself. Most of the newspapers under the directive from Ankara blatantly attacked the Soviet Union, although they tried to present their attacks in a veiled form. A striking

example is at least an excerpt from an article in the "Cumhuriyet" dated November 9: "we are not hypocritical people, whose hands shed blood, but whose lips speak of peace. Therefore, our love of peace is not false, but sincere. The malicious intentions of those dissatisfied with the pact are clear - they seem to have secret goals. The true peacekeepers and even the belligerent countries are satisfied with the pact, and among the disaffected there are seemingly peace-loving states, while in reality they are supporters of war. " there has never been such an outrageous tone in the Turkish press. Speaking about the guarantees given to Romania, the deputy of parliament Yalchin openly stated that now these guarantees have moved from the theoretical to the practical sphere.

Such statements were inspired by the press allied to the Turks and specifically by the article by Pertinax, which appeared on October 28 in the "Aerpe nouvelle". The author frankly stated that "the Anglo-French-Turkish treaty strengthened the Franco-British coalition morally, because the Ankara government took part in the cause of western democracy; now the former friend of Turkey - the USSR - is on the other side of the barricades; materially, because according to the agreement of October 19, England and France can count on the opening of the straits. " referring to art. 5 of the pact, Pertinax continued that "the convention concluded at Montreux<sup>251</sup> will have as its consequence, under modern circumstances, the expansion of Franco-British naval operations in the black sea, which Germany, based on its agreements with Moscow, wanted to consider as a supply route, avoiding any external control. "

What the Turks are still trying to keep silent about is blatantly blurted out by their allies. Both the British and the French are absolutely confident that Turkey will open the straits for their warships and armed transports in the event of any conflict in the black sea and, in particular, if Romania was involved in this conflict. ...

Various sentiments are seeping out of the circles close to the current government elite of Turkey, which basically boil down to the following: until the Soviet Union was active in the international arena, Turkey felt calm, and was taken for granted here the need to preserve Soviet-Turkish friendship. However, as soon as the USSR, especially in recent

years, took an active part in foreign policy events in Europe, among some strata of Turkey, the pro-British clique began to stir up sentiments of such an order that "the Russians returned to their previous plans for a free exit to the Mediterranean and that former fears about Russians should alert Turkey. " "

On the other hand, propaganda persistently sticks out with the aim of exalting Britain, which, they say, having no claims against Turkey, meanwhile, can help this country "interfere with the plans of both Italy and the Soviet Union." essentially, pro-English sentiment could have been noticed here a couple of years ago.

The mood of alertness fueled by the USSR did not appear the same immediately. This mood was not felt particularly acutely only because Ankara believed that the Soviet Union was busy with its internal affairs; the memory of the assistance rendered by the Soviet Union to Turkey during the period of the national liberation struggle was still fresh in my memory; it was also difficult to forget that Turkey owed its existence to the USSR, which is its powerful neighbor. All this for the time being forced the Turks to scatter rather falsely under all circumstance's assurances about the strength of the traditional friendship that exists between the two countries.

Now the situation has changed dramatically. The British, with the help of the French, apparently without much difficulty, convinced the Turks that only England and France could save Turkey from any danger that would threaten her from both the Mediterranean Sea and the Balkans. The leading role in the matter of not only rapprochement, but, in essence, the subordination of Turkish foreign policy to the wishes of the British and French are played here, as I have already indicated earlier, Fethi Okyar, Saracoglu, Kazim Ozalp and the same ismet Inonu, who is implementing in practice a clearly pro-British policy ...

The current rulers of Turkey are well aware that the mutual assistance pact signed with the British and French is unpopular in wide popular circles. This unpopularity is further increased by the fact that the Turkish people have a real feeling of friendship for the peoples of the Soviet Union, because only among the working population do they

really remember well the disinterested assistance that the Soviet Union rendered Turkey in its time in the struggle against its then enemies - England and France, who have now become Turkey's allies at the behest of the current rulers. It is among the people that you can hear talk that the government sold Turkey to the British and French for gold, for which it will pay with the blood of Turkish soldiers.

In conditions when present-day Turkey is not yet ready to actively engage in the armed conflict on the side of its allies, Ankara's leaders are trying by all means, on the one hand, to camouflage relations with the USSR and at the same time to inspire Anti-Soviet sentiments among the so-called party circles, as well as the highest and middle bureaucracy. Throughout November, the Ankara and Istanbul press periodically printed notes and correspondence emanating from foreign sources, indicating that the Soviet-Turkish negotiations were underway, that they had not stopped and that some delegates from Moscow were expected to arrive to complete these negotiations. ... All this was brought under the sauce that these negotiations would continue on the basis of the Turkish proposals.

The same form of camouflage can serve as a response to Saracoglu to the Hungarian envoy Maryasi. When asked by the latter, whether or not there are negotiations between Turkey and the Soviet Union, Saracoglu replied: "it cannot be said that there were negotiations, but constant contact is maintained. Terentyev asked me a number of questions to which I gave answer. My answers are now being studied in Moscow." all this is sheer fiction, since October 27, that is, for 40 days, I have not had any meetings or conversations with Saracoglu and, therefore, no answers to my questions are being studied in Moscow.

It follows from this that public opinion in Turkey is being systematically prepared by Ankara in the spirit that, they say, nothing special has happened in relations between the USSR and Turkey, and that Turkey's rapprochement with England and France is almost the result of positive advice that was given the government of the USSR.

The Anti-Soviet propaganda, carried out, albeit in an open form, by the current rulers of Turkey, aims to form an idea of the inevitability of a

clash between Turkey and the Soviet Union. This explains the chauvinistic statements of officials of the republican people's party and other Anti-Soviet elements that "sooner or later, but the Caucasus will be ours and the entire Muslim population will belong to Turkey." the reactionary elite, flaunting their bravery, declares that before Turkey had enemies, Italians and Bulgarians, but now Turkey, after signing a pact with the British and French, is not afraid of either one or the other, and at the same time "does not want to lag behind the Soviet Union".

Recently, the spread of all kinds of Anti-Soviet fables and provocative gossip has been especially noticeable. The press widely reprints all Anti-Soviet slander, which comes mainly from English and French sources. The same slander is also spread on the radio. As for the achievements of the Soviet Union, the newspapers are silent about this, and the Turkish radio has been completely silent about this recently.

The British, apparently, have firmly hammered into the heads of the current Turkish rulers that Turkey from now on, in alliance with England and France, is an invincible country. Statements of this kind are not at all isolated: "now we are not afraid of anyone. We have good allies, who have a lot of gold and a large navy, and we Turks are rich in spirit that no other army in the world has. "

And yet the Turkish government decided not to force events and in every possible way to avoid a clash with the USSR. However, in case such a clash turned out to be inevitable, the Turkish army would have been tasked with rapidly re-equipping and being ready to take part in one or another armed conflict by the spring. Not being properly prepared for a war with anyone, the Turks naturally refrain from a conflict with the Soviet Union, as they understand that they "can lose a lot without gaining anything." despite this, there is still a danger that the British may not ask the Turks, embarking on one or another adventure, spreading the fire of war to the Balkans and in the black sea region, and, forcing the straits, will present the Turkish government with a fait accompli. With this provision, no doubt, we will have to reckon with.

As I have already said, the main program of the Turks' actions is based on the desire to arm their army and bring it to the appropriate combat readiness by the spring of 1940. The Turks are already hastily arming themselves. In the last two or three months alone, they received from the British and French up to 300 aircraft, about 400 cannons and up to 200 tanks. Obviously, in connection with the events in Finland, the Turkish command hastily began to strengthen the Bosphorus. Now they are building concrete fortifications on both sides of the Bosphorus, where 13 11-inch guns have already been delivered. I was told that these guns, recently received from the British, seem to have been transferred from Canakkale, where they were to be installed. 16 tractor-drawn 4.5-inch guns were also sent to the Bosphorus region. In addition to these guns, there are 36 light field guns and 12 anti-aircraft artillery guns on the shores of the Bosphorus. In my last post, I have already reported to you on a number of measures that the Turks are carrying out to fortify the Bosphorus.

In this regard, the question of the passage of the straits by commercial ships armed with artillery rivets our attention. We know the fact that during the war in Spain the Turks were forced to remove the guns from the ships that belonged to the republicans and passed through the straits from the black sea to the Mediterranean into their holds. The Turks now adhere to a completely different point of view on this issue, allowing the British and French the passage of commercial ships armed with artillery. We were able to register a number of facts of this order, when British and French transports, delivering military materials for the Turks, came to Istanbul and other ports, armed with several guns.

It is very likely that the Turkish army, if the war expands to the Balkans or the middle east, will act as a barrier on its Transcaucasian borders and in Thrace in order to ensure the possibility of transferring Anglo-French troops from Syria, Palestine and Iraq through Greece and Yugoslavia for hitting southeast Germany. This point of view is especially actively adhered to by the German ambassador Von Papen, who, according to him, recommended that his government refrain for the time being from effective military action by German troops against England and France, so as not to call the British to create an eastern

front until spring. A decisive blow, in his opinion, should be inflicted on the Anglo-French army in the spring of 1940, bearing in mind that by this time Germany would be able to well arm the Bulgarian army and put it into action on its side.

As you know, over the past month and a half, British warships have been cruising in the waters of the Aegean Sea near the entrance to the Dardanelles. It is not excluded that the British warships may use the numerous Greek islands as shelters for temporary anchorage. It is known that many of these islands are completely uninhabited, and the stay of the English squadron may go unnoticed even by the Greeks. The experience of the world war showed that such a possibility is not excluded, since German submarines in those days were often based in the bays of these uninhabited islets.

To openly violate Greek neutrality in order to ensure long-term anchorage of British warships in any major Greek port, the British are now unlikely to dare, as it would be disadvantageous for both England and Greece. However, as soon as the same England recognizes, by virtue of circumstances arising from the general political situation, it is advantageous for itself to send its squadron to certain major Greek ports, she can do it at any time. Our naval attaché, comrade Rodionova, who had just arrived from Athens, informed me that the Greeks themselves recognize the possibility for the British fleet to enter Piraeus at any time and present any ultimatum to the Greeks in any form. It is clear that the Greeks will only have to obey this ultimatum and fulfill the requirements of the British.

Judging by some data, the desire of the Greek rulers is now reduced to preserving their neutrality as long as possible, because the beginning of a war in this small and poor country will cause a severe political and economic crisis.

The British still hold the Greeks tightly in their hands. The English envoy in Athens visits Metaxas at least twice a week, and a couple of months ago, in a conversation with the king, he said that England would allow food to be imported into Greece only as long as the Greeks did not violate the English anti-smuggling law. ... It is advantageous for



the British to support the food crisis that began in Greece, since by doing so they can keep the Greek government constantly in strong dependence on themselves.

It follows from all this that we must be extremely careful to monitor the maneuvers of the British in the eastern Mediterranean, as well as in the areas adjacent to the Dardanelles. I repeat again that the possibility of the passage of Anglo-French warships through the straits into the black sea is not at all excluded. As for the Turks, they would hardly want to take the path of opposing this action, and if they tried to outwardly protest, the British would still not reckon with them as allies. Personally, I am not even sure that the Turks would want to prevent the passage of the Anglo-French fleet, and, most likely, they would help facilitate the implementation of this operation.

During November, the Turkish press and public opinion made a lot of noise about the so-called Balkan problem. Quite recently, at the behest of the Ankara rulers, newspapermen shouted that the red army, after the liberation of western Ukraine and western Belarus, blocked the path for German expansion into the Balkans and that Turkey, having concluded a pact with the British and French, thereby frightened the Italians, who decided to remain neutral. Forgetting their plans to seize the western coast of Turkey. Moreover, the Turks began to flirt with the Italians, putting forward the thesis that henceforth the danger could come only from Germany and even the Soviet Union. The Turkish press widely published the Anti-Soviet comments of the Italian press on comrade Molotov's report. With a feeling of special praise, Turkish public opinion was presented with ideas of such an order that the Italians decided to counteract Soviet influence in the Balkans by creating a neutral bloc of south-eastern European countries.<sup>264</sup> some newspapers blurt out what the Turkish rulers are silent about, claiming that the British and French decided to get ahead of the Soviet Union and Germany and secretly form a bloc in the Balkans.

The idea of this bloc is not a secret: it is primarily directed against Germany and even against the Soviet Union. In a recent conversation with me, the Romanian ambassador said that the Turks are quite sympathetic to this bloc and that the sole purpose of organizing such a

bloc is to prevent the spread of the war in the east and southeast of Europe. Romanian also added that, while maintaining absolute neutrality, the bloc member states must find some measures in order to alleviate the financial and economic situation of the states of south-eastern Europe, which are experiencing great difficulties due to the war and the blockade. The idea of creating a neutral bloc comes, no doubt, from the British side. This was frankly published even in some Turkish newspapers, which emphasized that Britain, France and Turkey want to dominate the Balkans and that Turkey's cherished dream is to eliminate all external influence from the Balkans, understanding the Soviet Union and Germany by this influence.

Fulfilling the role of the clerk of Anglo-French imperialism, the Turks go out of their way to put together a bloc of southeastern countries so that this new organization could paralyze the actions of the member states of the bloc and thereby fully provide the opportunity for Britain and France to create an eastern front for the fight against Germany. The ideologues of creating a bloc see the only inconvenience in Bulgaria, which, apparently, will not enter into this combination. Naturally, when the Anglo-French army moves from Thessaloniki or Kovalı through Greece and Yugoslavia against Germany, Bulgaria, which is outside the bloc, will pose, with the help of Germany, a serious danger to the British and French. This, in fact, explains the noticeable pressure that the Turks and the British have been carrying out against the Bulgarians lately.

Acting to please their masters, the Turkish rulers are working in that direction to draw the Saidabad people into the orbit of Anglo-French influence. I learned that, at the insistence of the British, Sarajoglu worked hard to supplement the Saidabad pact "4 with a special military convention obliging afghans and Iranians, not to mention Iraqis, to act on the side of the Anglo-French if necessary. The only one who seems to have objected to the conclusion of this convention is marshal Fevzi Chakmak, who said that it would be enough for Turkey and the commitments it had undertaken in the Balkans and the Mediterranean.

The afghans turned out to be more susceptible to Anglo-Turkish pressure, while the same cannot be said about the Iranians, who

resolutely refused to conclude a military convention with Turkey and declared their intention to adhere to strict neutrality. In the circles of Turkish officers, there is talk that the Iranians allegedly told the Turks that they would never fight the Soviet Union, as they are absolutely sure that the USSR will not attack Iran. Moreover, the Turks became furious, allegedly because the Iranians informed the Soviet Union about the Turkish proposals.

The most insolent hostile Anti-Soviet position was taken by the entire Turkish press, no doubt at the behest of the Ankara rulers, on the issue of assessing the events taking place in Finland. Tass telegrams are placed in very limited numbers and then only in the backyards of newspapers. Every day, the entire press is replete with big notices and hats, calling for public opinion to be outraged by "Soviet aggression against the valiant heroic Finnish people." articles about fraternal ties linking Turkey and Finland, which belong to a single "Touraine nation", are published.

Telegrams emanating from Helsinki, information transmitted by both Reuters and Havas, are presented to public opinion in the form that the red army is presented as an army suffering huge defeats. The first pages contain all kinds of insolent slander about tens of thousands of red army men captured by the Finnish army, about the destruction of dozens of Soviet tanks and aircraft, about the sinking of a destroyer and much more. The Turkish press adopted an extremely cheeky, hostile tone towards the USSR, calling our country an "aggressor", "invader", etc. There has never been such a tone in the Turkish press before.

All this is happening with complete impunity, and more than that, as I know, it is constantly being inspired by the relevant bodies of the Turkish government.

In conclusion, we can conclude that the Turkish rulers, having completely sold out to Anglo-French imperialism, are forcing their country along the path of including it in the war on the side of England and France.

Under the directives of Britain and France, the Turkish government takes an increasingly hostile position towards the USSR. The advice of

the current Turkish friends boils down to the fact that the main danger for Turkey, they say, can only come from the Soviet Union, that the Soviet Union has an intention to seize the straits, and thereby encroach on the sovereignty of Turkey, and if so, then Turkey should close even closer with England and France and prepare for the fight against the USSR. This is the nature of the present foreign policy of the Turkish government.

Plenipotentiary of the USSR in Turkey a. Terentyev

Wua rf, f oil. On 4.n 31 d 166, l 331-344.

**Telegram of the plenipotentiary representative of the USSR in Turkey A.V. Terentyev to the people's commissioner for foreign affairs of the USSR V. M. Molotov**

December 25, 1939 immediately. Top secret

Today Saracoglu invited me to his place and declared the following: "I have just received a telegram from Aktay. As you know, two months ago Romania made us a proposal to create a neutral bloc \*. In accordance with the nature of our relations with the USSR, we wanted, before answering the Romanians, to know the opinion of the Soviet government on this project. About a month and a half ago, Aktay, on my instructions, reported the Romanian block project to Molotov. The latter promised to study it and give an answer, but more than a month passed, and there was still no answer from Moscow. Then, considering ourselves no longer entitled to delay with our answer to the Romanians, we informed them that we approve of their idea and that Romania would not encounter difficulties on our part. At the same time, I sent the exact content of our reply to the Romanians to Aktay so that he would bring it to the attention of the Soviet government. Aktay told me that he could not get a meeting from Molotov and on December 23 he was received by one of the deputy commissars. The following conversation took place between them. Aktay: approximately forty days ago, I handed over to Molotov a project to create a neutral bloc, but I still have not received an answer. Today I will convey to you the answer given by the Turkish government of Romania, and I ask you to bring it to the attention of Molotov. The deputy commissar asked him to translate the document that Aktay had given him (Turkey's answer to the Romanians), and after translation he said: "my government continues to study this Anti-Soviet project. I will convey your answer to Romania to Molotov. " saying all this, Saracoglu held Aktay's telegram in his hands and translated it from Turkish into French. Then Saracoglu said: "if the Soviet government considers this project anti-Soviet, then why did it not immediately inform us about it. Since Moscow did not reply to me, I believe that it does not attach any importance to this pact. " I, he continued further, a little incomprehensible to the statement of the deputy people's commissar

"my government continues to study this Anti-Soviet project." I'm really interested in whether Moscow considers this project anti-Soviet. Sincerely wishing to get the opinion of the Soviet Union on the Romanian project, I must confess that a week after the Romanian proposal I saw that this bloc was stillborn. That is why I believe that Moscow is not responding because it considers this bloc to be stillborn. The desire of the members of the Balkan entente<sup>40</sup> to create a bloc is not enough. It is necessary to include Bulgaria, Hungary and Italy. But after a week it became clear to us that these countries would not enter the bloc, and nothing would come of the creation of the bloc as a dead idea. I asked Saracoglu if it could be said that depending on the answer of my government, the Turks would give one or another answer to Romania. The minister replied: "of course, I would answer the Romanians then if I knew that Moscow considers the draft anti-Soviet, that, while approving the idea of a bloc, we do not consider it possible to talk about it, since the matter is hampered by the unwillingness of the three countries to join the bloc. And now we have answered Romania in essence the same, saying that there will be no difficulties on our part, knowing in advance that Hungary, Bulgaria and Italy do not want to join the bloc, making him stillborn. I would very much like the word "anti-Soviet" to be said earlier. Moscow is well aware that the title Anti-Soviet is not in use here. " I asked Saracoglu how his lengthy statement, made to me on the basis of the telegram received from Aktay, should be understood. Min [isr] in [stranger] cases replied that he simply considered it necessary to inform me of this case, after which the conversation ended.

Terentyev avp rf, f. 059, on. I, p. 293, d. 2028, l. 368-371.

**Recording of the conversation of the people's commissioner for foreign affairs of the USSR V. M. Molotov with the ambassador of Turkey in the USSR a.kh. Aktaem**

December 28, 1939 secret

The ambassador begins the conversation by suggesting that the chairman of the Soviet government is already aware of what he has come to talk about. The ambassador states the following:

On December 22, at the direction of my government, I handed over to the deputy people's commissar for foreign affairs Mr. Dekanozov a copy of Turkey's response to the Romanian project to create a bloc of neutral powers in southeastern Europe. At the same time, Mr. Dekanozov said that the Soviet government considers this project anti-Soviet.

I have been instructed to tell the head of the Soviet government that the government of the Turkish republic can never be an instrument for creating an Anti-Soviet bloc.

We have been waiting for more than 40 days, the ambassador continues, for the views of the Soviet government on this proposal. Having received no answer, my government came to the conclusion that the USSR did not consider this project worthy of study. And, being in this conviction, we handed over to the Rumanian government the answer, which is now known to the Soviet government.

If the Soviet government did not hesitate in responding until the moment when our response was handed over to the Romanians, then the Turkish government would have no difficulty in finding such a formula that would satisfy the government of the USSR.

After listening to the ambassador, comrade Molotov asks him if his statement means that the Turkish government wants to say by this that the Soviet Union is now responsible for the Turkish response to the Romanians regarding this bloc.

Aktay assures comrade Molotov that the question of responsibility is in no way raised by his government.

I take note of the statement by Mr. Ambassador, says comrade Molotov, and adds that, in his opinion, comrade Dekanozov was right in saying that, among other qualities, this project also has an Anti-Soviet quality. Further, comrade Molotov tells the ambassador that he read a transcript of the conversation between the Soviet ambassador to Turkey, comrade Terentyev, with the Turkish foreign minister, Mr. Saracoglu. In this conversation, Saracoglu said that the Turkish government considers the Romanian project to be stillborn. It came, according to Saracoglu, to this conclusion a week after receiving the Romanian project.

The ambassador states that he does not know that Saracoglu, in a conversation with Terentyev, said that a week later he realized that the said project of the bloc was stillborn.

Comrade Molotov reads out to the ambassador that part of comrade Terentyev's telegram, which refers to Saracoglu's statement that a week after receiving the Romanian draft it became clear to him that it was a stillborn project, since Italy, Bulgaria and Hungary refused to participate in this bloc. After that, comrade Molotov remarks that during his last conversation with Aktay he had the impression that the Turkish government was sympathetic to the project of creating a bloc. If, however, the Turkish government itself considers this case to be stillborn, then why engage in dead affairs, does not the Turkish and Soviet governments have enough deeds of the living?

To this Aktay states that his government believes that relations between Turkey and the Soviet Union are of the greatest importance for maintaining the status quo in this part of Europe. Further, the ambassador assures comrade Molotov that the Turkish government is interested in maintaining friendly relations with the USSR and that Turkey and the USSR have no disputes that would separate them. In support of this, the ambassador refers to recent statements by the president, prime minister and minister of foreign affairs of Turkey. The ambassador asks comrade Molotov about the opinion of the Soviet government on this question.

Comrade Molotov points out to the ambassador that the latter is aware of our frank statements about Soviet-Turkish relations. I only want to



say, says comrade Molotov, and Mr. Ambassador will probably agree with me that, on the one hand, it is true that the statements of leading figures are of great importance, but, on the other hand, actions, acts, in which foreign policy finds expression, are no less, and in some cases more important than some statements.

The ambassador asks comrade Molotov if he saw anything in the acts and actions of the Turkish government that would be at variance with its statements friendly to the Soviet Union. The ambassador will be grateful to Molotov if he names them to him so that he can draw the attention of the Turkish government to this.

Comrade Molotov replies that for today's conversation he did not collect such facts and questions but met with the ambassador because the ambassador had something to say to him. Then comrade Molotov asks the ambassador if the one-sided Anti-Soviet line of the Turkish press reflects the opinion of the leading circles of Turkish public opinion, or should this be considered random speeches?

The ambassador begins his response by saying that, despite some restrictions, the press in Turkey has some freedom. Anti-Soviet speeches of the Turkish press began after a fierce attack on editors and heads of the Turkish press by the Soviet press. The ambassador refers to an article published in Pravda entitled "there is a bazaar in Ankara" \*. This article attacked the entire Turkish press. What does the Turkish press print? Telegrams, news from abroad. This is just information. The publication of these telegrams has nothing to do with the opinion of the ruling circles of Turkey. It is impossible to find a single Anti-Soviet article that at least in the slightest degree reflected the opinion of the Turkish government. The ambassador gives comrade Molotov a categorical and official assurance that there are no Anti-Soviet opinions among Turkish leaders.

From what the ambassador said, says comrade Molotov, it can be concluded that these Anti-Soviet statements in the entire Turkish press, apparently, should not be given importance. Why do such statements still take place: perhaps this is being done in the interests of developing Soviet-Turkish relations?

In response, Aktay gives the following example. There was an oral agreement between the German ambassador to Turkey Von Papen and Saracoglu that the newspapers of both countries would not publish articles hostile to these countries. The Turkish government invited the Turkish press to refrain from publishing anti-German articles, but the German press failed to keep its commitment, and two weeks ago, Mr. Saracoglu told Von Papen that he was taking back his promise to the latter. After that, the Turkish press was explained that it can publish anything about Germany that the editorial offices find convenient.

Comrade Molotov points out to the ambassador that the Soviet government is not concerned with the question of relations between Germany and Turkey in the area of the press, that he is only interested in the question of the press in relation to the USSR. Further, comrade Molotov states that, judging by the example given by the ambassador, the Turkish government can still influence the content of articles in the Turkish press when it considers it necessary to do so.

Aktay admits that his government can influence the press in "the form of giving advice," especially since the editors of the main newspapers are party members. Further, the ambassador says that he will draw the attention of his government to the question raised by comrade Molotov. For his part, the ambassador promises to make every effort to reduce the printing of all kinds of telegrams and messages directed against the USSR in the Turkish press. According to Aktay, the printing of telegrams does not make any impression on Turkish public opinion if there are no articles by serious Turkish press. This is not entirely the case in the USSR, where the publication of two or three telegrams makes a certain impression, and the masses begin to talk about the weakening of Soviet-Turkish friendship.

Comrade Molotov declares that he does not address any request to the Turkish government on the issue he raised. He only wanted to find out whether any significance should be attached to the current Anti-Soviet line of the Turkish press.

Aktay again assures comrade Molotov that his government has no Anti-Soviet aspirations.

To this, comrade Molotov asks the ambassador what he thinks: was the vote of the Turkish representative in the assembly of the league of nations against the USSR directed in the interests of friendly relations between Turkey and the USSR?

The ambassador begins to assure comrade Molotov with great ardor that Turkey did not vote for the exclusion of the USSR from the league. According to him, Turkey abstained. He knows the content of the instructions given by his government to the Turkish delegate in the league. It was decided in advance that all members of the Balkan entente and participants in the Saidabad pact would abstain from voting. "

Comrade Molotov asks the ambassador if there has appeared anywhere in the press a message about Turkey's abstaining from voting in the assembly.

The ambassador replies that there may have been such messages, but he did not see them.

Why did they decide not to publish this in the press: perhaps, also in the interests of strengthening Soviet-Turkish friendship? - asks comrade Molotov.

- maybe, maybe, - Aktay answers.

Saying goodbye, the ambassador promises to comrade Molotov to look in the newspapers if a report has been published on the position taken by the Turkish delegate during the voting in the league of nations. The ambassador promises to inform comrade Molotov of the results of his searches.

The conversation was recorded by b. Podtserob

Avp rf, f. Oil, on. 4, p. 24, d. 5, l, 61-66.

**From: conversation between the 1st counselor of the USSR embassy in Germany m. G. Tikhomirov and the representative of the German air force m. F. Kleis**

Sent to comrade Molotov, comrade Dekanozov, gen. Secretariat

March 4, 1940

The domination of the USSR in Finland does not prejudice our interests. The Baltic sea is an inland sea. Even if, for example, the USSR wanted to leave the Baltic sea, its path would always be closed by our submarines. We do not think that after the defeat of Finland the USSR will threaten Sweden and Norway, and if so, the question of our struggle against the USSR disappears. I see a threat to the USSR, Kleis continues, not in the Baltic sea, but in the black sea. The Turks are turning their backs on the USSR. Here, in the black sea, there may be a threat to the USSR. It would be nice if the USSR (northern part), Italy and Spain were masters in the Mediterranean Sea, a small French fleet could be allowed.

**From: conversation of the people's commissar for foreign affairs of the USSR V. M. Molotov with the ambassador of Germany in the USSR f. Schulenburg**

// March 1940

4. Schulenburg further says \* that the Anglo-French bloc is pressing not only on Scandinavia, but also on Turkey: this is especially evident from one overheard conversation between Massigli (the French ambassador in Ankara) with Saracoglu. Massigli told Saracoglu that it would be good to squeeze the USSR in a vice, using Petsamo and the Dardanelles for this (i.e., to open the Dardanelles). Saracoglu seemed to feel terribly unpleasant during this conversation and kept silent more. It is believed that the Turks will not agree to this yet.

Comrade Molotov notes that this is too dangerous a business for the Turks and they, of course, will not succumb to the Anglo-French pressure.

## **Telegram of the plenipotentiary representative of the USSR in the Turkish republic A.V. Terentyev in the NKID of the USSR**

March 19, 1940

The Anti-Soviet tone of the Turkish press in assessing the Soviet-Finnish peace treaty \* in recent years noticeably interspersed with various kinds of guesswork "about the future plans of the USSR." one category of ct2f journals adheres to the view that the Soviet Union, having ended the war with Finland, "will not hesitate to move on to resolving another strategic problem of interest to it, mainly in the Balkans and the middle east." all articles of this type end with a warning at our address and advice is given "not to forget that tur-I is strong in its friendship with allies, who will immediately come to her \_\_\_ help in case of any external attack". Another category of journalists in their editorials carries the idea that "the Soviet Union after the Finnish war needs rest and therefore will take all measures to stay out of the European war as long as possible."

In either case, newspapermen do not skimp on explicit attacks on the USSR. Noteworthy is the inspired tone of several yesterday's articles published by the Istanbul newspapers on the topic "the possibility of signing a Turkish-Soviet non-aggression pact." the reason for these articles was the optimism of the Reiter's telegram from Amsterdam, which refers to the diplomatic activity of Germany, and the telegram of the Anatolian agency from Moscow that "the foreign policy of the USSR has entered a new phase and that the program of the" Stalinist peace "proceeds from the principle of security of the USSR in in all directions - in the south, northeast, west and northwest: ". The Turks ascribe to Germany the intention, firstly, to prevent the Soviet Union from "rushing into a new adventure", secondly, to reconcile the USSR with Italy and, finally, to ensure the conclusion of a non-aggression pact between the USSR, Romania and Turkey. Newspapers eagerly seized on the message that appeared in the foreign press about "the possibility of signing a Soviet-Turkish non-aggression pact."

Regarding the present Soviet-Turkish relations as "normal", Yalchin writes that "it depends only on the desire of the Soviet Union to bring

these relations to the level of the previous mutual sincerity and trust." newspapers repeat the thesis that "if there were any changes in relations between the two countries, they arose not through the fault of Turkey, but through the fault of Moscow." outlining the history of the Moscow negotiations with Saracoglu<sup>42</sup>, Yalchin makes the following conclusion: "if during the period that has elapsed after these negotiations, the statesmen of Moscow had the opportunity to think about everything and if they wish to return to relations of cordial friendship, then we will meet this desire with joy. Turkey will not refuse to conclude a non-aggression pact with the USSR within the framework of the old project. However, a lot of time has passed since the first negotiations, and a non-aggression pact between the USSR and Turkey can be concluded only to protect Turkish-Russian interests, since we will not agree to be an instrument for protecting the interests of Germany. " speaking about the "possibility" of starting some kind of negotiations on the conclusion of a bilateral pact, the Turks obviously want to probe the point of view and challenge us to some answer about the position of the USSR in relation to Turkey.

Terentyev

Avp rf, f. 059, on. 1, p. 314, d. 2160. L. 221-223.

**From: conversation of the people's commissar for foreign affairs of the USSR V. M. Molotov with the ambassador of Germany in the USSR f. Schulenburg**

Sent to comrade Stalin, comrade Voroshilov, comrade Mikoyan, comrade Kaganovich, comrade Dekanozov, comrade Lozovsky

April 9, 1940

..

Comrade Molotov asks the ambassador if the message is true that Copenhagen is occupied by German troops, and the Norwegian government was evacuated from Oslo to the mountains of Hamar.

Schulenburg replies that he has no data on this yet.

Schulenburg goes on to say that pressure from the Anglo-French bloc is being exerted not only in the north, but also in the south. According to reports, Britain and France are especially pressing on Turkey and are trying to come to an agreement with Turkey on the blockade of the black sea in order to prevent the transfer of oil from Batumi to the Danube.

Comrade Molotov notes that the Turks are unlikely to be unanimous in agreement to such actions of England and France, and it is unlikely that anything will come of this matter, since this is a very dangerous event for Turkey.



**Telegram of the plenipotentiary representative of the USSR in Germany a. A. Shkvartsev to the people's commissar for foreign affairs of the USSR v. M. Molotov**

April 20, 1940 immediately

Molotov. On April 20, I visited Ribbentrop, whom I asked to convey to Hitler from you, the Soviet government, and also his birthday greetings and wishes of success in his work. Ribbentrop thanked him and promised to pass this on to Hitler at once. Then I asked Ribbentrop how he viewed the situation in the Balkans, referring to the article "after Norway - the Balkans" in today's issue of *volkischer-beobachter*. Ribbentrop replied that he had not read this article yet and asked to tell its content. When transmitting the final words of the author of the article: "the German resistance on the coast of Norway - and not only there - to make sure that the plans of the allies to spread the war would not be forgotten" Ribbentrop chuckled and asked to bring him a newspaper. Meanwhile, he said that Germany is absolutely interested in maintaining peace in the Balkans. Geographically, Germany is not interested in the Balkans, but economically interested in the Balkan countries. Germany maintains political and economic ties with Yugoslavia, Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary.

We are interested, he further stated, in the normal continuation of these ties. These connections are a thorn in the eye of the British. Recently, the British sent speedboats upstream of the Danube with secret service agents to create explosions in the Danube rapids at the iron gate. The agents were detained by the Romanians. An international commission is currently working on the Danube to prevent such acts by England. England, after its failures in Scandinavia, is making a lot of noise in the southeast. There was also much talk, Ribbentrop continued, that the Turks were in a position that did not sympathize with the Germans. It is believed that the Turks will open the Dardanelles to the British and French. It is difficult to say whether the Turks will agree to this so easily, he finished. Ribbentrop also said that before the war it was believed that the air force could not be an effective enemy of large units of the navy. They thought that aerial bombs were too light to inflict significant damage on heavy ships. The 7 months of the war showed that the

aircraft is a more acute enemy of large warships. The dreadnought proved to be a weak enemy of the aircraft. Further, Ribbentrop, speaking about the importance of the occupation of Norway and Denmark, said that, I hope, Germany will soon win this war and then the Soviet-German trade relations will be even more strengthened. Then Ribbentrop asked me if I had reported in Moscow about a conversation with him about relations between the USSR and Italy \*. In his conversation with me, Molotov did not touch upon this question, which I once reported. Ribbentrop inquired about the health of comrade Stalin and comrade Molotov. Saying goodbye, Ribbentrop once again thanked Hitler for his congratulations and said that he would immediately pass them on to him.

Shkvartsev

Lip rf, f. 059, on. 1, p. 315, d. 2174, l. 264-266.

**From the diary of the plenipotentiary representative of the USSR in  
Germany a. A. Shkvartsev**

Sent to comrade Molotov, Dekanozov, gen. Secretariat

April 26, 1940

...

Ribbentrop, after his failure in Scandinavia, makes a lot of noise in the south-east.

Ribbentrop then touched on Turkey's position in modern warfare, calling this position not sympathetic to the Germans. It is believed, he said, that the Turks would open the Dardanelles to the British and French. It is difficult to say whether the Turks will agree to this act so easily, Ribbentrop concluded.

.....

Shkvartsev

Hdl rf, f. 082, on. 23, p. 95, d. 5, l. 43-45.

**Telegram of the plenipotentiary representative of the USSR in the kingdom of Afghanistan k- a. Mikhailov in the NKID the USSR\***

June 11, 1940

Minister of national economy Abdul Majid informally informed me on his own behalf that afghans are very worried about the current international situation. Italy's entry into the war on the side of Germany will lead to the collapse of France in the very near future. England is also unlikely to be able to resist for long. Turkey will certainly enter the war if Italy attacks Egypt or Syria. The afghan government will maintain strict neutrality in all circumstances. Afghans are free from any obligation of military assistance to anyone. The minister sharply condemned the policy of Turkey, which concluded a pact of mutual assistance with Britain and France to the detriment of its national interests and stressed that the Turks did not even consult Iran and Afghanistan on this matter.

If Turkey gets involved in a war, it - without the help of a country like the USSR - will be defeated. Having defeated Turkey, the Germans or Italians can go to war on Iran and Afghanistan. Afghans do not understand why the USSR does not use the situation. Why is the USSR passive in the middle east? Believing in the peaceful intentions of the USSR, Iran and Afghanistan nevertheless ask themselves whether they can find the support of the USSR in the event of a major danger to them and whether the USSR will not change its peaceful intentions towards these countries.

When I asked the minister what essentially caused his conversation with me and what he wants, Abdul said that if we did not object, he could ask his government to start discussing with us the issues of Soviet-afghan relations in terms of strengthening and developing them on the basis of stabilizing the afghan borders and guaranteeing security in this regard. At the same time, he stressed that this is only about Afghanistan, although, of course, the afghans would be interested in strengthening the current regime in Iran and Turkey. The minister stressed the positive resonance in Afghanistan of Molotov's welcoming telegrams to the minister of foreign affairs.

.....

Mikhailov

Avp rf, f. 059, on. 1, p. 322, d. 2215, l. 204-206.

**Telegram of the plenipotentiary representative of the USSR in the Turkish republic A.V. Terentyev in the NKID of the USSR**

June 20, 1940, urgent

I had Kirov. Oi believes that the expected declaration of Rafik Saydam will not take place, as the surrender of France rules out any statements made by Turkey a week ago. In his opinion, the Ankara pact has ceased to exist, and therefore "Turkey should think a little about reorienting its foreign policy either towards the USSR or Germany." Kirov told Mia some facts, which were confided to him in a highly secret manner by one senior official of the ministry of foreign affairs, that "Husrev Gereade, the Turkish ambassador in Berlin, constantly spoke in his reports about the strength and might of Germany, advising to maintain good relations with her. For all 10 months of the war, Gereade's reports were not read, but were archived. Now the Turks urgently extracted them completely and began not only to read, but also to study. Unfortunately, the Turks saw that Gereade's assumptions that Germany would win had come true. In one of his reports, the ambassador wrote about the map of the future Europe, and he made an assumption on the basis of his talks in Berlin. He wrote that after Germany won, Turkey would be reduced to the category of small Asian states like Iran, Iraq; Kars-Ardahan will have to go to the USSR, Thrace - to Bulgaria, and the straits with adjacent regions, including the city of Istanbul, will be under the joint control of the Soviet Union, Germany, Italy and Turkey. Thus, Kirov continued, the Turks saw that Gereade's assumptions had already been fulfilled by 80 percent. The last moment scares the Turks very much. They are afraid that the remaining 20 percent will be implemented. Moreover, Gereade wrote in his reports that there is an opinion in Berlin that if the allies are defeated, then in Turkey the question of changing not only the entire government, but also Ismet Inonu should inevitably arise. " Having listened to these reports of Kirov, I noticed that they are of interest, especially since the ambassador was informed about this by one of the responsible officials of the ministry of foreign affairs.

Then I asked Kirov about Bulgarian-Italian relations and referred to a telegram from Sofia about Popov's conversation with the Italian envoy,

which speaks of exceptional cordiality and so on. Kirov, for some reason embarrassed, replied that he did not yet have confirmation of the reliability of this telegram. I asked about Bulgarian-German relations. He said that these relations, as well as with Italy, are exceptionally good. "these countries," continued the Bulgarian, "are dissatisfied with the situation that has developed after the world war, and therefore we fully share their views. We suffered for a long time; the Balkan countries oppressed us from all sides. We did well in taking a position of strict neutrality. If we stood in line with the Balkan states, the Balkans would have long been used either against Germany or against the USSR. Now we must receive a reward for our neutrality." I asked Kirov what, in his opinion, the reward should be and who would give it to Bulgaria. He replied: "at the peace conference, not only German-Italian demands will be satisfied, but we will also be able, with the help of Germany, to get our former territories, primarily Dobruja and access to the Aegean Sea." Kirov was extremely positive about the message from Budapest that Hungary considers itself free from the terms of the Trianon treaty. He added that Bulgaria sees in the USSR a country that is sympathetic to its policies, and it would be very good if the USSR resolved the Bessarabia question. I reminded the Bulgarian of the words of comrade Molotov concerning bessarabia<sup>112</sup>. From Kirov's words and behavior, I concluded that Bulgaria is now eagerly awaiting the outcome of the war, hoping that Germany will give it all the territories it once owned. Many diplomats have the impression that Bulgaria is now capable of completely falling into the arms of Germany in order to receive the award, which, in particular, Kirov told me about. The same opinion is shared by the Romanian and Greek military attaches, which they expressed in a conversation with Kutuzov. From our military workers, I learned that. The other day, there was allegedly a meeting with Papen with the participation of Peppo, Kirov and Maryasi, at which joint measures to work in Turkey and to intensify pro-German activities in the Balkans were discussed. "3 there is no doubt that the Germans are active we took up the local Bulgarians, who, in the current situation and in the hope of gaining their former territories, may jump in the direction of Germany. I consider it necessary to report on these conclusions, which I come to.

Terentyev

Hdl rf, f. 059, on. 1, l. 314, d. 2161, l. 290-294.



**Telegram of the plenipotentiary representative of the USSR in the Turkish republic a. V. Terentyev in the NKID of the USSR**

June 24, 1940

Today, for the first time in two years of his stay in Ankara, the Italian ambassador Peppo \* came to me. He believes that, despite Turkey's non-entry into the war, its policy remains uncertain. "we are not worried about whether Turkey will be "neutral" or "out of the war," the Italian noted, "as long as the Turks do not participate in the war. I made it clear in Ankara, not directly, but indirectly, that if they went to break off relations with us here, it would still mean for them a war with Italy. The Turks, for example, could provide their ports to the allies, in which case there would still be a war. Contrary to the Turks, I didn't say anything except that they didn't move. I advised them: stay in the same position in which you are now, and you can be calm for yourself. If you move, it can get into trouble. For now, I am silent just as I did before, but soon I think to properly talk about the provocative behavior of the press and "Anaga", which give completely only messages to Reuters. They ignore the messages of Stephanie, Dnb and even Tass. " Peppo expressed great satisfaction that the Italian and Soviet ambassadors arrived in Moscow and Rome. "they tried to speculate on Italian-Soviet relations here," he continued, "but the news of the departure of the ambassadors to their posts affected the Turks like a thunderbolt in clear weather. I am very pleased that your ambassador presented his credentials to the king of Italy and Albania. " I asked Peppo what he knew about the arrival of Iraqi ministers to Ankara, and he replied: "this visit has been decided by the British. Nuri said pasha is clearly a pro-English figure bought by the British. I have absolutely accurate information that the stay of Asım gundis in Syria and Haifa and Chakmak in Beirut was intended to agree on the occupation of Aleppo by Turkey, and possibly Jazira. However, then negotiations were underway about this even at a time when Syria was in the hands of the French. Now France is finished, and the question of Syria will be decided by the terms of peace. Having lost France, the British intend to create an Arab state from parts of Syria, Palestine, Transjordan, and possibly Iraq, giving Aleppo and Jazira to Turkey. The Turks hope for

a solution to this question now, that is, when France is not there, but they are deeply mistaken if they think that everything depends on an agreement with Britain and Iraq. Not England or Iraq will decide the question of Syria. The Turk is very interested in what position Italy will take. However, this time I say absolutely nothing to them. I am sure that they will not succeed, since the Syrian issue will be resolved differently.

If, for example, Syria considers itself a part of the Fraitsia of Petain, then this issue will be resolved normally. If general of the army Mitte Hauser refuses to obey Petain, then we will consider him as a rebel. Received by the Turks last year, Alexandretta is important as a strategic and commercial port. The British wanted to use Alexandretta as a strategic port, but they failed to do so. This means that it has no military significance, but its commercial significance depends on whether Alexandretta will have a Heiterland in the form of Aleppo. That is why the Turks would very much like to get this city. I still think that they will not move but will wait. Their entire policy is based on expectation and speculation. They do not want to publish their decision for reasons of not looking like they have already had their last word. " Peppo believes that Turkey thinks more about the USSR, whose position will be the decisive factor for it. The Turks will not do anything that could put them in a conflict situation with the USSR. As he left, Peppo expressed an ardent desire to keep in touch with me. I answered in about the same spirit. Turks are actively mobilizing. For several days, cars, motorcycles, bicycles, carts, horses, mules and donkeys are stopped in front of the entire people in Ankara and Istanbul during the day, sending all this to mobilization points for transfer to the army. I myself have seen the continuous requisition paintings repeatedly in Ankara and Kutuzov in Istanbul. Three ages are called up: 1910, 1909 and 1908 years of birth. Large columns of mobilized people in new uniforms often March along the streets of Ankara \*: mobilization of three more ages is expected.

Terentyev

Avp rf, f. 059, on. 1, p. 314, d. 2161, l. 321-324.

**From: conversation of the general secretary Stalin with the ambassador of Great Britain in the USSR Cripps in the Kremlin**

/ July 1940 top secret

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Comrade Stalin turns to the question of Turkey.

What about Turkey? We have good relations with the Turks, but they, the Turks, play so much in politics and play so many unexpected tricks that it is difficult to guess what they want.

With regard to the aspirations of Italy and Germany to the middle east, comrade Stalin considers such aspirations not excluded, but here a lot depends on the position of Turkey which jumps and where she will make it, is very difficult to guess.

Cripps replies that, of course, the Turks will jump if there is a danger to Istanbul or to further revise the status quo on the Bosphorus or the Black Sea. If there is an opportunity for England to do something in the direction of resolving this issue, then England will gladly do everything possible.

Comrade Stalin turns to the question of the Balkans.

Comrade Stalin says that this question must be studied. I think, says comrade. Stalin, that it makes no sense for Germany to withdraw troops from the western front and transfer them to the Balkans. There is a lot of talk in Romania that because of the war in the Mediterranean, the Romanians have nowhere to send their oil. Romanians will sell oil to Germany and Italy. Therefore, there is hardly any reason to divert forces to the Balkans.

As for Turkey, Istanbul and the straits. What kind of danger could be for Turkey in this matter? Maybe this is a fictional danger of Turkey, on which the latter is going to play and throw out a new focus. If we talk not about imaginary, but about real dangers, then the speech of comrade Molotov must calm down the Turks. We have good relations with them insofar as we are not going to attack each other. With regard to the recent negotiations, it must be said frankly that we did not come

to an agreement with the Turks and we parted, dissatisfied with each other.

During his last visit, says comrade Stalin, Saracoglu did not even want to talk about the straits, and I think that our relations need to be improved. If the UK intends to make an effort to improve relations, then we will not object.

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S. A. Lozovsky

Avp rf, f. 0144, on. 20, p. 105, d. 3, l. 1-3.

**Telegram of the attorney of the USSR in the Turkish republic s. A. Vinogradov in the NKID of the USSR**

10 July 1940

Today I met with Faiza Mohamed khan. After several questions about Terentyev's health, on his own initiative, he said: "in connection with the publication of the documents \*\*", I got the following impression: after the defeat of France, Germany concentrated its main efforts on England. At the same time, Germany does not want the influence of the USSR to grow in its rear in the Balkans. After the USSR returned Bessarabia and received Bukovina by force, Turkey concentrated significant forces in Thrace. Germany set itself the goal of distracting the USSR and Turkey from the Balkans and published these documents in order to create a conflict between you and the Turks, for the same purpose they want to worsen Soviet-Iranian relations. Finally, and most importantly, I doubt that Turkey and poor Iran would think of any action aimed at the detriment of the interests of the USSR. " to this, I pointed out to the afghan that newspapers such as Izvestia and Pravda publish only such information that is reliable, and comments on the published documents reflect the official point of view \*\*\*. The afghan agreed that perhaps the documents were really authentic, and said: "the main enemy of Germany was France, and she dragged England into the war, because it is known that chamberlain was ready to make concessions to Hitler, to give him some more territory in Europe and in the colonies. Therefore, after the conclusion of the Soviet-German treaty \*\*\*\* France was enraged, and from here I admit that she and her ambassador to Ankara Massigli were plotting something against the USSR. But the Turks have nothing to do with it. " in the future, Faiza Mohamed spread for a long time about the application of protocol no. 2114 by Turkey as a sign of friendship with the USSR.

From the whole conversation it is clear that the afghan ambassador to Ankara is a brightly pro-British figure and, against the background of close Anglo-Turkish relations, is trying to shield the Turks in connection with the documents published against them. -

Vinogradov , Avp rf, f. 059, on. 1, p. 314, d. 2162, l. 59-60.

**From: conversation of the people's commissar for foreign affairs of the USSR V. M. Molotov with the ambassador of the Turkish republic in the USSR**

A. Aktaem

August 9, 1940

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Comrade Molotov replies that he spoke on this score at the supreme council, mentioning the flights of Turkish planes. There is one more fact about which it was inconvenient to speak at the supreme Soviet, but which can be said to the ambassador. The fact is that the us ambassador Steinhardt told the USSR plenipotentiary in the us, comrade Umansky, about the questions that were put to him from the Turkish side in Moscow. For example, he was asked what kind of fire-fighting equipment are available in the Soviet oil-bearing regions.

The ambassador says that he can, if comrade. Molotov wishes to bring and show his telegram about the conversation with Steinhardt, sent to Ankara. He sent this telegram only to show his government the sensitivity that existed in Moscow towards the oil-bearing regions, and also so that his government could refute rumors of a possible attack on the USSR through Turkey. According to the ambassador, Turkey would never and would not allow anyone to attack the Soviet Union through its territory. The Turks know that every trouble for the USSR is at the same time a trouble for Turkey.

Comrade Molotov points out that the documents published by the Germans \*, as well as what was said from the Turkish side to Steinhardt in February-March of this year. G. not only confirmed the point of view of the Soviet government, but also gave something more. For its part, the Soviet Union did not give any reasons for the deterioration of relations with Turkey. On the Turkish side, there were facts that did not improve relations with the Soviet Union. Using Aktay's presence in Ankara, the Turkish government could discuss the issue of improving Soviet-Turkish relations, taking into account the attitude of the USSR to the undesirable facts already mentioned.

Aktay says that he is convinced that his government is ready to start improving relations with the USSR, but it would like to receive from comrade. Molotov any advice or his thoughts on how to improve this relationship. According to the ambassador, the Soviet-Turkish differences are easy to overcome. There is only an atmosphere of mistrust between Turkey and the USSR that can be dispelled. The Germans seized the opportunity and published documents to darken Soviet-Turkish relations.

To this comrade. Molotov notes that he is not talking about German politics, but in this case, he is talking about the policy of the Soviet government. Comrade Molotov states that he was upset when negotiations with Turkey in the fall came to nothing<sup>50</sup>. However, after these negotiations, the Soviet government did not commit any acts that would complicate relations between the USSR and Turkey. If there were no such acts on the Turkish side, it would be better. The Soviet government's point of view is not aimed at deteriorating relations with Turkey, if the Turkish government so wishes.

The ambassador says he cannot understand how the Turkish government can be held accountable for plans that were made without his knowledge. You never know what Weygand was planning, the French or English general staffs. If Turkey was weak, then England and France would try to attack the Soviet Union through its territory, but they did not even ask the Turkish government about it, because they were sure in advance of the refusal. The Turkish government did not receive any proposals for an attack on the Soviet oil-bearing regions.

The ambassador again raises the question of what the Turkish government should do to dispel the atmosphere of mistrust in relations with the USSR.

Comrade Molotov says that he would not like to return to the issues of the past period, talk about Weygand's plans, etc., however, it should be noted that Turkey remains an ally of England and France, and Weygand was a regular guest in Ankara. As for the future, there is no reason for relations between Turkey and the USSR to deteriorate. If there is an intention on the part of Turkey to improve relations with the

USSR, then there will be no difficulties from the Soviet side. We would like to see Soviet-Turkish relations improve. We have to think about it, and the Turkish government has to think about it too. The Turkish government, for its part, must see what it should do to improve relations with the USSR.

Saying goodbye, Aktay says that he notes with satisfaction that comrade. Molotov views the past as the past. According to the ambassador, the Soviet and Turkish governments can come to an agreement and open a new era of friendship between each other. The ambassador promises to do everything in his power in Ankara to improve Soviet-Turkish relations.

Comrade Molotov wishes him success and a pleasant journey.

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Avp rf, f. 06, on. 2, p. 2, d. 15, l. 34-37.



**Telegram of the plenipotentiary representative of the USSR in the kingdom of Afghanistan Mikhailov in the NKID of the USSR**

August 14, 1940

Comrade Molotov's report \*, published in full by *Islah*, made a great impression on the afghans. The major successes of Stalin's foreign policy strengthen the USSR's arrogance here. It should be noted, however, that the widespread Anti-Soviet agitation of the mullahs in Afghanistan has its effect. It is reliably known that among the afghan semi-proletariat there are the following conversations: "everything is good in the USSR; one thing is bad - why is religion oppressed."

The afghan government expected that comrade Molotov would at least mention the conclusion of a Soviet-afghan trade agreement<sup>136</sup>. The afghans prepared for this by publishing a number of articles known to you. By the fact that comrade Molotov's report did not even mention Afghanistan, the afghan government, which is still oriented toward England, has learned a corresponding lesson. The afghan government consoles itself with the fact that comrade Molotov did not put Afghanistan on a par with Turkey and Iran. The British and Turks, with the support of the afghan government, have widely spread among afghans that the German white paper is false sewing. The facts about the mysterious planes reported in the report of comrade Molotov once again exposed the Turks and Iranians.

According to reliable information of the lawyer, Zahir Shah sent a personal letter with his ambassador to Reza Shah in June this year, in which he stressed that Afghanistan cannot imagine its existence without the closest ties with Iran.

Mikhailov

Avp rf, f. 059, on. 1, p. 322, d. 2216, l. 15-16.

**Telegram of the attorney of the USSR in the Turkish republic  
Vinogradov to V. M. Molotov, the people's commissar of foreign  
affairs of the USSR**

September 4, 1940

On your instructions, today I visited Saracoglu, to whom I explained the whole history of the issue of wool, passing to him in conclusion, in accordance with your directive, the opinion of the Soviet government on the position taken by the Turks on this issue. Saracoglu, silently listening to my statement, asked me if the official export prices for wool, set by the ministry of commerce, had been published. I answered in the affirmative, referring to the newspaper "Cumhuriyet" dated April 13, 1940, in which the official communiqué of the Anatolian agency was published about this, as well as to the official statement of the chairman of Birlik \* to our trade representative. Saracoglu then asked me which countries Turkey currently sells wool to. I replied that I was not interested in this, and I believe that the question raised by the minister has nothing to do with the discussed issue of supplying us with wool to repay the loan. After that, Saracoglu said: "I am not aware of this case, but I will attach the same importance to it as you attach to it, and I will personally speak with the minister of trade." I expressed the hope that the difficulty created by the ministry of trade will be removed and wool will be released to us at "Birlik" prices. At the same time, I asked the minister to invite me personally to give an answer to my statement. Saracoglu promised to resolve this issue in the very near future and give me an answer on it.

I asked Saracoglu what news about the international situation. He replied that "there is nothing particularly interesting. In Bucharest there are demonstrations of protest against the Transylvanian concession, as for western Europe, two days ago I received a telegram from London, from which it is clear that, despite the desperate air battles taking place over England, the British remain completely calm and confident that will repel all German air attacks. England is confident that if this year the German attacks are repelled, then next year will be achieved complete superiority in the air force over Germany and this will ensure victory for the British. I see that now the quietest countries where you

can breathe calmly are the Soviet Union and Turkey. " regarding the situation in the Balkans, Saracoglu said: "we have always believed and declared that Hungarian-Romanian relations are outside the sphere of our interests, but we have never spoken out for Romania, and for Hungary. As for the Romanian-Bulgarian dispute, we considered the claims of the Bulgarians to be fair and recommended that the Romanians both in Belgrade and in other places come to an agreement with Bulgaria. We are very pleased that the twenty years of dispute between the two Balkan countries has finally ended. As for the possibility of new demands, from what Papen told me about the Salzburg negotiations<sup>133</sup>, I realized that there were no more questions about any demands. " further, speaking about the Italian-Greek incident, Saracoglu said: "I believe that although this issue is not acute now, it has not been resolved. This is a postponed party, a party that does not have an acute form, but has assumed a chronic character. " leaving, I once again expressed my hope for a positive solution to the wool issue. Saracoglu reiterated his promise to do this immediately. I will give you the answer immediately.

Vinogradov

Avp rf, f. 059, on. 1, p. 314, d. 2162, l. 169-171.

**Telegram of the plenipotentiary representative of the USSR in the Turkish republic Vinogradov in the NKID of the USSR**

October 12, 1940

Today I visited Menemencioglu. Having started a conversation about the situation in Romania, the secretary general said that yesterday, when presenting his credentials, the Spanish envoy told ismet Inonu that, according to his information, there are several hundred German instructors in Romania and there can be no question of any introduction of German troops there. Further, Menemencioglu read a telegram from the Turkish ambassador in Bucharest, which says that the Romanian foreign minister allegedly announced the presence of 23 thousand German soldiers in the oil regions of Romania and that this number could be doubled at the request of the Romanian government. Another telegram from Bucharest indicates that, according to a report from the German military attaché to the Turkish military attaché, 300 instructors are expected to arrive on October 13 to prepare the arrival of the German division. Corps commander Hansen is to arrive these days. The division will have to be stationed in the vicinity of Bucharest. After informing this, Menemencioglu concluded: "the actions of the Germans in Romania may have local significance, but they can be considered as strengthening strategic positions from the point of view of further prospects of German-Italian advancement.

\* minister, director of the Yugoslav radio.

I would like to note, Menemencioglu continued, that the decline in Hitler's confidence in you is characteristic of the last period. " after my explanation of Soviet-German relations, Menemencioglu said that he sees this mistrust in Germany's desire to create a certain framework for the advancement of the USSR, to hinder its freedom of action. "I believe that in general, in the struggle for world domination, which Germany intends to wage, it will be difficult to avoid friction between the USSR and Germany. This goes beyond the framework of a non-aggression pact. " after my explanation of the foundations of the foreign policy of the USSR, Menemencioglu stressed that for him there was no doubt that the USSR had no aggressive plans and that the independent nature of

the foreign policy of the Soviet Union was indisputable. "the position of neutrality that the Soviet Union has taken since the beginning of the current war has once again emphasized the independence of its policy." in this regard, Menemencioglu stressed that Turkey's position is similar to that of the USSR. "although our country is bound by a pact with England"<sup>29</sup>, this pact, in essence, did not lead Turkey to the need to enter the war. One can even say that it is thanks to the pact that Turkey has so far managed to keep the peace. " then Menemencioglu began to explain at length Turkey's foreign policy in recent years. He began by saying that even before the war, Turkey, together with the USSR, Britain and France, discussed the issue of creating a common front against the aggressor. After the conclusion of the Soviet-German pact, according to Menemencioglu, Turkey had three options: to be neutral, to conclude a bloc with Germany, and, finally, to conclude an alliance with Britain and France. "if Turkey chose the position of strict neutrality, it would certainly be the object of the struggle between the two camps. It should be borne in mind that the Anglo-French bloc at the beginning of the war was very strong and we experienced great pressure on ourselves. We were also afraid that if we spoke out for maintaining neutrality, Britain and France would try to use this neutrality for purposes hostile to the USSR. Based on this, we decided to sign an agreement with England and France. It should be noted that at the conclusion of this pact, we succeeded in the most difficult diplomatic negotiations, since we managed to achieve, upon receipt of obligations of mutual assistance, the inclusion of a unilateral clause regarding the Soviet Union. The Ankara pact contains convincing proof of our friendly feelings not towards England and France, but towards the Soviet Union. Therefore, it is not clear to me why, precisely after the conclusion of the Ankara pact, a cooling began to be noticed in our relations with the USSR. I can only declare with certainty that we have never stopped and cannot stop treating the USSR with the friendliest feeling, our friendship originated in difficult moments for both our countries and has always remained at the basis of our relations. " at these words of Menemencioglu, I noticed that it was not the fault of the USSR that relations between the USSR and Turkey had become cool. At the same time, I pointed out the Anti-Soviet position of the Turkish

press during the Soviet-Finnish conflict. Menemencioglu replied that all the ambassadors were dissatisfied with the Turkish press, and first of all he himself. He also added: "I can repeat again that the alliance of Turkey with England did not in the least affect our relations with the USSR. History will show that the Turkish government has always taken great care to ensure that the USSR did not experience any trouble, especially with regard to some delicate points that the ambassador may be aware of. We have always viewed our relations with the USSR as an independent phenomenon, without linking them with our relations with other countries. The Soviet government obviously views relations with our country from the point of view of relations with other countries. I believe that in the recent period in our relations there have been a number of misunderstandings that must and can be eliminated. I can assure you that the Turkish government has the most ardent desire to make our relationship as friendly as possible. Friendship with the USSR is at the core of our foreign policy. I am deeply convinced of that. That our relationship will be the most cordial." I replied that I can only welcome this desire of the Turkish government.

The following conclusions can be drawn from recent meetings with Turkish leaders:

1. The Turks are now experiencing great anxiety in connection with the latest international events, and especially with the events in Romania. Foreign diplomats are also talking about this.
2. Obviously, this also largely explains the desire of the Turks to create the impression that there are exceptionally friendly relations between the USSR and Turkey. The amiable reception of me, the intensified assurances of friendly feelings, the incessant stream of the same outpourings in Turkish newspapers are all convincing evidence of this.
3. Along with this, I believe that the position of the Turkish government remains essentially wait-and-see. It is not yet felt that it intends to really achieve a decisive turning point in relations with our country.

Vinogradov

Avp rf, f. 059, on. 1, p. 314, d. 2163, l. 55-60.

**From: conversation of the first deputy commissioner for foreign affairs of the USSR A. Y. Vyshinsky with the ambassador of Great Britain in the USSR Cripps**

Sent to comrade Stalin, comrade Molotov, comrade Voroshilov, comrade Kaganovich, comrade Mikoyan, comrade Dekanozov, comrade Lozovsky, general secretariat

November 2, 1940

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Cripps then asked for permission to exchange views with me on the following two political issues:

1. Cripps stated that when he met with comrade Molotov \* he asked him what would have happened and what would have been the attitude of the USSR if Italy had attacked; Greece. Comrade Molotov replied that it was incredible, but that this fact could be discussed if this happened. At present, Italy attacked Greece, can he find out what is the attitude of the USSR to this issue.

I replied that, probably, he did not understand comrade Molotov's words correctly enough, since, obviously, it was about the fact that there was no need to discuss fortune-telling facts. Cripps corrected himself, saying that he understood comrade Molotov just that way, but that now, indeed, the translation was made inaccurately. On the merits of the question, I replied that our position is determined by the principles of our foreign policy, of which it is not difficult to be convinced on the basis of generally known facts.

2. Cripps asked what the attitude of the USSR would be if Turkey entered the war. This question interests him because the situation in Bulgaria leaves no doubt that she will do it.

Further, Cripps said that when he talked with J. V. Stalin \*, J. V. Stalin told him that the USSR would like to establish closer relations with Turkey, and that J. V. Stalin expressed his wishes that the British government should render the USSR its assistance in achieving this rapprochement. Since he, Cripps, does not often have to meet J. V.

Stalin, then he would like to ask what the attitude of J. V. Stalin to this question is.

I replied that, as Cripps should understand, I cannot take upon myself the right to express an opinion on this matter to J. V. Stalin, without being authorized to do so. Then Cripps asked me to express my opinion as a representative of the NKID. To which I replied that our relations with Turkey are determined by the 1925 treaty \*\*, in the spirit of which our attitude to the question posed at the present time should be considered.

The conversation lasted 1 hour and 45 minutes.

Comrade Novikov was present at the conversation.

A. Vyshinsky appendix

"Mr. Ambassador,

On behalf of the government of the union of Soviet socialist republics, in response to your note dated October 29, this year, I have the honor to state the following:

The government of the USSR is forced to recognize as incorrect the statement of the British government that the recognition by the Soviet government of the need to form a new Danube commission and the participation of the USSR in the negotiations in Bucharest are a violation of neutrality. ... The formation of the Danube commission with the participation of the USSR, as well as states located along the Danube or close to the Danube, is the restoration of justice violated by the Versailles and other treaties, by virtue of which, under the leadership of the British government, the USSR was removed from both the international and European Danube commissions.

The Danube commission, of course, should be made up of representatives of states located along the Danube or closely connected with the Danube and using the Danube as a channel for trade (for example, Italy).

It is clear that Great Britain, which is thousands of kilometers from the Danube, cannot be classified as such a state.



It is also clear that the question of the composition of the Danube commission has nothing to do with the question of neutrality.

In view of the above, the Soviet government cannot accept the protest announced by the British government in a note dated October 29 of this year.

I ask you, Mr. Ambassador, to accept the assurances of my utmost respect to you. "

Avp rf, f. 07, on. 1, p. 2, d.22, l. 29-36.

## **Telegram of the plenipotentiary representative of the USSR in Germany Shkvartsev in the NKID of the USSR**

November 4, 1940 top secret

In "Municher Nachrichten" of November 3, an article about Finland was published, indicating that real leaders have appeared in Finland, who have grown out of trench battles on the Karelian isthmus, and they do not need meetings, demonstrations, for fate is in firm hands. The newspaper underlines the common interests of Sweden and Finland. The frankfurter Zeitung, which is close to the foreign ministry, on November 4, calls on Sweden to arm itself on the model of the German army and glorifies Karl xii as a national hero of Sweden, whose work is being continued by Germany. Both articles are transmitted in detail by Tass. The connection between these press appearances and the visit to berlin of gedin192, Swedish journalists and the Schutzkorites is obvious. Germany seeks to secure a submissive north and to seal it, in particular, in order to reinsure the USSR. A similar line is being pursued in the Balkans, but with great Anti-Soviet emphasis.

Over the past two days, large articles and photographs have been published in print about the difficulties of the Greek theater (military operations). According to the American correspondent Hotad Pavlov, the issue of the failure of the Italian offensive in Greece is being discussed in the German responsible circles. In this connection, the report of our military attaché about the intensified transfer of German troops to Romania from the Blekovits army, which requires verification, deserves attention.

The absence of Ribbentrop in berlin was officially confirmed today by Schmidt at a conference of journalists at the foreign ministry. The usually informed Bulgarian journalist Aganianov told the Tass correspondent \* that a conference between Ciano, Ribbentrop and papsnom \* is allegedly taking place in bohemia \* and it is planned to propose to Turkey to pursue a clear outward political line and provide the axis countries with a base on the Anatolian coast.

In berlin, rumors about Molotov's arrival in Germany are being intensely circulated. The Swedish correspondent Svanström told our

correspondent that he was told about this by a foreign ministry official, whose name he declined to give. It is possible that the rumors are spread by the Germans to put pressure on the Turks. The refutation of these rumors would have a certain resonance if it is beneficial to us now.

Shkvartsev avp rf, f. 059, on. 1, p. 316, d. 2177, l. 96-97.

**Telegram of the first deputy commissioner for foreign affairs of the USSR A. Y. Vyshinsky to the plenipotentiary representative of the USSR in the Turkish republic Savinogradov**

November 4, 1940

Soy, secret

At the reception on October 30 this year. Turkish ambassador Aktay addressed me with the following questions:

- 1) the Turkish government is interested in the point of view of the USSR government on the conflict between Italy and Greece.
- 2) how the Soviet government regards the position of Bulgaria in connection with the Italian-Greek conflict.
- 3) the government of the republic of Turkey cannot remain aloof from the Italian-Greek events. It decided to take all the necessary measures to resist the enemy as soon as any danger arises and regardless of direct aggression. The ambassador said that the Turkish government appeals to the government of the USSR with a request to inform whether the Soviet government will be able to provide assistance to the Turkish republic in the event of a threat to Turkey or a military conflict; in what form, in what size and in what time period it will be able to provide this assistance.

I told the ambassador that in view of the seriousness of the questions he raised, I would like to clarify them. So, I would like to know the opinion of the Turkish government on the Italian-Greek conflict. The ambassador replied that the Turkish government expects the further course of events in Greece, since Italy's further intentions are still unknown. According to the ambassador, Italy presented an ultimatum to Greece not without the consent of Germany.

I asked the ambassador how the Turkish government views the situation in Bulgaria in connection with the Italian-Greek conflict.

The ambassador said that Bulgaria continues to assure Turkey of maintaining neutrality. However, for some time, urgent military measures have been observed in Bulgaria: an increase in the army,

partial mobilization, the supply of equipment, there is also an increase in the number of German troops in Bulgaria. Since none of the neighboring countries is going to encroach on the territory of Bulgaria, there is reason to believe that Bulgaria is ready to become an instrument of some foreign power. I replied to the ambassador that at present I cannot give him an official answer.

I will report the ambassador's message to my government and then give the ambassador a reply. When the ambassador asked about my personal opinion, I referred to the position of the neutrality of the Soviet Union. Then the ambassador turned to me with a request for permission to transit 950 tons of barbed wire through the territory of the USSR.

At the end of the conversation, the ambassador inquired about the work of the mixed Soviet-Turkish commission on the Sardarabad dam. Since this question was previously dealt with by comrade Dekanozov, the ambassador would like to know whether he should expect comrade Dekanozov arrival or whether he should contact another deputy of the people's commissar on this matter. I replied that I would study these questions, after which I could give him an answer.

Vyshinsky

Avp rf, f. 059, on. 1, p. 315, d. 2165, l. 70-72.

**Telegram of the first deputy commissioner for foreign affairs of the USSR A. Y. Vyshinsky to the plenipotentiary representative of the USSR in the Turkish republic sl. Vinogradov**

November 4, 1940

Top secret

November 4 this year I received the Turkish ambassador in order to inform him, on the instructions of the Soviet government, of the answer to the questions raised by the ambassador in our conversation on 30 October 40 \* (the text of the statement I made is attached).

The ambassador said that the Turkish government has not forgotten the assistance provided to him by the Soviet Union. The last paragraph of my statement made an unpleasant impression on the ambassador, from this paragraph the ambassador does not see a sufficiently friendly attitude of the Soviet] union towards Turkey. As for the position of Turkey in relation to the Soviet] union during the Soviet-Finnish conflict, the ambassador believes that no one can accuse Turkey of being hostile to the USSR. I replied to the ambassador that the final paragraph of the answer was well founded. As proof, I reminded the ambassador of the fact that in just 25 days in December 1939, Turkish newspapers printed over 150 telegrams, notes, etc., directed against the USSR.

The ambassador again assured the loyalty of the Turkish government to the USSR, pointing out that the Anti-Soviet articles that appeared in the Turkish press were mere reprints of messages from foreign agencies, but not a single article was inspired by the Turkish government. I replied that it was not at all necessary to reprint all kinds of Anti-Soviet gossip. The ambassador said that comrade Molotov had twice pointed out to the ambassador the appearance of Anti-Soviet articles in the Turkish press, but that in his last conversation, comrade Molotov had promised not to return to this question again. The ambassador noted that articles directed against Turkey appeared in the Soviet press. I denied it. Please, give us a try! The ambassador could not answer. I pointed out to the ambassador that our answer should be viewed not as proof of the lack of a benevolent attitude of the USSR

towards Turkey, but, on the contrary, as proof of a friendly attitude. The last paragraph of the reply shows the ambassador how, in the opinion of the USSR, friendly relations should be understood and what should be done in order to avoid the reasons that hinder the strengthening of these relations. The ambassador thanked me for the answer and clarification. He then asked permission to come to me if he had any questions about my application.

A. Vyshinsky

#### Application

On the questions posed by the Turkish government through its ambassador, Mr. Aktay, on October 30 to deputy] people's commissar for foreign affairs Vyshinsky, the Soviet government instructed me to answer the following:

1. The outbreak of the Italian-Greek war is one of the stages of the further expansion of the war. It is difficult for the Soviet government to judge what position Bulgaria can or should take in the Italian-Greek war. This is the business of the Bulgarian government itself.

The attitude of the USSR to the Italian-Greek war is determined by its general position in the ongoing war, which is based on the tendency to narrow the base of the war. However, with regard to Soviet policy in the future, much will depend on the course of events and on the situation that may develop in the Balkans in the near future.

2. The Soviet government takes note of the statement by Mr. Ambassador that the government of the Turkish republic cannot remain aloof from the Italian-Greek events.

3. As for the request of the Turkish government about whether the Soviet government will be able to provide assistance to the republic of Turkey in the event of a threat to Turkey or a military conflict - in what form, in what size and in what time period, the Soviet government is experiencing in connection with such a statement the question is some bewilderment. As you know, there is no mutual assistance pact between the Soviet Union and the Turkish republic that would oblige the USSR or Turkey to provide each other with military or other

assistance. Therefore, the Soviet government does not quite understand such a request from the Turkish government. However, in this matter, too, much will depend on the situation in the near future, which is not yet clear enough. In any case, we can now say that the behavior of the Soviet government will not be the same as the behavior of the political circles of Turkey during the Soviet-Finnish conflict.

Avp rf, f. 059, on. 1, p. 315, d. 2165, l. 73-74, 75-76.



**From telegram of the first deputy commissioner of foreign affairs of the USSR A. Y. Vyshinsky to the plenipotentiary representative of the USSR in the UK Immaysky**

November 5, 1940

Top secret

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3. On October 26, Cripps asked me on behalf of the [British] government] to supply Greece with some gasoline. I, in turn, asked if the British [government] government would obstruct the transportation of 5,000 tons of gasoline from the USSR across the Mediterranean to France. Today Cripps told me in a conversation that the British [government] cannot but obstruct our gasoline supplies to France.

I declared that such a different formulation of the question with respect to Greece and France was unacceptable to us, but that this question should be decided by the VNKVT.

In conclusion, Cripps was interested in our views on the Greek-Italian war, our attitude to the fact of the attack on Greece, and what is the attitude of comrade Stalin to the establishment of more friendly relations between the USSR and Turkey. On the first question, I referred to the principles of our foreign policy; on the second, that I do not consider myself entitled to express comrade Stalin's opinion on this issue without authority; to Cripps' question about the point of view of the NKID, I replied that our relations with Turkey are determined by the 1925 treaty \*, in the spirit of which our attitude to the question posed at the present time should be considered.

Vyshinsky

Avp rf, f. 059, on. 1, p. 326, d. 2239, l. 89-94.

**Conversation of the temporary attorney in the affairs of the USSR in the kingdom of Greece A. Ilazareva with the prime minister of the kingdom of Greece I. Metaxas**

Sent to comrade Molotov, general secretariat

November 7, 1940

Secret

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Turkey is an ally of Greece in the Balkans, but at present it is not known about the nature of the assistance it will provide to Greece, this is being negotiated.

Relations between Greece and Yugoslavia are friendly.

Until recently, relations with Bulgaria were friendly, but now these relations have begun to deteriorate slightly, as rumors circulate in Bulgarian circles about Bulgaria's intention to reach the Aegean Sea in the Kavala region \*.

In conclusion, Metaxas touched upon rumors that Germany allegedly demanded from Bulgaria and Yugoslavia the unhindered passage of German troops into Greek territory. He stated that all these rumors are groundless, that neither Yugoslavia nor Bulgaria received such demands from Germany. Also fictitious is the message of the Bulgarian newspaper "Vremya" that, allegedly, the Greek government appealed to Germany with a request to act as a mediator in the Italian-Greek war. Metaxas stressed that there can be no talk of any negotiations, that the Greeks will fight with all determination for their independence, for the expulsion of the enemy from their territory.

The conversation ended there.

Lazarev avp rf, f. 084, on. 22, p. 132, d. 5, l. 11-13.

**Some] dir [ekti] you to burl [inn] ride \***

[November 9, 1940]

Top secret

V.M [olotov]

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C) Bulgaria - the main issue of negotiations, should be, by agreement with Germany] and Shtalia], attributed to the sphere of interests of the USSR on the same basis of guarantees of Bulgaria from the USSR, as was done by Germany and Italy in relation to Romania, with the introduction of Soviet troops into Bulgaria.

D) the question of Turkey and its fate cannot be resolved without our participation, since we have serious interests in Turkey.

E) the question of the future fate of Romania and Hungary as bordering the USSR is of great interest to us, and we would like to see an agreement on this.

[f) the question of Iran cannot be resolved without the participation of the USSR, since we have serious interests there. Don't talk about it unnecessarily.]

G) with regard to Greece and Yugoslavia, we would like to know what the axis thinks to do?

H) on the question of Sweden, the USSR remains on the position that maintaining the neutrality of this state is in the interests of the USSR and Germany<sup>87</sup>. Does Germania] remain in the same position?

I) the USSR, as a Baltic state, is interested in the issue of free passage of ships from the Baltic in peacetime and wartime through the m [scarlet] and b [big] belty, Oresund, Kattegat and Skagerrak. It would be nice, following the example of the conference on the Danube, to arrange a conference on this issue from representatives of interested countries.

J) in Svalbard, our coal concession must be operated.

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3. Transit Germany - japan - our powerful position, which must be borne in mind.

4. If they ask about our relations with Turkey, say about our answer to the Turks, namely: we told them that the absence of a mutual assistance pact with the USSR does not give them the right to demand help from the USSR.

5. If they ask about our relations with England, then speak in the spirit of an exchange of opinions at st [alin's] dacha.

6. To say that we were informed about the peace proposals made by England from Germany through Roosevelt. Is this true and what is the answer?

7. To a possible question about our relations with the united states, answer that the united states is also asking us: can we provide support to Turkey and Iran in the event of a danger to them. We have not yet answered these questions.

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Archive of the president of the Russian federation, f. 56, on. 1, d. 1161, l. 147-155.

Publ .: new and contemporary history. - 1995. - no. 4. - p. 77-79.

**From the telegram of the interim attorney of the USSR in France  
Ivanov in NKID USSR**

November 9, 1940 top secret

Congratulations on the 7th of November Delacha: Chinese and Turkish ambassadors. Pierre Laval sent in his card with a folded left end. On November 8, the Turkish ambassador Erkin visited me. Three days ago, I was visited by the adviser of Yugoslavia \* Dukhan Raskovic. The latter is married to the daughter of Albert Thomas and has great connections in France.

1. Germany wishes to conclude contact with England. The German command finally abandoned the plan for the invasion of the English isles as an unrealistic plan. The British fleet will not allow a sufficient landing. In addition, the war against England does not give the Germans the agrarian territories that Germany needs. Draskovich believes that Germany is not interested in obtaining the overseas colonies of England, because, without a fleet, the Germans will not be able to keep these colonies, even if she gets them.

2. Germany occupied a number of highly developed industrial countries in Europe with a dense population: Poland, Czech Republic, Belgium, Holland, France. Germany's food difficulties have increased significantly thanks to the war, as well as difficulties in industrial raw materials. The German economy needs agricultural land on the European continent. The occupied countries cannot provide Germany with the food and raw materials it needs. Here again they began to talk intensively about the plans for German expansion to the east, set out in the books of Hitler and Rosenberg<sup>194</sup>.

3. The Turkish ambassador said that the Germans are preparing for a war against the USSR, in particular against Soviet Ukraine, or they will move to Turkey, Baghdad, Suez and so on. Until spring, the Germans are unlikely to begin active operations in the east. Many German officers in civilian uniforms arrived in Bulgaria. The German military is preparing the ground in Bulgaria for the passage of German troops. He told me that 105 German divisions were concentrated on the Soviet-German border. The concentration of German troops in eastern

Germany is reported from a number of sources. The Germans are recruiting Ukrainians in France, who know the Ukrainian terrain especially well, as well as white guard officers. By order of Rosenberg, the Turgenev library was sent from Paris to Berlin<sup>195</sup>. She had 100 thousand volumes. Lenin, Gorky, Plekhanov used to work in this library. The Germans requisition horses in France, send them to Germany, where they create cavalry units.

Ivanov

Avp rf, f. 059, on. 1, item 328, a. 2253, l. 267-269.

**From: talk of the chairman of the council of people's commissars of the USSR, people's commissioner for foreign affairs of the USSR V. M. Molotov with minister of foreign affairs of Germany I. Ribbentrop**

November 12, 1940

Stalin said that England no longer has the right to rule the world. And if she nevertheless started this war, then she will pay for it. We, says Ribbentrop further, think that great changes will take place in the domain of England. We think that as a result of our new relations that have developed in the past year, we have achieved good successes, both Germany and the Soviet Union. We put on a good card. The USSR carried out its revisions in the west, and it thinks that Germany's victory over Poland and France contributed significantly to this. We have done good deeds in the past, and my question is, can we do good deeds in the future? He believes that the USSR can benefit from the redistribution of the territories of the British empire through expansion towards the Persian Gulf and the Arabian sea. The aspirations \* of the USSR may lie in parts of Asia in which Germany is not interested.

The second question in this regard, says Ribbentrop, is the question of Turkey. Turkey was an ally of England and France<sup>129</sup>. France fell out. England is a dubious ally. Turkey has cleverly reduced its obligations towards England to a state that does not go beyond neutrality. In this regard, Ribbentrop would like to discuss with Molotov what are the interests of the USSR in Turkish affairs. In the interests of a quick end to the war, it would be important to influence Turkey to free her from British influence. He does not know if this will be possible, but in defining the main political concept of Italy, Germany, the USSR and Japan, perhaps there will be an opportunity to influence Turkey in this direction. He did not speak about these issues with the Turks in a concrete manner. Recently, according to Ribbentrop, he spoke to the Turkish ambassador and told him in confidence that they would welcome Turkey's policy of maintaining absolute neutrality and that they have no claims to Turkish territory. We fully understand, says Ribbentrop, that the USSR is dissatisfied with the Montreux convention<sup>95</sup>. We are even more dissatisfied with it. With the USSR in

Montreux, they did not really reckon, but. Germany was not asked at all. I believe that the Montreux convention should disappear, as well as the Danube commission, and that something new should be created in its place, on which the especially interested powers could agree, and first of all the USSR, Turkey, Italy and Germany. It seems perfectly acceptable for Germany to think that the Soviet Union and other black sea states should be given priority rights over other states. It is completely absurd for other states to have equal rights with the USSR or with other black sea states. Therefore, it is necessary to create a new agreement. In the new agreement, the USSR must be granted special rights. How and in what order to do it -. You can think. The goal is for the USSR to be able to find a way out of the straits into the Mediterranean. I spoke about this with the Italians and met with full understanding. The question is that the USSR, Italy and Germany should pursue a policy that, firstly, would free Turkey from its obligations while fully retaining its "face", as they say in the east, i.e. Its prestige, and would allow Turkey to become a member of a group of states (literally - "a member of the combination"), not aspirationen (German) - aspirations, claims, calculations those wishing to expand the war; secondly, this should lead to the elimination of the Montreux conventions by Turkey and to the creation of a statute satisfying the Soviet Union, Italy and Germany with special rights for the USSR. In this regard, the territory of Turkey could be guaranteed in some form.

After that Ribbentrop said that he wanted to express thoughts about deepening Soviet-German relations. One can think of the form in which the three states, i.e. Germany, Italy and Japan could come to an agreement with the USSR and in which it would be possible to express that the USSR declares its solidarity with the aspirations to prevent the further expansion of the war. We could add to this a few points about cooperation and mutual respect of interests.

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Recorded by v. Pavlov archive of the president of the Russian federation, f. 3, on. 64, d.675, l. 21-30. Publ .: new and contemporary history. - 1993. - no. 5. - s. 69-73.



**From: conversation of the chairman of the council of people's commissars of the USSR, people's commissioner for foreign affairs of the USSR V.M. Molotov with Reichscanzler of Germany Agitlerom**

November 12, 1940

Top. Secret special folder

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Molotov turns to the last question raised by the Reich chancellor. If we talk about relations for the future, we cannot fail to mention the triple pact concluded recently between Germany, Italy and Japan, which is already in operation. Molotov would like to know what this pact is, what it means for the Soviet Union; he would like to see more clarity on this issue during his stay in Berlin and Ribbentrop's stay in Moscow. In this connection it will also be possible to raise the question of the Black Sea and the Balkans, which will be a topical topic, and directly the question of Romania, Bulgaria and also Turkey. Further, I would like to know what is meant by the new order in Europe and Asia and where are the borders of the East Asian space.

Hitler replies that the tripartite pact provides for a leading role in Europe for the two states in their areas of natural interests. The Soviet Union is allowed to indicate those areas in which it is interested. The same with regard to the Great East Asian space - the Soviet Union itself must say what interests it. He, Hitler, invites the Soviet Union to participate as the fourth partner in this pact. Hitler believes that it will be possible to reach an agreement with the Soviet Union, that earlier negotiations had taken place with Italy and France, and now that the issue has been clarified with them, he considered it timely to invite the Soviet Union so that the USSR speaks out about its interests. The questions that the Soviet Union has in relation to Romania, Bulgaria and Turkey cannot be resolved here in 10 minutes, and this should be the subject of diplomatic negotiations. We are all continental states, although each country has its own interests. America and England are not continental states, they only strive to set European states against each other, and we want to exclude them from Europe. A certain world order must be created, which will have its own spheres of interest.

Germany offers its services as a good broker in order to reach the possible mutual understanding on these issues. We cannot resolve the issue of greater Asia, since Russian interests are mainly important here, as are ours in Europe. When concluding the tripartite pact, we stressed that our special relationship with Russia would not be affected, and this is written in the pact. It is directed against a country that has no interests in Europe, Africa and Asia, just as we have no interests in south America.

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This concludes the first conversation with Ribbentrop.

Recorded by v. Pavlov archive of the president of the Russian federation, f. 3, on. 64, d.675, l. 21-30. Publ .: new and contemporary history. - 1993. - no. 5. - s. 69-73.

**Telegram of the chairman of the council of people's commissars of the USSR, people's commissioner for foreign affairs of the USSR V. M. Molotov to the general secretary of the cc VKP (B) J. V. Stalin**

November 12, 1940

Top secret

Stalin. The first, more than two-hour conversation with Ribbentrop took place. In view of the fact that now we must go to a conversation with Hitler, I briefly report on the conversation with Ribbentrop. Extensively repeating his letter to Stalin<sup>176</sup> \*\*, he added that Germany's interests were in east and west Africa; Italy - in north-east Africa; Japan - in the south, and the USSR also in the south - to the Persian Gulf and the Arabian sea. In addition, he spoke in favor of revising, with the participation of Turkey, the USSR, Germany and Italy, the convention in Montreux<sup>95</sup>, ensuring the USSR's advantageous position, as well as, if possible, not touching upon the "faces" of Turkey. Ribbentrop also spoke of the desirability of reaching an agreement between the USSR, Germany, Italy and Japan in the form of a declaration against the expansion of the war, as well as the desirability of a compromise between Japan and Chiang Kai-shek. So far I could only briefly answer that Ribbentrop's thoughts are very interesting, deserve discussion in Berlin, and then in Moscow with his participation, that I need to find out from him a number of questions in connection with the triple pact and that, in principle, actions of four powers are possible, and also that I consider last year's Soviet-German agreement \* exhausted in the course of events, with the exception of the question of Finland, but that I also have other questions of relations with Germany, Italy and Japan.

Molotov avp rf, f. 059, on. 1, p. 338, d. 2314, l. 5-6, 7-9. Publ. : international life. - 1991. - no. 6. - s. 126.

**From: telegram of the chairman of the council of people's commissars of the USSR, people's commissioner for foreign affairs of the USSR V. M. Molotov to the general secretary of the cc VKP (b) J. V. Stalin**

November 13, 1940

Top secret

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As for last year's Soviet-German agreement, it really was in the interests of Germany (firstly, a strong rear in the east when the war was unfolding in the west. Secondly, the acquisition of Poland) and the USSR, which considers the agreement fulfilled, with the exception of the question of Finland, which, I think, will continue to speak more specifically and with all frankness. Now the time has come to talk about a broader agreement between the USSR and Germany, but at the same time it is necessary to first clarify something in connection with the presence of such a new fact as the tripartite pact. Then it will be easier for me to explain to Hitler the questions of interest to the USSR, and in the extreme case, the issues related to the black sea and the Balkans, where we will have to talk primarily about Romania and Bulgaria, and then about Turkey. I asked further to clarify to me, representing a government that did not participate in the preparation and resolution of the issue of the tripartite pact, what the authors of the pact meant by the concept of "new order in Europe", which countries and on what conditions will participate in this matter, what are the planned rates of implementation of the main ideas of the pact, what kind of "east Asian space" is and where are its borders, to what extent the plans of the authors of the pact affect the USSR.

Hitler perked up noticeably and began to explain in relation to Europe, the tripartite pact established the agreement of two powers, Germany and Italy, which want to come to an agreement with the USSR on the question of Europe. With regard to Asia, Japan must also come to an agreement with the USSR.

Germany (Hitler said "we", and here, as in some other cases, there were ambiguities - whether he spoke in this case on behalf of only the

Germans or on behalf of all the participants in the pact) invites the USSR to participate in the tripartite pact as a fourth partner. At the same time, Hitler assured that "they" did not want to confront Russia with a fait accompli, that "they" would like to know what are the interests of the USSR in Europe and Asia in order to coordinate their interests with the USSR and be good brokers between the USSR and Japan, as well as Italy, that the clarification of questions about Romania, Bulgaria and Turkey, of course, requires a certain amount of time, but that the pact specifically provided for so that the interests of the USSR would not be hurt or a foregone conclusion without the USSR.

I thanked for the clarifications, but still replied that I was waiting for some additional explanations from Hitler about the plans of the parties to the pact. I added that the USSR does not refuse to participate in certain joint actions of the four powers, but not in the pact of three, where the USSR is included only as an object. Hitler cheered up completely, confirmed that the USSR should not be an object, but a subject of a new agreement, and said that he was very interested in continuing the unanimously started conversation.

Since we had already sat in excess of the norm, and it was already the hour of the appointed lunch, we agreed that tomorrow, November 13, I would have breakfast with him and after that we would continue.

In conclusion, I add. Our preliminary discussion in Moscow correctly highlighted the issues that I faced here. While I'm trying to get information and probe partners. Their answers in conversation are not always clear and require further clarification. Hitler's great interest in negotiating and strengthening friendship with the USSR on spheres of influence is evident. There is also a noticeable desire to push us towards Turkey, from which Ribbentrop wants only absolute neutrality. They keep silent about Finland, but I will make them talk about it. I ask for directions.

Molotov

Avp rf, f. 059, on. 1, p. 338, d. 2314, l. 11-18.

Publ. : international life. - 1991. - no. B. - s. 131-132.

**Telegram of the first deputy people's commissioner for foreign affairs of the USSR Vyshinsky to the plenipotentiary representative of the USSR in Germany A. Shkvartsevu**

November 13, 1940

Top secret

For Molotov from instance<sup>199</sup>

1) as for the black sea, you can answer Hitler that it is not only about leaving the black sea, but mainly about the entrance to the black sea, which was always used by Britain and other states to attack the shores of the USSR. All the events from the Crimean war of the last century to the landing of foreign troops in the Crimea and Odessa in 1918 and 1919 indicate that the security of the black sea regions of the USSR cannot be considered ensured without settling the issue of the straits. Therefore, the USSR's interest in the black sea is a question of defending the shores of the USSR and ensuring its security. This is organically linked to the question of guarantees from the USSR, for it is impossible to ensure calm in the straits area without an agreement with Bulgaria on the passage of Soviet troops to protect the entrances to the black sea. This question is especially relevant now and does not tolerate delay, not only because Turkey is connected with Britain, but also because Britain occupied the islands and ports of Greece with her fleet, from where she can always threaten the shores of the USSR, using her agreement with Turkey.

2) in all other respects, proceed from the directives you know \*, and if the results of the further conversation show that you can basically come to an agreement with the Germans, and for Moscow there will remain the end and formalization of the case, then so much the better.

3) we consider your behavior in negotiations to be correct.

Vyshinsky avp rf, f. 059, on. 1, p. 339, d. 2315, l. 29, 30. Publ. : international life. - 1991. - no. 8. - p. 104-105.

**Telegram of the first deputy people's commissioner for foreign affairs of the USSR Vyshinsky to the plenipotentiary representative of the USSR in Germany al. Shkvartsev**

November 13, 1940

Top secret

Molotov from Stalin

We advise:

1. Not to show our great interest in Persia and say that, perhaps, we will not object to the proposal of the Germans.
2. Regarding Turkey, for the time being, keep within the framework of a peaceful resolution in the spirit of Ribbentrop, but say that a peaceful resolution will not be real without our guarantee to Bulgaria and the passage of our troops to Bulgaria as a means of pressure on Turkey.
3. If the Germans propose a partition of Turkey, then in this case it is possible to open our cards in the spirit of the directive \*, and in the second case - the arguments of the encryption of the instance.
4. About china to agree with Ribbentrop about a compromise, without yet deploying directives \*.
5. With regard to the declaration, agree in principle without reversing paragraphs.

A. V. Gminski

\* \* \*

Molotov from instance

It must be said in the communique that the exchange of views took place in an atmosphere of mutual trust, that the exchange of views revealed mutual understanding on all important issues, and so on. We advise not to offer the Germans your draft communiqué, but to wait for the Germans to give their own draft.

P.s.: transferred on behalf of the instance.

Vyshinsky avp rf, f. 059, on. 1, p. 339, d. 2315, l. 35, 35a, 36, 38, 39. Publ  
.: international life. - 1991. - no. 8. - p. 105.



**From: telegram of the chairman of the council of people's commissars of the USSR, people's commissioner for foreign affairs of the USSR V. M. Molotov to the general secretary of the cc CPSU (b) J. V. Stalin**

November 13, 1940

Top secret

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Now we are talking about the east. First of all, relations between the Soviet Union and Turkey. This is a very important question, and here the USSR must express its opinion.

The great Asian space should be divided into east Asian and central Asian. The latter extends to the south, providing access to the open ocean, and is viewed by Germany as a sphere of Russian interests.

For all this, of course, a long time is required, 50-100 years.

Molotov says Hitler touched on big issues that are not only of European importance. He wants to dwell first on matters closer to Europe. We are talking about Turkey. Noting that the USSR is a black sea power, or rather, the main black sea power, he believes that the German government will understand the importance that this issue has for the Soviet Union. Along the way, in this regard, he should touch on one more controversial point. We are talking about Romania and related issues. As far as Romania is concerned, the Soviet government here expressed its displeasure with the fact that, without consulting it, Germany and Italy guaranteed the inviolability of Romanian territory. He believes that these guarantees were directed against the interests of the Soviet Union. This fact has to be reckoned with. From what the Reich chancellor said, he understood that from what the Reich chancellor declared, he understood that Germany did not consider it possible for a certain period of time to waive these guarantees. This cannot but affect the interests of the Soviet Union as a black sea power, very interested in the position of the black sea powers and straits. With regard to the black sea straits, it must be said that they have more than once been the gateway for an attack on Russia. This was during the Crimean war of 1855-1856 and in 1918 and 1919.

Molotov declares that he would like to know what the German government will say if the Soviet government gives guarantees to Bulgaria on the same grounds as Germany and Italy gave them to Romania, and with full preservation of the existing internal regime in Bulgaria, if you like, [not] hundreds, but thousands of years. He would like to reach an agreement on this issue as much as possible. Turkey knows that the Soviet Union is not satisfied with the Montreux 95 convention regarding the straits, therefore, this issue is very topical.

Hitler says that regarding the agreement in Montreux, this is exactly what Ribbentrop told him about, who also talked about it with Italy and found out that Italy was well disposed. He, Hitler, believes that the question of the straits should be resolved in favor of the Soviet Union.

In connection with the question posed by Molotov, Hitler considers it necessary to note two points:

1. Romania itself applied for a guarantee, since otherwise, it could not cede parts of its territory without war.
2. Italy and Germany gave guarantees, tk. This was demanded by the need to provide oil sources; Romania has applied for the protection of oil fields. For this, the air force and some ground troops were needed, because had to reckon with the possibility of the landing of British troops. However, as soon as the war is over, the German troops will leave Romania.

With regard to Bulgaria, Hitler believes that it is necessary to find out whether Bulgaria wishes to have these guarantees from the Soviet Union and what will be Italy's attitude to this, since she is most interested in this issue. With regard to the straits, Russia must obtain security in the black sea. He would like to personally meet with Stalin<sup>171</sup>, since this would greatly facilitate the negotiation, he hopes that Molotov will hand over everything to him, Stalin.

Molotov notes the latter with satisfaction and says that he will gladly convey this to Stalin. We want one thing: to guarantee ourselves against attack through the straits. The USSR can resolve this issue with Turkey. Bulgaria's guarantees would help to solve it more reliably. He adds that

the USSR considers it necessary to ensure that in the future the Soviet Union cannot be attacked through the straits, as Britain has done more than once. He thinks that this issue can be resolved through an agreement with Turkey.

Hitler declares that this would be in line with what Ribbentrop said to him - this is the absolute security of the black sea by revising the convention in Montreux, so that the straits would allow merchant ships to enter the straits in peacetime, but that Russian warships would always have a free exit and that the entrance to the warships of the non-black sea powers was closed.

Molotov believes that with regard to the straits, the situation is that the USSR is interested in guaranteeing the straits against the possible penetration of Britain, which, especially thanks to Greece and Turkey, has military bases near the straits. He speaks of the desire of the Soviet government for the solution of this issue to be carried out in practice, and not remain a promise. He knows who determines the policy of Germany, so he wants to get an answer from the Reich chancellor to his question about guarantees for Bulgaria, and he reiterates that the internal regime in Bulgaria will not be affected at all and, in addition, the USSR is ready to support Bulgaria's desire to obtain exit to the Aegean sea, considering this her aspiration legitimate. Hitler believes that, in his opinion, this requires:

- 1) find out whether Bulgaria itself wants these guarantees from the Soviet Union,

And

- 2) discuss this issue with duce.

Molotov says that he does not believe that this issue should be resolved here now, but only wants to know the opinion of the Reich chancellor.

.....

Archive of the president of the Russian federation, f. 3, on. 64, d. 675, I. 49-67.

Publ .: new and contemporary history. - 1993. - no. 5. - p. 80-88.

**Conversation of the chairman of the council of people's commissars of the USSR, people's commissioner for foreign affairs of the USSR V.M. Molotov with minister of foreign affairs of Germany I. Ribbentrop**

November 13, 1940

Top Secret special folder

Ribbentrop states that he would like to make some additions and clarifications to what the fuehrer said \*. At the same time, he wants to confine himself to statements about the possibility of defining broad lines of Soviet-German cooperation for the future and repeating the prerequisites for such cooperation, about which he had already written to Stalin<sup>176</sup>. He would like to present "raw thoughts" as he imagines them, i.e. Thoughts that, perhaps, in the future could be realized. These thoughts lie in cooperation between the state's parties to the pact of three and the USSR. Ribbentrop thinks that first we need to find a way to jointly establish the spheres of interests of the four states in broad terms, and then come to a special agreement on the problem of Turkey. The problems of delimiting spheres of interest concern four states, while the problem of Turkey affects only Germany, Italy and the USSR. After Molotov talks with Stalin and after Germany and the USSR agree on this set of issues, the minister thinks that Germany and the USSR will come into contact with Japan and Italy in order to find out the possibilities of bringing their interests into one formula. As for Turkey, he means contact with Italy. One could find a "modus procedure" \*\* to influence the Turks in the desired direction. If it would be possible to bring the interests of these countries to a common denominator, which Ribbentrop considers not impossible and beneficial for the parties concerned, then it would be possible to fix these two complexes in confidential documents between them, if the USSR shares the views of Germany on preventing the expansion of the war and stands on the point of view its end. He adds that he thought he understood correctly from Molotov's words that all these questions deserve study. I imagine that the ultimate goal of this study should be to conclude an agreement between the parties to the pact of the three on the one hand and the USSR on the other hand on cooperation between the four powers in this

sense. To address these cases more specifically, he sketched out several points from which, in his opinion, this agreement should consist. He would like to emphasize that in this specific form he, Ribbentrop, did not speak either with Japan or with Italy. He thought that these thoughts should first of all be clarified between the USSR and Germany. Of course, he discussed these thoughts in general terms with Japan and Italy.

.....

One could think of a second additional protocol, which would fix the following: Germany, Italy and the USSR agreed in their views that it was in their interests to attract Turkey to cooperate with them. They undertake to pursue the same policy in this regard. Germany, Italy and the USSR will act in such a way that the statute of Montreux<sup>95</sup> is replaced by another statute. Under this new statute, the Soviet Union must be granted the right of passage for its naval fleet through the straits, while other powers, with the exception of the Black Sea, Italy and Germany, must waive their rights to allow their warships to pass through the straits. It goes without saying that the straits remain open to all merchant ships. If the USSR is inclined to cooperate with Italy and Japan, Germany would welcome it. "

.....

On other questions raised by the Reich minister, Molotov would like to make a few comments and, in turn, pose a number of questions to Ribbentrop. With regard to Turkey and the straits, the Soviet government proceeded from the premise that, firstly, it was necessary to agree with Turkey on the issue of the straits. Second, that the Montreux convention is not good. Thirdly, for the USSR, as for the Black Sea power, it is necessary to obtain real guarantees against an attack from England across the straits, as Britain did several times before. It is necessary to discuss specific forms of guarantees against such an attack and ensuring security for the Black Sea powers and the USSR. This question needs to be studied and requires a certain time for its solution.

Ribbentrop (interrupting the translator) says that he thinks that cooperation between the USSR, Italy and Germany should free Turkey

from its ties with England and lead to the fulfillment of the USSR's wishes for the straits. Moreover, the satisfaction of the USSR's desires must be carried out in spite of some of Italy's aspirations. Germany is interested in the straits in the second place. Russia is primarily interested in them. Our interests run parallel. While Germany is interested in the straits during the war, wanting to prevent the British from entering the black sea, the USSR is constantly interested in the straits.

Molotov, adding to the above, says that Ribbentrop must agree with the position that Germany is not a black sea power. For her, the straits have not the second, but, perhaps, the tenth significance; for Italy, also a non-black sea power, the straits have, perhaps, the fifth significance. For the USSR, the question of the straits is extremely important, since the Soviet Union is subject to a direct attack on its borders from the side of the straits. Germany "does not have a pain in the soul" in this matter. In connection with the interests of ensuring the security of the USSR against attack across the straits, the question of Bulgaria is especially important. Moreover, Molotov emphasizes that the Soviet Union is not interested in the internal life of Bulgaria, which the Bulgarians can arrange as they want, for centuries and millennia. The USSR not only considers it necessary to touch upon Turkey, but also links the issue of the security of the USSR's black sea borders with Soviet guarantees to Bulgaria.

Ribbentrop says he cannot agree that Italy is not interested in the straits. She is interested in them, tk. Located in the Mediterranean Sea.

Molotov makes the remark that no one from the black sea of Italy has ever threatened and no one will ever threaten. Ribbentrop replies that he is not a naval strategist and cannot judge the strategic position of Italy. As for guaranteeing Bulgaria, he does not know how the fuehrer said the same today, how Bulgaria thinks about this. Ribbentrop will have the opportunity to talk with the statesmen of these states on this issue. As he already said, some states (an allusion to Bulgaria. - v.m.) May join the tripartite pact in a different form, of course, than it might be for the USSR. The question of guarantees for Bulgaria should be discussed with Italy. The minister is interested in how Molotov

connects guaranteeing Bulgaria with the task of securing the USSR against an attack across the straits.

Molotov points out that Bulgaria, after Turkey, is the closest black sea country to the straits and is very interested in this issue as a black sea power. But in this case, since it is impossible to find out all the questions concerning other countries, it would be interesting to know the point of view of the German government on the issue of the Soviet Union's guaranteeing Bulgaria. He repeats that he is not saying that there is no need to ask the opinions of other states on this question, but here in Berlin it would be easier to clarify the point of view of the German government than other questions.

Ribbentrop reiterates that the German government cannot answer this question without consulting Italy. He would like to know if the USSR's desire to guarantee itself against attacks from England across the straits does not correspond to what Ribbentrop spoke about with Italy in this respect. Italy, despite its interest in the straits, promised to meet the wishes of the USSR and make concessions, which made him, Ribbentrop, very happy. What is the opinion of the Soviet government about this project?

Molotov expresses satisfaction with Italy's benevolent attitude to this issue. He expressed his point of view on the importance of this issue for Germany, Italy and the USSR, and again declares that the USSR needs not only an agreement on this issue with Turkey, which owns the straits, but also real guarantees. The corresponding answer of the USSR on this question also includes the Bulgarian question from that foreign policy point of view, which does not affect the internal life of Bulgaria. In this case, the USSR considers it possible, by analogy with Romania, to which Germany and Italy gave guarantees, but gave guarantees to Bulgaria without consulting the USSR in advance and without asking the USSR's opinion on this issue. The Soviet government considers itself entitled to raise the question of giving guarantees to Bulgaria, which in turn must guarantee the straits to the Soviet Union. Moreover, the Soviet government considers it necessary to ask Germany's opinion on this issue.

(then the translator continues the interrupted translation of Molotov's first answer.)

Molotov believes that the issues of interest to the Soviet Union are not limited to Turkey. In connection with the straits, the USSR is interested in the Bulgarian question. The Soviet Union is also interested in the question of the fate of Hungary and Romania as states bordering on the USSR. The Soviet Union cannot remain aloof from how the fate of these countries will be decided. Molotov says that he would like to receive information on what axis thinks about Yugoslavia and Greece. Then about the fate of Poland. The USSR and Germany have a protocol on this score \*. Does this protocol, providing for the exchange of views on the fate of Poland, remain in force? Going even further to the west, the USSR is interested in the question of Sweden's neutrality. At one time, the governments of both states - the USSR and Germany - expressed the opinion that they were both interested in Sweden's neutrality<sup>87</sup>. The USSR still holds the same opinion on this issue. Has Germany also remained on the same point of view on the question of Sweden's neutrality?

The USSR is interested in the issue of leaving the Baltic sea: small and big belt, sound, Kattegat and Skagerrak. Is it not advisable, following the example of the Danube issue, to also convene a meeting of interested countries on this issue? He is not now talking about the Finnish question, on which he has already expressed the point of view of the Soviet government. If Ribbentrop considers it necessary to touch upon these issues now, then it would be desirable to do so. After that, Molotov declares, he would like to touch upon the questions about which Ribbentrop spoke at the beginning.

.....

This concludes the conversation.

The conversation lasted from 9 pm to midnight in the Ribbentrop bomb shelter.

Recorded by v. Pavlov



**Telegram of the chairman of the council of people's commissars of the USSR, people's commissioner for foreign affairs of the USSR V. M. Molotov to the general secretary of the cc CPSU (b) J. V. Stalin**

November 14, 1940 top secret

Stalin. Today, November 13, we had a conversation with Hitler for three and a half hours, and in the afternoon, in addition to the programmed conversations, a three-hour conversation with Ribbentrop. So far, I am reporting these conversations briefly. Details follow. Both conversations did not produce the desired results. The main time with Hitler was spent on the Finnish question. Hitler said he was reaffirming last year's agreement \*, but Germany says it has an interest in keeping the Baltic sea peace. My indication that no reservations were made on this issue last year was not refuted, but also had no impact. (to be continued.)

(continuation) the second issue that aroused Hitler's suspicion was the question of guarantees to Bulgaria from the USSR on the same grounds as guarantees to Romania were given by Germany and Italy. Hitler declined to answer, saying that on this issue he must first seek the opinion of Italy.

Ribbentrop stubbornly insisted that on the black sea straits we spoke out in favor of revising the Montreux convention<sup>95</sup> and for a new convention with the participation of Turkey, the USSR, Italy and Germany with the provision of guarantees for the territory of Turkey and a promise to satisfy the legitimate wish of the USSR not to allow military vessels to enter the black sea non-black sea powers. I replied that on this issue the USSR should come to an agreement with Turkey, bearing in mind that for Germany and Italy, which are not the black sea powers, the question of the straits is not essential from the point of view of their security, and for the USSR the issue of the straits is not only related to the conclusion of a new agreement with Turkey, but also with real guarantees of the security of the USSR. The issue of such guarantees concerns not only Turkey, but also Bulgaria in the sense I have indicated, that is, with the provision of guarantees for Bulgaria itself.

To the questions posed, I answered him that the "joint work" of the USSR, Germany, Italy and Japan in the delimitation of the main spheres of influence between them I consider possible and desirable, but it is necessary to agree on this, and it is necessary to correctly link these questions of tomorrow with the questions of today ... Ribbentrop introduced, or rather read, rough sketches ("raw thoughts") of a draft joint open statement of the four powers and two draft secret protocols:

A) on the delimitation of the main spheres of interests of the four powers with the deviation of our sphere in the direction of the Indian ocean.

B) on the straits - in the spirit of the agreement between Turkey, the USSR, Italy and Germany. Ribbentrop suggested that these projects be discussed in the usual diplomatic manner through ambassadors. (the ending follows.)

(end) I said that I do not mind this order of discussion of these projects. Thus, Germany is not now raising the question of Ribbentrop's arrival in Moscow.

These are the main results. There is nothing to brag about, but at least I figured out Hitler's current moods, which will have to be reckoned with.

I have not yet thought about what to give a communique on my departure from Berlin, since I have just returned from Ribbentrop, and I have no suggestions from him on this. If you have time to give advice, please do so.

Molotov

Avp rf, f. 059, on. 1, p. 338, d. 2314, l. 41-44.

Publ.: international life. - 1991. - no. 8. - s. 117.

**Telegram of the advisor of the plenipotentiary representation of the USSR in Germany Semenova in the people's commissariat for foreign affairs of the USSR**

Sent to c. Stalin, c. Molotov, c. Voroshilov, c. Kaganovich, c. Mikoyan, c. Vyshinsky, c. Dekanozov, c. Lozovsky

November 14, 1940 top secret

It is widely believed among foreign correspondents in Berlin that, as a result of comrade Molotov's Berlin negotiations, the USSR is giving up its interest in the Balkans, in return for a free hand in Asia at the expense of Iran and Turkey. Journalists of various directions generally agree on this: Abola and Chalich (Yugoslavia), the American Lochner, the Swede Svanström, Lekrenier (German) suspected of having connections with the Gestapo and others. Note that on the eve of Molotov's arrival, the Italian correspondent of the Stampa newspaper assured that a pact of the four would be concluded, according to which the USSR would receive freedom in the central Asian space.

Svanström told our correspondent that these rumors come from the Germans themselves. Chalich asserted this in today's conversation with attaché Mikhailov, without, however, naming the source by name<sup>201</sup>.

The communiqué published by the Germans is identical to our text \*, with the exception of the second phrase, where instead of "the most important questions" it says "important questions" in German.

Semenov

Avp rf, f. 059, on. 1, p. 316, d., 2177, l. 129.

**Conversation of advisor of the plenipotentiary of the USSR representation in the kingdom of Afghanistan Kozlov with the ambassador of Turkey in Afghanistan Shevket**

Sent to comrade Molotov, comrade Vyshinsky, comrade Dekanozov, comrade Lozovsky, general secretariat

November 15, 1940

The ambassador inquired about the reason for the absence of the plenipotentiary envoy, comrade Mikhailov, at the film show in the English mission, and talkatively told me the following:

1. At the present time Turkey has calmed down and has great confidence in the foreign policy of the Soviet Union. Friendly relations between the USSR and Turkey have existed for as long as 20 years, and unexpectedly for the Turks, some time ago, what should be considered already in the past, a period of cold attitude of the USSR towards Turkey, the reason for which the Turks cannot understand, since, for example , the fact of the conclusion of a non-aggression pact between Turkey and England<sup>129</sup> was, as is known, agreed with Moscow. In addition, during Potemkin's last stay in Turkey, the ambassador asked his opinion about the attitude of the Soviet Union towards Turkey. Potemkin allegedly said not only on his own behalf, but also on behalf of the Soviet government, that the attitude of the Soviet Union towards Turkey was good. When asked about the reasons for, as the ambassador put it, "the cold attitude of the USSR to Turkey", the Turk could not say anything and hastened to move on to another question.

2. He said that he had heard on the radio that there were currently two national flags in Romania - Romania and Germany. This is a very significant fact, the Turks noted, especially considering that at present, according to reliable data, there are 14 German divisions in Romania. Then the ambassador, referring to not entirely accurate information at his disposal, said that he had heard that Romania had already disbanded its troops, which, in his opinion, meant the complete surrender of Romania to Germany, i.e. Essentially the military occupation of Romania.

3. Then the Turk turned to the question of the war between Italy and Greece and noted that Italy alone cannot cope with Greece, not because it is technically poorly armed, "but for the reason that the Italian army fights badly," and this fact worries Germany and makes her think about the need to provide Italy with substantial assistance. Apparently, it will take decisive steps in this direction in the near future. When I asked how Germany can do this, the ambassador replied that Germany is probably using the territory of Yugoslavia or Bulgaria for this purpose with all the ensuing consequences.

4. Then the ambassador briefly spoke about the relationship between Germany and Afghanistan. The Turk noticed that the Germans did not understand the psychology of the afghans. When I asked what exactly this conclusion of the ambassador is based on, the Turk said that the Germans are trying to show their military power by showing films about their victory over France and the colossal destruction caused by Germany to England, but by this the Germans repel the afghans from themselves, as can be seen from the fact that afghans are reluctant to attend the German mission's film shows. (the ambassador completely forgot that the British film we just watched was just a picture seeking to show the power of England in the air and on the water, as a result of which the British inflict colossal damage on the Germans.) To my question about the state of trade relations between Afghanistan and Germany, the ambassador said they were improving. Moreover, the afghan government has received a large loan from Germany. The Germans, the Turks continued, have adherents among some part of the ruling clique of Afghanistan, in particular, he named the names of the minister of war Ahmed Khan, the minister of health - Yahya khan, the minister of the national economy - Abdul Majid khan, and others. He especially singled out the military minister, emphasizing that that he is everywhere and everywhere shouts loudly about the military might of Germany. All this group at one time tried in every possible way to prevent the strengthening of relations between Turkey and Afghanistan and even tried to oust the Turks from Afghanistan and dramatically improve relations with Germany. Currently, this group has changed its point of view and does not prevent the Turks from strengthening their relations with Afghanistan. The ambassador further

stressed that foreign minister Ali Mohammed khan, minister of education Naim khan and some others are certain supporters of friendship with England.

5. I asked the Turk how the afghans assess comrade Molotov's trip to berlin. The Turk replied: "they (?) Asked me many times what significance this fact of Molotov's trip to berlin would have, and at first they were very worried about the upcoming meeting between Molotov and Hitler, moreover, they were scared, but as soon as the message was received about Molotov's return to Moscow, the afghans have calmed down a little, and even they are happy about this trip." listening to this chatter of the Turk, I asked him what exactly the afghans were afraid of and what they were happy about. The ambassador hesitated and said that he could not specifically answer this question, but what he said is really believable.

6. Already saying goodbye, the ambassador again repeated what was said earlier that the Turks are very good at the USSR, but if Germany takes a commanding role in its relations with the USSR and strengthens itself in Afghanistan, the Turks pointedly emphasized, most will be undermined.

V. Kozlov

P.s. It is interesting to note that at the time of the appearance of the warrior Ahmed khan in the cinema (somewhat belated), everyone presents stood up as if on command. After watching the film, I asked the 1st secretary of the British mission Fletcher on the reasons for this special respect shown in relation to the military man. Fletcher replied that such a meeting is always in the English mission to the military and the prime minister.

Avp rf, f. 071, on. 22, p. 192, d. 7, l. 72-75.

**Telegram of the plenipotentiary representative of the USSR in the Great Britain I.M. Maisky in the NKID of the USSR**

November 15, 1940

Immediately top secret

On further reactions in London to comrade Molotov's visit to Berlin, I can report the following: today, in a conversation with a diplomat, butler among other things said that the talks in Berlin, in his opinion, had the most concrete results in the economic field and that the expansion of the Soviet-German economic cooperation can lead to great military and political consequences. As for purely political issues, butler doubts that anything definite has been decided in Berlin in this area. Rather, he believes that comrade Molotov took with him to Moscow any political proposals of Hitler, which the Soviet government will still discuss and consider. Of these political issues, the British are most concerned about Turkey: is there an agreement between the USSR and Germany on joint pressure on Turkey in order to let German troops into Syria through its territory? Less responsible foreign office officials (for example, McLean, deputy head of the northern department) say that if, as they expect, Turkey resists any such attempt, relations between Britain and the USSR could become extremely acute. The British are very worried about another question: why did the two deputy commissars of aviation go to Berlin with comrade Molotov? In government circles, they are expressing concern: are we talking about the deployment of German industry in the USSR? In government circles, concern is expressed: are we talking about placing German orders in the USSR for the construction of aircraft? This fear is partly based on the fact that, according to the foreign office, the trade negotiations in Moscow will raise the issue of our sale of weapons to the British, and we are supposedly ready to supply them with guns, revolvers and other things, while the supply of aircraft is in question. In government circles, the argument is as follows: if the USSR can sell some weapons to England, why cannot it accept orders for airplanes for Germany? This prospect of the British is very embarrassing, because then the effect of American aid to Great Britain would be greatly weakened. In general, however, no one here knows anything for sure

about the content of the berlin talks, everyone is speculating and noticeably worried.

Maisky wua rf, f. 059, on. 1, p. 326, d. 2237, l. 120-121.



**Telegram of the people's commissioner for foreign affairs of the USSR V. M. Molotov to the plenipotentiary representative of the USSR in the UK I.M. Maisky**

November 17, 1940

Top secret

For your orientation, I give brief information about the berlin conversations \*:

1. My trip to berlin was in the nature of a return visit to Ribbentrop's two trips to Moscow last year and took place at the invitation of the German government.
2. Contrary to some incorrect reports in the foreign press, the berlin conversations concerned mainly questions of Soviet-German relations, the fulfillment of the agreements concluded last year and the clarification of possibilities for the further development of Soviet-German relations. Questions about the delimitation of spheres of interest between the USSR, Germany and other countries, as well as questions about the USSR's accession to the three-power pact in berlin were not resolved in these conversations.
3. No agreement was signed in berlin and it was not supposed to be done. The case in berlin was limited, as follows from the well-known communique of November 10, \*\* to an exchange of views.
4. In the future, it is possible to consider in the usual diplomatic manner a number of issues on which there was an exchange of views in berlin.
5. As it turned out from the conversations, the Germans want to get their hands on Turkey under the guise of guarantees of its security in the manner of Rumshia, and they want to smear our lips with the promise of revising the convention in Montreux in our favor, and they offer us to help them in this matter. We did not agree to this, because we believe that, firstly, Turkey should remain independent, and, secondly, the regime in the straits can be improved as a result of our negotiations with Turkey, **but not behind Turkey's back.**

6. The Germans and Japanese, apparently, would very much like to push us towards the Persian Gulf and India. We rejected the discussion of this issue as we consider such advice from Germany to be inappropriate.

Molotov avp rf, f. 059, on. 1, p. 326, d. 2239, l. 112-114. Publ .: international life. - 1991. - no. 8. - p. 119.

**From: political letter of the plenipotentiary of the USSR  
representation in Germany**

November 19, 1940

Top secret

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About Turkey

Unlike some other powers, Turkey was mentioned specifically and precisely in the leading national Zeitung of 11. xi.

"states located in the sphere of German-Russian interests and who have not finally established their position at the moment should see Molotov's visit as a reason to test their policy. Turkey is primarily located in this political zone".

In the diplomatic game of Germany, Turkey has recently occupied one of the most important places. This is confirmed by the behavior of the German press, the movements of troops closer to Turkey (Romania, Bulgaria) and the trips of the German ambassador to Turkey, Von Papen, to Berlin. Not long before comrade Molotov's trip to Berlin, Papen had the opportunity to "hunt pheasants" in the Bohemian forests together with Ribbentrop and Ciano, which he publicly confirmed at a meeting of journalists on November 15. During comrade Molotov's stay in Berlin, Papen was also here and even taking part in a dinner in honor of comrade Molotov on November 12 at the Kaiserhof. On November 15, Papen spoke at the house of foreign journalists on German-Turkish relations. According to journalists, the ambassador's speech in this house is not at all a custom. Then Papen left for Vienna.

The aforementioned speech of Papen was transmitted to Tass, but the report of Tass correspondents at some points differs from the information of comrade Kobulov.

Based on the materials available to comrade Kobulov, Papen spoke diplomatically, but clearly enough to understand the following:

"1. The straits issue is a decisive issue for Turkey.

2 the question of the straits has lost its historical significance for Russia. For the USSR, there are other problems and development opportunities.

3. Germany is not directly interested in the straits.

4. Why have strong points (bases) if you can live in friendship.

5. In fact, Germany is the only country that can supply Turkey with the necessary industrial goods. "

According to the same source, Germany's general line towards Turkey allegedly boils down to the following (this was indirectly confirmed by Papen):

"1. Germany will try to establish friendly relations with Turkey. The leadership will be carried out by Von Papen, as he "knows all the leaders of Turkey who were in the world war in his army ..." \*

\* in 1917-1918, Papen served in the Folsenau army in Mesopotamia and Palestine, and then in the 4th ottoman army (information provided by deutsche Führerlexikon).

In berlin, they decided to launch an immediate political offensive against Turkey, since a calm pause ensued in German-Russian relations.

2 Germany will persuade Turkey that Germany could take on guarantees that no other power will receive the Dardanelles.

3. Germany rejects all Russian claims to Turkey. "

From the stories of our correspondents about Papen's speech, his remark about Syria deserves attention:

"question: what happened to Syria?

Papen's answer: nothing much happened, but I think Turkey is very interested in Syria. I don't think there's anything new there."

For the sake of completeness, let us cite the message of the berlin bulletin of the American agency "united press" of November 18, 1940

from Istanbul: "Istanbul, November 18. In the first official reports on Molotov's visit to Berlin, conveyed by the Turkish ambassador in Berlin, the opinion is expressed that at present there is no reason for Turkey to fear changes in its present position. Turkish ambassador to Berlin Gerede said: "at the moment I am confident that the German-Turkish relations, which can be regarded as normal, will not change." They expect that on Monday Gerede will inform the Turkish government about Molotov's visit to Berlin. The Turkish press says it is necessary to wait for what will happen in the near future. The newspaper, however, expresses its conviction that Keitel's negotiations with Badoglio should accelerate the development of events in the south-east. "

Outwardly, the reaction of the Turks to comrade Molotov's visit here was expressed in a hasty visit to the embassy by the Turkish adviser Alkand (see the diary of adviser Semenov of November 15 of this year) \*. Alkand expressed the opinion that the involvement of the USSR in European affairs could only be beneficial for Turkey, but he was nevertheless alarmed and assured too much about Turkey's friendly feelings towards the USSR.

.....

Union and Germany, are in London ... "(frontline" kölnische zeitung "16.xi.) [...]

Avp rf, f. 082, on. 23, p. 104, d. 57, l. 146-166.

**Telegram of the plenipotentiary representative of the USSR in the Turkish republic ca. Vinogradova in the NKID USSR**

November 21, 1940

Immediately top secret

In connection with the last visit to Germany, in particular of tsar Boris \*, and especially in connection with Phalen's statement to German journalists, the concern among Turkish government circles increased even more. The Turks believe that after Hungary signed the Berlin Pact<sup>206</sup>, Germany will move its troops to Greece through Hungary and Yugoslavia to help the Italians. For the time being, the Turks have ruled out the transfer of German troops to Greece through Bulgaria, since they believe that this action would have caused the inevitable entry into the war of Bulgaria, and thus Turkey; the Germans, according to the Turks, do not want now Turkey to side with the Greeks. The Turks are anxiously awaiting the return of Phalen to Ankara, as they believe that he will take all measures to put pressure on the Turkish government in order to cool the Anglo-Turkish friendship and reorient Turkey towards the axis countries. The Turks are especially worried about the unknown position of the USSR in relation to the Balkans and Turkey after the Berlin talks. Some believe that the USSR gave Germany's consent to freedom of action in the Balkans and Turkey. The anxiety of the government circles also spread to the population, among whom there is already a somewhat panicky mood, this affects at least the fact that more or less well-to-do circles are beginning to stock up on food. The recently passed law to black out all cities in Turkey has further exacerbated this mood. Along with this, the English influence is not weakening here. All the British, expelled by the Germans from Romania, settled in Turkey. A large number of British military and civilian specialists are now in Istanbul. Izmir has over one hundred British military pilots and one English general. Martial law has almost been introduced in this city, after 11 pm it is forbidden to walk along the street, the part of the city adjacent to the Aegean Sea has been declared a prohibited area, the police are checking documents in the streets and in public places. Our military officials claim that all this information is reliable. In a conversation with me, Kirov also told me

that the Turks are very anxious and are strenuously preparing for any surprise. In recent days, daily government meetings have been taking place. In addition, Kirov suggested that Bulgaria, in his opinion, would soon enter the Berlin Pact.

Despite the fact that the war is really approaching Turkey, I still believe that the Turkish government will take all measures in its power to avoid entering the war now.

Vinogradov

Avp rf, f. 059, on. 1, p. 314, d. 2163, l. 126-128.

**From: talk of the people's commissioner for foreign affairs of the USSR. M. Molotov with the German nose in the USSR by F. Schulenburg**

November 25, 1940

Top. Secret special stick

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In accordance with the above, the draft protocol to the treaty of four powers, presented by Mr. Ribbentrop, on the delimitation of spheres of influence in the spirit of determining the center of gravity of the USSR aspiration south of Batum and Baku in the general direction to the Persian gulf, should be changed.

In the same way, the draft protocol outlined by Mr. Ribbentrop should be changed - the agreement between Germany, Italy and the USSR on Turkey in the spirit of ensuring the military and naval base of the USSR near the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles on the basis of a long-term lease with a guarantee of 3 powers of independence and the territory of Turkey in case Turkey agrees to join the four powers.

This protocol should provide that in the event of Turkey's refusal to join the four powers, Germany, Italy and the USSR agree to develop and implement the necessary military and diplomatic measures, about which a special agreement should be concluded.

Equally, the following must be adopted: the third secret protocol between the USSR and Germany on Finland; the fourth secret protocol between the USSR and Japan on Japan's renunciation of coal and oil concessions in northern Sakhalin; the fifth secret protocol between the USSR, Germany and Italy, recognizing that Bulgaria, due to its geographical position, is in the security sphere of the black sea borders of the USSR, in connection with which it is considered politically necessary to conclude a pact of mutual assistance between the USSR and Bulgaria, which in no way should not affect either the internal regime of Bulgaria, or its sovereignty and independence.



Archive of the president of the Russian federation, f. 3, on. 64, d.675, l. 108-116.

**Telegram of the secretary general of the NKID USSR Sobolov to the people's commissioner for foreign affairs of the USSR V. M. Molotov**

November 25, 1940

Out of line especially important

Today at 11:30 am I, together with Lavrishchev, were received by the chairman of the council of ministers Filov, to whom I orally stated the content of my statement to the tsar (the meeting with the tsar was scheduled for 5:30). Filov listened with great attention and outwardly calmly. He asked to repeat only the last point - on Bulgaria's joining the pact of three. When I asked if everything was clear to him, Filov confirmed that everything was clear, except for the point where it was said that the USSR was renewing its proposal for a mutual assistance pact with Bulgaria. Filov does not remember that the USSR made such a proposal to Bulgaria in September 1939. I reminded him of your conversation with Antonov in September and of Kyoseivanov's reply in November 1939 to Lavrentiev \*. Filov said that the Soviet government's proposal is very important and will take some time to study. He further noted in passing the complexity of the situation in Bulgaria and said that they knew about the hostile "moods" in Turkey. When I replied that it was not only about him, Filov agreed that there were indeed military preparations by Turkey against Bulgaria. Neither Germany nor Italy were ever mentioned in the conversation.

Filov said that instructions were sent to Stamenov on Saturday to respond to the USSR's proposal on guarantees for Bulgaria. The Bulgarian government thanks the Soviet government for the friendly feelings shown towards Bulgaria but does not see the need to accept the USSR guarantee at this time, since no one threatens Bulgaria.

Filov agrees that the Soviet proposal, set out in my statement, raises the whole question in a new way and requires special study.

Sobolev, avp rf, f. 059, on. 1, p. 331, d. 2272, l. 167-168.

**Telegram of the plenipotentiary representative of the USSR in the Turkish republic ca. Vinogradova in the NKID USSR**

November 26, 1940

Top secret

I saw Papen yesterday. The ambassador spoke with enthusiasm about his meeting in Berlin with comrade Molotov, emphasizing at the same time that a very good impression of comrade Molotov's visit had remained in Berlin. According to Papen, during the conversations, all issues of interest to Germany, from Japan to the Balkans, were raised, and a common opinion was established on these issues. Turning to the situation in Turkey, Papen said: "I have found great anxiety and nervousness here. On Saturday I visited Saracoglu, who asked me about the results of Molotov's conversations with our leaders. I told him that our leaders had acquainted Molotov with the project of creating a new Europe and we had invited our Soviet friends to participate in establishing a new order. The Turks are very worried that Germany may come out today to help Italy in the Balkans, by virtue of which Turkey will be involved in the war. I told Saracoglu that Germany does not intend to affect Turkey's interests. Germany wants Turkey to keep the peace. I also told him that even if Britain creates a front in the Balkans and we are forced to conduct military operations there, in this case Germany will take all measures not to affect the interests of Turkey. " to my remark that Turkish newspapers wrote a lot about the statement made by Papen to foreign journalists and that now there are stories in Ankara that Papen had made a proposal to Saracoglu that required a special discussion at the party group of the Mejlis, the ambassador replied: " immediately upon arrival, I made a statement to the Ulus newspaper that I had never made the declaration attributed to me. As far as I know, this message was broadcast on the radio in Spanish, but here it was mistaken for a DNB message. The truth is that I was invited to a journalist club in Berlin, where journalists asked me a number of questions. My answers to their questions were restrained and moderate. I was asked, in particular, a question about the Straits. I replied that the Straits are primarily of interest to Turkey and the USSR, and that Germany has no even secondary interest in this. There was no

question about the Persian Gulf, which appears in this message. I believe that one of the journalists deliberately presented my answers in such a way as to cause concern in public opinion. "

I asked how Saracoglu reacted to Papen's statement to him. The ambassador replied: "Saracoglu only took note of my words and did not say anything to me. I got the impression that after my conversation with him he felt great relief. The Turks had a very strong opinion that Germany intended to come to the aid of Italy. I believe that Italy has ample opportunity to improve its position in Greece. In any case, Mussolini did not ask us for help and is unlikely to do so. In connection with my conversations with the Turkish leaders, we can now state a certain relaxation of tension. As for their last preparations, I consider it nonsense, since no one threatens Turkey and she can remain calm until she does something herself. " Papen went on to suggest that the Turkish government could change its foreign policy orientation if "you and I will act together. If you and I, Papen continued, we jointly put pressure on the Turkish government, persuading it to change its attitude towards the USSR and towards us and seeking to resolve the issues of interest to you and economic issues, the resolution of which is important for us, we can achieve positive results in this regard.

The basis for our common actions with you may be the statement that was made on our part to Molotov in Berlin. We said that we are interested in preserving peace in Turkey and are not going to affect its interests, but we are ready to cooperate with the Soviet government in resolving issues of interest to your country. If you and I act together, along the same line, we can achieve a foreign policy turn in Turkey. " I didn't reply to what Papen said, confining myself only to the remark that I had not had the opportunity to talk with either Saracoglu or Menemencioglu for the last few days, and therefore I can't say anything about what impression the recent events made on the Turkish government. Phalen said after my remark: "it is very difficult to reveal their common opinion, and in particular in relation to your country. In any case, in response to my comment on this, Saracoglu limited himself to an evasive indication that Turkey is sufficiently armed and that it can defend its independence with arms in hand, whether there will be a

danger from Germany or the Soviet Union. I got the impression that the Turkish government, as a result of its policy, has reached an impasse and cannot get out of it. The Turks believe that it is better for them to fight now than to remain in their present situation, although they know in advance that their entry into the war will bring them destruction. Therefore, it would be nice to tell them that it is time to stop being so distrustful and not to look at us and the Soviet Union so angrily, you need to establish different relations with both the USSR and Germany.

"

From my conversation with Papen, I get the following impression:

1. The Germans have launched a great deal of work here now, trying to achieve from the Turks, if not a turn in their foreign policy, then at least neutralize them at this stage.
2. In their conversations with the Turks, the Germans, of course, present them with all their attitudes under the sauce of the "unanimous opinion" of Germany and the Soviet Union both in relation to Turkey and the Balkans. Papen's proposal for joint pressure on the Turkish government is necessary for the Germans to support this thesis and cover up their own plans.
3. It is likely that the Germans are now doing double work here, that is, on the one hand, they are trying to persuade the Turkish government through diplomacy and, on the other hand, are preparing for a military action if they fail to achieve anything first \*.
4. It is also possible that the Germans secretly carry out subversive work among the Turks against the USSR, stubbornly emphasizing and inspiring at any opportunity "the USSR's interest in resolving the question of the straits."
5. With regard to the statement allegedly made by Papen to foreign journalists in Berlin and then refuted by him upon his arrival in Ankara, I have the opinion that this statement was deliberately launched by Berlin as a test step and was refuted only because the reaction caused by him, was too harsh for the moment.

Vinogradov

Avp rf, f. 059, on. 1, p. 314, d. 2163, l. 135-140.

**Talk of the plenipotentiary representative of the USSR in the Turkish republic of ca. Vinogradova with the ambassador of the kingdom of Yugoslavia in Turkey Shumenkovich**

November 28, 1940 , secret

I visited the Yugoslav ambassador Shumenkovich. Shumenkovich first of all asked me the question: "what did you talk about at the berlin meeting?"

I replied that in comrade Molotov's conversations with the German leaders, issues of interest to both our countries were discussed.

Shumenkovich said: "what exactly are the questions? I have information that in berlin there was a talk about areas of interest to one country and which are the living space (espace vitale) of another country. I know that it was, for example, about the Balkans. It would be extremely interesting to know if any decision on these issues has been made in berlin? "

I replied that I could not add anything to what was published in the Tass report \*, since I myself was not present at the negotiations in berlin.

Shumenkovich said: "according to the information I received, there were talks in berlin about Turkey as well, since Turkey belongs to the regions of interest to the Soviet Union and is part of the living space of Germany."

I asked who Shumenkovich had heard this message from.

Shumenkovich said: "I heard this from circles close to the participants in the berlin talks. Based on what I have heard, I can only assume that in berlin the German side raised these questions before Molotov, but the Soviet Union did not discuss them. In my opinion, the USSR has taken a mysterious position. In any case, the decisions, obviously, were not taken and this is already good. "

Shumenkovich then asked my opinion on the Italian-Greek war. I pointed out that in this matter, apparently, his hypothesis that Italy was not prepared for war turns out to be correct.

Shumenkovich said: "the most interesting question now is whether Germany will come to Italy's aid? I have heard a version of this kind that Germany will act in the Balkans if England creates a front in Greece that resembles the Salonika front of the last war. "

I noticed that, according to Papen, Germany is not going to help Italy, especially since the latter does not ask for it.

Shumenkovich said: "the question comes down to how long Germany will remain a spectator. The concept of a "front in the Balkans" is very vague. If desired, the landing of British divisions in Thessaloniki to help the Greeks can be considered a "front" and a pretext for action. Can then be considered the British front in the Balkans the assistance provided by Britain to Greece with the aim of inflicting the final defeat of Italy?

I replied that, in my personal opinion, much will depend on England, which may try to create a front in the Balkans for conducting offensive operations against Germany.

Shumenkovich said: "this is impossible for England, since she does not have a sufficient army for this."

When I asked about the current mood in Turkey and, in particular, about the reasons for the change of ministers, Shumenkovich replied that "the resignation of ministers is explained by purely personal reasons. Topcuoglu reacted nervously to the difficulties associated with his portfolio. Cetinkaya also, due to his state of health, could not cope with the difficult duties of the minister of railways. As for the position of the Turkish government, it has not changed its policy. In my opinion, Turkey will not enter the war until it is attacked. The Turkish government may be more or less concerned depending on the situation. There will be a threat of war all the time until the war is over. "

S. Vinogradov, avp rf, f. 0132, on. 24a, p. 236, d. 7, l. 32-30



**From: telegrams of the plenipotentiary representative of the USSR in the kingdom of Bulgaria Lavrishchev to the people's commissioner for foreign affairs of the USSR V. M. Molotov**

November 30, 1940

Top secret highly important out of turn

Popov conveyed in oral and written form the response of the Bulgarian government as follows: "the foreign policy of Bulgaria has always been inspired by friendship for the Soviet Union, and there was no case that Bulgaria acted against the interests of the latter. Something more: Bulgaria rejected attempts, accompanied by seductive promises, made by some of the concord powers after the world war in order to push Bulgaria against Soviet Russia. On the other hand, the Bulgarian foreign policy was guided by peacefulness and was never violated. The Bulgarian people have suffered many victims in a series of wars for their unification and have suffered so many losses in the conclusion of peace and so much suffering in recent years that it is the duty of each Bulgarian government to protect its people from any step that would cause them new trials.

.....

Bulgaria has national interests in western Thrace, but she does not intend to implement them by force of arms. She considers these interests to be so fair in all respects that she can count on the support of all those who strive for a just settlement of relations between peoples in the future. Bulgaria is sincerely glad that it has the assurances of the Soviet government on this issue, which were conveyed through its envoy in Sofia on July 6 this year.

The government thanks for the information on Turkey's intentions to provide armed resistance to the penetration of Bulgaria to the south. He knows these intentions, but they do not pose an immediate threat to Bulgaria, since she's not going south with a gun. On the other hand, we have the most categorical assurances from the Turks (we received such assurances very recently, almost simultaneously with the Soviet proposal) that military preparations in Thrace are only of a defensive

nature. Given this position, there can hardly be any doubt that Turkey may feel an immediate threat as a result of the signing of a mutual assistance pact between the Soviet Union and Bulgaria, since the Turks would probably have remained convinced that it was directed against them, and we fear lest the danger of a clash, which we want to avoid and which, we have no doubt, the Soviet Union, does not want, might increase with the current tension. It would be difficult for the Bulgarian people, whose peacefulness the government takes into account, and for the Bulgarian parliament, it would be difficult to understand and accept the obligations providing for Bulgaria's intervention in resolving such a big issue as the question of the straits, which are not covered by the interests of our small country.

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Lavrishchev

Avp rf, f. 059, on. 1, p. 331, d. 2272, l. 192-199.

**Conversation of the first deputy people's commissioner for foreign affairs of the USSR al. Vyshinsky with the ambassador of the Turkish republic in the USSR at Aktaem**

**Sent to comrade Stalin, comrade Molotov, comrade Vyshinsky, comrade Lozovsky, general secretariat**

December 6, 1940

The ambassador came to me with the following questions:

1. About the border incident that took place on November 17 this year. In the area of the border post number 383, as a result of which 2 Turkish soldiers were killed.

I told the ambassador that I would get acquainted with this case, check the facts, and only then could I give an answer.

2. About the transit of some goods through the USSR from Sweden and Finland to Turkey. The ambassador presented the attached list of notes verbales sent by the Turkish embassy to the NKID, to which a response has not yet been received. The ambassador asked to speed up the response to them.

I promised the ambassador to familiarize himself with these notes and take measures to expedite the resolution of the transit issue.

3. On the strengthening of trade relations between the Soviet Union and Turkey. The ambassador said that the Turkish government is very willing to develop commercial relations between Turkey and the Soviet Union. The ambassador spoke on this topic on behalf of his government with the deputy people's commissar for foreign affairs Dekanozov, who promised to give the ambassador an answer in the near future.

At the moment, the Turkish government is ready to begin discussing the question of what goods Turkey can supply to the Soviet Union and what goods it would like to receive from the USSR.

The ambassador handed me a copy of the note on trade relations between the USSR and Turkey, handed to him by Dekanozov  
November 13, 1940

I told the ambassador that I will try to answer this question as soon as possible.

4. About calculations for the Sardarabad dam. The ambassador handed me a copy of the memo on this issue, also handed to him on November 13 this year. V. Dekanozov. The ambassador told me that he will take any decision on this issue, he is ready to consider me an arbiter in this matter.

I told the ambassador that I am not aware of this issue, so it is difficult for me to be an arbiter now; I promised to get acquainted with the details of the case.

5. The ambassador handed me a copy of the note handed over to him on November 13/20 of this year. V. Dekanozov, about the complaints of the Turkish consul in Batumi about the hostile attitude from the local authorities.

I told the ambassador that I would ask the Batumi authorities for an explanation on the merits of this case. The embassy will be notified of the results.

6. At the end of the conversation, the ambassador, referring to a previous conversation with me \*, said that he conveyed my opinion on the Italian-Greek conflict to his government. The Turkish government was very pleased with this message. After comrade V. M. Molotov to Berlin, the ambassador talked with comrade Dekanozov, who made some explanations to the ambassador about this trip. The ambassador is very grateful for these explanations, which dispelled the false rumors that took place in connection with the visit of comrade V. M. Molotov. The ambassador asked me if I could tell him something about the mission of comrade Soboleva in Sofia \*.

I replied to the ambassador that, unfortunately, I am not fully aware of this matter, since comrade Molotov is in charge of this matter directly.

To this the ambassador told me that he was interested in comrade Sobolov's visit because after comrade Sobolov's visit to Sofia, Bulgaria's position had changed dramatically: Bulgaria, which had recently called for war, had calmed down and maintained its neutrality. The Turkish

government believes that this change in the position of Bulgaria can be attributed entirely and only to the influence of the Soviet government.

Our conversation ended there.

Comrade Chumakova was present at the conversation.

Attached are copies of the notes mentioned in the text \*\*.

A. Vyshinsky avp rf, f. 07, on. 1, p. 2, d. 27, l. 4-6.

**Conversation of the people's commissioner for foreign affairs of the USSR Molotov with the ambassador of the Turkish republic in the USSR**

December 10, 1940

Top secret special folder

The ambassador declares that many changes have taken place in world political life since his meeting with comrade Molotov \*. Of these changes, Turkey is most interested in Italy's declaration of war on Greece. As the ambassador predicted during his last conversation with comrade Molotov, Greece took up arms to defend itself. Fortunately for all the Balkan countries, she successfully fights against Italy.

After Italy's declaration of war on Greece in the Balkans, an alarming period began. It seemed that new complications would follow. The trips of comrade Molotov and the Bulgarian tsar Boris to Berlin were followed by comrade Sobolov's visit to the Bulgarian capital \*\*. After comrade Sobolov's visit to Sofia, Turkey was able to state that the "wind of war" has stopped blowing in the Balkans, and the Turkish government hopes that the Balkans in the world will survive the ongoing crisis.

When the Italian-Greek war broke out, the ambassador, at the direction of his government, asked comrade Vyshinsky about how the Soviet government viewed this war. Comrade Vyshinsky conveyed to the ambassador the answer of the Soviet government, which was received with satisfaction in Ankara. In addition, in response to the ambassador's request, comrade Dekanozov informed him of comrade Molotov's trip to Berlin. The explanations given by comrade Dekanozov were very reassuring, since they represented an official refutation of the tendentious rumors spread after comrade Molotov's return from Berlin.

Turkey's leaders have an impression that turns into a conviction that the atmosphere of peace and tranquility that has recently been established in the Balkans owes its origin to the influence of the Soviet government on current events. The Turkish government would be very happy if comrade Molotov could inform him of the position of the

Soviet government in relation to Turkey and Bulgaria, so that Turkey could take this position into account in subsequent policy towards its neighbors.

Comrade Molotov replies that he is ready to inform the ambassador on questions of interest to the latter. Reminding the ambassador that the latter asked comrade Vyshinsky a question about comrade Sobolov's trip to Sofía, comrade Molotov confirms the answer given by comrade Vyshinsky that the negotiations in Bulgaria were conducted under the direct supervision of comrade Molotov.

After his trip to Berlin, comrade Molotov got the impression that Bulgaria was feeling bad, that it was apprehensive about its position and was looking for a guarantee from Italy or Germany. In this regard, on behalf of comrade Molotov, comrade Soboleva visited the Bulgarian tsar and informed him that if comrade Molotov's impressions were true and Bulgaria needed a guarantee to maintain peace, then the Soviet government was ready to discuss this issue in the interests of peace.

Comrade Molotov says that he should, as a frank statement, add that he had the impression that an attack on Bulgaria from Turkey was not ruled out. Therefore, comrade Soboleva was instructed to say in Sofía that the USSR considers it possible to discuss with Bulgaria either the question of giving a guarantee to Bulgaria from the USSR, or the question of a pact of mutual assistance between the USSR and Bulgaria. The Bulgarian government gave the following answer to this: the Bulgarian government believes that at this time the situation in Bulgaria has improved and, in this regard,, it does not see at the moment the need to obtain the guarantee about which we raised the question.

Thanking comrade Molotov for his report and for the frankness with which it was made, Aktay promises to immediately report it to his government. For his part, the ambassador considers it necessary to state that the Turkish government has never considered the issue of Turkey's attack on Bulgaria. The Turkish government, on the contrary, could state numerous signs that spoke of the danger of an attack on Turkey from Bulgaria. Recently, however, tensions in Turkish-Bulgarian relations have been defused and the Turkish government has asked the

Bulgarian government whether there is a way to eliminate the atmosphere of uncertainty prevailing in relations between the two countries. Aktay suggests that the Turkish government is currently exchanging views with the Bulgarian government on this issue.

Returning to the question of the possibility of a Turkish attack on Bulgaria and emphasizing that he is making a completely official statement, the ambassador says that the Turkish government will not take any action, especially in the Balkans and the black sea region, without the consent of the Soviet government. The ambassador asks to have full confidence in his words that Turkey has never considered the possibility of an attack on Bulgaria.

Comrade Molotov replies that, as is widely known, Turkey has concentrated a large number of its troops in areas directly bordering Bulgaria, and this naturally raises certain questions and doubts. As for the negotiations between Bulgaria and Turkey, which the ambassador mentioned, are they not negotiations on a mutual assistance pact or some other similar agreement? If the ambassador could inform comrade Molotov on this issue in the same way as he informed him about Sobolov's trip, then such information would be of interest.

Aktay acknowledges the presence of a large number of Turkish troops in Thrace. According to him, it was caused by the information that reached the Turkish government that Turkey is threatened with an attack from the north. The arrival of German troops in Romania and the militant position of Bulgaria were the reasons for the concentration of Turkish troops.

Regarding the Bulgarian-Turkish negotiations, the ambassador states that he does not know their details and does not know if there is a question of a mutual assistance pact. The ambassador promises to ask his government about this and expresses confidence that he will be able to convey to comrade Molotov the answer to his question no later than 48 hours later.

The ambassador will add that he heard about these negotiations on the radio from Ankara. In addition, a week ago he received a telegram from Saracoglu, who reported about the relaxation of tensions in the Turkish-



Bulgarian relations and that the Turkish government was exchanging views with the Bulgarian government on the possibility of "allaying uncertainty" in these relations.

At the end of the conversation, the ambassador asks about comrade Molotov's view of the general situation: are we on the eve of peace or on the eve of the continuation of the war?

Comrade Molotov replies that there are only rumors and talks about peace, while the war is going on, it, unfortunately, is a reality.

The ambassador says that we should be happy that there is peace in the area of the globe that we occupy.

Comrade Molotov replies that peace is a great blessing and we must spare no effort to maintain it.

Recorded subcerob of wua rf, f.ob, op. 2, p.z, d.19, l.10-14.

**From: telegram of the plenipotentiary representative of the USSR in the Turkish republic ca. Vinogradova in the people's commissariat for foreign affairs of the USSR**

December 13, 1940

Out of line top secret

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Moreover, the Turkish government was informed about this proposal. Saracoglu said: "this was done at our request; we would like to hear Molotov's answer." I repeated that I would forward the minister's statement to Moscow and noticed that lately there have been persistent rumors about the alleged negotiations between Turkey and Bulgaria. Saracoglu replied: "negotiations are too much. I can say that, wishing to ensure tranquility in the Balkans, we have put forward some suggestions from our side". I said that there were rumors about the upcoming conclusion between Turkey and Bulgaria of some kind of agreement, perhaps even a mutual assistance pact. Saracoglu reiterated that "talking about a pact is too much. Considering that Bulgaria, like us, is interested in preserving peace, we put forward some considerations. As for the fears of Bulgaria on the part of Turkey, we gave her repeated assurances that she had nothing to fear from us". I replied that I still do not understand from the minister's answer whether the rumors that an agreement is being prepared between Turkey and Bulgaria are true. Avoiding a direct answer, Saracoglu asked me if I consider it possible for Bulgaria to agree to a mutual assistance pact with Turkey? I replied that it was difficult for me to speak for the government of Bulgaria and, moreover, in this case, I was not interested in the position of Bulgaria, but in the position of Turkey. Saracoglu, agreeing with me, said: "there are three currents in Bulgaria: its leaders are closely connected with Germany and the pro-German trend is strong there. But there is also a strong movement for the preservation of peace. It reveals itself less, but there is also a trend that advocates strengthening ties with the Soviet Union. We are based on Bulgaria's desire to keep the peace in the Balkans. We are not obliged according to the pact to inform the Soviet Union, since Bulgaria is our

neighbor, but we will widely inform the Soviet government on these issues. " I then asked Saracoglu for his opinion on the current situation. The minister said: "it is very difficult to make any assumptions now, since reason and logic do not play any role at the moment in determining the course of events. Now every day you can expect some news. " as unexpected and inexplicable, in his opinion, the events Saracoglu cited the Italian attack on Greece \*, suggesting that "by the spring the Greeks will be able to throw the Italians into the sea." referring to the Turkish-German relations, Saracoglu said: "there are unthinkable disagreements between our country and Germany. If Germany does not intend to descend into the Balkans, then there is no reason to complicate our relations with her. Since we received assurances from Berlin that they have no aggressive intentions towards Turkey and the Balkans, we can note the improvement in relations between our countries.

I personally believe that Germany's assurances can be trusted, at the moment they obviously really do not want to go down to the Balkans. However, we remain very vigilant, since there are no guarantees that when it needs it, Germany will find thousands of reasons and excuses to do what it wants. In any case, we state that the Soviet Union is calm, and we are also calm. " Saracoglu asked me if I could inform him about the results of the Berlin talks. I said that, as far as I know, Dekanozov informed Aktay on this matter. I can only repeat the same. Saracoglu said that he knew Dekanozov's answer.

During the conversation, Saracoglu was very nervous and not particularly talkative. It was very noticeable that when he raised his last question, he expected to receive a more detailed answer than the one given by Dekanozov to Aktay.

Vinogradov

Wua rf, f.059, op.1, p.314, d.2163, l.170-174.

**Talk of the people's commissioner for foreign affairs of the USSR.  
M. Molotov with the ambassador of the Turkish republic in the USSR**

December 14, 1940

Top secret special folder

The ambassador declares that on the question raised to him by comrade Molotov on December 10 \*, he received the following message from Ankara.

In early December, the Turkish government found it necessary to inform the Bulgarian government that military and administrative measures (declaration of a state of siege, blackout of cities, etc.) Were taken by the Turkish government in connection with the fact that the war was approaching the Balkans. However, these measures do not include any aggressive intentions against Bulgaria.

Convinced that the Bulgarian government has no doubts about its neighbor, the Turkish government is ready to give it any assurances. The Turkish government, not knowing the opinion of the Bulgarian government on this issue, is nevertheless confident that the strengthening of any great power in the Balkan peninsula would be undesirable and dangerous for the independence of the Balkan states.

The Turkish government states that although the geographical position of both countries obliges them to have a different direction of foreign policy, there is one point uniting Turkey with Bulgaria, this is the desire not to be involved in the war and to do everything possible to maintain peace and tranquility in both countries. If the Bulgarian government agrees with the Turkish government, then, regardless of the foreign policy sympathies of each country, the Turkish government is ready to discuss with the Bulgarian government the conclusion of a local agreement aimed at preventing involvement in the war.

Bulgarian foreign minister Popov welcomed the Turkish statement and said he shared the same view. But, given the extreme sensitivity of the Germans, he would not like to take any action that could worsen the current situation. Therefore, he decided to invite the Bulgarian envoy

to Ankara to Sofia in order to discuss the Turkish proposals with him and to find a formula that could not displease any of the great powers.

The Turkish government is currently awaiting a response from Popov. As soon as the conversations with the Bulgarians are resumed, the Turkish government through Aktay informs comrade Molotov about them.

Comrade Molotov asks whether the conclusion of a definite agreement was envisaged in the Bulgarian-Turkish conversations.

The ambassador replies that Turkey did not make any specific proposal on this or that agreement, but only limited itself to raising the question. At the same time, the ambassador explains that, speaking about the foreign policy sympathies of Bulgaria and Turkey, he meant that Bulgaria is on the side of Germany.

Comrade Molotov notes that, as he understood the meaning of these negotiations, they were allegedly based on the desire to prevent the strengthening of any great power in the Balkans. Comrade Molotov draws the ambassador's attention to the fact that the strengthening of the great powers is already taking place in the Balkans. Italy and England are at war, have naval and air bases and are strengthening their positions in the Balkans with weapons. Germany, as the ambassador himself admitted, has Bulgaria on its side, not to mention Romania, in which both Germany and Italy have strengthened. Comrade Molotov asks, against the strengthening of which great power in the Balkans is the draft Turkish-Bulgarian agreement directed.

The ambassador admits that comrade Molotov's remark that the great powers are already strengthening themselves in the Balkans is correct. However, no one invited Italy to the Balkans. Having occupied Albania, she prepared an attack on Greece. The Turkish-Bulgarian agreement would not be directed against one or another power and would only prevent the transformation of Bulgaria or Turkey into an instrument of a great power that wants to involve these countries in the war. We believe, the ambassador says, that if one of us enters the war, then the other country will fatally have to participate in the war.

Comrade Molotov notes that the ambassador referred to the fact that no one invited Italy to Bazhany. In this case, it can be assumed that England, who was invited there, and which came there with their battleships and planes, as well as Germany and Italy, who were invited to Romania, have some rights on the Balkan peninsula. Or does the ambassador believe that the arrival of these three great powers in the Balkans is a positive fact?

The ambassador replies that Germany gives Turkey assurances that it has no intention of coming to Bazhany. The arrival of the Germans in Romania is a fact, the help of the British to Greece is also an indisputable fact. In order to avoid similar facts in Turkey and Bulgaria, the Turkish government asked Bulgaria if it was possible to agree to a local agreement.

The ambassador says that he has the impression that comrade Molotov did not respond well to the Turkish proposal for a purely defensive agreement with Bulgaria.

Comrade Molotov replies that he has not yet [not] expressed any relation to this issue and that his questions are preliminary.

Then the ambassador asks comrade Molotov to tell him what issues of interest to Turkey were raised during comrade Molotov's talks in Berlin. There is various information on this in Turkey. At one time, comrade Dekanozov gave Aktay some explanations on this matter. The Turkish government would like to have information on this matter from comrade Molotov himself.

Comrade Molotov reminds Aktay that at one time he was informed on this issue by comrade Dekanozov, who participated in the Berlin conversations. The course of events confirmed the accuracy of comrade Dekanozov's information.

Comrade Molotov's trip to Berlin was not intended to reach a new agreement. Its purpose was to exchange views on issues of interest to Germany and the USSR, on the implementation of the Soviet-German agreements concluded last year, as well as on the further development

of Soviet-German relations. No agreement in berlin was planned or concluded.

Comrade Molotov says that he, in turn, would like to know about the content of the conversations that the German ambassador to Ankara von Phalen had with Saracoglu and the president of the republic of Turkey after his return from berlin. There were a number of obscure reports on this score. In particular, it was reported that in these conversations Turkish-Bulgarian relations were also touched upon, especially since after these conversations the Bulgarian envoy to Ankara Kirov left for Sofia.

Aktay thanks comrade Molotov for the answer and says that Kirov's trip to Sofia had nothing to do with Papen's conversations with Saracoglu and ismet. It was carried out at the request of Popov, who wished to discuss with his envoy the possibility of a local agreement with Turkey.

In conversations with Saracoglu and ismet after returning from berlin, Papen, according to Aktay, said the following: 1) in Molotov's conversations with Hitler, the German government emphasized that the German government considers Turkey's independence and inviolability to be necessary for the balance of world politics; 2) during comrade Molotov's talks in berlin, the Soviet and German governments came to an agreement to expand the space in which peace reigns and, if possible, to narrow the space in which the war is going on; both governments agreed that negotiations on this issue should continue; 3) judging by the political atmosphere, it is believed in Germany that relations between the USSR and Turkey are not good. If relations between Turkey and Germany are improved, the German government will do what is necessary to improve Soviet-Turkish relations.

Papen, according to Aktay, received a categorical response from the Turkish government that relations between the USSR and Turkey are and will be normal and friendly and that there is no need for mediation between Turkey and the USSR.

Comrade Molotov asks Aktay whether ismet Inonu informed Papen what Aktay told comrade Molotov on December 10, namely, that

Turkey would not come out and declare war, especially in the Balkans and the black sea region, without the consent of the Soviet government.

The ambassador replies that in his last conversation with comrade Molotov, he allegedly spoke only about the fact that Turkey would not undertake any action without informing the Soviet government about it. This action also means a declaration of war.

Comrade Molotov notes that it is impossible to hide the war and that reporting such a fact is not something special.

Aktay adds that today he can say that the Turkish government will not take any action without the consent of the USSR. As for whether Papen is informed about this, the ambassador does not know. However, he, knowing Ismet's political line, suggests that the latter may have told Papen about this.

Comrade Molotov declares that he can say the following about Germany and the USSR. Germany, as you know, is a warring country, and the USSR is a country of peace and a supporter of the war not expanding but coming to an end. Everything that is in the interests of the world is in the interests of the USSR. This follows from all Soviet politics and is consistent with relations between the Soviet Union and Turkey.

On instructions from his government, Aktay asks comrade Molotov for the opinion of the Soviet government on how much they correspond to art. 2 of the Soviet-Turkish protocol of 1929 \* proposals made by the Soviet Union to Bulgaria on guarantees and a pact.

Comrade Molotov replies that the representative of the NKID, comrade Soboleva, only asked the Bulgarian government: if Bulgaria needs guarantees and wants them from Germany and Italy, then wouldn't it be better to get these guarantees from the USSR. Comrade Molotov informed the ambassador of comrade Sobolov's question and the reply of the Bulgarian government. The USSR does not conduct any negotiations with Bulgaria and did not transfer any draft agreement to it. Thus, says comrade Molotov, all this has nothing to do with art. 2 of the mentioned protocol.



Comrade Molotov asks Aktay how much they correspond to art. 2 protocols from 1929 negotiations which are underway between Bulgaria and Turkey.

Aktay replies that he finds comrade Molotov's answer quite satisfactory, takes note of it, is confident that the Turkish government will share his opinion, and considers the question to be settled. As regards comrade Molotov's question, the point is as follows. The Turkish government has probed the Bulgarian government on a specific issue but has not yet received an answer. As soon as the answer is received, the ambassador informs the Soviet government about it. All these actions comply with art. 2 Soviet-Turkish agreements.

Concluding the conversation, comrade Molotov replies that he takes the ambassador's statement into consideration.

Recorded subcerob of the rf wua, f.ob, op. 2, p.z, d.19, l.50-57.

\* see minutes of December 17, 1929 (documents ... - t. Xii. - doc. 377.)

**Telegram of the plenipotentiary representative of the USSR in the Turkish republic ca. Vinogradova in the NKID USSR**

December 17, 1940

Top secret

Today again Saracoglu invited me to his place. Asking to convey his gratitude to comrade Molotov for the information that Aktay received from comrade Molotov, Sarajoglu said that "the Turkish government is very pleased that from Molotov's answer it can be understood that article 2 of the 1929 protocol remained in force." then Sarajoglu said: "I just wanted to clarify two questions: 1) after answering our question about how compatible the proposals made by the Soviet Union to Bulgaria \* were with article 2, Molotov asked Aktay the question of "why the Turkish government did not inform the Soviet Union about their negotiations, which are currently underway with Bulgaria ". Aktay told Molotov the data on this issue that we sent him. However, so that there are no misunderstandings, I would like to clarify the following in my answer: the secret protocol to the pact contains an indication of when Turkey and the USSR should inform each other about their negotiations with third countries \*\*. This protocol precisely lists all the countries that should be considered as neighboring states in relation to one country or another. This protocol states that Bulgaria is a neighboring state in relation to Turkey and that therefore the Soviet Union has an obligation to inform the Turkish government of all negotiations that it intends to start with Bulgaria. Turkey, for its part, is not obliged to inform the USSR about its negotiations with Bulgaria, since Bulgaria is not a neighboring state with your country. " I noticed that Bulgaria, like the USSR, is located on the black sea. Sarajoglu again referred to the secret protocol, indicating that Bulgaria was not listed in this protocol as a neighbor of the USSR. He further said that Aktay, while informing Molotov of the data sent to him about our negotiations with the Bulgarian government, obviously did not know about the secret protocol. "I, of course, do not want to say by this that we refuse to inform the Soviet government about this or that of our negotiations with Bulgaria. But I ask you to take into account that we want to fulfill this not as a formal obligation for us, but as a manifestation of friendly

feelings, as evidence of good-neighborly relations. I would like to convey this to you in order to establish a mutual understanding of this issue. " I said that I would bring the question raised by the minister to Moscow's attention. At the same time, without going into the essence of this issue, I stated that I want to make a small clarification. I pointed out that, according to the information I have, the question raised by comrade Molotov to Aktay was of a somewhat different order. Comrade Molotov asked Aktay how the negotiations between Bulgaria and Turkey correspond to article 2. As Mr. Minister sees, in the question of comrade Molotov there are no words "why the Turkish government did not inform", etc. Sarajoglu, embarrassed, remarked: "in this case, Aktay did not inform us correctly on this issue, but I repeat to you again that the Turkish government listened with great satisfaction to Molotov's answer on the question of Sobolov's conversation with the Bulgarian tsar, and is pleased to note that the Soviet government also considers the pact existing between our countries to be in force. I would like, Sarajoglu continued, to clarify one more question: the answer that Aktay received from Molotov on the question of whether the question of Turkey was raised during the berlin talks or not does not satisfy us. The answer that was given to Aktay does not go beyond the framework of the published communique \*\*\*. Therefore, I am asking you to inform me about this if you have the relevant information. I ask you to inform Moscow about my request and, if Moscow answers, inform me. " I replied that, as far as I know, Aktay asked comrade Molotov and comrade Dekanozov a question about the berlin negotiations and he did not express the Turkish government's dissatisfaction with the answers of comrade Molotov and comrade Dekanozov on this matter. I added that I would inform Moscow about the sentiments of the Turkish government, conveyed to me by the minister.

On the last question of Saracoglu, I made him a hint about our position in relation to Turkey in the spirit of the fifth point of Molotov's telegram about the berlin negotiations, since I believed that after the conversations between Molotov and Dekanozov with Akte, in which this issue was not raised, I should raise this question should not be asked now. I ask you to give instructions on the questions raised by Saracoglu. I also ask you to tell me what the essence of the secret

protocol is, which the minister refers to in his last conversations with me.

Vinogradov

Wua rf, f.059, op.1, p.314, d.2163, l.182-185.

**From: talk of the plenipotentiary representative of the USSR in the Great Britain I. M. Maisky with the minister of foreign affairs of the Great Britain A. Iden**

**Sent to comrade Molotov, comrade Vyshinsky**

December 27, 1940

Secret

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5. Eden, of course, was interested in the general lines of our policy. He specifically asked me about our relations with Germany, japan, china, Turkey, the Balkans, the middle east. I declared that I had no instructions from my government to inform Eden on all these questions, and therefore I could only state my personal point of view. This is what it boils down to: the USSR pursued and is pursuing its own, independent, independent policy, which remains, as before, the policy of peace. The USSR does not want to be drawn into the war and will try to take the necessary measures to preserve its neutrality in the future. The USSR does not sympathize with the expansion of the field of war, especially to areas close to its borders. The relations of the USSR with Germany are conditioned by the Soviet-German agreements, political and economic, which are known to everyone. Our economic relations with Germany are strictly based on the principle of mutual benefit. The USSR would like to have normal political and economic relations with japan, as it would like it in relations with all other countries, but, of course, the achievement of such relations is possible not at the expense of our principles or our interests. The Soviet policy towards china remains unchanged. The relations of the USSR with Turkey continue to be good, and in general the USSR seeks to develop friendly ties with the Balkans and the middle eastern peoples. Eden was evidently in the course of my presentation, he several times nodded his head sympathetically, as if wishing to emphasize his agreement. After each section of my message, Eden definitely wanted to say, "I thought so." when I finished, Eden said that he found the invariability of the USSR's policy towards china and the friendly relations of the USSR with the Balkan countries, including Turkey, especially valuable. Here Eden again returned to the Moscow communiqué of 1935, once again began to prove that there were no fundamental contradictions in interests between the USSR and Great Britain, and that therefore, more than ever, it was necessary to look for a common language between the two countries. I replied that I had more than once heard from the lips of

British government officials that they wanted to improve relations with the USSR, but, unfortunately, so far, all such statements have remained just a dead letter. I would like to hope that in this case it will be different and that good words will also be followed by good deeds. In any case, I will wait for things to be done before summing up the final results satisfied with my messages.

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I. Maisky avprf, f.059, op.24, p.70, d.43, l.132-137.

**Conversation of the people's commissioner for foreign affairs of the USSR V. M. Molotov with the ambassador of the kingdom of Italy in the USSR a. Rosso**

December 30, 1940

Secret

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Comrade Molotov replies that he takes note of these words and thinks that the special interests of the USSR in this matter are clear to the Italian government.

Rosso goes on to move on to the section of the June 25 statement relating to Turkey. The distrust of Turkey from Italy is as great as the distrust of the USSR. Turkey is pursuing an essentially anti-Italian policy. Ciano told Gorelkin that the Italian government agreed to recognize the USSR's superior position in the black sea and declared Italy's rights in the Mediterranean.

Comrade Molotov asks the ambassador to clarify exactly what Ciano means when he speaks of Italian superiority in the Mediterranean.

Rosso replies that he does not yet have instructions on this matter and promises to request Rome. For his part, the ambassador asks comrade Molotov to give an explanation on the question of the interests of the USSR in the black sea and the straits.

Comrade Molotov replies that the USSR's interest in the straits is connected with the issue of the security of the union's black sea borders. Russia has been attacked more than once from the straits. During the Crimean war of 1854-55. The war came to Russia through the straits. In 1918, England, across the straits, carried out its intervention against Russia. In 1919, the French entered Russia through the straits. Turkey is currently an ally of England, and Britain is taking measures to strengthen its position in the eastern Mediterranean by setting up new naval bases on the Greek islands, which the USSR cannot ignore. We understand Italy's position on the Mediterranean Sea issue. Does the Italian government understand the position of the USSR on the issue of the breakdown from the point of view of the security of its borders, taking into account the position of Turkey and England and the historical experience of the USSR?

The ambassador replies that the statement made by Ciano on December 26 includes an understanding of the exceptional importance for the USSR not only of the black sea itself, but also of the "gateway" to it. The

ambassador assumes that his government understands the interests of the USSR in this matter. He promises to ask Rome on this matter.

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Recorded subcerob wua rf, f. 06, on. 2, p. 20, d. 229, l. Is — 21.

**1941**

**From the diary of the plenipotentiary representative of the USSR in the kingdom of Romania a. I. Lavrentiev**

January 6, 1941

Secret



I called the military attaché of the Turkish mission, Kocaturk, and said that I would like to meet with him. Kocaturk agreed to this and came to the embassy.

I asked Kocaturk how he assessed the situation created in Romania as a result of the arrival of German troops. Kocaturk stated the following:

A month ago, it was believed that at least one infantry division was stationed in Romania, which arrived to train the Romanian army and which was deployed as separate companies and battalions in various points in Romania: roman, Bacau, Focsani, Rshnik-sarat, Buzau, Ploiesti, Bucharest, Djurzhu, Brasov, Targovishte and others with a command post in Brasov.

From the second half of December to January 1, at least 2 more divisions arrived in Romania.

The location of these 2 new divisions was as follows: one division was sent to Banat [division commander in Timisoara]; another division - towards the southeastern border of the country [dzhurzhu, optenitsa, kala-rash]. The command of the second division is located in Bucharest. With the arrival of new units, the command post of the division that arrived first moved to Bacau. This division was concentrated in Moldavia.

Continuing German troops are concentrating on the country's southeastern border. From this disposition and movement of the troops, it can be judged that the Germans intend to cross the Danube and enter Bulgaria. One division, located in Banat, will cover the main group of forces moving south from the right flank, and the other division, located in Moldova, will provide protection from the left flank.

The above considerations are also supported by the facts that the units arriving at the Romanian-Bulgarian border are located not in barracks, but in camps. Obviously, their stay in these places will not be long. In addition, from personal observations of k [okaTurk1 and other military attachés, it follows that the Germans are concentrating a large number of engineering units and pontoon means on the Romanian-Bulgarian

border and attracting Romanian forces here. This indicates that they are going to cross the Danube. Moreover, there is reliable information. K [Kocaturk] said that he has his own person in the Medjidie, who has his task to monitor the movement of military trains, that the Germans have concentrated and continue to concentrate a large number of troops and in northern Dobruja, in particular, many German troops are passing through Constanta. According to an observer from Medjidie, about 80 military trains have passed through Medjidie to northern Dobruja to this day. K [Kocaturk] considers this figure exaggerated, explaining it by the ignorance of his observer in military affairs.

I asked Kocaturk] a question - how many, in his opinion, German troops are in Romania today. K [Kocaturk] replied that it can be considered established that there are at least 3 infantry divisions [wartime manning - deployed] and one air division [fighter regiment, reconnaissance aviation regiment, bomber regiment and air defense regiment] in Romania. This is, of course, at least, and as a maximum for today it can be considered possible to have 5 infantry divisions and one air division.

Kocaturk] speaks of only 3 divisions only because he personally could identify only 3 divisions by identification marks [on vehicles, etc.]. The first of the arriving divisions bears the identification mark in the form of parallel lines, the second - in the form of the Latin letter y [igrek] with a crossed-out base, and the third - a circle divided into three parts by radii.

K [Kocaturk] pointed out that the Germans are sending more material to Romania than the soldiers, and, according to some military attaches, military material [weapons, ammunition, uniforms, equipment, food - canned food] for 20-25 divisions has already been sent to Romania. But Kocaturk] is inclined to think that the last figure is greatly exaggerated.

However, it is a fact that in Romania there is already military material to supply the personnel who are arriving or may arrive.

K [Kocaturk] indicated that he was told that 2000 German officers were arriving in Bucharest. Two generals have already arrived, in addition

to the existing four, whom he personally knows as the generals in charge of the German military mission in Romania.

Regarding the number of military trains arriving daily in Romania, K [Kocaturk] said that he did not have these data, since they are difficult to obtain. He can cite as an example his conversation that he had on December 28 with the chief of a railway station located between Ploiesti and Bucharest, who said that he was given the task of passing 750 military echelons through his station from January 1 to January 7. Regarding the goals of concentration of German troops in Romania, Kocaturk] indicated that, in his opinion, the Germans would enter Bulgaria and, together with the Bulgarian army, would launch an offensive against Turkey, seeking to seize the straits and throw the Turks off the European mainland. Upon completion of this task, it will be possible to end Greece even by a simple diplomatic route, by presenting an ultimatum to her. After that, having thus provided assistance to the Italians, the Germans will launch an offensive against the USSR, since, according to Kocaturk], the German headquarters considers the USSR to be as much an enemy as England. Therefore, Germany wants to quickly launch a war against the USSR, so as not to give the USSR the opportunity to grow stronger still. The occupation of the straits will have the aim of preventing the provision of possible aid to the USSR by Britain.

To this I noticed that it seemed to me absolutely impossible for Germany to embark on such an adventure as an attack on the USSR. If we continue the colonel's thought that Germany is seeking to seize the straits, then it can logically be assumed that Germany will not stop there, but will seek ways to penetrate Egypt and, as they say, after conquering the straits will continue to move through Turkey and Syria. K [Kocaturk] replied that, in his opinion, it is very difficult, almost impossible to do this way.

In his personal opinion, in the event of a German penetration into Bulgaria, it would be necessary to attack the Germans and Bulgarians from two sides: Yugoslavia would attack Bulgaria from the west, and Turkey from the southeast. With the help of the British and Greeks, this war in the Balkans could have lasted for about a year and thus kept the

Germans in one place. A year later, however, the situation could change seriously.

In conclusion, k [Kocaturk] expressed his opinion that Yugoslavia would not let the German troops through; Bulgaria will let through and even fight with the Germans against Turkey and that the arrival of German troops in Bulgaria should be expected from day to day, at the latest - in a week.

K [Kocaturk] pointed out that in Bulgaria there is already one German air defense communications battalion on the line between Razgrad - Plevna, which even the German military attaché allegedly told him a few days ago.

Lavrentiev avp rf, f. 0125, on. 27, p. 122, d. 4, l. 68-71.

**From a conversation of the plenipotentiary representative of the USSR in Germany Dekanozov with the temporary attorney in the Turkish republic in Germany F. Alkendom**

Sent to comrade Molotov, comrade Vyshinsky, general secretariat

January 13, 1941 secret

[...] "Romania, the so-called "legionary state", is a Balkan country, joined the pact of the three and found it possible to let German troops into their country. Hungary is also a Balkan country, which, as you know, joined the pact of three. Countries such as Bulgaria, Yugoslavia and Greece now differ from these countries. As for the Soviet Union, it

primarily pursues its own interests and conducts its own foreign policy, and in each individual case its actions will depend on what kind of relationship exists between the Soviet Union and the country in question. "

A [lkend] replied that, in his opinion, the Soviet Union still cannot remain passive in the case of Germany's occupation of the Balkans, since the occupation of the Balkans will be followed by the occupation of Turkey, and Turkey may be followed by Russia. Germany, having occupied Turkey, will first of all seize the Mosul oil sources, and then will seek to seize Baku. A [lkend] stressed that even in the last war, when Germany and Turkey were allies, after Turkey's occupation of Baku there was a clash between Turkish and German troops, even then Germany did not want to cede oil sources to Turkey. Germany wants to seize all oil fields, so the Soviet Union cannot be indifferent to her actions. I replied that if we talk about the danger in relation to Baku, then we should speak first of all about the precedents that took place not so long ago, when someone's planes, not German ones, made reconnaissance flights both over Baku and over Batumi \*, which was also mentioned in the white book published by the Germans. And [lkend] said that he knew what I was talking about, but he wanted to assure me that it was a misunderstanding, the Turks could not let the British planes fly over Batumi, Turkey knows the price of friendship with the Soviet Union, therefore its aspiration is to keep good and friendly relations with the Soviet Union. I added that a lot of papers had been written on this in due time and I would not like to add anything to what happened now but mentioned this in connection with the fact that the attorney raised this issue. And [lkend], continuing this conversation, said that in the last speech of the Turkish prime minister it was said that Turkey will not allow any country to use its bases. I said that I did not have this speech. A [lkend] expressed its readiness to send me its text.

To my question, when a [lkend] was expecting the arrival of the ambassador, a [lkend] replied that Gerege was ill himself, and now his wife was ill, and he did not know exactly when he would arrive.

Saying goodbye, a [lkend] once again remarked that if Turkey is in danger, he hopes that the Soviet Union will not be indifferent.

The conversation lasted 1 hour and 50 minutes.

Plenipotentiary representative of the USSR in Germany Dekanozov avprf, f. 082, on. 24, p. 105, db, l. 75-76.

**Talk of the people's commissioner for foreign affairs of the USSR.  
M. Molotov with German ambassador to the USSR F. Schulenburg**

January 23, 1941, Top secret special folder

Schulenburg transmits to comrade Molotov the replies of the German government to his inquiry regarding the Soviet government's statement of November 25 \*\* and to the Soviet government's statement regarding Bulgaria. Schulenburg informs him that he received both answers by telegraph from Salzburg from Ribbentrop.

Moreover, he would like to emphasize that in the response of the German government to the statement of the Soviet government regarding Bulgaria, in two places it is said that these measures will be carried out by Germany in the eventual case, i.e. In the event of military operations in the Balkans.

Comrade Molotov declares that he takes note of the message of the German government regarding the Soviet government's declaration of November 25 and says that the question of the Soviet proposals of November 25 was raised by him in his last conversation with Schulenburg in passing. The main question that stood then was the question of the introduction of German troops into Bulgaria and the straits region. The answer of the German government on this matter, says comrade Molotov, requires careful study. At the same time, comrade Molotov emphasizes that when the Soviet government raised the question of Bulgaria and the straits as our security zones, it meant preventing the black sea from turning into a theater of military operations, knowing that Germany, like the USSR, is not supporter of the expansion of the war. The Soviet government talks about Bulgaria and the straits because they are connected with the black sea, and the USSR is the main black sea power.

Then comrade Molotov asks Schulenburg several questions. Comrade Molotov asks whether he correctly understands point 3 of the answer of the German government in the sense that the passage of German troops through Bulgaria has already been predetermined by Germany.

Schulenburg replies that the interests of the USSR and Germany run parallel. Germany is also not interested in turning the black sea into a theater of war. If they take any steps in the area, they do so to prevent the expansion of the war. In his opinion, the response of the German government suggests that a precondition for the entry of German troops into Bulgaria will be Britain's attempt to gain a foothold in Greece. If this does not happen, Germany will also not open hostilities against Turkey, unless she forces her to do so. According to Schulenburg, if anything happens, it will happen in Thessaloniki, i.e. Far from the Dardanelles and Turkey.

Further, comrade Molotov asks whether point 3 of the answer can be understood in such a way that the question regarding the straits, in contrast to Bulgaria, has not yet been decided by Germany. Is it necessary to understand that, asks comrade Molotov, that Germany will act in the straits only if Turkey opposes Germany?

Schulenburg replies that this is how he understands the point, but the German government believes with sufficient confidence that there will be no attack from Turkey.

Comrade Molotov also asks Schulenburg in which case the entry of German troops into Bulgaria will take place: does this mean further intensification of hostilities by England in Greece, say, something like the occupation of Thessaloniki.

Schulenburg replies that German troops will enter Bulgaria if Britain takes these further steps. At the same time, Schulenburg points out that the German government was informed of England's intentions to gain a foothold in Greece, which was the reason for the concentration of German troops in the Balkans. It is possible, of course, that England will abandon her intention, or that the Greeks will dissuade the British, then Germany will not do anything.

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Avp rf, f. Oh, on. 3, p. 1, d. 4, l. 42-47.

**From the diary of the plenipotentiary representative of the USSR in the kingdom of Bulgaria Lavrishchev**

January 24, 1941

Secret

Met with the Belgian envoy Mott. Mott recounted his conversation with Roosevelt's envoy Donovan. From this conversation, he found out the following: "Donovan, on behalf of Roosevelt, assured the Bulgarian government and the tsar that the united states is entirely on the side of England and that the united states and the British government intend to drag out the war for a long time. Roosevelt has no doubts about Germany's defeat. Roosevelt wants Bulgaria not to oppose Greece and not let German troops pass through its territory. The tsar told Donovan that Bulgaria has not yet concluded any agreements with Germany that could compromise it before the united states and England. " in the same conversation, Mott found out that the briefcase that was stolen from Donovan in Sofia \* contained not only a passport and letters of



representation, as the newspapers report, but, according to Donovan himself, notes about conversations with the leaders of some European states. Donovan himself has no doubt that this theft was organized by German intelligence.

Mott further said that to his question about the possibility of German troops entering Bulgaria, Popov replied: "if the Germans go, the Bulgarians cannot and will not oppose them with arms in hand."

According to Mott, the Bulgarian government is now seeking to clarify the question: how Turkey will behave in the event of the entry of German troops into Bulgaria, if the Germans give assurances that these troops are directed not against Turkey, but only against Greece.

Mott asked my opinion about the reasons for the concentration of German troops in Romania. I refused to express my opinion on this issue, citing the abundance of various assumptions, from which it is difficult to distinguish assumptions that correspond to reality.

Mott expressed his opinion on this issue, according to which German troops in Romania are in order to keep Greece at bay, to paralyze a possible Turkish defense of Greece and to some extent distract the attention of the British from the defense of the island.

\* \* \*

Attended a reception at the German embassy. I spoke with the tsar's advisor Gruev. Gruev said: "Roosevelt's envoy came to Sofsho to find out the opinion of the Bulgarian government on foreign policy issues. He assured the Bulgarians of the inevitability of Germany's defeat and recommended that Bulgaria, resorting to threats, not actively side with the latter. The Bulgarian government responded by announcing its aspirations to preserve peace." Gruev assured me that there were no German troops in Bulgaria, but only German mechanics and engineers (instructors), and that the issue of the passage of German troops by the Bulgarian government was not and is not being discussed. However, he said, no guarantee can be given that German troops will not come to Bulgaria, since this circumstance depends not on Bulgaria, but on

Germany. According to him, the government is very concerned about the increase in the number of German troops in Romania.

Avp rf, f. 074, on. 26, p. Po, d. 6, l. 26-27.

**Conversation of the people's commissioner for foreign affairs of the USSR V. M. Molotov with the ambassador of the kingdom of Italy in the USSR a. Rosso**

January 27, 1941

Top secret special folder

The ambassador, accompanied by attaché relli, declares that he reported to Rome about the questions put before him by comrade Molotov in a conversation on December 30 \*. At the present time he has answers from the Italian government, which instructed him to state the following to comrade Molotov.

1) the guarantees given by the axis powers to Romania \*\* are not directed against the USSR. As it follows from the very circumstances of the guarantees, Italy and Germany have a fundamental interest in maintaining peace and order in Romania. This interest is due to the close ties of the axis powers with the Romanian economy. Of vital interest to the axis powers is the extraction and transport of oil and grain from Romania to Italy and Germany. These are the reasons that prompted Germany and Italy at the end of august last year, when the situation seemed critical, to issue an arbitral award in order to save

peace in the Danube basin and to ensure order in that part of Europe forever. For these reasons, Italy and Germany gave guarantees, which the Romanian government urgently requested. The arbitral award<sup>166</sup> provides for the cession of a significant part of the Romanian territory to Hungary. Therefore, the Italian and German governments could not help but reckon with the demand of the Romanian government to recognize its border with Hungary and its territory in general as finally guaranteed against any external interference. Since the territorial claims of the USSR against Romania had already been satisfied and the peaceful satisfaction of the Bulgarian demands could be considered close, for the axis powers there was no concern from this point of view about the provision of guarantees.

2) concerning the Danube problem<sup>\*\*\*</sup>. The Italian government declares that Italy is ready to get in touch with Germany and Romania and to cooperate in a practical and useful solution to the issue that would satisfy all parties. The USSR has an equal place with others in the solution of this question.

3) with regard to the question of the security of the USSR in the black sea, the Italian government is fully sympathetic to the change in the statute of the straits in a sense favorable to the USSR. The Italian government would, for example, agree that the right to navigate warships through the straits was granted only to the black sea powers. It goes without saying that a detailed settlement of this issue should have been reserved for future negotiations with Turkey.

Having listened to the ambassador, comrade Molotov said that he should make the following remarks. The Soviet government is seriously interested in the issue of guarantees for Romania, since it is a question of a country that has a common border with the USSR. Meanwhile, when giving guarantees to Romania, the USSR was not warned in advance. Nor was it done what took place at the conclusion of the German Italian Japanese pact of September 27, 1940, when a special clause on the interests of the USSR was introduced. It is clear that such a situation could not and cannot satisfy the Soviet government. As for the point of view of the Italian government, the statement is clear and understandable.

Turning to the Danube question, comrade Molotov says that he takes note of the Italian government's statement that it wants to cooperate with the USSR and with other participants in the settlement of this question.

The Russian government will take this statement into account and counts on the greater objectivity of the Italian representatives when discussing this issue. In this dispute between the USSR and Romania over the one-sided position of Romania, Italy until now has always been with Romania.

As for the question of the straits, it is more complicated than the previous questions. Comrade Molotov points out that after a detailed acquaintance with today's statement of the Italian government, he may have to specially formulate the point of view of the Soviet government. However, we can already say that the statement of the Italian government is of interest to the USSR and contains something new.

Comrade Molotov says that as far as he understood, the Italian government agrees to change the statute of the straits and considers it expedient to revise it so that only the black sea powers have the right to navigate warships through the straits.

Rosso replies that the meaning of his statement is as follows. The Italian government understands the importance of the straits for the security of the Soviet Union. It is so aware of this that in future negotiations it proposes to abolish the convention on the straits and allow only the warships of the black sea powers to pass through the straits. Such a solution to the issue would be of practical importance only for the USSR, since the navies of the other black sea powers are extremely insignificant.

Comrade Molotov replies that this statement is of certain interest to the USSR and asks in this connection about the reservation that was made in the statement of the Italian government that a solution to the question of the straits can take place only with the consent of Turkey. Can the Italian government inform the Soviet government about Turkey's position on this issue, since Italy's position is made dependent on Turkey's position?

The ambassador replies that in giving its answer, the Italian government considered that Turkey has territorial sovereignty over the straits and believed that when deciding on the future regime of the straits, Turkey's consent must be obtained.

Comrade Molotov asks if the Italian government has any data to judge Turkey's consent to such a solution to the issue.

The ambassador replies that he has no such information and does not know whether his government has come into contact with Ankara on this issue. He assumes that there was no such contact.

Comrade Molotov asks the ambassador to ask the Italian government on this matter. The Italian government has stated its point of view with a proviso that may turn things differently than the Italian and Soviet governments think, especially given the current situation when Turkey is an ally of England and has a mutual assistance pact with the latter<sup>129</sup>. Germany, as she informed the Soviet government about this, intends to send troops through Bulgaria against Greece. In this regard, one can expect that Turkey will be dragged into the war and military actions will be transferred to the black sea. Will it not turn out that, while we are talking on this issue, Turkey will let British warships into the black sea. Can these events be avoided? Comrade Molotov says he is raising this issue because the Italian proposal depends on Turkey's position.

Rosso declares that Turkey's position on this issue is of great importance for the Italian government, especially in connection with the circumstances that comrade Molotov spoke about. Turkey's position is the key to this situation. The Italian government has information about the possibility of the passage of German troops through Bulgaria. The Italian government also has information that if German troops enter Greece through Bulgaria without touching Turkey, Turkey will not be drawn into the war. The decision of the Italian government is based on this hypothesis. If the Turkish government is drawn into the war, then Italy's response to the question of the Soviet government about the straits will change.

Comrade Molotov draws the ambassador's attention to the fact that the data on what Turkey's position is at the moment on the issue of today's

proposal of the Italian government on the straits, as well as on the fact that in the case of Turkey's participation in the current war in the Balkans, Italy's response will also change, are not included in today's statement by the Italian government.

The ambassador replies that he will get in touch with his government and put before it the questions that are being put forward by comrade Molotov. The ambassador says that his government's reply concerned only the question raised on December 30 by comrade Molotov. Taking into account the interests of the Soviet government, Italy agrees to reconsider the question of the straits, but she cannot speak only about herself, since the question of the straits concerns many powers. The ambassador recalls the differences between the Soviet and British points of view that took place in Montreux. Therefore, the Italian government's response does not provide for different options. This is a general answer to the question posed by the Soviet government. The Italian government could not go into details. It wanted to emphasize its agreement with the point of view of the Soviet Union and raised the issue in a new way. About two years ago the Italian government had a different point of view on the question of the opening of the straits.

Comrade Molotov replies that he has no right to claim immediate answers to his today's questions. On the other hand, he could not raise these questions earlier, since he did not have an answer from the Italian government. He emphasizes that Italy's position is of interest to the Soviet Union. The ambassador will understand that one cannot be satisfied with only a theoretical consideration of the question of the straits. Comrade Molotov admits that Italy has no information about Turkey's position, but he would like to be informed on this score. The issue was discussed under certain conditions and therefore one cannot but touch upon the current situation. As the ambassador is informed, Germany intends, in connection with the intensification of military operations by England and Greece, to move its troops through Bulgaria to Greece. Therefore, it is legitimate, given the mutual assistance pact between England and Turkey and the current Greek-Turkish relations, the assumption that military action could spread to the black sea. How does Italy assess Turkey's position? If the Italian government finds it

possible to provide information on this matter, then comrade Molotov asks him to inform about it.

The ambassador replies that he will inquire about this from Rome and asks for more details on how comrade Molotov is considering the possibility of transferring military operations to the black sea.

Comrade Molotov says it can be assumed that in response to Britain's intensification of hostilities in Greece, Germany will carry out her intention to send troops to Greece through Bulgaria. This will pose some danger in terms of expanding the scope of military operations. The situation will then worsen and the question of the security of the USSR will become more serious. Turkey is unlikely to stay away from the conflict, since she has a pact with England. In addition, England already has a base for aircraft and submarines on the island at the entrance to the straits. The war will be transferred to the black sea, and this, naturally, will affect Turkey's position on the straits issue. Such a development of events is not excluded due to the ties between Turkey and England.

The ambassador thanks comrade Molotov for the answer and promises to immediately inform Rome about the conversation.

Concluding the conversation, comrade Molotov promises to inform his colleagues in the government about the conversation with the ambassador.

Recorded subcerob wua rf, f. 06, on. 3, p. 17, d. 208, l. 1-7.

**From; talk of the plenipotentiary representative of the USSR in the  
Great Britain I.M. Maisky with the minister of foreign affairs of the  
Great Britain**

Sent to comrade Molotov, comrade Vyshinsky

January 29, 1941 secret

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3) then the conversation turned to current political issues. Eden said that in Africa, the British are now "in order" and for Egypt he no longer worries. But he is very confused by the situation in the Balkans. Eden again spoke about the systematic "infiltration" of the Germans into Bulgaria and asserted that there were already 10 German divisions in Romania. At the same time, the number of German troops in Romania is increasing more and more. Speaking about the Balkans, Eden asked me if we were maintaining our previous position with regard to the Balkans, as I described it in a conversation with him a month ago. I replied that our position remains unchanged. Then Eden asked me if Turkey, in the event of any danger, could be sure that it would not face any unpleasant surprises from the USSR. I replied that Eden's question seemed somewhat strange to me. He should be aware that our relations with Turkey are friendly in nature and we are not going to change this character. Eden listened to my answer with visible relief and then said: "if Turkey were attacked, it would be my desire for the USSR to practice the same 'non-interference' policy towards Turkey as it did towards Spain. Maybe I want too much, but at least that's what I would like." I replied that it is now difficult to say what position the Soviet government would take in the hypothetical case that Eden is talking about. This would depend on many such circumstances, which are now difficult to take into account in advance.



.....

Molotov.

I. Maisky avp rf, f. 069, on. 25, p. 71, d. 6, l. 19-23.

**From: conversation of the plenipotentiary representative of the USSR in Germany Dekanozov with the ambassador of the kingdom of Bulgaria in Germany Draganov**

Sent out to comrade Molotov, comrade Vyshinsky, general secretariat

18 February 1941 secret

At 12 o'clock the Bulgarian envoy Draganov came to me on his first visit. He tried to explain his belated arrival to me by the fact that at first, he was absent from Berlin, and then was ill. After a short conversation on general topics, I said that Draganov could be congratulated on the 'new agreement between Bulgaria and Turkey, which was published today, and asked how this agreement should be understood. Draganov said that regarding the question of interest to me, he can say the following: there is a treaty of eternal friendship between Bulgaria and Turkey of 1926. Both countries adhered to this agreement all the time, although there were times when Turkey was not happy with Bulgaria, and Bulgaria with Turkey. Recently, the Turks have concentrated 24 divisions on the Bulgarian border. Bulgaria could not be indifferent to this, since it is natural that the concentration of troops on the border of any state causes concern for this state. Therefore, Bulgaria turned to Turkey with a proposal to clarify relations between the two countries. On this occasion, an exchange of views took place, which resulted in the published declaration of friendship, according to which Turkey pledged not to attack Bulgaria, and Bulgaria pledged not to attack Turkey.

I noticed that at the present time, as Draganov evidently knows, there are many assumptions about the possible passage of German troops through Bulgaria. How should this be understood in the light of the declaration - will Turkey react in any way in the event of such a passage of troops. Draganov replied that, as follows from the treaty, Turkey will defend itself only if it comes under attack. Therefore, in the event that

the German troops really passed through Bulgaria, Turkey could take any measures only if it were attacked by these troops. As long as German troops do not attack Turkey, Turkey, in turn, will not take any steps. Draganov added that it is perfectly clear from the agreement, that this is exactly how this agreement should be understood and that otherwise there would be no point in concluding this agreement.

Then Draganov began to say that the Bulgarians are a peaceful people. That they have always wanted peace in the Balkans, but this does not depend on Bulgaria. In general, small peoples cannot determine their fate, and the proverb "you cannot escape fate" is quite suitable for them.

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However, Hitler has always done what he said so far. Therefore, even now he, obviously, will not allow England to settle in any point of Europe. The offensive of the army, which is concentrated in Syria, was still impossible, since first, due to the rapid advance of Germany, France was incapacitated, and then the British were busy with actions in Africa. Now that the situation in Africa has become favorable, the British can engage in the transfer of this army to the Balkans, wishing to carry out their plan to create a new front together with the allied Turkey and Yugoslavia (Draganov made a reservation that Bulgaria was and remains neutral), as well as disorganize the Balkans as a source raw materials for Germany.

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The conversation lasted 1 hour and 50 minutes.

Plenipotentiary of the USSR in Germany v. Dekanozov avp rf, f. 082, on. 24, p. 105, d. 6, l. 124-130.

**Conversation of the first deputy people's commissioner for foreign affairs of the USSR Ia. Vyshinsky with the ambassador of the Turkish republic in the USSR**

Sent to c. Stalin, c. Molotov, c. Voroshilov, c. Kaganovich, c. Mikoyan, c. Lozovsky, c. Sobolov

February 20, 1941

Secret

The ambassador came to me wanting to know how I assess the declaration just signed by Turkey and Bulgaria.

I told the ambassador that it seems difficult for me to give an assessment, knowing about this declaration only from the text published in the press. I would like to preliminarily get acquainted with the ambassador's opinion on the declaration.

The ambassador said that I have the right to ask his opinion, since the outlook and goals of the Turkish government three months ago were different [than] at present.

Previously, Turkey and Bulgaria intended to conclude an agreement based on negotiations between the secretary general of the Turkish ministry of foreign affairs Menemencioglu and the minister of foreign affairs of Bulgaria Kyoseivanov's. But in view of the special position of Bulgaria in the Balkans and its agreement with Germany, the Bulgarian government asked Turkey to take these circumstances into account when concluding an agreement. The Bulgarian government feared that Germany would accept the negotiated agreement between Menemencioglu and Kyoseivanov's as an act of hostility towards Germany. Turkey agreed with the Bulgarian proposals, and thus a declaration was signed, the preamble of which stated that the declaration did not affect the obligations of both sides towards third countries.

When I asked how England relates to the Turkish-Bulgarian declaration, the ambassador replied that England was aware of it and gave its consent.

The only goal of both powers when signing the declaration, according to Aktay, was to maintain calm in the Balkans. The Turkish government hopes that everything will be fine. The ambassador asked me how the Soviet government viewed the Turkish-Bulgarian declaration.

I replied to the ambassador that in international affairs it is necessary to judge declarations by the consequences. Wait and see. As for the USSR, the ambassador is well aware of the policy of the Soviet Union. Our policy remains unchanged. The Soviet Union will always be able to defend its interests.

The ambassador asked if I knew the details of Hitler's conversation with tsvet-kovic7-21. I answered in the negative and in turn asked Aktay an analogous question. Aktay replied that the Yugoslav envoy Gavrilovic conveyed to him in general terms the content of this conversation. Hitler told Cvetkovic, said the ambassador that he guarantees Yugoslavia's political independence and the integrity of its territory, and also promises Yugoslavia's participation in a peace congress after the end of the war.

Aktay said that he views this statement by Hitler as a direct proposal for Yugoslavia to join the axis.

At the end of the conversation, the ambassador asked me whether one should believe the rumors about the sending by the Soviet government of a delegation headed by Soboleva to Bulgaria.

I replied to the ambassador that the Soviet government had not sent any delegations to Bulgaria. Sobolov was in Moscow.

Comrade Chumakova was present at the conversation.

A. Vyshinsky avp rf, f. 07, on. 2, p. 9, d. 24, l. 1-2.

**From the diary of the plenipotentiary representative of the USSR in the Turkish republic ca. Vinogradova**

Sent to comrade Molotov, comrade Vyshinsky, general secretariat

March 25, 1941 secret

Coming to me, Papen announced that he had come to congratulate me on "a wonderful act published today." he further stated: "I think that the Soviet-Turkish declaration is a very good thing. Such an act is always a valuable contribution to the relations between the two countries. I greet her all the more because our policy has always boiled down to limiting the front of the war. "

I thanked for the congratulations.

Phalen then asked me: "and who raised the question mentioned in this declaration, not you, Mr. Ambassador?"

I replied that all negotiations on this declaration took place in Moscow. As can be seen from the text of the declaration, the Soviet government responded to an inquiry addressed to it in connection with the rumors circulating about this.

Papen said: "the Turks claim that it was not they who raised this question."

I noticed that the Turks, apparently, in any case, should be well aware of who he came from.

Papen then said: "I hope that by making such a declaration the Soviet government did not think that Germany was going to attack Turkey? You are well aware of my policy towards Turkey and the assurances that we gave the Turks that Germany has no aggressive intentions against their country. "

I replied that I had really heard such statements from the ambassador. I then asked what, in his opinion, the impression made by the published communiqué on foreign diplomats, and in particular on the British?

Papen said: "the British, of course, outwardly in their press will declare that they are very pleased with this act, which, in their opinion, shows a rapprochement between the Soviet Union and Turkey. But it is unlikely that they can actually be happy, since this declaration essentially turned against them. "

Then Papen said: "you probably know that the tripartite pact will be signed by Yugoslavia today in Vienna. In this connection I would like to note that all rumors circulating in the foreign press about the passage of German troops through Yugoslavia, etc. Completely untrue. We have never made demands on Yugoslavia that would contradict its position. The last step of the Yugoslav government is on our part only a logical consequence of our policy. I very much regret that a misunderstanding has arisen in relations between our countries - I cannot call it otherwise - on the issue of the entry of our troops into Bulgaria. We have repeatedly stated that we have no interests here. Our task is to defeat the British, and our actions against Bulgaria are a consequence of our fulfillment of these tasks. When we began the struggle with the British and French and you took part in it, the goal of this struggle was clear to both of us - it was a victory over the British. During this struggle you earned no less than we did: half of Poland, the Baltic states, Bessarabia. Now we want to beat the British wherever they are: both in the Balkans and in England itself. Therefore, the introduction of our troops into Bulgaria was inevitable. I believe that your disapproval of this step is based only on a misunderstanding. I am sure that we will win the war only by walking hand in hand with you. "

I noticed that the Soviet Union, for its part, did nothing that could spoil the relations established between our countries.

Papen again began to assure that the German action in the Balkans was also in no way directed against the interests of the Soviet Union and that, on the contrary, they would be backed by Germany.

I noticed that, nevertheless, it should be admitted that, introducing its troops into Bulgaria, Germany chose a path that affects the interests of our security.

Papen repeated again: "the interests of the Soviet Union in the Balkans are well known. Germany has no interests in the Balkans. She has only one goal here: to defeat the British. I had to say about the same to the Turks, to whom I pointed out that, having completed this main task, Germany would evacuate its troops from the Balkans. I am sure about that".

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Comrade Zhegalova was present during the conversation.

Plenipotentiary of the USSR in Turkey Vinogradov avp rf, f. 0132, on. 24a, p. 236, d. 7, l. 223-226.

**Talk of the plenipotentiary representative of the USSR in the kingdom of Afghanistan Mikhailov with the ambassador of Turkey in Afghanistan Esendalem**

Sent to comrade Molotov, comrade Vyshinsky, comrade Lozovsky, general secretariat

April 17, 1941 secret

The Turkish ambassador, who returned after almost two months in India, paid me a visit.

The Turk began with an apology for the occasion that he had not come to see me before his departure for India. He stated that his departure to India was accelerated by the English envoy Fraser Tyler, who recommended that the Turk be sure to stop by Delhi and see the viceroy, warning that the viceroy was leaving soon, so the Turk was forced to leave immediately.

I asked the Turk how his trip went, what were his impressions of the events taking place in India, with whom he had seen.

The talkative Turk reported the following:

1. Meetings of the Turkish ambassador with the viceroy of India and other officials

The Turk said that he was generally pleased with his trip. He visited Peshawar, Delhi, Lagore, Bombay, Calcutta and many other places. He met with a large number of British and Indian statesmen and public figures. First of all, he went to Delhi.

Then Esendal noticed that when Fraser Tytler recommended to him to see the viceroy, he allegedly told the Englishman that he had nothing significant that he could tell the viceroy. To this f. Tytler allegedly told the Turk that the viceroy might have something of interest to the Turk. The Englishman allegedly especially insisted on the meeting of the Turk with the viceroy and said that this meeting could determine the success of the Turk's trip to India. The Turk declared that he was received in Delhi by the viceroy of Linlithgow, or, as he put it, the viceroy. The viceroy, according to the Turk, was mainly interested in two questions.



These are questions about German afghan and Soviet-afghan relations. In addition, he was interested in the question of the attitude of the afghan government to the movement of border tribes.

Regarding German African relations, the viceroy allegedly asked the Turk the following questions:

1. How does the afghan government feel about the organization of the berlin-Kabul airline?
2. How is the transit of German goods to Afghanistan carried out?
3. Through which territories do German specialists travel to Afghanistan? To these questions, the Turks said, if you believe him, the following: German afghan relations are still developing. If the USSR

Gives the Germans the right to organize a berlin-Kabul airline through their territory, the afghans may not object to the Germans organizing this airline. Since there are neutral relations between the USSR and the Germans and there is no war, the Turks see no reason that the Soviet Union could prevent the transit of German goods and the travel of German passengers through the territory of the USSR.

The Turk told the Englishman, when asked about the relationship between the USSR and Afghanistan, that there were no changes, and everything was the same.

When asked about the attitude of the afghan government towards the border tribes, the Turk asked the Englishman what he meant. The Englishman said that he was interested in the attitude of the afghan government towards the movement led by the fakir from Ipi. At the same time, the Englishman allegedly emphasized that it should be considered a fact that the Germans and Italians provided assistance to "fakir from Ipi", but that the Englishman allegedly did not understand how the afghan government approached this matter.

The Turk allegedly said that the British themselves should not create reasons for the movement of the afghan tribes of the border zone and that he personally doubted that the afghan government could provide assistance to the movement led by the fakir of Ipi.

The Turk noticed that he had put a number of questions to the Englishman, to which he did not receive an answer immediately. The Englishman promised to answer him through the Indian foreign affairs ministry, and that later, on the way back, the Turk managed to get from the Englishman a list of specific measures taken by the British to strengthen India's defenses. At the same time, the Turk noted that the Englishman did not answer a number of questions.

In a further conversation, the Turks said that in addition to the viceroy, he was received not only by the minister of foreign affairs, who gave him lunch, but also by the commander-in-chief of the Indian armed forces, who also had a dinner in honor of his dachas.

The British generally received the Turk very warmly. The first secretary of the English mission in Kabul, Fletcher (knows Russian), traveled with the Turk to some places in India and introduced him to a number of people. In particular, he introduced him to the family of Jawaharlal Nehru (a prominent leader of the Indian congress), more precisely, to one of his sisters. Fletcher is closely associated with this family. With the help of the British, the Turks were at a new, recently built, shipyard, located 70-80 miles south of Bombay. At this shipyard, the Turks observed the construction of large ships with a tonnage of 15 thousand tons. He knows for certain that in India, a forced order and at the same time supposedly very organized and efficiently produces a large amount of military weapons and ammunition, in particular, a series of fairly large factories for the production of airplanes, tanks, cannons, machine guns and rifles have been built.

These industrial enterprises are located partly in southern India (Madras, Mysore) in the province of Bihar, in central India and elsewhere.

## 2. Growth of American influence in India

America is providing enormous assistance in strengthening British military measures in India. From a number of sources, the Turks found out that the Americans have recently invested in India a huge amount - 1 billion 600 million British pounds.

In India, America's influence has increased enormously. Among the large number of foreign specialists (mainly British, Australians and Canadians) are a large number of Americans.

When I asked how to explain the growing influence of America in India, the Turk said that, in the opinion of many people with whom he met in India, England, whether she won the war or lost, would still give up all her decisive international positions to the united states. The Americans are already actually holding England in their hands and without fighting they are winning one position after another from the British. India has a number of large, well-performing American banks, commercial, industrial and other enterprises. The number of capital investments has sharply increased, and it can be assumed that at present, American capital in India is in second place after English capital.

### 3. Industrial development of India

I asked the Turk how the war affects the Indian economy, and in particular the industry, from where the Indian military industry draws qualified workers.

Turk reported that besides the exceptionally large number of American and British specialists, engineers and technicians, besides the engineering and technical forces arriving from Australia, there are also a large number of skilled workers who have arrived from the listed countries.

The Indian working class is allegedly not yet prepared to participate in a very complex military industry and is limited to performing the functions of a predominantly unskilled labor. All skilled workers, and especially technical personnel in India, who are in the production of military equipment, came from other countries.

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### 4. Indian national congress and British politics

I asked the Turk what impression he got from the national movement in India, how strong this movement is. The Turk replied that of all the

national organizations in India, the Indian national congress is the largest and most famous. British policy towards the latter is clear. The British want to keep this organization in their hands, reduce its political weight and generally render it harmless.

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#### 5. Anti-German mood in India

India has a very developed national bourgeoisie. It has huge capital. The middle bourgeoisie in India is much richer than the Turkish big bourgeoisie. The Indian bourgeoisie is now closely linked with British and American capital. This explains the fact that the Indian bourgeoisie fears a German invasion of India and begins to fear a Japanese invasion. In this regard, he believes that the Germans and Japanese do not have much influence in India. The same circumstance explains the success of the British in carrying out military training in India to disarm anti-British elements. German propaganda in India is carried out mainly through radio. Other sources of German influence are not so significant, according to the Turk.

#### 6. About the reasons for the absence of universal military service in India

I asked the Turk how the organization of the Indian military forces was carried out and how to explain the absence of general military service in India.

The Turk said that he was personally interested in this question and asked it to a number of members of the British military command in India. Currently, he has the following opinion on this issue. India has over 350 million inhabitants. The introduction of universal military service in India for the British does not seem necessary. Without general conscription, the British have the opportunity to recruit the army they need. Moreover, the introduction of universal military service would lead to the fact that, due to the colossal poverty of the masses in India, such a huge number of people would come to the army that it would be difficult for the British to provide them with food. The Turk noted that he would inform me in more detail on this issue somehow, since

the issue related to the organization of military forces in India is very big. In any case, he got the impression that the British in India have no shortage of human military personnel. It's all about training these cadres. As for the commanding staff, India has a large number of British as well as American officers.

## 7. India and the defense of Turkey

In a cautious manner, I asked the Turk what he believed to be whether military assistance from India would be provided to Turkey in case this assistance was needed.

The Turk was reluctant to answer this question. He said, however, that many, apparently Indians, asked the influential British in his presence, and in particular the commander-in-chief of the Indian army, why India is not already providing assistance to the Turks, why military units from India are not being transferred to Turkey.

Thus, in the ambassador's opinion, the mood of the Hindus on the issue of providing assistance to Tournai is extremely positive, especially among Indian Muslims. Another thing, the British. The Turk said that both the Vije King of India and the commander-in-chief of the Indian army allegedly did not report anything definite about the assistance to Turkey. The British do not help the Greeks very thoroughly, and there is little hope that they will provide much assistance to Turkey. The Turk was left with the impression that Turkey could be in a very difficult position if the Germans sent their huge army to invade Turkey. According to the information that the Turks have, and which were confirmed by the British military circles in India, the Germans now have an army of allegedly 7 million soldiers. Of this number, one million is concentrated on the borders with the Soviet Union, one million in France, near England and other parts of northern Europe, and 5 million are partly in the Balkans, partly concentrated not far from the Balkans.

Turkey at the present time, with the most intense measures, can nominate a maximum of 2 million soldiers. Of course, the Turks emphasized, if the Germans throw 5 million. Army, then Turkey will not be able to resist for a long time and will be forced to surrender.

## 8. Questions of afghan Iranian assistance to Turkey

I asked the ambassador what his impressions of the possible help to the Turks from the members of the Saidabad pact were. The Turk answered in the same spirit in which he repeatedly answered this question. Turkey does not currently view the Saidabad pact as a serious force. Neither Iran nor Afghanistan, in the ambassador's opinion, are not only incapable, but also unwilling to provide serious assistance to Turkey in the event of a military attack on the latter by the Germans.

The Turk noted that after his arrival from India he had not seen the afghan prime minister Hashim khan, the latter is currently ill. As for the afghan foreign minister ali Muhammad khan, he spoke with the latter recently. The Turk comes to the conclusion that the afghan foreign policy is currently uncertain, expectant and unreliable for Turkey. Afghan ruling circles, with chagrin and anger told the Turks, "neither fish, nor meat." Turkey, due to the current situation, has to rely on itself. Its strength, unfortunately, is not so great. True, the Turks noted with pride, the Turkish army is not one of the last among the best armies in the world, the Turks have had major achievements in the field of the production of military equipment in recent years, in particular, they allegedly have a significant number of tanks, guns and other things useful for war. At the same time, if the Turks are expecting substantial help from anyone, it is only from the Soviet Union. Recently, according to a report from Ankara, Turkish-Soviet relations have been characterized very positively. If the Soviet Union helps Turkey, then the Turks will not be afraid of any enemy. Turk especially noted the fact that now all more or less sober political and even ordinary people who do not occupy major official posts are aware of the great prospects facing the Soviet Union. In India, the Turks also had the opportunity to observe the growth of sympathy for the Soviet Union and saw that many advanced cultured people among the Indians, and there are a lot of intelligent and developed people who are not representatives of the big bourgeoisie, declare themselves as supporters of India's rapprochement with the USSR. When I asked what kind of rapprochement we are talking about, the Turk could not say anything concrete.

#### 9. About afghan tribes of the border zone

I asked the Turk what he knew new about the movement of the tribes in the border zone. The Turk said that, unfortunately, he was not able to visit the border strip. For some time, there was a group of Turkish officers at the end of 1940, who collected a lot of information on the Indo-Afghan border and sent it to Ankara. Personally, he could not find out anything significant. He knows that the British continue to send significant weapons - secrets, cannons, etc. - to the border zone. A major concentration point for military units is the city of Ambala, 70 miles north of Delhi. From this point, the troops are partly directed to the northwest and north of India. From this, the Turks concludes that the British are worried about the border strip, apparently, there is something disturbing the British, what exactly, he does not know.

#### 10. About the coup in Iraq

I asked the Turk how he viewed the coup that took place in Iraq<sup>237</sup>.

The Turk informed me that he was interested in this question himself. The opinion that he has formed is the following: the head of the new government in Iraq is a man who does not enjoy the sympathy of either the British or the Germans. The defeat of the Iraqi government, according to the Turk, was allegedly committed by a group of nationalist leaders. It is difficult to say anything more definite about this.

I asked the Turk what his opinion was about the Iraqi diplomatic mission in Kabul.

The Turk stated that he did not believe these people. Iraqi chargé d'affaires El-kadeyari is a man who clearly does not inspire confidence in him. Among the Iraqis, there is one Kurd named Aziz khan, who is allegedly a nationalist. The Turk said that he also had a low opinion of the Egyptian envoy in Kabul, Suleiman bey. This person is too isolated and does not represent a large figure.

By the way, the Turk noticed that El-kadeyari is worn with the idea of uniting Arab and Muslim countries and expresses his sympathy for the Germans. The Turk believes that there can be nothing efficient in

uniting with the Arabs. They are few in number, backward and disconnected. They will not resist good technique. They will not go further than their tents. Arabs need to have strong power over themselves.

At the end of the conversation, the ambassador noted that the Turks were very impressed by the exchange of declarations between the Soviet government and Turkey on the issue of mutual understanding and neutrality \*.

Turkish ambassador Esendal is about 65 years old. He's a pretty chatty person. Since the beginning of the current war, due to some cooling of Soviet-Turkish relations, the Turks have become much more restrained. Here in Afghanistan, he is considered the English mouthpiece. At the same time, his closeness with the afghan prime minister is known. Through this closeness, as well as through a group of Turkish specialists and through cadres of Turkish agents among the afghans recruited during their stay in Turkish educational institutions, the ambassador manages to keep abreast of the domestic and foreign policy of afghans. Not trusting the Turk, considering that, despite his talkativeness, he is still a rather clever businessman, and especially taking into account his thoroughly disguised hostility towards the USSR, we are careful in dealing with him and do not take his word for it.

K. Mikhailov avp rf, f. 071, on. 23, p. 196, d. 4, l. 280-292



**From; talk of the plenipotentiary representative of the USSR in the Turkish republic of ca. Vinogradova with the ambassador of the kingdom of Yugoslavia in Turkey Shumenkovich**

Sent to comrade Molotov, comrade Vyshinsky, general secretariat

April 23, 1941 secret

.....

Shumenkovich said that he only knows that the Turks stubbornly refute the existence of negotiations between them and the Germans on this issue. However, he said that he considered it quite likely that Von Papen would bring certain proposals to the Turks upon his return to Ankara. Shumenkovich said that, in his opinion, the Turks would not accept any proposals from Germany. "there is no doubt that Turkey can enter the scene if the Germans fail to approach the Suez through Egypt. Germany may then try to secure its way through Turkey. I am of the opinion that the Turks will not accept any proposals from Germany. "

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Plenipotentiary of the USSR in Turkey Vinogradov avp rf, f. 0132, on. 24a, p. 236, d. 7, l. 281-285.

**Talk of the plenipotentiary representative of the USSR in the Turkish republic of ca. Vinogradova with the ambassador of Great Britain to Turkey Netchbull-hugessen**

Sent to comrade Molotov, comrade Vyshinsky, general secretariat

May 3, 1941 secret

I had Hugessen. In response to my comment that, judging by today's reports, England has started a war with Iraq, 237 Hugessen said: "you cannot actually say that this is a war. The point is as follows. In accordance with our agreement, we have asked to transport our troops through Iraqi territory. The Iraqi government agreed and kindly met the first part of these troops on their landing in Basra. But when we wanted to land the second part of the troops, about which there was an agreement, the Iraqis declared that this was contrary to the Anglo-Iraqi agreement. As a result, a shootout began there yesterday. These events are the result of German intrigue. Gailani, the head of the Iraqi government, has been nominated to this position by some Iraqi generals who are in close contact with berlin. "

When I asked where the Germans came from in Iraq, Hugessen said that there are no Germans in Iraq, since relations with Germany were severed by Iraq after the start of the war. But the Germans are doing their work there with money and through the Italian embassy.

I asked if it was true that the Iraqi government had turned to Germany for help and how Germany could help Iraq.

Hugessen said: "the Iraqi government has turned to berlin for help by radio. If Germany really wants to provide military assistance, it will be a risky and difficult operation for her. The Turks will not allow passage through their territory, I am firmly convinced of this. "

I asked how the Turks reacted to the reports on the events in Iraq.

Hugessen said that the Turks are very worried about these events, since the maintenance of peaceful relations between Britain and Iraq is of vital interest to Turkey, therefore Turkey took upon itself mediation in this matter.

I asked how Hugessen assesses the current position of Turkey.

Hugessen said: "Turkey's position remains the same. She wants, first of all, to stay out of the war, if only this can be achieved without affecting her independence, her neutrality and the policy of alliance with England. I have developed this conviction as a result of repeated conversations with Turkish leaders. "

I said that there has been a lot of talk lately that Turkey will conclude a non-aggression pact with Germany<sup>240</sup>.

Hugessen stated that he considered it impossible. But he admits that the Germans will try now, in any case, to strengthen their ties with the Turks, primarily in the economic sphere. The ambassador added that England also buys a lot from Turkey.

I asked what obligations Turkey still had under the Ankara pact<sup>129</sup>. If you look closely at this pact, you get the impression that the Turks should have fulfilled a number of obligations long ago. Now they do not even talk about security zones and seem to limit their obligations under the pact only to the defense of their own borders.

Hugessen replied: "in general, this is true. However, the pact should not be interpreted too literally. Its implementation depends on the circumstances. The most important thing is that Turkey remains intact so that it is not invaded. This is important not only for us, but also for your country. "

Hugessen went on to say: "I understand your policy. But I would like to draw your attention to the fact that under certain circumstances, in order to preserve the security of your country, it is more expedient to take certain actions than to do nothing. Recent events have made it especially clear that countries that thought to save themselves by doing nothing have lost everything because of this."

I said that the policy pursued by our government is completely independent and it did not and will not depend on the wishes of any other country. Our country cannot be called an inactive country either. We are taking all necessary measures to ensure our safety. It is not at all

necessary for this to go to war. You can ensure your interests in another way.

The Englishman said: "lately, many people have been talking about the next target of German pressure to be Turkey. But also, many argue that Germany will soon turn against the Soviet Union. In this regard, the reports about German troops in Finland and Moldova attract much attention. "

I said that I heard similar rumors, but I consider them implausible. As for our relations with Germany, they are determined by the treaties existing between our countries.

Hugessen inquired about the meaning of the recently published decree banning the transit of military equipment through the USSR \*.

I replied that I knew about this decree only from foreign newspapers. Hugessen said: "the Japanese did not like it very much anyway. I heard that you still allowed the Turks to transit some relatively innocent goods. "

I said that indeed the Soviet government had given such permission for some goods.

Hugessen stated: "I was informed about this by the Kriegschs and also by the Turks.

I know that at first the Soviet government seemed to have given its consent to the transit of all goods purchased by Turkey in Sweden. But then it was announced that only certain goods were allowed to pass, and the Turks were disappointed with this. I personally hope that you will allow Turkey to transport all the goods it needs. They can only get it through your country or from you. I know that the Turks wanted to ask your country to sell oil and a number of other urgently needed goods. If they haven't done it so far, they will obviously do it in the near future. For its part, the British government, in the person of Eden, addressed your ambassador Maisky \* with this question, pointing out the extreme importance for Turkey of receiving oil and other goods it needs from you. "

I noticed that I had not heard about Turkey's appeal to us on this issue. Hugessen said: "could you take the initiative in this matter by offering Turkey oil and other goods it needs. It's also in your interests. "

I limited myself to pointing out that there is no surplus of oil in our country, since we ourselves have great needs for it.

I then inquired about the ambassador's opinion on the prospects for the development of military operations. Hugessen replied that, in his opinion, the Mediterranean would be the center of hostilities. It is quite possible that the Germans will do something against Gibraltar. Egypt now has a fairly strong defense.

I asked the ambassador if Turkey has any obligations under the Saidabad pact<sup>14</sup>, pointed out that the Turks may find themselves in a difficult position if they are obliged to help Iraq, as they have, on the other hand, in accordance with the Ankara pact<sup>129</sup> the obligation to help England ...

Hughessen said that he is not familiar with the text of the Saidabad pact, but admits the possibility that Turkey will find itself in such a predicament. He then stated that a solution to the conflict in Iraq can only be achieved by eliminating the Gailani government. The ambassador said that there is a large number of people in Iraq who are dissatisfied with this government, which relies only on a relatively small group.

Plenipotentiary of the USSR in Turkey Vinogradov avp rf, f. 0134, on. 24a, p. 236, d. 7, l. 288-292.

**Conversation of advisor of the plenipotentiary of the USSR representation in the kingdom of Afghanistan Kozlova with the ambassador of Turkey in Afghanistan Shevket**

Sent to comrade Molotov, comrade Vyshinsky, comrade Dekanozov, comrade Lozovsky, general secretariat

November 15, 1940

The ambassador inquired about the reason for the absence of the plenipotentiary envoy, comrade Mikhailov, at the film show in the English mission, and talkatively told me the following:

1. At the present time Turkey has calmed down and has great confidence in the foreign policy of the Soviet Union. Friendly relations between the USSR and Turkey have existed for as long as 20 years, and unexpectedly for the Turks, some time ago, what should be considered already in the past, a period of cold attitude of the USSR towards Turkey, the reason for which the Turks cannot understand, since, for example , the fact of the conclusion of a non-aggression pact between Turkey and England<sup>129</sup> was, as is known, agreed with Moscow. In addition, during Potemkin's last stay in Turkey, the ambassador asked his opinion about the attitude of the Soviet Union towards Turkey. Potemkin allegedly said not only on his own behalf, but also on behalf of the Soviet government, that the attitude of the Soviet Union towards Turkey was good. When asked about the reasons for, as the ambassador put it, "the cold attitude of the USSR to Turkey", the Turk could not say anything and hastened to move on to another question.

2. He said that he had heard on the radio that there were currently two national flags in Romania - Romania and Germany. This is a very significant fact, the Turks noted, especially when you consider that at present, according to reliable data, in Romania there is

14 German divisions. Then the ambassador, referring to not entirely accurate information at his disposal, said that he had heard that Romania had already disbanded its troops, which, in his opinion, meant the complete surrender of Romania to Germany, i.e. Essentially the military occupation of Romania.

3. Then the Turk turned to the question of the war between Italy and Greece and noted that Italy alone cannot cope with Greece, not because it is technically poorly armed, "but for the reason that the Italian army fights badly," and this fact worries Germany and makes her think about the need to provide Italy with substantial assistance. Apparently, it will take decisive steps in this direction in the near future. When I asked how Germany can do this, the ambassador replied that Germany is probably using the territory of Yugoslavia or Bulgaria for this purpose with all the ensuing consequences.

4. Then the ambassador briefly spoke about the relationship between Germany and Afghanistan. The Turk noticed that the Germans did not understand the psychology of the afghans. When I asked what exactly this conclusion of the ambassador is based on, the Turk said that the Germans are trying to show their military power by showing films about their victory over France and the colossal destruction caused by Germany to England, but by this the Germans repel the afghans from themselves, as can be seen from the fact that afghans are reluctant to attend the German mission's film shows. (the ambassador completely forgot that the British film we just watched was just a picture seeking to show the power of England in the air and on the water, as a result of which the British inflict colossal damage on the Germans.) To my question about the state of trade relations between Afghanistan and Germany, the ambassador said they were improving. Moreover, the afghan government has received a large loan from Germany. The Germans, the Turks continued, have adherents among some part of the ruling clique of Afghanistan, in particular, he named the names of the minister of war Ahmed khan, the minister of health - Yahya khan, the minister of the national economy - Abdul Majid khan, and others. He especially singled out the military minister, emphasizing that that he is everywhere and everywhere shouts loudly about the military might of Germany. All this group at one time tried in every possible way to prevent the strengthening of relations between Turkey and Afghanistan and even tried to oust the Turks from Afghanistan and dramatically improve relations with Germany. Currently, this group has changed its point of view and does not prevent the Turks from strengthening their relations with Afghanistan. The ambassador further

stressed that foreign minister Ali Mohammed Khan, minister of education Naim Khan and some others are certain supporters of friendship with England.

5. I asked the Turk how the Afghans assess Comrade Molotov's trip to Berlin. The Turk replied: "they (?) Asked me many times what significance this fact of Molotov's trip to Berlin would have, and at first they were very worried about the upcoming meeting between Molotov and Hitler, moreover, they were scared, but as soon as the message was received about Molotov's return to Moscow, the Afghans have calmed down a little, and even they are happy about this trip." Listening to this chatter of the Turk, I asked him what exactly the Afghans were afraid of and what they were happy about. The ambassador hesitated and said that he could not specifically answer this question, but what he said is really believable.

6. Already saying goodbye, the ambassador again repeated what was said earlier that the Turks are very good at the USSR, but if Germany takes a commanding role in its relations with the USSR and strengthens itself in Afghanistan, the Turks pointedly emphasized, most will be undermined.

V. Kozlov

P.s. It is interesting to note that at the time of the appearance of the warrior Ahmed Khan in the cinema (somewhat belated), everyone presents stood up as if on command. After watching the film, I asked the 1st secretary of the British mission Fletcher on the reasons for this special respect shown in relation to the military man. Fletcher replied that such a meeting is always in the English mission to the military and the prime minister.

Avp rf, f. 071, on. 22, p. 192, d. 7, l. 72-75.



**Telegram of the plenipotentiary representative of the USSR in the kingdom of Afghanistan Mikhailov in the NKID of the USSR**

December 10, 1940

Top secret

In the local diplomatic corps, the Turks are spreading rumors that comrade Molotov's trip to Berlin did not live up to German hopes. This is based on the following arguments:

1. Molotov did not sign an agreement with Germany on the USSR's accession to the Berlin Pact. This means that the Soviet government is unwilling and opposed to the movement to the east.
2. They say that as a result of pressure from Moscow, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia refused to join the Berlin Pact.
3. It is difficult for the Germans to provide the Italians with assistance against the Greeks, without the support of the USSR, they are now in no hurry with this help.

The Turks, although they have declared martial law in the straits zone, now feel relatively calm. They believe that the Italians, having shown their weakness in Greece, would not risk attacking the Turks without the direct help of the Germans.

Two Turkish officers recently arrived in Kabul via Iran. One of them knows English. This is the first officer among the Turks here who knows English.

According to the reliable information we have, Cripps, the British ambassador in Moscow, over the past month has begun to systematically send cipher telegrams to the British ambassador in Kabul.

Mikhailov avp rf, f.059, op.1, p.322, d.2216, l.161-162.

**From the diary of the plenipotentiary representative of the USSR in the Turkish republic ca. Vinogradova**

Sent to comrade Molotov, comrade Vyshinsky, general secretariat

March 2, 1941 secret

Cripps came to me with Hugessen. After exchanging the usual pleasantries when we first met, I noted that the past week had been very active, both from England and from Germany. I then inquired whether the message published in the Anag bulletin that the British envoy in Sofia had delivered an ultimatum to the Bulgarian government was correct. Both Cripps and Hugessen categorically stated that this was not true.

I then asked Hugessen if Mr. Eden was satisfied with the results of his conversations with the Turkish leaders?

Hugessen said: "yes, he is satisfied. These conversations showed us the firmness of the Turkish government and its determination to loyally fulfill its obligations. "

I noticed that it is interesting to know what impact this visit will have on the situation in the Balkans.

Hugessen said: "keeping peace in the Balkans will also depend on your country. It would be very nice if you supported him. "

When I asked who wants our support, Hugessen and Cripps replied that this is necessary first of all for the Turks.

I asked if the Turks had any fears on our part.

Hugessen said: "no, they have no particular fears, but if they received assurances from you that you would not do anything against Turkey, they could safely transfer all their troops to Thrace."

I noticed that the Turks should be well aware of the attitude and position of our country and that I have repeatedly heard from the

Turkish leaders an indication that they are confident in the friendly attitude of our country towards Turkey.

Cripps noted: "it is necessary to take into account that German propaganda is constantly trying to prove to the Turks that there is a certain threat from you."

I said that I had never heard from the Turks that they wanted to receive any assurances from us.

Cripps remarked: "as far as I know, Aktay conveyed to Mr. Molotov the desire of the Turkish government to expand and deepen relations between your countries. But he didn't seem to have received any answer from you".

Hughessen added that he also heard that the Turkish government expressed a desire to expand relations between Turkey and the USSR but had no answer to this.

I said that, as far as I know, the Turkish government, or rather the Turkish ambassador in Moscow, addressed the head of our government with such a question, but he received an answer to this, and the further depended on the Turkish government itself.

.....

I did not answer this question, indicating that I was not aware of this.

Plenipotentiary of the USSR in Turkey Vinogradov avp rf, f. 0132, on. 24, p. 236, d. 3, l. 19-24.

**Recording of the conversation of the people's commissioner for foreign affairs of the USSR V. M. Molotov with the ambassador of Turkey in the USSR Aktay \***

June 24, 1941 secret

Comrade Molotov states that he invited the ambassador to him in order to find out if the ambassador has official instructions on the position of the Turkish government in relation to the war between the Soviet Union and Germany.

The ambassador replies that, unfortunately, he has not received any messages from his government for four days. He even wanted to contact comrade Barkov in order to find out whether his telegrams had been detained. The ambassador heard yesterday on the radio from Ankara that the Turkish government has announced its decision to maintain strict neutrality towards both belligerent powers. Today, Turkish radio broadcast the contents of a number of articles from the Turkish press dedicated to the war between the USSR and Germany. The articles also refer to the decision of the Turkish government to adhere to a position of neutrality in relation to both warring countries. The ambassador believes that the Turkish government will maintain strict neutrality towards the Soviet Union, the only state that has provided assistance to the Turkish republic in its struggle for independence. The Turkish government always retains a sense of the deepest and most sincere gratitude towards the Soviet Union.

The ambassador repeats that he has no official instructions from Ankara, but he will immediately ask his government on this issue and, upon receiving an answer, will immediately inform comrade Molotov.

Comrade Molotov told the ambassador that, as a representative of the Soviet government, he was interested in the question of whether the Turkish government adheres to a position of neutrality or whether it adheres to one or another belligerent side.

As regards telegraph communication between the embassy and Turkey, comrade Molotov promises to take all measures to ensure that communication is ensured.

The ambassador thanks comrade Molotov and declares for the second time that he will immediately ask his government on a question of interest to the Soviet government.

Saying goodbye to comrade Molotov, the ambassador wished the Soviet Union success in this war.

Recorded by Chumakova

Avp rf, f. About. On. 3. P. 1, d.5. L. 32-33.

**Recording of the conversation of the first deputy people's commissioner for foreign affairs of the USSR A. Vyshinsky with the ambassador of Turkey in the USSR a. Aktay**

June 26, 1941 secret

The ambassador said that the third Diya comrade Molotov asked him about the position of the Turkish government in relation to the Soviet-German war. Then the ambassador could not immediately answer the question posed. However, sometime later, he received a clerical telegram that on June 22 the Turkish government had proclaimed "Turkey's neutrality in relation to the situation created by the outbreak of the German-Soviet war." the ambassador informed the people's commissariat of this with a note.

At the same time, comrade Molotov raised the question of the nature of neutrality that Turkey can adhere to.

The ambassador received instructions from his government to reply to the Soviet government that Turkey would adhere to strict and absolute neutrality. The ambassador stressed that this message is completely official, and he makes it on behalf of his government. I tried to get Aktay to clarify the formula of his statement, to get an explanation of what the expression "neutrality in relation to the situation" should mean. Aktay could not answer. In response to my subsequent question about what exactly should be understood by absolute neutrality, Aktay explained that absolute neutrality means that Turkey will seek to establish absolutely equal relations with both belligerents.

I asked if this neutrality makes any changes to the position that Turkey has held until now.

Aktay replied that there were no changes in Turkey's position and asked that his statement be brought to the attention of the Soviet government. I promised to do it.

A. Vyshinsky wua rf. F. 06. On. 3. P. 3. D. 29. L. 73-74.

**Recording of the conversation of the first deputy people's commissioner for foreign affairs of the USSR A. Y. Vyshinsky with the ambassador of Turkey in the USSR a. Aktay**

June 29, 1941 secret

I told the ambassador that I had invited him in order to finally clarify the question of the flight of the USSR ambassador comrade Vinogradov to Ankara. According to the information we received from Vinogradov, the Turkish border commissioner told him that permission had been received to let Vinogradov cross the border. However, when comrade Vinogradov wished to leave for Ankara by train, the Turkish border commissioner opposed this, referring to the fact that he had received permission to cross the Turkish border by comrade Vinogradov not by train, but by plane. In this regard, I asked the ambassador to finally clarify this issue and telegraph to Ankara so that the crew of a Soviet aircraft, which, naturally, does not have entry visas to Turkey, should be allowed a short stay in Turkey until they return to the USSR without visas.

The ambassador replied that the border commissioner had no right to act in this way and that it is not the commissioner who decides on the issues of entering Turkey. He, the ambassador, just before leaving for the Narkomindel learned that an urgent telegram from Ankara had been received at the embassy, which is now being deciphered. Perhaps this telegram refers to Vinogradov's flight. The ambassador promised to inform me of the contents of this telegram if his assumption turns out to be correct. If he received a telegram on another matter, he will telegraph my request to the ministry of foreign affairs, but he will not fail to inform me of the results.

Aktay went on to say that he had received a telegram from his foreign ministry stating that there had been numerous flights of Soviet aircraft through Turkish territory lately. The ambassador was instructed to draw the attention of the Soviet government to this circumstance and ask that the crews of Soviet aircraft be instructed not to violate the territory and territorial waters of Turkey. Aktay handed me a memo on this matter.

I replied that, apparently, there was some kind of misunderstanding and flights, if they did take place, could only be accidental. I promised to give instructions on the verification of the facts listed in the note and report the results to the ambassador.

Thanking me for my answer, Aktay said that he had another assignment from his ministry. He was asked by the ministry of foreign affairs to make, in order of information, the following message:

1) the Turkish foreign ministry has received a message that rumors are spreading in Tokyo that the secretary general of the Turkish foreign ministry on the day of the start of the Soviet-German war congratulated the German ambassador to Turkey Papen on the start of the war and said that this war is a punishment to the Soviet Union for its violation of the Soviet-German trade agreement. Aktay has been instructed to state that these rumors are pure fiction.

Answering my question whether this information had been published in the Japanese press, Aktay said that these rumors were being spread by the German embassy in Tokyo and it is possible that they could appear in newspapers.

2) Turkish diplomatic missions abroad report that rumors are spreading from various sources according to which the latest German-Turkish agreement has some secret articles and secret attachments. The ambassador is authorized to declare that the said treaty does not have any unpublished articles and that no secret documents, no secret attachments to it were signed with this treaty.

Aktay added that all these conversations are "German combinations", which he was instructed to refute.

Comrade Podtserob was present at the conversation. I must note that Aktay made an impression on me and comrade Podtserob of a person clearly "not at ease": when making a statement about border flights by our pilots, he was noticeably worried and stressed twice or more that such cases were observed by the USSR for the first time.

A. Vyshinsky wua rf. F. 06. On. 3. P. 3. D. 29. L. 83-85.



**From; recording of the conversation of the chairman of the council of people's commissars of the USSR J. V. Stalin with the ambassador of Great Britain in the USSR s. Cripps**

July 10, 1941, top secret

....

While agreeing with the new version of the first paragraph, Cripps, however, said that since the text he proposed mentions the rendering of "each other assistance of all kinds," **he does not see a great need for the addition proposed by comrade Stalin.** Cripps also stated that as a lawyer, he often encountered agreements in England and always used general terms. The British, Cripps explained, have a strange way of conveying the meaning of the document, and he finds that if you make a reservation, then in England there will be people who will think that the assistance stipulated in the agreement is limited. Cripps considers the question raised by comrade Stalin to **be purely technical.** However, he personally must warn that London might make the same remarks that Cripps himself made.

Comrade Stalin asked Cripps if he would mind if comrade Molotov was present at the conversation.

Cripps fully agreed with comrade Stalin's proposal, after which comrade Molotov took part in the conversation.

After comrade Molotov got acquainted with Churchill's message and the Cripps proposals, comrade **Stalin read the Anglo-French-Turkish treaty** and agreed that this treaty does indeed say: "if Turkey is involved in hostilities with a European power the aggression committed by this power against Turkey, France and the united kingdom will effectively cooperate with Turkey and will render her every assistance and assistance within the limits of their forces. "

Cripps jokingly stated that he hoped that the agreement, which Britain and the USSR were going to conclude, **would not suffer the fate of the Anglo-Franco-Turkish treaty.**

Cripps stated that he had received Churchill's personal message to comrade Stalin, which was a response to the proposals made by comrade Stalin in his conversation on July 8 .

After reading out loud and handing comrade Stalin the Russian text of Churchill's message, Cripps noted the difficulties encountered in translating into Russian that part of Churchill's message which refers to the "declared agreement expressed in the statement." Cripps further stated that in order to expedite the signing of the agreement, he, on his own initiative and under his own responsibility, drafted a draft agreement that, in his opinion, reflected the views of the British government.

The draft agreement presented by Cripps read:

"his majesty's government in the United Kingdom and the government of the union of Soviet socialist republics have agreed and declare as follows:

A) both governments mutually undertake to render each other assistance of every kind in the present war against Germany.

B) they further pledge that during this war they will not negotiate peace and **will not conclude an armistice** without mutual consent. "

Answering comrade Stalin's question why not call the proposed draft document an agreement, Cripps said that in drawing up the draft he had to be guided by Churchill's message, where the latter calls the document an "agreed declaration". Wishing to start discussing the agreement as soon as possible, Cripps decided to draw up the draft in the simplest, in his opinion, form, and he, Cripps, would have nothing against introducing any amendments and proposals into the text of his draft.

**Comrade Stalin noted** that no one could and cannot say that the Soviet Union did not fulfill its obligations under the treaties it concluded.

Referring to the wording of the first paragraph of the draft agreement, comrade Stalin proposed the following **option**:

1) both governments undertake to provide each other with all kinds of assistance and support ...

If, said comrade Stalin, this option is acceptable, then **he no longer has any objections.**

Taking note of comrade Stalin's remark, Cripps asked if he could send a telegram to London with the text of the draft agreement as approved by the Soviet government.

Answering in the affirmative, comrade Stalin asked Cripps whether the validity of this agreement was determined by **any time limit or not.**

Cripps stated that the duration of the agreement was determined **by the duration of the war** against Germany. As soon as the war is over, the treaty will disappear by itself. The war will not end until both countries, as indicated in the agreement, do not conclude peace by mutual agreement.

**Comrade Stalin** said in a joking tone: "isn't England afraid that **the Russians themselves will defeat Germany** and say to England: we don't want to have anything to do with you, they say."

Cripps, also laughing, replied that **this was not possible**, since the parties to the agreement were not allowed to do anything like that.

Further, comrade Stalin asked Cripps what the name of the draft document proposed by the ambassador would be.

Cripps said it would be a declaration agreement. This declaration will say that both contracting parties have concluded an agreement, which they "declare" about.

In response to comrade Stalin's proposal to call the document **not a declaration, but an agreement**, as Britain and Turkey did, Cripps said that the agreement is much more complicated in its content, has various additions, appendices, etc.

Perhaps, Cripps said, we could work out such a treaty later.

Disagreeing with comrade Stalin's remark that a declaration is less binding than an agreement, Cripps proposed to call the document either the "agreed declaration" or "declared agreement".

According to Cripps, the new form of agreement is better than the usual one as it will yield results soon. If both sides discuss separate points of the document, then months will pass.

**Comrade Stalin** told Cripps that it would be better for months to pass but let both sides work out a real document defining their cooperation.

In response to Cripps' proposal to call the document a declaration "on an agreement on joint actions by the government of his majesty and the government of the USSR," comrade Stalin said that **there are better forms of defining cooperation**. The experience of Munich has already made the whole world convinced that **declarations are worthless**, and no one is fulfilling them.

Cripps began to assure comrade Stalin that England would abide by and observe the present agreement and that the title would not change the meaning and content of the document.

Comrade Stalin noted that the title of the document proposed by the ambassador would provide ample material for critics. It may appear that **both parties lack confidence in each other**.

Agreeing with comrade Stalin's remark about the critics, Cripps said that France would be afraid to criticize the agreement. Cripps, however, proposed to name the document "agreement between Britain and the USSR on joint actions against Germany" or "agreement on mutual assistance and consultation between the USSR and England."

Comrade Stalin and comrade Molotov noted that the addition of the word "**consultation**" **weakens the meaning of the document**.

Cripps then proposed the following title of the document: "agreement on joint actions of his majesty's government in the United Kingdom and the government of the union of Soviet socialist republics in the war against Germany."

Comrade Stalin and comrade Molotov agreed with Cripps' proposal.

Further, comrade Stalin and comrade Molotov and Cripps came to a final decision on the text of the agreement itself, adopting the following wording:

“the government of his majesty in the United Kingdom and the government of the union of Soviet socialist republics have concluded this agreement and declare the following:

1. Both governments mutually undertake to render each other assistance and support of every kind in the present war against Hitlerite Germany.
2. They further undertake that during this war they will neither negotiate nor conclude an armistice or peace treaty, **except by mutual consent.** ”

Cripps stated that he would like to send both the English text of the draft and the Russian to London.

Comrade Stalin and comrade Molotov approved Cripps' desire and handed the Russian text of the draft agreement to the ambassador.

Cripps said that if he received his government's consent to signing in the form as it is now worked out, he, Cripps, would ask London to authorize him to sign this agreement.

At the end of the conversation, comrade Molotov asked Cripps if he had received an answer from London regarding proposals to take joint measures in Iran and Afghanistan.

Cripps stated that he had telegraphed to London and asked to **consider the question raised by comrade Stalin immediately.** Cripps also pointed out to London that it was necessary to get in touch with Maisky to find out if a joint deMarche could be made.

Having promised to consult with the British envoy in Tehran, Cripps suggested that the military might have to support diplomatic measures.

Comrade Stalin agreed with Cripps' last remark.

Adding that he pointed out to London the need for swift action **on the issue of the Germans in Iran**, Cripps said that he would communicate with the British envoy in Kabul and find out the state of affairs. If necessary, he will coordinate with his government the question of joint actions by the British and Soviet governments.

Comrade Stalin told Cripps that Soviet intelligence learned about a month ago about the proposals that the Germans had made to the Iranians. The Germans offered Iran to sell them oil three times more than the British.

The Germans also promised the Naans that they would help seize the oil fields of Baku.

Cripps stated that he had similar reports of the former. As for the promises of the **Germans to provide assistance in the capture of Baku**, he hears this for the first time. Cripps added that the only way to deal with the Germans is to take joint action.

Saying goodbye to Cripps, comrade Stalin said that he personally asked both Cripps and Churchill himself to quickly resolve the issue with the signing of an agreement in order to clarify both in the USSR itself and throughout Europe.

Cripps assured comrade Stalin that there would be no delay either on his part or on Churchill's side, and that the question would only be behind the dominions.

The conversation lasted 1 hour and 10 minutes.

The conversation was recorded by Potrubach

Wua rf. F. 048. On. 48. P. 431. D. 10. L. 5-12.

Publ.: Soviet-English relations ... - t. 1. - p. 77-81.

**Recording of the conversation of the people's commissioner of foreign affairs of the USSR V. M. Molotov with the ambassador of Great Britain in the USSR, Cripps**

July 20, 1941 secret

Cripps handed comrade Molotov a memo on the stay of the Germans in Afghanistan and Iran. The text of the memorandum is attached 11.

After reviewing the contents of the note, comrade Molotov announced that he would bring the contents of the document to the notice of the Soviet government. Comrade Molotov promised to inform Cripps about the decisions to be taken in connection with the discussion of the memorandum.

Referring to the deMarches undertaken by the Soviet and British representatives in Iran, comrade Molotov noted that these deMarches did not yield positive results. It turned out that the Iranians are not inclined to meet half-way on the issue of the stay of the Germans in their country. As for Turkey's position, said comrade Molotov, the Soviet government considers it very important to consider this question. The Soviet government considers it desirable that Turkey should create difficulties in obtaining transit visas for the Germans to travel to Iran. Comrade Molotov expressed the hope that the UK will take the necessary action against Turkey in connection with the passage of the Germans to Iran. The Soviet government, for its part, may also take appropriate measures.

Cripps asked comrade Molotov to inform Maisky of the forms of action that the Soviet government intends to take with regard to Iran if the latter refuses to meet halfway on the issue of the Germans.

Comrade Molotov promised to inform the ambassador of further measures that the Soviet government would decide to take.

Cripps said that he would consider it a very important circumstance if the Soviet government accepted the offer of the British government regarding military or economic pressure on Iran, in case the latter refused to meet halfway on the issue of the Germans. Cripps also added that he had a conversation with Gavrilovic and found it expedient for

comrade Molotov to talk to a Yugoslav who could provide interesting information about Turkey's position.

Then Cripps posed to comrade Molotov the question of the Soviet-Iranian treaty of 1921 \*. Cripps inquired whether the Soviet government would adhere to the clauses of this treaty if outside troops entered Iran. Cripps pointed out that German troops were known to wear civilian clothes. Cripps is interested in whether Soviet troops will enter Iranian territory if German troops find themselves there.

Comrade Molotov replied to Cripps that the Soviet government considered the Soviet-Iranian treaty a very important factor in the current situation. For his part, comrade Molotov asked Cripps whether the British government had military forces in southern Iran that could put pressure on Iran in the event of a serious military threat.

Cripps replied that since the campaign in Syria is over, it seems to him personally possible to use a certain amount of British forces for military pressure in southern Iran. Cripps suggested that it would be nice to give instructions to the British industrialists, the owners of the oil fields in Iran, so that they refuse to supply the Iranians with oil. Cripps also added that he thinks it will be very convenient to negotiate Iran in London. For this, the Soviet government must authorize Maisky to make the necessary decisions.

Answering comrade Molotov's question, Cripps said that he considered the negotiation of Iran in London more convenient, since he had very little information here about the British military forces in Syria and southern Iran.

Having once again asked comrade Molotov to inform him of the government's decision on the question of Afghanistan, Cripps withdrew.

The conversation was recorded by Potrubach

Avp rf, f. 06, on. 3. P. 1. D. 6. L. 67-69.



**Recording of the conversation of the people's commissioner for foreign affairs of the USSR V. M. Molotov with the ambassador of Great Britain in the USSR, Scripps \***

5 august 1941

Top secret

Special folder

Arriving accompanied by the 3rd secretary of the embassy Denlop, Cripps handed comrade Molotov a memorandum on the question of Turkey (a translation of the memorandum is attached) 19.

Comrade Molotov said that he would bring the proposals of the British government to the attention of the Soviet government and inform Cripps of the decision. Comrade Molotov added that relations between the USSR and Turkey remain invariably friendly, as evidenced by the March exchange of declarations between the governments of the USSR and Turkey. This exchange of declarations, as is known, took place even before the German-Soviet war, despite the fact that the Germans did not approve of such support for Turkey from the USSR.

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The conversation was recorded by Potrubach

Wua rf. F. 06. On. 3, p. 1.d. 6.l. 103-105.

**From; recording of the conversation of the people's commissioner for foreign affairs of the USSR V. M. Molotov with the ambassador of Great Britain in the USSR s. Cripps \***

August 6, 1941 top secret

Cripps arrived at comrade Molotov's summons, accompanied by the 3rd secretary of the embassy, Denlop.

Comrade Molotov stated that he had two questions that he wanted to pose to Cripps.

The first question, said comrade Molotov, concerns Turkey. The Soviet government considers it timely to raise the question of relations with Turkey. Comrade Molotov added that after his conversation with Cripps on August 5, he received a telegram from comrade Maisky with information about the conversation with Eden. After briefly acquainting Cripps with the contents of the telegram, comrade Molotov said that in his conversation with comrade Maisky, Eden went further in the proposals than Cripps did, and raised the issue of providing Turkey with assistance and military support in the event of pressure or attack on it from Germany. ... Eden, however, made a reservation that he did not define the implementation of his proposal by the moment, form and content under which a deMarche should have been made to Turkey.

Taking note of comrade Molotov's statement, Cripps asked where it would be better to reach agreement on measures related to the solution of the question posed — in London or in Moscow. In the opinion of Cripps himself, the deMarche would have been better coordinated in London.

Agreeing with Cripps' remark, comrade Molotov, for his part, asked the ambassador if he considered it right to send a telegram to comrade Maisky with instructions to take steps to agree on the moment, form and content of the deMarche of England and the USSR.

.....

Comrade Molotov said that the Soviet side would always keep in mind the opinion of the British government. If it was decided to conduct negotiations in Moscow, then for this purpose the Soviet government could authorize comrade Lozovsky.

Cripps promised to get in touch with his government and find out his point of view on this issue.

At the end of the conversation, comrade Molotov said that since comrade Zhukov was at the front at the moment, general McFarlin would be received by comrade Shaposhnikov, who is currently comrade Zhukov's deputy. Information about Turkey, which Macfarlane wanted to bring to the attention of comrade Zhukov, he can communicate to comrade Shaposhnikov.

The conversation was recorded by Potrubach

Wua rf. F. 06. On. 3. P. 1. D. 6. L. 111-113.

**Statement of the Soviet government of respect for the territorial invalidity of the Turkish republic**

[august 10/94 / y.]

Soviet ambassador to Turkey comrade s. Vinogradov visited the minister of foreign affairs of Turkey, Saracoglu, and on behalf of the Soviet government made him a message as follows:

"the Soviet government reaffirms its loyalty to the Montreux convention and assures the Turkish government that it has no aggressive intentions and claims in relation to the straits. The Soviet government, like the British government, is ready to scrupulously respect the territorial integrity of the Turkish republic. Fully understanding the desire of the Turkish government not to be involved in the war. The Soviet government, like the British government, would nevertheless be ready to provide Turkey with any assistance and assistance in the event that she was attacked by any European power. "

Publ .: foreign policy of the USSR ... -t. I. - s. 145-146.

**Recording of the conversation of the ambassador of the USSR in Turkey Vinogradov with the minister of foreign affairs of Turkey Saracoglu**

August 30, 1941 secret

I visited Saracoglu. I read to him the text of the note of the Soviet government handed today to the Iranian government, and then conveyed the assurance of the Soviet government to the Turkish government in connection with our action in Iran \*.

Saracoglu said: "I am very grateful to the Soviet government for the attention it showed to the Turkish government over the entire period of the development of this case."

I pointed out that the Soviet government considered it its duty to keep the Turkish government informed of this issue, and stressed that the Soviet government was forced to use the right granted to it by article 6 of the 1921 treaty in view of the danger posed by German activities in Iran in the created situation.

Saracoglu replied to my last words that he is aware of this.

I then expressed the hope that the Turkish government would perceive the action of the Soviet government in Iran as it is indicated in our note and as it can be expected from a friendly country.

Saracoglu said: "the Turkish government will certainly study this issue from the point of view of friendly relations between Turkey and the USSR, on the one hand, and friendly and allied relations between Turkey and Great Britain, on the other."

Saracoglu then asked me to send him, if possible, a copy of the note we handed to the Iranian government.

I promised to send it as soon as I receive the French text. Saracoglu then pointed out that events are developing very quickly. He noted that when the British ambassador came to him today to convey this assurance, he greeted him with the words: "as if you will have breakfast in Tehran today?" - and added that he had already heard the message from Reuters on the radio that British troops had crossed the Iranian

border. The British ambassador did not yet know about this. I inquired about the minister's opinion on how further events will develop.

Saracoglu said: "two days ago, I hoped that this issue would be settled peacefully. I had this hope only two days ago, after my conversation with the Iranian ambassador. On Friday, August 22, when the Iranian ambassador was with me, I conveyed my last message to him, and the ambassador then posed a question to me: if the Iranian government would agree in principle with the proposals of the Soviet and British governments and if it had disagreements only if they were fulfilled and whether the Iranian government can count on the assistance of the Turkish government to achieve a peaceful resolution of these issues.

I replied to the Iranian ambassador that if the Iranian government expresses its agreement in principle and only the terms of application will be discussed, the Turkish government will make every effort to help resolve this issue. After this conversation with the Iranian, I had the impression that the Iranian government is ready to accept the proposals of the British and Soviet governments. On Saturday, I informed the British ambassador about my conversation with the Iranian ambassador and about the impression that I got from this conversation. "

.....

On behalf of the government on behalf of the government

Union of Soviet United Kingdom

Socialist republics of Great Britain

And Northern Ireland a. Mikoyan r. Stafford Cripps

Avp rf, f. For - Great Britain, d. 107.

**Record of the conversation of the chairman of the council of people's commissars of the USSR Stalin with the heads of the delegations of the Great Britain Lord W. Beaverbrook and the USA, A. Garriman at the Moscow conference of the representatives of three "**

September 29, 1941 highly secret

**Beaverbrook:** I will allow myself to submit for your consideration the invitation to speak at the conference on Thursday to report on progress and to celebrate the role of the united states of America. Such a performance would create an atmosphere of triumph, strengthen the common front and make a strong impression on England, the USA and even France. I am trying to get the best out of the meeting for the benefit of all three countries.

**Stalin:** I do not see the need for this. Plus, I'm very busy. I don't even have time to sleep. I think that comrade **Molotov's speech will be quite sufficient.**

On Beaverbrook's proposal to bring the conference delegates to the kremlin, comrade Stalin again points to his busyness. Beaverbrook states that he will return to this issue.

**Beaverbrook:** with America's help, we can deliver 500 tanks, of which no more than 50% are light tanks and the rest are heavy.

**Stalin:** what is the weight of the light tanks and the caliber of the guns?

Beaverbrook: 7-8 and 13 tons, and caliber - from 37 to 40 mm.

**Stalin:** we agree if small tanks are no less than 7 tons and guns are no less than 37 mm. But is it possible to increase the number?

**Beaverbrook:** now we are talking about procurement over the next 8 months. Then we can give more. In our proposal we have reached the limit of possibilities. Of course, it will be necessary to keep the Arkhangelsk port open.

**Harriman:** where would you like the American tanks to be sent - to Arkhangelsk, Vladivostok or via Iran? This issue, of course, can be resolved in the commission, if we cannot make a decision now.

**Stalin:** to Arkhangelsk, closer to the front.

**Beaverbrook:** there are very few cranes there, to my knowledge.

**Stalin:** the number of cranes can be increased.

**Beaverbrook:** let's move on to aviation now. We will be sending out 200 fighters per month from the UK for 8 months and more thereafter. If we do not agree to make any changes to the types of fighters, we intend to send hurricannons, spitfires or other types. We'll have to send them by sea to Arkhangelsk (it is impossible to send them by air), of course, disassembled.

**Stalin:** can't Lord Beaverbrook say what the weight of the hurricanes and spitfires is.

**Beaverbrook:** I can't say now.

**Stalin:** what motors?

**Beaverbrook:** 800 horsepower Merlin, Rolls Royce motors. These fighters saved the UK.

**Stalin:** as far as I know from the literature, the power should be 1000 horsepower.

**Beaverbrook:** quite possibly. Tomorrow I can tell you more precisely.

**Stalin:** will the oil (*other necessary items*) be supplied with weapons?

**Beaverbrook:** yes, guns and ammunition.

**Stalin:** it is advisable to have ammunition for each aircraft for 20 sorties. "tomahawks" had ammunition only for 4-5 sorties, which our pilots consider very insufficient.

**Beaverbrook:** we sent ammunition for the tomahawks from England for 1,100,000 rounds, 3,150,000 were sent from America. On October 10, 500,000 will arrive, of which 200,000 are armor-piercing and 100,000 are tracer. I think that this will be enough for now, and if not, we will send it. We are not interested in keeping planes inactive.



**Stalin:** our planes take with them 600 rounds for small-caliber machine guns, 300 for large-caliber machine guns and 150 for 20-mm cannons. These numbers must be multiplied by 20. The plane lives with us for a month and five days, which is equivalent to 20 sorties. If you do not have the specified amount of ammunition, the aircraft may remain inactive for some time.

**Beaverbrook:** this calculation is correct if on each departure the plane will use up all the taken supplies each time. In any case, we are interested in the maximum benefit from the aircraft, and we will take care of the sufficient supply of ammunition to the fighters.

**Harriman:** I am surprised by the numbers given.

**Stalin:** our machine gun fires 2400 rounds per minute, the large-caliber one - 1100-1200, the 20-mm cannon - 800, and the 23-mm - 580. Each plane takes 500-600. This is 15 sec.

**Beaverbrook:** that's right. I will share with you the results of the British experience in this regard.

**Stalin:** we don't take tracer bullets. Experience has shown them to be useless. We need incendiary bullets.

**Beaverbrook:** incendiary can also be sent. Do you need armor-piercing?

**Stalin:** yes, we do. Is it not possible to receive planes of the same type: either the hurricanes or the spitfires, so that it would be easier for our pilots to master?

**Beaverbrook:** I understood you yesterday in the sense that you want to have spitfires as well, and I telegraphed an order today, which I can of course cancel?

**Stalin:** I said yesterday that we would prefer to have only spitfires. If it is not possible, then we are ready to take only "hurricanes".

They say that there are three-ton machine-gun tankettes. Could you supply us with them?

**Beaverbrook:** we'll get to that point a little more.

I persuaded Harriman to send 1,800 aircraft from the united states within 9 months, of which about 100 will be sent in October, 150 in November, 200 in December, 200 in January, and the remainder over the next 5 months. Agreement between Great Britain and the united states. Half of each monthly dispatch will be bombers. Fighters will be of the tomahawk type in small numbers, and the rest of the Katigavk type. This is an improved tomahawk type, and pilots familiar with this type will not have to re-master the Katigavk. According to your wishes, the radius will be from 600 to 700 kilometers, and the bombs will be one ton on average, some will be larger, others smaller.

**Stalin:** twin-engine?

**Beaverbrook:** all twin-engine. Some of this number will be sent from England.

**Stalin:** yesterday we expressed a desire to receive more bombers than fighters, namely, in a proportion of 75-25%.

**Beaverbrook** (throwing up his hands): it's absolutely impossible.

**Stalin:** we have a special type of Sturmovik bomber. It has armor of 5-7 mm, and in some places even 13 mm. He hits tank columns and manpower. Armed with cannons and bombs. The motor is not high-altitude, it flies at an altitude of 50-150 meters. Foggy weather doesn't matter to him if the fogs are not very low. It has a great effect in combat. It has 23 mm guns, but soon we will put 37 mm guns. The speed at the ground is 380-400 kilometers. Russian motor, m-38. Single engine. The team consists of one person. Power 1250 horsepower. The Germans really don't like him. Your military saw him.

**Beaverbrook:** it would be interesting to see it.

We can give other things as well: field guns, heavy Bren-class aircraft. I would like to discuss each subject one by one and come to definite solutions here. We intend to come again in 8-9 months with a supply proposal on a larger scale. After we come to certain decisions here, the rest of the items can be transferred to the supply committees in London and Washington. If this plan is approved, then I will start listing further types of supplies.

Do you need 25-pound cannons?

**Stalin:** we can do without them. Can't you get anti-aircraft guns?

**Beaverbrook:** we don't have them.

**Harriman:** unfortunately, we are very lagging behind in the production of anti-aircraft guns, we have 90mm zeits, which we are just starting to produce. We value them very much, but I am authorized to offer 152 guns from them within 9 months, and u1-mm - 756 within 6 months. These are the only two types that we produce, about 150 per month.

**Beaverbrook:** anti-aircraft guns don't shoot down planes. That is why we prefer fighters.

**Stalin:** during massive air raids, anti-aircraft guns frighten, do not allow hitting the target and make them throw bombs in disorder.

**Beaverbrook:** from the anti-tank guns, we could get some 2-pounders with armor-piercing rounds. We now only make armor-piercing guns. Within the next 9 months we will be able to deliver 2750. They penetrate 50 mm armor. They are all on trailers.

We can provide machine guns with a caliber of over 6.72 mm used in tomahawks. The magazine contains 97 and 37 rounds.

We can offer three-inch mortars used in the infantry. They shoot 1,500 yards.

**Stalin:** no, they will not be needed. We are replacing them with mortars.

**Beaverbrook:** it has anti-tank mines that we can give you 60 thousand a month.

**Stalin:** yes, we do.

Beaverbrook: hand grenades?

**Stalin:** we have.

Beaverbrook: we can give you some anti-tank rifles, and later we can give more. I can tell you the caliber tomorrow.

**Stalin:** yes, good.

Beaverbrook: do you need wedges for a team of 2-3 people?

**Stalin:** yes, we do.

Beaverbrook: there are Thomson-type stenautomatic rifles, 8-9 rounds in the magazine.

**Stalin:** no, they are not needed. We have a 10-round magazine.

Beaverbrook: you ordered them, and we've already sent 20 thousand.

**Stalin:** no, we don't need it.

Harriman: we have small four-wheeled vehicles built specifically for the army, especially for communications, like the jeep. We have 5 thousand of them.

**Stalin:** okay, let's take it.

Beaverbrook: I'll ask if we can give them a lot.

**Stalin:** what about barbed wire?

Harriman: you can.

Stalin: how much? Harriman: I'll have to ask.

The conversation ended there, and the continuation is scheduled for 6:00. The evening of the next day.

Wua rf. F. 048. On. 48. P. 431. D. 10. L. 19-25.

Publ .: Soviet-English relations ... - t. 1. - s. 132-136.

**Recording of the conversation of the chairman of the council of people's commissars of the USSR J. V. Stalin with the heads of delegations of the Great Britain Lord W. Beaverbrook**

September 30, 1941 highly secret

Harriman delivers a note in English concluding the responses of the British and American delegations to the individual items on our list of applications, after reading this note.

**Stalin:** we could take 8-10 thousand 3-ton trucks a month. If it is impossible, then they would agree to take part 17, and 2-t.

Harriman: I can't talk about the numbers right now. But we will do our best to satisfy you as much as possible.

**Stalin:** 4 thousand m(eter) of barbed wire a month is not enough for us. We would like to receive 10-15 thousand tons at once. Can't you get now a 2-month supply of 8 thousand m in one month?

Harriman: I can't promise now.

Beaverbrook: in addition to toluene, we will send you 10,000 m, but I don't know what month. It is an explosive substance containing toluene.

Harriman hands over a list of goods that it is desirable to receive from the USSR.

Beaverbrook: I would suggest ending the conference so that we can return to the UK and the us and there to discuss your maritime application with our governments. I want the UK to go far, very far, to have a sense of real cooperation.

**Stalin:** how many tankettes can you give?

Beaverbrook: 200 a month now and more then. Everything that we produce and that is not included in your applications, we will give you. You only need to tell us what you want. I am making this proposal on behalf of my government. Do you need quarter-ton bombs?

**Stalin:** we would prefer half-ton bombs.

Beaverbrook: we can offer you oxygen cylinders for 75 and 750 liters, as well as various rockets, for example, for lighting water, smoke, etc.

**Stalin:** we need to study all this.

Beaverbrook: you can wire me this.

Harriman: if you don't mind, I would like to leave here a permanent representative at the embassy who would deal specifically with the supply issues and would help our ambassador in this.

**Stalin:** it would be very good (...]

If we have finished with this question, then I would like to say a few words about after Steinhardt. It seems to us that he is very influenced by the local foreign diplomatic missions. At the very beginning of the war, he frightened us with the fact that the Germans were supposedly plotting to send parachute troops to kidnap me and comrade Molotov. At that time, he already suggested that we evacuate the government from Moscow, as well as the embassy. He has been keeping part of his embassy in Kazan for a long time.

Harriman: I didn't know that. It seemed to me that Steinhardt was eager to help.

**Stalin:** are you satisfied with our ambassador Umansky?

Harriman: he talks too much. He addresses many people on the same matter, and as a result no one knows who is responsible for the execution. It would be better if he spoke with one person, who is responsible in each case.

There is a brief exchange of views on Maisky and Cripps, with lord Beaverbrook speaking highly of Maisky.

Harriman: I want to return to the issue I raised yesterday regarding the Siberian airfields. Who could our general Chaney turn to?

**Stalin:** to general Golikov.

How is Hess doing?

Beaverbrook: I visited him on September 8th.

**Stalin:** is he so hospitable?

Beaverbrook: it's in a wired house with bars on the windows. He handed over to Mia a memorandum of 40-50 pages, written with his own hand, where the thesis against Russia is being developed. He complained that he, who had come to save England, was being held behind bars and not even allowed to correspond with his family. He especially insists that he be allowed to communicate with Hitler. In my personal opinion, which Churchill does not share, Hess came with someone's knowledge; in England he hoped to decline, to cause through his supporters a movement against the British government and then fly back. But, obviously, he was not met at the agreed place or did not give the necessary signals, the fuel ran out, and Hess had to go down by parachute. Churchill thinks Hess is insane.

We would like to do something for the Turks, they treat us with sympathy.

**Stalin:** it would be good **so that Turkey does not go to Germany**. But she doesn't behave like an ally of England.

Beaverbrook: they didn't do anything to hurt us, no trouble. They were hurt by our actions in Iraq and Iran. Helping them boils down to delivering tools you don't need. Yesterday I spoke about a thousand 87 lei of field guns, which would mean a lot for the Turks.

**Stalin:** to help, you need to have guarantees that help will not be lost. Is lord Beaverbrook sure of that? There is no union between Turkey and England, but there is neutrality.

Beaverbrook: we would like to resurrect the union.

**Stalin:** this should have been a condition for help.

Beaverbrook: we can't complain about them. We ourselves did not fulfill some obligations.

**Stalin:** Turkey is afraid of Bulgaria and its alliance with Germany.

Does the blockade extend to Finland?

Beaverbrook: I think we're ready to distribute, but I'm asking you not to rely on that answer. I could give a more accurate answer to this from England.

**Stalin:** Finland is behaving very impudently towards Britain's ally - the USSR. At the beginning of the war, she said that she was striving to establish the old borders, and now she behaves like a vassal of Germany.

Beaverbrook: so, you want a blockade of Finland?

**Stalin:** this would be a continuation of the blockade of Germany. Finland has long crossed its borders.

I once asked the president of the united states of America if he could threaten Finland to break off relations. Do you know, Herr Harriman, what followed?

Harriman: I can't say, but personally I think it would be politically difficult for the president.

**Stalin:** I think that our agreement with Britain on cooperation against Germany and on not concluding a separate peace should be turned into an alliance treaty that would cover not only the military, and about post-war period, our government is wholly behind this.

Beaverbrook: I personally would support such a proposal and would like the issue to be raised. We have a military cabinet and a defense committee, which is responsible for the issue raised. Members of the defense committee are Churchill, Attlee, Eden, and Beaverbrook. They make certain decisions without asking the rest of the government.

**Stalin:** is it possible to end the conference by signing the agreement on cooperation of the three powers?

Beaverbrook: I think it would be difficult for America.

Harriman: lord Beaverbrook speaks from personal experience. You should not push the president with agreements.



**Stalin:** I do not press, but only ask.

Harriman: you have to understand where the president is leading his country.

**Stalin:** but all the same, there is a **lot of ambiguity in America's position:** on the one hand, it supports the belligerent England, and on the other hand, **it maintains diplomatic relations with Germany.**

Beaverbrook: America is doing everything it can to harm Germany. The country is very friendly towards Great Britain, but the army and navy are not so willing to part with their own supplies. Roosevelt, Hopkins and Harriman, however, are pushing through. I would like you to be as much a friend of these people as we are.

Harriman: for clarity, I will add that our fleet wants war with Germany and by all definitions of the concept of war, it is already at war, having received the order to fire on German ships. Our army is too small, but difficulties are being overcome.

Beaverbrook: from July 1, 1942, we will be delivering 375 tanks a month and 500 tanks a month from January 1, 1943. I see no reason why the us could not deliver the same quantities to you. I can promise on behalf of my government to raise the delivery of airplanes to 500 per month from July 1, and to 400 from January 1, 1943. If America gives the same quantities, then you will receive 800 per month, I repeat once again, if we produce anything in the UK that is not on your list, we are always ready to provide you with a certain percentage of products.

**Stalin:** we would very much like to receive trucks from America.

Do you think a press communique is necessary?

Beaverbrook and Harriman: yes.

Harriman: we are sending a military mission to China; do you have anything to say about this?

**Stalin:** it would be nice, but China has stopped fighting.

Harriman: are you continuing to supply china?

**Stalin:** no, due to our own needs we stopped supplying, but 4 months ago we sent artillery and aircraft there.

Beaverbrook: the Americans recently sent 67 bombers to china that were destined for England.

Harriman: can you say something about japan?

**Stalin:** when the neutrality treaty was signed, the question of aid to china was not raised at all. There is no way to tear japan away from Germany. Does America seem to be working on it? It would be nice.

Harriman: all I can say is that the UK and America have dealt with this issue a lot. We now represent a united front to make japan understand the fallacy of its relationship with the axis powers. This policy, which we have been developing since the president's meeting with Churchill, is already yielding good results.

**Stalin:** I have the impression that Japan is not Italy and does not want to go into slavery to Germany. Therefore, there are grounds for separating it from Germany.

A decision is made to end the conference from tomorrow and to prepare a press communique in the meantime.

Wua rf. F. 048. On. 48. P. 431. D. 10. L. 26-31.

Publ .: Soviet-English relations ... - t. 1. - p. 136-140.

**Recording of the conversation of the ambassador of the USSR in Turkey Vinogradov with the minister of foreign affairs of Turkey s. Saracoglu**

October 15, 1941 Soviet secret

I visited Saracoglu, to whom I conveyed on the instructions of the people's commissar for foreign affairs, comrade Molotov, about the intention of the Soviet government to transfer some ships from the black sea to the white sea.

After listening carefully and carefully writing everything down, Saracoglu asked me if the two icebreakers I had mentioned were on the list of auxiliary vessels in our navy.

I said that I do not think so, since these ships are usually used to escort merchant ships. I added that I could clarify this issue, but the minister said that he himself would check whether these vessels are on the list of auxiliary vessels. Saracoglu said that the clarification of this issue is necessary because, as is known, not so long ago, the Italians were denied passage through the straits of the Tarvisio vessel, which was previously an auxiliary vessel of the Italian fleet. In this connection, the minister repeated the story of the Tarvisio to me.

Saracoglu then asked why the transfer of eight tankers was necessary.

I pointed out that tankers are needed to transport oil to the northern regions of the Soviet Union.

The minister said that he would give instructions to study this issue and do everything in his power to resolve it favorably.

I asked the minister to keep this plan a secret until it is implemented.

Saracoglu promised this, pointing out that he fully understood that disclosing this case would jeopardize our ships, as German and Italian aircraft would wait for them over the Dardanelles.

When I asked whether the minister considered a favorable resolution of this case possible, he replied that he considered it quite possible if the icebreakers were not included in the lists of auxiliary vessels. Saracoglu

added that he would try to give me an answer today, or at least tomorrow.

I said that together with the response of the Turkish government, it would be desirable to know what kind of oil products Turkey would like to receive. Thanking for the kind promise of the Soviet government to give Turkey oil products. Saracoglu replied that he would clarify the question I had raised; the minister added that it would obviously be possible to agree on quantity and prices as well. I have confirmed this.

Referring to the situation at the fronts, Saracoglu said that, in his opinion, the situation there is not bad. In the last 48 hours. There is some improvement. The Germans, in any case, did not achieve the results they expected. Saracoglu then pointed out that Aktay informed him of the exceptional calmness observed in Moscow; life and work are going on there quite normally, as if this city is in a state not affected by the war.

I noted that all the employees arriving from the Soviet Union to Ankara tell me the same thing. Our people remain completely calm, because they are confident of victory over fascism, despite all the difficulties of the current struggle.

I then inquired about the minister's opinion on the speech published yesterday by the German ambassador Von Papen in Izmir.

I pointed out that I found it odd to say that the fate of Turkey was also defended by Germany on the eastern front.

Saracoglu said that such statements have become traditional in the speeches of German leaders. Hitler, according to the minister, also used such expressions in his last speeches. The minister added that he cannot, of course, regulate what the ambassadors accredited in Turkey say in their public speeches.

Vinogradov wua rf. F- 06. On. 3. L. 22.d. 300. L. 58-59.

**Recording of the conversation of the ambassador of the USSR in Turkey Vinogradov with the minister of foreign affairs of Turkey Saracoglu**

October 16, 1941 Soviet secret

Saracoglu summoned me and reported the following response from the Turkish government: "we did not find any indication in our files that these vessels \* could be considered auxiliary. If the embassy or your government can confirm to us that the two icebreakers and eight tankers, the names of which you have given me, cannot be regarded as auxiliary vessels in the terms of the second annex of the Montreux convention and that these vessels have never been of a similar nature, the Turkish government sees no difficulty. For the passage of these ships; on the contrary, we will give them the opportunity to go through as you asked. "

I said that I would immediately convey the answer of the Turkish government to the Soviet government.

Saracoglu added that the Turkish government would like to receive the following percentage of oil products: ordinary oil - 27%, gasoline - 32%, aviation gasoline - 5%, motorin \*\* - 26% and fuel oil - 10%. The minister pointed out that the Turkish government does not want to determine the quantity, it leaves it to the discretion of the Soviet government; the Turkish government would only be desirable to observe the proportion indicated by it in the supply of oil products to Turkey.

I replied that I would convey these wishes to Moscow.

Saracoglu then began to say that the Turkish government needs our written confirmation that the mentioned vessels are not now and were not auxiliary because not so long ago the Italians were denied the passage of the merchant ship Tarvisio, which was previously auxiliary. Recalling the Tarvisio story again, Saracoglu said: "when we have the above confirmation from you, we will be able, if the Italians request it, to prove to them that, unlike Tarvisio, your ships were not auxiliary before. We are ready, - emphasized Saracoglu, - to take the word of the Soviet government in this regard " - the minister then asked me why,

after all, we turned to the Turkish government with such a request. Did we think there would be difficulties?

I replied that our appeal was caused by the fact that the ships must pass through the territorial waters of Turkey; taking into account the existing relations between our countries, we wanted to better ensure the safety of ships.

Saracoglu said that the Turkish government has nothing against the fact that these ships pass the territorial waters of Turkey. But, the minister added, they will have to do so at their own peril and risk. If something happens to the courts, we will, of course, protest, but we will not be able to go beyond that.

Saracoglu noted that such incidents are very rare, and he is sure that nothing will happen to our ships. The minister recalled in this regard the case of the sinking of a French ship by the British in Turkish territorial waters, then pointed out that there were cases of Italian aircraft flying over the territorial waters of Turkey; the Italians gave, according to the minister, after the protests of the [ets] to the [th] government], an assurance that they would no longer allow this. German planes, according to Saracoglu, did not violate Turkish territorial waters.

I asked the minister if it can be expected that after we give the above confirmation, the Turkish maritime authorities will receive the necessary instructions regarding the passage of our ships.

Saracoglu said that the Turkish maritime authorities are already aware of this issue, since he consulted with them when preparing a decision on this issue.

The minister then asked me if our boat "Akker-man" had already gone out to sea. I said that I have no information on this issue. Saracoglu stated that the boat was given 48 hours to repair and was to be supplied with fuel; in addition, he is allowed to enter the Turkish port once on the way to replenish fuel supplies; obviously he had already gone to sea.

Vinogradov wua rf. F. About. On. 3. L. 22.d. 300. L. 60-61.

**Recording of the conversation of the chairman of the council of people's commissars of the USSR J. V. Stalin with the minister of foreign affairs of the Great Britain Eden**

December 18, 1941

Top secret

Special folder

Comrade Stalin proposed to Eden a new draft treaty on the post-war organization of peace and security (the text is attached), expressing the opinion that, as it seemed to him, a formula was found in this draft for article 4 that could satisfy both sides.

Eden said that he had also worked out some compromise proposals, but that he would first like to discuss comrade Stalin's new draft.

Since the translation into English and the typewritten correspondence of article 4 of comrade Stalin's draft took a certain amount of time, while the meeting moved on to discussing the issue of a military treaty.

Comrade Stalin asked Eden why we could not now conclude an agreement in its entirety. Why is Eden proposing instead to sign only an agreement now? Great Britain has, for example, a mutual assistance agreement concluded in its entirety with Turkey. Is the USSR really worse than Turkey? If the British government sees any obstacles to concluding a formal treaty with the USSR, it would be best if it told us this frankly.

Eden objected that comrade Stalin's suspicions of the British government's unwillingness to conclude a formal treaty with the USSR had no basis at all. Eden proposes to conclude an agreement and not a treaty for reasons of a purely legal nature. The formal treaty is concluded in the name of the king, who is not only the king of Great Britain, but also the dominions and emperor of India. The conclusion of such a treaty requires the consent of not only the British government, but also the governments of the dominions. Eden has credentials from the British government, but no dominion governments. Therefore, he proposes to conclude an agreement, the legal force of which in the eyes

of the British is no less than the strength of the contract. If, however, comrade Stalin prefers a treaty, then Eden proposes such a way out: to sign an agreement in Moscow, and then upon arrival in London and after a corresponding consultation with the dominions, convert this agreement into a treaty, which and ratify it. This procedure is possible.

Comrade Stalin agreed to accept Idea's proposal. Then he moved on to another issue and pointed out that if we do not want to turn the military agreement into a simple piece of paper, then it is necessary that it be confirmed by certain practical actions. In the past, we raised the question of a second front, the creation of which the British government rejected for various reasons. Then we put forward another proposal - to send British troops to the Soviet front. If the British government considers this proposal to be hardly feasible at the moment, then we are ready not to insist on it and now put forward a new, third proposal: a joint Anglo-Soviet operation in the north, in the Petsamo region, and in northern Norway. The USSR could have provided ground forces for this operation; Britain would have been required to help with the fleet and aviation. As a result, Petsamo would be occupied and a hotbed of resistance to German aggression would be created in northern Norway. In the future, Norwegian volunteers could also be sent there. There are few German troops in the area, while all of them are mostly Austrians. Comrade Stalin was interested in Eden's opinion on the issue of the northern operation.

Eden replied that at the present time England did not have sufficient forces to send reinforcements to the Soviet southern front. As for the northern operation, it seems to him very desirable and feasible. He is ready to start negotiations on it now, during his stay in Moscow, involving general Ney in the discussion of this issue. I wanted to leave the idea, however, when approximately this operation is supposed.

Comrade Stalin replied that the northern operation could be launched in a month, or maybe in 6 weeks.

Eden promised to urgently address this issue.

Then the conversation touched the question of the possibility of sending British troops to the USSR at a later stage, and Eden asked



comrade Stalin to which sector of the front he would consider it expedient to send British troops.

Comrade Stalin replied that if British troops were sent by the northern route, they would be ready to send them to the Leningrad front, somewhere along the border with Estonia. He could, of course, give them a place on the Finnish front, but believes that the British would probably want to avoid military action against Finland. If the British troops came from the south, they could take part in operations on the Ukrainian front.

Eden replied that until the end of the Libyan campaign, including the trip to Tripoli, Britain would hardly be able to send any armed forces to the USSR. In addition, when deciding on the dispatch, it is also necessary to take into account the fact that the dispatch of British troops by the northern or southern route must inevitably affect the possibility of delivering the necessary military supplies to the USSR. From a military point of view, it seems to Eden to send troops to the USSR at the expense of bringing in equipment. In addition, the British do not have troops suitable for operations in the winter.

Nevertheless, if comrade Stalin considers it necessary. Eden is ready to raise this issue with the prime minister. Comrade Stalin, in response, remarked that he was by no means inclined to insist on sending British troops to the USSR if the British government considered it impossible.

It was then that the English text of the new wording of article 4, given by comrade Stalin, was brought in, and the meeting moved on to consider the second treaty - on the post-war organization of peace and security.

Eden proposed to add to article 1 of comrade Stalin's draft the words: "both contracting parties undertake to jointly consult on the terms of a peace treaty, including the question of borders."

This proposal was accepted by comrade Stalin with the amendment that both sides would not "jointly consult", but "act by mutual agreement in working out the conditions" of a peace treaty, etc. Eden agreed with the proposed modification.

Then Eden proposed a new text for the first part of article 3 \*, which read as follows: "both contracting parties undertake to work together on the reconstruction of Europe after the war, taking full account of the interests of each of them." the mention of "acquisitions" and non-interference in the internal affairs of other peoples were thrown out.

Comrade Stalin objected that he could not agree to such a formulation. On the contrary, he considers it necessary to leave both the mention of "acquisitions", specifying only both "territorial acquisitions" and the mention of non-interference in the internal affairs of other peoples. This latter is especially necessary because many abroad talks about the USSR's intention to "bolshevize Europe."

Eden agreed with comrade Stalin. However, he refused to accept the wording of article 4 in comrade Stalin's draft, finding that it was a recognition of the border of the 1941 USSR, albeit in a slightly veiled form. Eden further proposed to give, simultaneously with the signing of the treaty, a letter in which he undertakes, upon his return to England, to take measures to arrange for a discussion of the issue of future borders between the united states, Great Britain and the USSR. Eden presented the draft of this letter to comrade Stalin. (text attached.)

Comrade Stalin agreed with the text of the letter, provided that the mention of the borders of the USSR was deleted from it.

Eden did not object to such a discard. With article 4, however, a dead end was created. Eden rejected comrade Stalin's formula, while comrade Stalin declared that Eden's formula was unacceptable to us. Eden tried to defend his position, stating that his intention, when traveling to Moscow, was to develop and publish the Moscow charter, which, to a certain extent, would be a counterbalance to the Atlantic charter. Now he sees that it will not succeed. He would therefore ask comrade Stalin to accept his formulation of article 4 with an additional letter, the draft of which he had just handed over to him.

Comrade Stalin objected that this was not enough. Comrade Stalin also expressed surprise at Eden's reluctance to recognize the need to restore our old borders, the border of 1941, although at the last meeting he was ready to recognize the expansion of the territory of Yugoslavia, Poland,

Greece and other allied states. In the meantime, the restoration of the old borders is absolutely necessary. The best example of this is Leningrad.

Article 4 is mistakenly indicated in the original.

The tang government does not agree with this, the impression is created that it probably would not mind the dismemberment of the USSR.

Eden strongly opposed this suspicion. The point is that the British government, for the reasons that Eden has already spoken about, refuses altogether to recognize any new borders that arose during the war, be it the borders of Yugoslavia, Greece, or even Great Britain itself. Eden said that he very much regrets the need to persist in his point of view, but he has no other choice: without consulting the united states and the dominions, the issue raised cannot be resolved.

Comrade Molotov noted that now, in view of the upcoming meeting between Churchill and Roosevelt, the resolution of the border question could be facilitated.

Comrade Stalin emphasized the enormous sacrifices made by the Soviet people in the struggle against Germany. This struggle is not waged for the interests of the Prussian king, but for the sake of securing our own borders.

Eden, in support of his position, made the following argument: how could he explain the recognition of our 1941 border, for example, to the poles?

Cripps. In order to clarify, he posed the question: what kind of boundaries are implied in the wording of article 4 in comrade Stalin's draft? Borders 1941?

Comrade Stalin confirmed that this wording meant the 1941 border.

Eden said that the fulfillment of the requirements of comrade. Stalin would mean recognizing the polish border as it was in 1941.

Comrade Stalin objected that our agreement might not concern the polish border. He would have been ready to give a special letter to Eden on this matter simultaneously with the signing of the treaty.

Eden tried to defend his position by pointing out that this letter would be of a secret nature and, if the question about the polish-Soviet border had been asked to Eden in parliament or elsewhere, he would not have been able to refer to it.

Comrade Stalin replied that he would have sent a copy of his letter to Eden to general xi Korekho and would even be ready to publish it.

However, Eden continued to resist the adoption of article 4 in the formulation of comrade Stalin.

For his part, comrade Stalin said that in view of the ambiguous attitude of the British government to the question of Soviet borders, which was discovered during yesterday's meeting, the Soviet government was forced to insist on the introduction of a clause on the recognition of Soviet borders in the treaty on the post-war organization of peace and security.

Comrade Molotov noted that we intend to sign a treaty of alliance with the British, but for this we need to know why we are fighting.

Eden replied that we are fighting in order to defeat Hitler. He refused to make any concessions on the wording of article 4.

Comrade Stalin expressed regret about this and said that in this case, the signing of the treaty could not take place.

Eden replied that no matter how unpleasant it was, he was forced to come to the conclusion that the signing really could not take place. He now understands the situation, he knows what difficulties are in question, and upon his return to London.

Will endeavor to take steps to remedy these difficulties. But now he sees no other way out but to postpone the question of the treaty.

Comrade Stalin remarked that Eden ought to have got in touch with the prime minister on this matter. During the chamberlain government,

Churchill sharply attacked the latter in connection with the failure of negotiations on a mutual assistance pact over the Baltic states. Comrade Stalin does not think that the prime minister would object to the signing of the treaty on the basis of the project he proposed.

Eden objected that he was quite sure the prime minister would have taken the same position that he, Eden, took. Comrade Stalin's demands essentially mean the immediate recognition of a part of the future, a peace treaty. The time has not yet come for this. In addition, it is very difficult to get in touch with the prime minister now for technical reasons. Therefore, Eden can only propose to think over the situation once more and say the final word tomorrow.

The meeting ended at 21:00. 00 minutes

Translated by Maisky

Ap rf. F. 45. On. 1.d. 279. L. 115-122.

Publ .: Soviet-English relations ... - t. I. - s. 192-197

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**Recording of the conversation of the people's commissioner for foreign affairs of the USSR V. M. Molotov with the ambassador of Great Britain in the USSR s. Cripps \***

December 28, 1941 secret

Comrade Molotov says that, in accordance with Cripps' wishes, he is handing him personally a response to Eden's December 20 memorandum on the Kurds. Today the text of the note will be handed over to comrade Maisky for presenting Eden. Comrade Molotov says that the essence of the note boils down to the fact that we see no reason on our part for Turkey's concern over the Kurdish issue. On the territory of Iran, where the Soviet troops are located, there has never been any riots by Kurdish elements, and, of course, this kind of thing is not encouraged by the Soviet troops. On the contrary, measures are being taken to prevent clashes between Kurds and Iranians. Comrade Molotov states that he specifically spoke on the phone with Baku and asked if any of the Kurds were in Baku. Kurdish figures from the territory of Iran, where the Soviet troops are located, were indeed in Baku on their own initiative without political goals in order to get acquainted with the theater of Azerbaijan and the city of Baku. It was inconvenient for them to refuse a desire to visit Baku. No one had any political conversations with them, and no internal issues concerning the Iranians or Kurds were discussed with them. Comrade Molotov says he can add that our ambassador recently reported on a conversation between prime minister Forugi and Bullerd and Smirnov. Forugi rebuked that the British in some places support the Kurds against the Iranians. We did not have any information on this. Comrade Molotov repeats that neither the Iranians nor the Turks have contacted us on this matter.

Cripps thanks for the message. He explains that the reason why he personally wished to receive an answer from comrade Molotov to Eden's note is that he wanted to ask whether the Iranians or the Turks would be informed about this answer.

Comrade Molotov replies that if they had contacted us, we would have given them appropriate explanations.

Cripps says it would be prudent for the Iranians and Turks to seek relevant information directly from the Soviet government. The best thing would be if the British ambassador to Turkey and the British envoy to Iran inform the governments of Turkey and Iran that if they show concern, it is advisable for them to turn to the Soviet government. Cripps asks: can he tell Eden that the best way for the Turks and Iranians to get acquainted with the views of the Soviet government is to go directly to the Soviet government?

Comrade Molotov says that we do not insist that Iranians or Turks contact us. If they apply, they will receive appropriate explanations from us.


At the end of the conversation, Cripps reports that a Norwegian envoy has arrived in Moscow from Arkhangelsk. He doesn't know what to do next. Perhaps comrade Molotov will tell him, Cripps, what to convey to the Norwegian envoy. He would like to know if he will be able to present his credentials in Moscow while comrade Kalinin is here.

Comrade Molotov replies that he does not know how long comrade Kalinin will stay in Moscow. Comrade Molotov promises to clarify this issue and inform the Norwegian envoy through comrade Kozyrev.

The conversation was recorded by v. Pavlov

Wua rf. F. 06. On. 3. P. I. D. 7. L. 45-46.

Source USSR foreign policy documents







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